out the District, they will not take them for legislative action. This is all; and had he, at the time, been a member of the House of Rep esentatives, under existing circumstances, he should have voted as the majority of the delegation from his State voted upon the resolution offered to the House by the honorable member from Maryland, [Mr. JOHNSON.] He would have done this as the only course left him, in order to put to rest this agitating question; and, in doing thus, he could not have supposed for a single moment that he was thereby abridging the general right of petition. In his opinion, it was due to the interests of the public to put this question to rest-to stop debate, and to avoid action upon this subject. He, therefore, was free to say that he entirely approved the course which his friends in the other House had seen fit to take; and he ente tained no doubt that their course would be approved by their constituency. His own course, since he had been a member of Congress, upon the subject of Abolition pe'itions, was well known at home, and well understood here. He had been in favor of that proposition which contemplated the least possible disturbance of this agitating subject. His language had been, "Hands off." Let this whole matter alone. No po sible good could result: if, by entertaining the petitions of the Abolition memorialists--even if Congress should carry into effect the prayer of these memorialists, and slavery should be even abolished in the District of Columbia, there would not be one slave the less. His opinion had been, and still was, agitate not this question. Let this subject alone, had been his appeal at home, his docIrine here. It concerns not those who send up to the Senate, periodically, their petitions. If grievances exist, arising from the institutions of domestic slavery, they cannot effect those States in which no such institutions are established. If slavery be a great moral evil, let that evil be confined to the region where it is tolerated. If rights exist, growing out of the relation, he would not interfere therewith. In no sense, in his judgment, can the Abolitionists of the North be justified in their unhallowed efforts-efforts tending to destroy the rights of property, and tending to rend a under this Confederacy. He would now say to the nonslaveholding communities-as he had repeatedly before said let this whole matter alone.

ATHERTON, had been offered to quiet the public mind upon this distracting subject, to prevent excitement, and to show to the South that the Northern feeling was generally opposed to any ac ion by Congress upon Abolition petitions. These resolutions, thus presented, and for such an object, designating merely the n.ode of disposing of this class of memorials, had met with the most determined opposition from every quarter. That opp sition was not confined to the non-slaveholding States. They met with a most extraordinary opposition from another quarter. The author, in the North, had been vilified as the destroyer of the right of petition. He was charged at home, within the limits of his native State, with having, by a shameful dereliction of public duty, prostrated and rendered of no effect one of the dearest rights of the people. That charge he had met, fearlessly met, before his people; and that people had recently passed a commentary upon his course, most gratifying to his feelings. They had returned upon the issue a verdict with which he has every reason to be satisfied. Gentlemen from slaveholding States had denounced Mr. ATHERTON'S resolutions as wholly inefficient, and destructive of Southern rights. The resolutions were presented for the purpose he had stated, and contemplated the adoption of a rule of practice in relation to this class of memorials, precisely similar in eff.ct to that what has been in use in the Senale, and from which much benefit, in his judgment, had already resulted. Experience has shown that, so violent was the opposition to the resolutions, by some from the slaveholding States themselves, it was rendered altogether impracticable to re-enact them at the present session for the guidance of the House of Representatives. A month of angry and useless debate in that branch of Congress, gave distinct evidence that some thing must be done, and dene without delay, to give tranquillity to the public mind. And what was to be done? Would it have answered further to delay, and put off action upon the all important public business before that branch of Congress-would it have answered longer to have consumed the public time, and to have exhausted the public Treasury, in offering and dispos ing of those memorials, asking for the abolition of slavery, as they might occasionally be presented? Was a course like this to be tolerated? Sure he was, that the response of his own State would most emphatically be, No! And for what object was opposition made to the adoption of any rule of practice which would, in effect, dispose of Abolition memorials, when offered without any debate or definite action. To save, it was said, the right of petition to protect this high privilege of the citizen. He utterly denied that the general right of petition was impaired under the rule of practice, as adopted by both the House and the Senate at the last, or as established by the House at its present, session, in relation to the mode of disposing of Abolition memorials. That general right remains undisturbed, untouched, by this recent act of the House of Representatives. The ATHERTON resolutions and the recent rule have the same general object in viewto prevent debate-to save all action upon this particular class of petitions. It was not believed, or even supposed by any one, that under either rule the House would bestow the least consideration upon these petitions-they were to meet the same fate there, that they experienced here-they were in no sense to be received for any purpose of legislative action-they were, without reading, without printing, without referring, to receive their quietus; and, mystify this matter as you may, this was the sum and substance of the action of both Houses of Congress in relation to Abolition petitions. But in no way is the general right of petition thereby impaired, nor, in truth, is the particular right of petition upon the self same subjects, thereby infringed. Both the Senate and the House have distinctly indicated that they will not consider-that they will not act upon these memorials; and this is all they say. They take away no right of petition-they do not thereby prevent the people from assembling and asking, at any time, for a redress of grievances. They distinctly say that, as far as it respects petitions asking for the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia, coming from persons with

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upon the other side, the Senate is bound to receive every memorial, coming from whom it may, and asking for what it may; otherwise the right of petition is impaired. If the right of petition impl es an absolute and unqualified obligation to receive, does it not follow, with equal force, that the right imposes a corresponding obligation to consider and

to acı?

