Take the death of the $8 per day man, leaving a widow of 21 years of age. To pay compensation in this case under the bill would require approximately $36,000, and, if there were children, a much larger sum. Under the New York law, with no children surviving, approximately $22,000 would be paid by the employer. There are other differences between the New York schedule of compensation and that contained in the bill, all imposing greater burdens on the employer than the provisions of the New York law. The New York law contains another material and important provision relating to death of aliens, which is absent from the bill. The New York law provides that compensation to aliens not residents of the United States or Canada shall be the same in amount as provided for residents, except that dependents in any foreign country shall be limited to surviving wife and child or children, or if there be no surviving wife or child or children, to surviving father or mother, whom the employee has supported either wholly or in part, for the period of one year prior to the date of the accident, or upon the application of the insurance carrier shall commute all future installments of compensation to be paid to such aliens by paying or causing to be paid to them one-half of the commuted amount of such future installments of compensation as determined by the commission. The bill before the committee makes no distinction between citizens and aliens and provides the same compensation for each class and in their respective dependents. The definitions of "child" in section 2 (g) and of parent in section 2 (h) will result in imposing burdens on the employer far beyond those imposed under similar circumstances in State laws. Section 7, with its various subdivisions regulating medical attendance, are unreasonable. The so-called panel system of physicians provided in the bill will be ineffective and unworkable. A similar provision has been rejected by the State of Massachusetts after a trial of several years. Subdivision (e) of section (7), permitting the employee to request the services of a consulting physician at the expense of the employer, will subject the employer to all the caprices an injured man may have. Section 47 (e) prohibits the compromise of a third-party action without the employee's consent. This is an unusual provision. The majority of such cases are of doubtful recovery, and to require an injured man's consent after he has received full compensation under the proposed law is unreasonable and unfair to the employer. Section 52 provides that no vessel shall be allowed clearance unless the 'master or agent shall satisfy the collector that the provisions of the proposed law requiring the securing of compensation have been complied with. Counsel for the American Steamship Owners' Association explained fully to the committee that this provision will unreasonably restrict the sailing of vessels; that it is so broad that it might be impossible for a master to obtain information that would satisfy a collector to enable him to issue clearance orders. This criticism is particularly true in case the vessel is sailing from a port other than her home port. While a compensation law covering maritime workers is desirable any such law should be reasonable and conform to the principles underlying compensation for industrial accidents. The subject of compensation for industrial accident to maritime workmen should be studied carefully and a bill prepared that will be equitable to employer and employee. Its object should be to prevent the injured man and his dependents from becoming a burden on the State. It should contain reasonable provisions for compensation and simple administrative procedure. It should encourage workers to thrift, even after injury, otherwise workers will lack the self-dependency and in many cases remove inducement to prevent accidents. The proposed bill lacks provisions that will accomplish these results. It will create a group of pensioners receiving their dole at the expense of the maritime industry, which ultimately will be borne by the people at large. Respectfully submitted. COUNCIL OF AMERICAN SHIPBUILDERS (INC.), HENRY C. HUNTER, Counsel. APRIL 7, 1926. STATEMENT OF JOHN B. ANDREWS, SECRETARY, AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR LABOR LEGISLATION It is extraordinary that so many New York lawyers representing the maritime employers, while confessing enthusiasm for the principle of workmen's accident compensation, can find nothing good in this specific measure which is based upon the successful New York compensation act. These lawyers appear to believe that their duty to their clients is not fulfilled unless they condemn unreservedly the sections of this bill which are taken verbatim from the New York law and in the next breath complain bitterly that certain other phrases are not in the New York law. The proponents of Senate bill 3170 at the beginning of these hearings pointed out a half dozen important departures from the New York act which had been suggested by the operation of law in New York and for most of which the New York administrative officials have amendments now pending before the New York legislature. The proponents have also made it sufficiently clear that they have followed most closely the law in New York because that is the State having the largest number of workers of the particular classes to be protected by this legislation. UNIFORM PROTECTION FOR MARITIME WORKERS The amazing suggestion of one of the opponents that another effort be made to provide accident compensation benefits