brief that had been submitted to the court. 105 La. 304, 54 L.R.A. 930, 29 So. 708. The attorney protested that there were The same in substance is established with sixteen or eighteen of these copies, and that respect to defamatory testimony. Cooper the court would not expect him to scratch v. Phipps, 24 Or. 357, 22 L.R.A. 836, 33 the passage out of them all, but in reply Pac. 985, and other cases cited in the annothe judge merely said, "Do as the court tation to that case in 22 L.R.A. 836. But, directs," while an associate judge leaned while the privilege in such cases is not unforward and expressed his wish to contrib- limited, it is so nearly so that an attempt ute an assenting opinion to this order. to get legal satisfaction for defamation in This incident is taken from a newspaper a lawsuit is rarely made. It is therefore report of the transaction, but, assuming all the more important that the court its truth, it is a very gratifying instance should, in every instance where possible, of deserved rebuke to a gross offense. administer severe and drastic treatment to Courts have not always been so vigorous any attorney who wantonly and gratuitousin their treatment of similar cases. ly attacks the character of another person.

The pettifoggers and the shysters who infest some of the lower courts have always been much given to a personal abuse

The steady increase in the use of ballot machines has brought out several decisions of the courts on the question of the constitutionality of their use where the Constitution provides for voting by ballot. The latest decision on this question is in the Minnesota case of Elwell v. Comstock, 99 Minn. 261, 7 L.R.A. (N.S.) 621, 109 N. W. 698, in which the court holds that the use of a voting machine at an election does not contravene the constitutional provision that elections shall be by ballot. This decision is in accord with those rendered in other

of the opposing attorney's parties and wit- Constitutionality of Voting by Machine. nesses. No doubt their breed is gradually becoming extinct. But, even among those who regard themselves as honorable members of the legal profession, there have always been some who were dishonorable enough to make violent, outrageous, and unjust attacks on those who opposed them, in the hope of getting an advantage in their suits. Such practices succeed best with juries of the lowest grade. Doubtless defamation in lawsuits has been for the most part confined to oral argument before juries. Attorneys willing to exhibit themselves both as liars and as cowards have taken advantage of the shield of priv-states, as shown by the opinion of the court ilege to utter libels or slanders in lawsuits which they would not dare to repeat out of court. As intelligence, decency, and a sense of justice become common in a community, unjust abuse uttered by an attorney in a case recoils upon himself and damages his case, though it must be confessed that here and there a man is found who has achieved much success at the bar who has a reputation for brutal and unscrupulous treatment of those opposed to him.

and the note to the case in 7 L.R.A. (N.S.) 621. That a vote by a machine is not a "ballot" in the literal sense is obvious. It is therefore necessary, in order to sustain the use of machines where the Constitution calls for ballots, to interpret the word "ballot" somewhat freely. On this point the Minnesota court says: "In view of the objects sought to be attained and secured by the framers of the Constitution, it is unnecessary to consult the lexicographers for a definition of the word 'ballot.' It was not employed in its literal sense, but only for the purpose of designating a method of conducting elections which would insure The case of Randall v. Hamilton, 45 secrecy and the integrity of the ballot." La. Ann. 1184, 22 L.R.A. 649, 14 So. 73, In Re House Bill No. 1291, 178 Mass. 605, and other cases reviewed in a note to that 54 L.R.A. 430, 60 N. E. 129, on the quescase in 22 L.R.A. 649, sustain the proposition of the right to adopt voting machines tion that defamation in a pleading is not privileged, unless the defamatory matter is pertinent or relevant to the case. The same doctrine is upheld in Grant v. Haynes,

The legal privilege of an attorney for defamation in the course of a suit is not absolute, though many appear to think it

So.

under a constitutional requirement of a "written vote," three of the justices gave the opinion "that the object and even the words of the Constitution in requiring

'written votes' are satisfied when the voter the court overlooked, however, the demakes a change in a material object,— cision in the case of State v. Carney, for instance, by causing a wheel to revolve 69 N. J. L. 478, 55 Atl. 44. In that case a fixed distance, if the material object the court affirmed a conviction for attemptchanged is so connected with or related ing to commit suicide, and held, while to a written or printed name purporting to be the name of a candidate for office that, by the understanding of all, the making of a change expresses a vote for the candidate whose name is thus connected with the device." A fourth justice concurred in this, provided the result of the action of the machine in registering the vote was visible to the voter, and the work of the machine in adding up the votes was done under the supervision of some person duly charged with counting the votes cast. But three of the justices dissented. But the more liberal view of the majority of the justices in that case has been taken by the courts of Rhode Island, Michigan, Illinois, and Minnesota, as shown by the report of the Minnesota case above named.

Attempt to Commit Suicide.