If this general right of petition is thus abridged, then it follows that, at all events, and under any circumstances, Abolition petitions coming up here, and all others, must not only be received, but considered and acted upon by the body to which they may be addressed. The Legislature of his own State had, on frequent occasions, given such an expression of their own opinion as relieves him and his friends from all diffculty and embarrassmenton this question.

His own State had so repeatedly, through her Legislature, declared the palpable injustice of any action by Congress upon the subject of slavery, as it exists in this District, unrequested by its inhabitants, that he could not, nor could bis friends in the other House, for a moment believe, that by his and their course upon the subject of Abolition petitions, he and they were depriving them of one of their dearest rights. How is this doctrine attempted to be supported? It is said that this sacred right of petition is expressly guarantied by the first article of amendments to the Constitution of the United States. In his judgment, that article has no particular bearing whatever upon the question. This right, as it now exists, so it has existed long before the Constitution itself was formed. What is the article to which reference has been made?

"Congress shall make no law respecting an esta blishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, or abridging the freedom of speech ot of the press, or of the right of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances."

Now, he utterly denied, that by the course he had pursued here, or by the course his friends had pursued elsewhere, that he or they were lending their aid in the passage of any law abridging the freedom of speech or of the press, or to prevent the people peaceably assembling together to ask the Government for a redress of grievances. He would go as far as he who would go farthest against the passage of all such laws. He was ut. terly and absolutely opposed to any such legislation. How, then, has he, or how have his friends in the other House, by his and their course of conduct upon these memorials, exposed themselves to the charge of impairing the general right of petition?-a right well understood by his people, and a right which he would not disturb or abridge-a right which, he rejoiced to add, was so universally enjoyed, and which could be so properly exercised by the freemen of this country.

Mr. PRESIDENT: I rise to participate in this ebae, so far only as the question is supposed to involve the right of petition, and the policy of our action here, in reference to that view of the subject.

The honorable Senators, from Massachusetts, [Mr. WEBSTER,] and from New York, [Mr. TALLMADGE,] seem to regard a refusal by Congress to the presentment of petitions for the abolition of slavery, as an infraction of that right, whilst the honorable Set ator from Kentucky [Mr. CLAY] has, with his accustomed eloquence, and much plausi bility, expressed his apprehension that the people of the South, in claiming even their rights here with too fastidious exaction, may diminish their friends in the North, by permitting the Abolition. ists the advantage of involving, with their primary question, the more popular one of the right of petiton, and that many will probably make common cause on the right of petition, and persist in assert ing that principle here, who would not concur in the particular proposition on which this right is so frequently debated.

I propose a brief discussion of these two ques tions; and first, as to the right of petition.

The following is the amendatory article of the Constitution of the United States, in which the right is said to be secured:

"ART. I. Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free

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exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition the Goveinment for a redress of grievances."

In respect to the right of petition, what does this article propose? It does not attempt to specify the measure, or the extent of the right, or to what subjects it shall appertain. It does not attempt to specify what are the duties and obligations of Congress in the reception of petitions, or the measure of redress which Congress may, can, or shall afford. The right secured by this article is imply an immunity on the part of the people from any law emanating from Congress abridging the popular rights "peaceably to assemble and petition Government for redress of grievances.” Whilst Congress abstains from making any such prohibitory law, are not all the obligations which this article imposes upon Congress duly respected? It must be observed that this article contains no grant of power to Congress; it does not enlarge the sphere of its duties-it brings nothing within the jurisdiction of Congress not otherwise conferred by the Constitution; it does not multiply the subjec's on whtch it is permitted to give audience, indulge debate, or grant relief. No such thing. It is prohibitory and restrictive on Congress, so far as power and jurisdiction are concerned. It observes entire silence as to the several subjects on which the people may rightfully and appropriately petition the "Government" of the United States for relief. These unquestionably must remain precisely as if this prohibitory article on the powers of Congress had never been inserted in the Constitution. What criterion, then, is furnished to the people for the appropriate exercise of their right of petition? Is not the answer obviously found in the inquiry as to what Government has the power to grant redress?

Suppose the grievance complained of be the statute of Massachusetts recently known as the "fifteen gallon law." Will any constitutional lawyer contend, or does the most ignorant citizen believe, that the article of the United States Constitution above quoted has conferred a right on the citizen to come here by petition to have that law abolished? The answer to such a proposition would seem to me so manifest as to leave no room for doubt on the subject. If such petition were presented, what should be not only the right of Congress, but its respectful duty toward a sovereign State? Should we permit ourselves to receive, refer, report, and debate the propriety of our assuming to correct the legislation of Massachusetts on this subject? May some half dozen citizens of Massachusetts come here and claim, as of right, to hold the sovereignty of that State in abeyance before Congress for weeks, and months, and years together, on such a subject, which every citizen feels and knows we have no jurisdiction of? But if the proposition appears unreasonable in this aspect, how much greater its enormity, when the measure, instead of being proposed by citizens of Massachu setts, protesting against the grievances of their own State laws, it should turn out that this mal-administration of affairs there was sought to be corrected in Congress, on the petition of some score of bacchanalians from the shore of the Mississippi?