for these maritime workers in accordance with the varying scales of compensation in the numerous diverse State compensation laws might raise a question as to the enthusiasm of these lawyers for the prompt adoption of the workmen's compensation remedy even if it were not apparent that the suggestion has been finally turned down by the highest court. These New York lawyers in their opposition to Senate bill 3170 have not explained how their compensation proposal for benefits to be dispensed in accordance with the diverse schedules of the individual State laws would be made to apply to the half dozen States, such as North Carolina, South Carolina, and Florida, where there are no State compensation laws. LOSS OF HEARING The general attitude of the opposition is perhaps best indicated by their objection to compensating an injured worker for an injury which destroys the hearing of one ear. One of the opponents stated that a committee in New York had decided that compensation should not be furnished for the loss of one ear but only if the injury resulted in the loss of both ears. Recent and more authoritative testimony is offered by the introduction of a bill in the New York legislature this year at the request of the State compensation officials to provide 60 weeks' compensation in case of injury resulting in the loss of hearing in one ear. This bill, Senate bill 3170, proposes compensation for 52 weeks in such cases and certainly must be regarded by all reasonable people as a fair and just allowance. OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE DISABILITIES In reference to compensation for all occupational diseases which is provided in Senate bill 3170, Congress has made the same provision for the civilian employees of the United States Government and the majority of laws which provide occupational disease compensation (as, for example, the compensation laws of California, Connecticut, Massachusetts, North Dakota, Wisconsin and that of the United States) follow this all-inclusive method of coverage. It is true that this is one of the particulars in which the present bill departs from the New York compensation act, but here again the New York State compensation officials have had amendments introduced at Albany to extend the present inadequate list of 19 specified occupational disease disabilities to an allinclusive coverage as is proposed in this bill. A committee of the House of Representatives, moreover, has this very week reported a carefully considered compensation bill for private employees in the District of Columbia which contains this same all-inclusive coverage for occupational disease disabilities. One of the opponents has made the astounding statement at this hearing that the inclusion of the disease feature in this bill might add 20 per cent to the cost of the compensation payable. Upon questioning he has admitted finally that possibly 3 per cent additional cost would result if all occupational diseases are compensated in a workmen's compensation law. In support of even this more modest estimate the opponent refers to some predictions made years ago by an actuary at Hartford, Conn. For the information of the Senate Judiciary Committee I wish here to quote a written statement secured recently, while this bill was under preparation, from the National Council on Compensation Insurance, 151 Fifth Avenue, New York City-a rate-making organization supported by all classes of compensation insurance carrierssaying, in the light of practical experience with occupational disease compensation in America: "Our practice up to this time has been to value the addition of an all-inclusive occupational disease coverage in a compensation law, which had previously made no occupational disease provision, as equivalent to one per cent increase in compensation cost. In the light of our present knowledge of the subject, we see no reason to recommend to the committees of the Council any change from past practice." This adds but little to the total compensation burden of the individual employer, but to the individual victim of occupational disease it is a much needed and wholly justified relief as already recognized by Congress. A JUST AND ADEQUATE MEASURE It is disappointing that Mr. Hunter and his galaxy of New York lawyers, believing so thoroughly in the workmen's compensation principle, should not have been able to find anything to commend in a bill that embodies the best features of existing compensation laws. This bill is especially well adapted to the circumstances in New York where the greater number of these workers are employed, and it has been warmly commended by experienced compensation commissioners throughout the country as a just and adequate compensation measure. It is hoped that tactics of delay will not be permitted to interfere with the early adoption of this much needed protection for a class of workers who have been too long neglected. DEPOSIT OF SECURITIES PREFERABLE TO SURETY BOND In reference to the request that self-insuring employers be not required to deposit securities and that they be permitted instead to file a surety bond, it should be noted that this has never been permitted under the New York law. As tersely suggested by the very able former counsel of the New York Industrial Commission, "We want security; we don't want lawsuits." Securities such as Liberty bonds can readily be converted into cash and compensation payments made promptly and regularly in accordance with the law, whereas technicalities are likely to intrude themselves in connection with surety bonds. Much, for example, depends