Statutes making it a crime to attempt to commit suicide have been for years in force, or at least on statute books, in several states, at least in New York, North

Dakota and South Dakota. But it does not appear that there have been any convictions under these statutes. In the late case of May v. Pennell, 101 Me. 516, 7 L.R.A.(N.S.) 286, 64 Atl. 885, it was held that an attempt to commit suicide is not a crime, in the absence of a statute making it such, or making suicide a crime. If suicide is made a crime, it is obvious that statutory provisions making it a crime to attempt to commit an offense apply, at least in terms. The opinion in this case says that, "although there have doubtless been innumerable attempts to commit suicide in the United States, no instance has been discovered in which there has ever been a conviction for this offense, on either

there was no independent enactment in the
state making an attempt at suicide a
crime, that suicide, like any other murder,
was common-law felony, and that an at-
tempt at suicide was an indictable offense
at common law. This case distinguishes
the Massachusetts cases which held that
such attempts were not crimes, on the
ground that the common-law offense had
been repealed by implication by the Massa-
chusetts statute. A note to the Maine case
in 7 L.R.A. (N.S.) points out the fact that
in Massachusetts and in Maine the statute
as to attempts to commit an offense pro-
vides that the punishment therefor, if no
punishment is expressly provided for such
attempt, shall be "the same kind of pun-
ishment that might have been inflicted if
the offense attempted had been committed,
but not exceeding one half thereof," while
in New Jersey there is no such implied lim-
itation. But the case is governed by a
statutory provision that offenses of an in-
dictable nature at
common law, if not
otherwise provided for by legislature, "shall
be misdemeanors and be punished accord-
ingly." The authorities on the question
are, however, very scanty, and attempts to
commit suicide, while very common, are
very rarely prosecuted. The public policy
of punishing attempts at suicide is much
questioned by some people, and some feel-
ing of doubt on this point, combined with
pity for the unfortunate person who has
made the attempt, probably accounts for
the practical immunity from punishment of
those who make such attempts, even where
the statutes explicitly provide for their
punishment. It is certain, however, that,
if such statutes are not to be enforced, they
should be repealed.

statutory or common-law grounds, prior to Equitable Remedy Against False Birth

Certificate.

that in the case at bar." And the conviction in the case at bar was, of course, destroyed as a precedent by the decision of A case of exceptional interest has just the court of last resort holding that been decided by the New Jersey court of the attempt was not a crime, and errors and appeals. The facts were that a discharging the prisoner. As shown by certificate of birth, which, by statute, was the note to the case in 7 L.R.A. (N.S.) | entitled to be received in evidence to prove

the facts therein contained, was placed on marriage. The court refers to a note in record in the bureau of vital statistics. 37 L.R.A., page 787, which states that, The certificate was made by the physician present at the birth of the child, and, as required by statute, it set forth, as far as could be ascertained by him, the time and place of birth of the child, the name of each of the parents, the maiden name of the mother, and the name of the child. But, in making the certificate, the physician was imposed upon by false statements of the mother as to the paternity of the child, and certified, contrary to the facts, that the complainant in the case decided was the father. The complainant asked equitable relief to cancel the false certificate, or so much as charges him with the paternity of the child, and an indorsement of the fact of this cancelation, also an injunction against the use of the original certificate, or copies thereof, as evidence, and against any claim by the mother or the child by virtue of the certificate, that the child had the status of a lawfully begotten child of the complainant. The court granted the relief in all these particulars.

A precedent somewhat close, cited from the supreme court of New York, is the case of Randozzo v. Roppolo, not yet reported, in which a woman was perpetually restrained and enjoined from claiming or representing herself to be the wife of the plaintiff, or from claiming any right and interest in and to his property and estate, and the commissioner of health, who was the custodian of the records of marriages, was directed to indorse upon the certificate of marriage a reference to the decree in the case, determining that the pretended marriage was a nullity. This case was closely similar in the fact that the New York statute gave the marriage certificate practically the same evidential character as the New Jersey statute gave to the birth certificate in the case just decided.

The opinion in the New Jersey case by Dill, J., is exceptionally clear and cogent. It cites authorities to show the jurisdiction of equity to cancel and set aside for fraud either judgments of the courts or certificates and determinations of public officers, and also to direct a cancelation of such a record upon the face thereof. It refers to the jurisdiction in cases of fraud to cancel negotiable instruments and other financial obligations, and to annul the status of

while the courts have striven to uphold equitable jurisdiction to protect personal rights upon the ground of some property right, however slender and shadowy, the tendency is to afford more adequate protection to personal rights, and to that end to lay hold of slight circumstances tending to show a technical property right; and in this connection the opinion unhesitatingly says: "If it appeared in this case that only the complainant's status and personal rights were thus involved, or thus invaded by the action of the defendants and by the filing of the false certificate, we should hold, and without hesitation, that an individual has rights, other than property rights, which he can enforce in a court of equity, and which a court of equity will enforce against invasion; and we should declare that the complainant was entitled to relief and to a decree establishing the truth as to the paternity of the child, relieving the complainant of the intolerable burden prima facie put upon him by the false record, and preventing the wife from perpetuating a fraud upon the husband."

But the court held that it was unnecessary to place the decision upon this ground, as the complainant's property rights were unmistakably prejudiced by the record of such a false certificate, making the child prima facie the heir of the complainant.

The substantial justice of this decision is beyond question. Its legal soundness also seems clear. It is refreshing to read the vigorous statement, above quoted, in support of the power of chancery to protect the complainant in such a case, even if property rights were not involved. This journal has repeatedly pointed out the disingenuousness and absurdity of granting relief in equity for the protection of personal rights on the false pretense that some alleged but entirely shadowy property right was involved. But as many courts, while granting such relief, have reiterated the statement that equity has no jurisdiction to protect personal rights, that doctrine has continued to perpetuate itself in theory, while in practice it has been more and more disregarded. While in the present case a real property right was unquestionably involved, the court plainly recognizes the sufficiency of the personal right alone to entitle the complainant to relief.

In this it notably differs from those courts which actually grant such relief while professing to do something else. Other judges may hereafter be less timid about frankly adopting this doctrine, instead of trying to reach the same result by a subterfuge.