As I would act, and as I believe the Senate would act in such a case, so, in my judgment, they ought to act in this.

This, Mr. President, is emphatically a question of jurisdiction, and the rejection of such petition as now presented does not assail or invade the right of petition. The whole scope and extent of the poliLical RIGHT of petition, is the right to ask redress from that Government or tribunal having the power to grant relief.

Common sense, as well as legal and cons'itutional rules, prescribe this as an essential principle, and necessary limitation to the right of petition. If a citizen of the United States was desirous to obtain a patent right of protection to a mechanic invention, to be used in the kingdom of Great Bri tain, would he, as a matter of common sense and propriety, petition that Government or this for the protection? If a citizen of the United States, of the Catholic faith, desired some spiritual indul. gence from the church, would he petition the papal power of Rome, or this Federal Government?

If it were desired by the citizens of New York to have some new regulation in respect to their public markets or on the 'subject of lamp-lighting the streets of that city-is there any among them who, through ignorance, or in pretending to assert the right of petition, would come here for redress of such grievances? Do any citizens of our country, seeking to recover debts owing to them by other citizens, ever assert their right of petition so unadvisedly as to ask the judgment of Congress to award that redress? All must accord a negative response to these propositons, and the reason must as obviously occur to all: namely, in seeking either favor or redress, the petitioner perceives and acts upon the necessity to present his solicitations where the power is vested to grant what is asked for.

I readily admit, that in a complex system of Government, there may be evils, for the redress of which intelligent citizens might mistake the tribunal or authority to which they should apply. Nay, further, that the departments or tribunals themselves might honestly mistake their own power, and wrongfully grant or withhold relief. But the difficulty of distinguishing the appropriate tribunal, having power to grant relief, does not change the principles of the question. And this rule is particularly true of the Government of the United States, which is of limited jurisdiction. It is not for the Goverment to palter with pretensions to jurisdiction, when it is ascertained not to be within its granted powers. There should be no affected courtesy to those who would besiege this Senate into the assertion of unauthorized power, at the expense of prostrating the sovereignties who send us here and particularly on a question, the right to legislate on which has been so often disclaimed on all sides, and in which opinion all here concur.

But further, to illustrate this question of jurisdiction in contradistinction to the right of petition, it may be observed that all eur citizens practically understand the duplicate form of their Government, and readily distinguish the general and exclusive powers that appertain to their State Government from those which belong to the United States Government. Every citizen knows that the great body of the laws that prescribe his rights and duties as a member of society, and the rules and regulations that control his right and title to pro. perty, emanate from his own State Legislature; and it seldom occurs (and perhaps has never cccurred) that a petition is presented here which so mistakes its proper direction as to ask relief of this Government in matters respecting which the petitioner's State Covernment alone possessed the power to grant relief. And it is perhaps still more remarkable that neither ignorance or impertinence has ever perpetrated a petition by citizens of a State to their own State Legislature, asking the abolition of any law or institution in another State. Every citizen of the slaveholding States, it' inquired of why slavery does not exist in Massachusetts, will answer, because it is proscribed or abolished by the Government and laws of that State. And every citizen of the non-slaveholding States, if inquired of why slavery does exist in Mississippi, will as readily answer, the institution is established and permitted by the Government of Mississippi. Up to this point, and to this extent, ali must understand the matter alike. Now, suppose the citizens of the South should commence, by petitions, to importune Congress to establish slavery throughout the States of New England. Has New England a Senator here whose constituents could be induced to believe Congress had the power to grant such petitions? And has New England a Senator here, or citizen at home, who would not feel himself insulted, and the rights and Sovereignty of his State wantonly outraged, by incessant importunities here of this character? Would they defend the monstrous presumption of such importunities, and demand your respectful deference to their claims, on the ground that such was the right of petition? If such be the right, let us note its bearings in a case which might aptly arise on the same article of the Constitution, from which, it is said, this extent of the right of petition is deduced.

"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion," &c. A petition is presented

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by the Baptist association of North Carolina, praying Congress to establish their creed and faith as the national religion, and abolish all others. A Senator having such petition in charge, states its import, and proposes its presentment. Its reception is objected to, because it seeks of Congress that which the Constitution forbids Congress to grant er to legislate upon. But the advocates of this extended right of petition, rise and answer: "We admit Congress has no power to grant the prayer of the petition, or to make any law respecting it. But the same article of the Constititution prescribes also that Congress shall make no law abridging the * right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances;' and we consider, first, the petitioners have a right to regard the provisions of the Constitution, interdicting Congress the power to establish national religion, as a 'grievance;' secondly, we are bound to lieten to it, as a grievance rightfully complained of, though we are sworn to maintain it, as not a grievance; thirdly, we are bound to proceed with the preliminary formr of legislation, as if to grant redress, though we all know and acknowledge our oaths to support the Constitution as no 'grievance' in this behalf, compels us to deny redress. We therefore cannot constitutionally reject this petition, till all this solemn mockery is gone through with, in order to preserve the right of petition. The right to have these ceremonial preliminaries of legislation dispensed to the petitioners is secured to them as the vital principle of the right of petition. The petitioners knew, before coming here, the Constitution denied us the power to grant the 'redress' sought. It is presumed, therefore, they petitioned with no expectation of redress. And we are bound to conclude, that knowing ther rights, and our power in this respect, they are merely asserting the right of petition, by way of a healthful political exercise. Thus we regard this sacred right. A right in this case, secured by the Constitution, to seek its destruction. A right which binds us as priests to minister at the sacrificial alter, though pre-obliged to save the victim. Finally, a right in this, and like cases without remedy, but yet a profound and sacred right."