upon the precise wording of the surety bond and upon the signatures affixed to it. It is much more satisfactory to have the securities. It is suggested that the employer, for instance, in the case of an old and faithful worker in his establishment being accidentally killed, would without protest admit responsibility and start payments of compensation to the widow. Within a year, however, the employer might become insolvent and the compensation official would thereupon ask the surety company to pay. The surety company might then insist upon its right to be heard and demand a re-hearing, thereupon depriving the widow of her compensation payments for a long period of time. The adoption, therefore, of the suggestion that a surety bond be substituted for deposit of securities would, in the opinion of experienced state officials consulted, be inviting litigation and delay the avoidance of which is one of the purposes of workmen's compensation. However, the bill S. 3170 permits both methods, and, in the interest of early legislative action, we will not request that it be changed. I. Section 8, (e), page 10.-In answer to the contention that there is no provision made in the bill for determining the method by which a minor may have compensation raised, it may be said that this provision is taken from the New York law. There is no method prescribed in the New York law, it is impracticable to define a method. It is a question of fact to be determined by the deputy. The provision is operative in New York, and has been upheld by the New York courts. There is a similar provision in the Federal law for civilian employees. II. Subdivision (g), page 1, 1, 13.—In answer to the contention that the phrase "over eighteen" be omitted, it may be said that this provision makes it possible for a dependent child to receive compensation after he reaches the age of 18 if he is mentally or physically incapable of self-support. There is a similar provision in various Federal acts: World War Veterans' Act, U. S. Employees Compensation Act, World War Adjusted Compensation Act. III. Subdivision (a), section 12, page 18.-In answer to the objection that notice of the injury may be given to the deputy having jurisdiction of the place of residence or to the deputy having jurisdiction of the place of the accident, it may be said that an injured worker should be entitled to the right to serve such notice upon the deputy who is most available. If a man living in New York is injured in New Jersey, for example, he should be permitted to notify either the New York or New Jersey deputy. Without that option, the worker might suffer unnecessary hardship in certain cases. IV. Subdivision (i), page 26.-In answer to the contention that the commission and not the deputy should require deposit for periodic payments, it should be pointed out that this provision is intended to operate only in unusual individual cases. If, for example, the deputy is not satisfied that a tramp steamer has made proper security and a longshoreman is injured on board that vessel, the deputy should be empowered to demand security for the compensation in that particular case. To require the central commission in Washington to make that demand would involve delay that would make the provision inoperative. It is emphatically an emergency power. But it, of course, may be omitted if its inclusion endangers early passage of this legislation, which is so urgently needed. V. Section 24 (d), page 30.-In answer to the argument that a stay of compensation should operate automatically in case of appeal to the district court, it should be pointed out that should this important provision be stricken from the bill the injured man would be deprived of compensation pending the decision on appeal. The employer is reasonably protected by the provision that the court may grant such stay in cases where the court deems a stay in payment warranted. VI. Section 39, page 36.—In answer to the objection to "any state authority" having access to accident report records, it may be said that without such access, state compensation officials who are invited to assist in administering the law would be under a serious handicap. VII. Section 42, page 37.-In answer to the contention that a $500 penalty is excessive, it may be said that the fixing of the amount of a penalty is a question of judgment and New York State experience has been followed in this particular. The New York law (sec. 110) provides a $500 penalty. VIII. Section 52, page 44.-In answer to the objection "that a tramp steamer can be arrested any place in the world; that the ship might be in Honolulu while the master may have taken out papers in Washington," it should be sufficient to point out that the purpose of this section is to prevent a ship which has violated the act by not complying with the insurance provisions from slipping away without paying compensation to a harbor worker who might have been so injured as to be entitled to compensation. IX. Section 72, page 52.-In answer to the objection that this provision wipes out encouragement to the American merchant marine, it may be said that under the statutes enumerated in this section a ship owner may limit his liability for injuries sustained on board vessels-his liability is thus usually limited in the event of catastrophe such as the sinking of the ship. This section of the act removes that right in case 1. An employer fails to secure his liability as required in the act and is therefore sued as provided in section 5, page 5. 2. Any proceeding is brought to recover compensation. 