Now, I ask of those who reason thus here, if they have heard the like logic at home from any of their constituents? I apprehend not. If their constituents fully understand this point in difference, if they will comprehend this essential nothing so far as their object is concerned in the particular case, and the right of petition is vindicated for them by their representatives here, will they importune us longer to gain this certain negative, this affirmative nothing? I state the question, and I stare it for the common sense of the people to decide, and believe those that are honest will decide with us. It is this:

A petition is presented here to abolish slavery in the Southern States. Such petition, all parties, or a great majority, in Congress, agree, would seek that which Congress has no power to grant. It is no question of expediency or propriety; but it is a question of power—of jurisdiction-and the majority so believe and regard it. The question is then made, "Shall the petition be received?" Now if Congress be already agreed that they have no constitutional power to grant the petition, in what respect are the petitioners benefited in having it receive } ? Suppose it be received and referred to a committee, who report thereon, "that Congress have no power over the subject-matter of the petition," and which report is adopted by the Senate, can the most sanguine petitioner imagine that he has asserted his rights with any more success than if his petition had been rejected without such reference and report? Has he obtained any more of what he sought in this latter result than the substantial rejection of his petition? Those who advocate the extended right of petition, say this mode of rejection is what the petitioners are entitled to. It is what they mainly desire-what they deem all important to the preservation of their liberties. As one, Mr. President, I do not believe the Abolitionists who understand the question as thus presented, are contending for any such phantom. Nor can they believe the essential right of petition consists

in having their petition peremp'orily denied by Congress for want of jurisdiction after report by a committee, rather than denied on presentment for the same reason. I have debated a case, Mr. President, in which all concur that Congress has no pow. er to grant the petitioner's prayer, because the advocates of this extended interpretation of the right of petition assume that such peculiarity of the case makes no difference in their view of the question.

But in my judgment the whole class of petitions on this subject, whether to abolish s'avery in this District, the Territories, or the States, are equally objectionable on constitutional grounds, though, perhaps, for somewhat different reasons.

Property, with the rights and incidents pertaining to it, originates in the arbitrary institutions of society. Land is generally a subject of property; water is seldom made so, and air never. Domestic animals are property; wild beasts and birds are not so regarded. Governments are instituted for the protection and regulation of life, liberty, and property. How far life or liberty shall be protected, is a stipulation in the compact of Government, indicated by consideration of the benefits and necessi ties of the social system. No society ever established a Government protecting life or liberty in their utmost possible extent. Nor was a Government ever established extending equality of rights, social or political, to all its members. The whole system of the domestic relations, of boud service by indenture or other means; the political disfranchisement of women, generally better, and often more capacitated, than the master man, who control them, are abiding illustrations of this latter position.

In the regulation of property, all Governments resting in compact have some limits prescribed to them. There is not, and probably there never was, a Government beneath the sun, possessed of the right, as a conceded and acknowledged prerogative, to take or abolish the property of the citizen or subject at pleasure, and without recompense. Such a compact would be a political absurdity, inasmuch as it implies a principle destructive of a primary end and object for which Government is instituted.

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In our General Government, and in many of our State Governments, of written and fundamental constitutions of political power, such an idea is expressly repudiated. I do not, of course, gainsay the operation of the penal and taxing powers of the Government, by which rights to properly are seized up, lost, or forfeited, though these also are restrained. But I speak of the assertion, by Government, of a distinct, independent power, which, from considerations of general or particular benefit to the social system, it should sume to take from the ciuzen, without recompense, that which his form of Government had entitled him to possess as property; or to abolish, by Legislation,any species of property held by the citizen, and so to cancel all right and title of the propriefor. I believe there is not a sirgle State Government in the Union invested with the power to pass such a law. The people, in organizing their form of Government, may undoubtedly invest their Legislature with such a power. But I repeat my belief, there is no evidence extant that they ever have yet committed so gross a folly. If, by mere legislation, any of our Governments, from motives of municipal policy, can destroy and abolish the property of the citizen, then can they also legislate away the lives or liberties of the citizen. Life, liberty, and property, as regarded in our Government, constitute the political trinity in the faith of the American citizen. In their conservative destiny, they are one and indivisible.

To regulate the use of property, great and ample powers are conferred upon the Legislature. For such conservative purposes it is but little restricted. A man's house may be demolished to save a city from conflagration. His private property may be destroyed to prevent its giving succor to a hostile

army.

He may be forbidden to wear concealed weapons, or to permit his ox or dog to roam at large on the public highway. But suppose the Legislature pass a law that all the cattle and horses owned by the citizens shall cease to be property,

the right of ownership therein abolished, and the animals turned out to the enjoyment of brute freedom; would such a law be valid? I answer, without hesitation, it would not.

Now the rule in regard to the power of the Legislature will be the same, whether it attempts to abolish the citizen's right of property in lands, houses, furniture, or slaves. There is no power in the Legislature to abolish either. Were such a law en. acted, the people, by common consen', might defer to its provisions, and forbear to contest its validity. But I advance the opinion, with much confidence, that if such a law be ever passed, under existing powers of Government, and its validity shall be contested by the citizen, the Judiciary wil pronounce it void.

Then, how stands the case with this District? The Constitution has invested Congress with the power of "exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever over such District."

Now what may Congress de? They may "legislate in all cases," but can they do what they please in all cases, without restrain? Can Congress, for the capricious reasons of social propriety, take away by law the lands or goods of the citizen, or abolish his right of property in either? Can Congress, irom considerations of promo ing public or retributive justice, require by law that the owners of slaves shall exchange their relative condition, and the servant, in turn, become the master? I conclude all will admit Congress possesses no such powers as the questions con'emplate.

It is readily perceived, then, that the power given to Congress, 10 "legislate in all cases whatsoever over such District," will not authorize it to do all things by its legislation. There are, perhaps, few Abolitionists so perfectly frantic on this subject, as to contend that the exclusive legislative powers of Congress here would authorize the passage of a law to sell the District out at auction. All will perceive the genius and spirit of our Government impose some limitation to its powers. We then arrive at the important question, can Congress abolish slavery in this D strict, and deprive the citizen of his right and property therein, without compensation.

To solve this question, I consider the Constitution itself a sufficient and affirmative exposition. Article five of the amendments prescribes that "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shail private property be taken for public use, without just compensation."

By the first part of this article life, liberty, and property, are secured to the citizen on the same terms; and, by the same means appointed to deprive him of either, he may be deprived of all. The second part is equally explicit and easy of comprehension, and both remarkable for the prompt mo◄ rality they inculcate.

The Government, as representing the public in its authority of eminent domain, may take private property for public use, by rendering just compensa

tion.

But the Congress of the United States, in all its omnipotence of power, cannot, by the enactment of a direct law for that purpose, and without pretence of its being for the public use, as authorized by the Constitution, deprive the citizen of either State or District of his property, or right of property, to the value of a shilling; and I will add, also, it would be the highest prerogative of despotism, were it otherwise.

As to the powers of the General Government to regulate the use of property in this District, I readily acknowledge it is possessed in the most ample ex

tent.

But its exercise would be an irresponsible and odious tyranny, if instigated and prescribed by foreign influence, and enforced by mere power on the people of the District, against their will.

With these views, I main ain that the want of jurisdiction, the absence of adequate power to grant a petition to abolish slavery in this District, exhibits our rights and duties to be'no more or less than pertains to us on petitions to abolish slavery in the States.

I have no object or intention to derogate from the right of petition, and would not, here or elsewhere, abridge that right in a single hair's breadth, in its legitimate exercise. It funishes a conve

nient means to the minority, essentially useful and proper, by which to urge their complaints, and ask redress of such grievances as the measures of the majority may inflict upon them. But I contend the right of petition can never confer upon us any dominion whatever over subjects not delegated in the Constitution. It cannot require of us, whose powers and duties are circumscribed and appointed by the Constitution, that we shall be invoked, or rather goaded to action, and required to attempt, and partially progress, to do that which we are forbidden to do, in order to vindicate an exaggerated extension of a right, perverted into wrong, insult, and aggression.

It is not to be questioned but the right of petition is convenient in its appropriate functions, and valuable in its degree; and, in my apprehension, it is no depreciation of that right to say, that so far as indicated in the Constitution of the United States, it does not challenge the ex'ravagant eulogies bestowed upon it here. The right, as there incorpora'e), breathes a distrust which might not be improperly entertained against a despotism, but cerla n'y does not evince the highest pretensions of a free people, who claim the right to make and unmake their form of government at pleasure.

Few, I presume, would distinguish it as the most favorite feature in the Constitution of a free, wise, and just Government of the people's choice. It might be regarded as a trophy of some pride and Foast where an oppressed people had wrested it from the strong grasp of the tyrant. It was well spo ken by the honorable Senator from South Carolina, [Mr.CALHOUN,] that the ballot box, which, in our Democratic system of Government, commands the will of the majority to be executed in all our legislation, (within the rules prescribed by the organic law,) is a main substitute for the right of petition in arbitrary Governments; and I will add, of much higher and prouder pretensions. In our system the right of petition is the most limited of popular and political righ's.

The specification of such a right, in our power of Government, implies in one view an apprehen. sion of wreng to the citizen, superinducing a necessity to sue for as a favor, that which the people in this Government may demard as a right. In the other aspect it implies the still humbler privilege of soliciting that which it may be generous to bestow, and yet not unjust to withhold.