3. Any action is brought to collect any civil penalty. 4. Any proceeding is brought to collect the assessment of expense under this act. Since the definition of employer (subd. (m), p. 4) specifically exempts the United States or any agency of the United States, this provision would not affect Government-operated vessels. 66 Answering the suggestion of Mr. Brown in reference to the definition of 66 child," grandchild," etc., including those over 18 and mentally and physically incapable of self-support, it should be noted that the United States employees' compensation act contains a similar provision which has not been found burdensome or costly. Cases of this kind where incapacity is established are very infrequent, and, of course, it should be added they do not necessarily involve the payment of compensation for life. Mr. Brown, in speaking of the provision on page 3, paragraph (h), including under the term "parent"-any person who has stood in the place of a parent to the deceased employee for more than three years-apparently had not read the bill as a whole or he would not have spoken as though he did not realize that a parent can never be awarded compensation unless he can prove dependency. Moreover, Mr. Brown apparently does not realize that the existing Federal compensation act provides compensation for the loss of hearing of one ear, and that such cases have not been found to present any overwhelming difficulties. The opportunity of malingering or of deceiving an examining physician in such cases is no greater, we are informed, than in the case of many other disabilities, such as loss of vision, for instance. Moreover, in reference to the method of computing lump-sum settlements, which, it is generally agreed, are to be discouraged, it should be pointed out that the existing Federal commission which is to administer this present legislation has had no great difficulty in working out satisfactory settlements in those rare cases where it is clear that commutations are of advantage to the beneficiary. There is no objection to specifying the American experience table of mortality with a discount rate of 4 per cent as in the present Federal law for Government employees. In reference to Mr. Brown's objection to the phrase at the end of paragraph (e) page 41, in regard to third party actions, he has apparently overlooked the fact that compromises may sometimes result in an amount less than the com. pensation due as well as in excess of compensation. This in fact has occurred in both kinds of cases, and agreements have been entered into by all parties interested. The employee has a real interest in a suit conducted by the emloyer against a third party, just as the employer has interest in a suit conducted by the employee against a third party. If it is a fair proposition that the employee in compromising his suit is required to secure the written approval of the employer, it is fair also that the employee, in case of compromise, be required to secure the written approval of the employee. The extent to which the opposition was willing to go at public hearings is indicated by Mr. Emerson's objection to the requirement (p. 36, sec. 40a, line 8) that the employer shall send a first report of the injury to the commission within 48 hours after the injury. He alleges that this time is too short. This provision, however, is in accordance with the Standard Accident Reporting Schedule indorsed by the National Safety Council, the Association of Industrial Accident Boards and Commissions, the American Association for Labor Legislation, and the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics. The requirement has been in effect pretty generally for years in this country and should be retained in the interests of prompt reporting, early care of the injured to prevent infections, and also for the purpose of comparative accident statistics. A few employers' representatives who have appeared in opposition to this bill (S. 3170) have apparently been more interested in accident compensation for seamen than for these local harbor workers. It may be that the opportunity of the seamen to sue for damages under the Federal employers' liability act has some influence upon this preference. The New York law, by the way, contrary to the impression of some of the opponents, is not the most liberal compensation act. It is third on the list as to generosity in death benefits; it is on a par with 11 other State laws as to medical and hospital benefits; and no less than 11 States (Arizona, Maryland, Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Utah, and Wisconsin) pay more liberal compensation for temporary disabilities, according to the comparative table benefit costs prepared by the National Council on Compensation Insurance. The United States Chamber of Commerce is actively supporting a $25 weekly maximum bill in Congress at the present time, and has induced local chambers to do likewise. Moreover, the House District Committee reported favorably on March 29 another compensation bill for the protection of private employees within the District of Columbia, with a $25 weekly maximum and a 3-day waiting period, as in this bill. The New York compensation officials have an amendment before the legislature to raise this to $30 per week maximum; Governor Smith sent a message to the legislature saying that it should be at least $25. The proponents of this bill have shown a willingness to accept improving amendments, but they are unwilling to so emasculate the bill as to make it unworkable. They must, of course, likewise refuse responsibility for efforts |