It our Government was that of the few, which oppre sed the many, and when the people assem bled to petition for redress of grievances, the minions of power, backed by the military, read the rot act, or the tyrant's proclamation, and then dispersed the multitude, under such circumstances it might be highly prized as a great and gracious privilege to approach the throne of a master through the obsequious medium of petition. But I trust it shall prove a vain effort of the Abolitionists to magnify the right of petition here, into such consecrated importance as to profit them much in aid of their seditious cause. They cannot dignify this right by claiming for it such profound consideration, but at the correspondent expense of debasin; the American people to a more servile condition than every principle of their Government entitles them to occupy. To hold it up here as a test of the people's freedom, the conservative principle of their liberties, the deep foundation on which their Government rests, and that all is at stake in the rejection of their petitions, is truly working up an ocean tempest

"to drown a fly."

The condition of the American people is happily more elevated, their means of political preservalion more enlarg d, than this portentous clamor would report them. It is a false alarm, and will not take, that the liberties of the people are held by so frail a tenure as the right of petition.

But I am not tenacious that such petitions as now presented should be refused admission, rather than nailed to your table, so soon as received upon it. As a question of right, I would certainly prefer that such petitions should not be received into this chamber at all. I would prefer it, also, from a sense of due and becoming respect to those States whose sovereignties and reserved rights these peti tions most wrongfully and rudely assail.

With respect to the propriety and policy of referring these petitions, and reporting on their merits, with the view of conciliating the petitioners, I shall say but little more than to declare my uncomNot that I promising aversion to such a course. should apprehend, from the present organization of the Senate, a report tending, in any material degree, to excite apprehensions, or endanger our rights in the South. I am well assured no such report would at this time be made. But it is sufficient for me to repeat, that as I verily believe Congress has no rightful jurisdiction of the subject, I should regard any report that could be made as a triumph yielded to the officious importunities of the petitioners, and hence a criminal usurpation of power against the sovereignty of the States interested. Nor do I believe that any report which would be made here, would allay that obtrusive spitit of the petitioners. It is the Moloch spirit of religious and political fanaticism; and when has sober reason and simple justice ever met such adversaries with succe s?

To the honest and misguided of our Northern brethren who may have conceived their right of petition at hazard in this contest, we will say to them, in hope and confidence, that their full and impartial investigation of this question must result in our justification. The question of jurisdiction, in every tribunal on earth, is a previous question, rightfully made at the threshol; and no court, that maintains a decent respect for its own character and the rights of suitors, will betray itself by a judgment on the merits of the controversy, when not possessed of competent juridiction over the subject and the paries. Now the night of legal redress for injuries to person and property, and the pledge of power that the courts shall be kept open for the administration of such redress to all, are familiar pledges in most of the Cousti tutions of the State Governments. Suppose the citizen mistakes his forum, and seeks redress in one court, that can only be awarded to him in arother: the court object to adjudge the meri's of his case, because impotent to grant redress. But the suitor persists that his right of suit is guarantied to him by the Constitution, and that this right is arbitrarily nullified and rendered valueless, unless he can obtain a hearing and ju 'gment on the merits of his cause. The answer which the court must necessarily give to such importunity is: "Your right of suit, as abstract from our duties to adjudge, we do not contest; but such right on your part does not confer on us a jurisdiction to decide your case. We take no cognizance of the matter, not from disrespect to the suitor, but for want proper authority to retain and a judge the su t. Go hence, t) thất tribunal which has the power to grant what you pe inon fcr."

So would reason, necessity, and the philosophy of its principles, dispose of such a question.

Those who seek only in sincer ty to vindicate the right of petition in this controversy, I permit myself to indulge the belief, will concur in these common sense views of the subject. But to those who have determined to busy themselves with that which concerns them not, and who discard the dictates of common sense, the evidence of truth, and the lights of reason, to grasp at conclusions in a sheer spirit of wilfulness; those who reject facts to theorize in abstractions, who substitute the bigot's morality for municipal law; who trample, without show of decency or remorse, upon all the plighted fai h and sacred compacts of our Union, and shout in justification the hypocritical pretext of the right of petition, to such we know our rights and reasoning are urged alike in vain. No conciliation can be hoped for with them, but on terms of concession that can never be submitted to, till that despotic usurpation which has unfurled its banner here in these petitions, shall extort them at Philippi.

On motion of Mr. BUCHANAN, the motion to receive the petition was laid on the table.

Mr. C. also presented a memorial of Kirk Brown, and others, praying for the imposition of a duty on silks; which was referred to the Commitee on Finance.

On motion,

The Senate adjourned,

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

THURSDAY, February 13, 1840.

On mo1ion of Mr. SERGEANT, a communication from Samuel Hazard, enclosing a copy of th Commercial ani Statistical Reg ster of the United States, was referred to the Committee on the Library.

The SPEAKER announced that the first business in order was the motion of Mr. CASEY to refer the memorial of the National Road Convention, held at Terre Haute, Indiana, to the Commit. fee of Ways and Means, with instructions to report a bill appropriating $150,000 to each of the States of Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois, to be expended on the Cumberland road.

Mr. RUSSELL remarked that it was known to the House that the committees had not been afforded an opportunity, at the present session, to make reports. He hoped the House would therefore agree to a suspension of the rules, for the purpos: indicated; and, with the consent of the genle nan from South Carolina, [Mr. PICKENS,] he made the motion that the rules be suspended to enable him to introduce a proposition to receive reports from the committees, on to-morrow, till the hour of one o'clock.

Mr. PICKENS had no objection to yield the floor for the purpose.

Mr. RUSSELL'S motions-to suspend the rules, and to set apart one hour on to-morrow for the reception of repor's--were then agreed 10.

Mr. CAVE JOHNSON suggested to the House the propriety of referring the many bil's on the SPEAKER'S table to the various committees; but, objection was made.

Mr. DROMG OLE begged the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. PICKEN] to yield the floor to him to make a motion to refer the Fresident's annual message to the Committe of the Whole. It struck him that there was great impropriety in refer ing particular d cumen's, accompanying the message, to the committee, and not to refer the message itself. He thought it was due to the character of the members, and due to the country, that it should be taken from the table and referred, that the House might, when it thought proper, go into committee

on it.

Mr. PICKENS was willing to yield the floor; but objection was made to the motion, and it was not pressed.

Mr. THOMPSON of Mississippi,by permission, gave notice that he wou'd on to-morrow ask leave to introduce bills of the following titles:

A bill to regula e the fees of the clerks and marsha's in the District Court of the Southern District of Mississippi; and

A bill further to provide for the adjustment of the claims to reservations of land under the fourteenth article of the Choctaw treaty, made at Dancing Rabbit Creek, in the year 1830.

Mr. PICKENS then proceeded to discuss the question before the House. He made a strong argument against the expediency and constitutionality of appropriating moneys from the National Treasury to objects of internal improvements in the States. He replied to the arguments of Mr. MASON of Ohio, and Mr. HowARD of Indiana, that the National Government was bound by contract to complete the Cumberland read, and contended that the compact had been complied with to its fullest extent, and showed to the House that several milions more had been appropriated to that object than the means which formed the basis of the contract justified.

Mr. P. after concluding his remarks on the proposition bef re the House, which he opposed as being unprecedented and unparliamentary, and because it was improper to bind the committee to do a certain thing without allowing them the privilege of examining into its expediency and propr ety, moved the following amendment as a substitute for it:

"And that the memorial be committed to the Committee of Ways and Means, with instructions to consider the expediency of reporting a bill in favor of the measure."

Mr. PROFFIT then obtained the floor, not with a view, he said, of discussing the merits of the Cumberland road, but to hold up the present Ad

ministration to the censure of the people. He was in favor of the amendment of the gentleman from Illinois, [Mr. CASEY.] and opposed to the substitule of Mr. PICKENS, because, he said, it the evaded the question; and if referred to committee in that form, it would never be re. ported upon. He had understood already that the Committee of Ways and Means would not report a bill without having before it estimates. He justified the committee in that course on the ground that they were bound to consult the report of the proper Department. He censured the Department of the Treasury for omitting the Cumberland road in the estimates, and contended that it was done intentionally. Mr. P. then denounced all the land schemes, or propositions 10 graduate and reduce the prices of land, as humbugs to deceive the people in the West; and commented on the message of the President recommending a reduction as a part of the same system of deception; and sad he had her, at every cross road in Indiana, the same arguments preached nine hundred and ninetynine times over a barrel of hard cider. Mr. P. then censured and denounced the Administration for the manner in which the Fiorida war had been conducted, and made some humorous remarks in characterizing the officers which had returned from that war, as dandies. He then entered at large into a discussion of the State politics of Indiana, in the course of which he alluded to his colleague, [Mr. WICK ] aud charged him with having denounced the Whigs as Federalists, a party to which that gentleman, he said, had but recently belonged; having been one of the electors for PresiIdent in favor of Mr. CLAY and having always acted with the Whigs.

Mr. WICK denied that he had ever been a Whig since the Federal party had assumed that cognomen. He was understood to say that he hat never acted with this new-born Whig party, which was now made up with the fag ends of all parties and all principles. He was born and reared a Democrat, and had always followed in the footsteps of those who had acted upon the great pinciples upon which that party are united. It was true he had been an elector in favor of Mr. CLAY; but since that time that gentleman had repudiated his old Democratic principles, and a me ancholy change had been effected in his opinions. He was, however, conscious (even if he was in the wrong) that he was now right, and that he should re

ma'n so.

Mr. PROFFIT then resumed his remarks, and continued in the same strain of denunciation. He then examined into the claims of General Harrison for the Presidency; and having eulogized his military exploits at Tippecanoe, the Thames, Fort Meigs, and the river Raisin, he concluded by saying that his advancement to the Presidential chair cou'd not add one laurel to his brow, but might do him an act of justice.

Mr. MARVIN rose, not for the purpose of making a speech, but to offer a substitute for that of Mr. PICKENS, and as an amendment for the original proposition. His amendment contemplated that the Committee of Ways and Means should discharge a duty which it had done at every previous session of Congress. Until the last s'ssion, it had been in the habit of reporting bills for the Cumberland road, and for constructing harbors and building light-houses; but it had refused at that time to take the responsibility; and if it be left to them at this time, as a mere question of expediency or propriety, the House would never hear of the maiter again. The committee was so constructed, that it would control the subject, and entirely keep it from before the House. He was not to be alarmed by the assertion that it was not in accordance with parliamentary practice to bind a committee of the House to carry out i's views. If the House was in favor of any particular measure, it was right and proper to instruct or compel its committees to report such a bill as would best promote its wishes. But he contended that the committee had just as much jurisdiction over this subject now as it had at any past time-that it had the estimates of the Topographical bureau, which had been referred to it, and ought to be compelled, by instruction, to act upon those estimates. He

believed it more than idle to pass upon any proposition simply to ask the committee to inquire into the propriety of reporting an appropriation for this road. Mr. M. after arguing for some time in reply to Mr. PICKENS, contended that it was perfectly constitutional for the General Government to carry on works of internal improvement and to con struct harbors on the lakes, and concluded by offering his proposition as follows, as an amendment to the original proposition:

"And that the Committee of Ways and Means be instructed to report bills in accordance with the estimates contained in the reports from the Chief Engineer and the Chief of the Topographical Engineers, to the Secretary of War, and communicated to Congress by the President, making appropriations for the year 1840, for the continuation of the construction or improvements of harbors and roads, and the navigation of rivers, for which appropriations have been heretofore made."

Mr. BARNARD then obtained the floor, and proposed the following, which he prevailed on the gentleman from New York [Mr. MARVIN] to accept as a modification of his amendment, to follow at the end of the same, viz:

"Unless, in any particular case, the committee should be of opinion that the particular work ought to be entirely discontinued; and in such case, if any, the committee shall submit to this House the reason which lead to such conclusions.

Mr. B. was anxious to speak on the subject, and moved the House would adjourn; but withdrew it at the suggestion of

Mr. BLACK, from the Select Committee on Printing, who reported a resolution to extend the time to that committee to investigate the subject, and to prepare its report.

Mr. L. WILLIAMS inquired why the committee did not fix a day on which to report.

Mr. BLACK said the time had now expired en which the committee was to have made a report; and it was impossible to fix a day, as it had much business yet to attend to.

Mr. L. WILLIAMS then proposed to amend the resolution by inserting the 1st of March; and, after some conversation between Messrs. BELL, BLACK, and R. GARLAND, as to how far the extension of time would affect the conditional contract with the Printer, the amendment was adopted, and the resolution, as amended, was agreed to. Mr. HAND then presented several petitions, which were referred; after which,

On Motion of Mr. BARNARD,
The House adjourned.

IN SENATE,

it

FRIDAY, February 14, 1840. Mr. PIERCE presented the memorial of Samuel E. Cones, and one hundred and fifty-nine other citizens of Portsmouth, New Hampshire, upon the subject of a Congress of Nations. Mr. P. said that most of the signers were known to him, either personally or by reputation. They were engaged in the various pursuits of life, and it was but just to say of them, that they were gentlemen of great intelligence, respectability, and high moral worth. They introduce the subject (which is treated with clearness and ability) by the declaration that is a growing sentiment among men, of all classes and professions, that international war is as needless as it is confessed to be ruinous to the resources and morals of a people;" and as "the most fruitful causes of war (in their estimation) flow from the unsettled state of international law," they present the project of a Congress of Nations, with a view to the double object of the amicable adjustment of national disputes, and the more definite one of the establishment of a code of international law. Although Mr. P. did not concur in all the views expressed by the memorialists, he enter tained for their opinions a high respect, and moved the printing of the memorial, and its reference to the Committee on Foreign Relations.

Mr. BUCHANAN presented fourteen memorials from citizens of the United States, severally remonstrating against the use of bloodhounds in prosecuting the war against the Seminole Indians; which were referred to the Committee on Military Affairs.

Mr. WALKER presented the petition of Edward C. Hyde, praying to be allowed to enter a quantity of land at the minimum price, in lieu of a like quantity purchased and paid for by him, and afterwards sold by the United States; which was referred to the Committee on the Public Lands,

Mr. WRIGHT presented three memorials from citizens of the State of New York, praying the pas sage of a general bankrupt law;'which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary.

Mr. BUCHANAN presented a petition of a number of citizens of Philadelphia county, praying a repeal of all lav s that conflict with the Constitution of the United States; the motion to receive which was,

On motion of Mr. FULTON, ordered to lie on the table.

Mr. B. also presented the petition of a number of citizens of Pennsylvania, relative to the abolition of the foreign slave trade; which was referred to the Committee on Commerce.

Mr. BUCHANAN said that he rose to present a petition signed by six hundred and twenty-seven citizens of the city and county of Philadelphia, "manufacturers of, and employed in the manufacture of, umbre'las and parasols."

These petitioners state that, under the twenty-first clause of the second section of the tariff act of July, 1832, a duty of twenty-five per centum ad valorem was imposed on the importation of "umbrellas and parasols, of whatever materials made." That this duty continued to be collected from the time that act went into operation, un'il the month of March last; when, under a new construction of the compromise act of March, 1833, silk umbrellas and parasols have been admitted free from any duy whatever.

The memoralists, therefore, ask Congress to pass an explanatory act imposing the same duties on silk umbrellas and parasols which were raid, under the acts of July, 1832, and March, 1833, until the month of March, 1839. They conclude by declaring that upon the action of Congress "depends the support of the many thousands who are engaged in the hitherto growing branch of domestic industry, which has amounted to millions of dollars per annum, but if admitted free from duty, umbrellas and paraso's must cease to be of American manu- facture."

Mr. B. said that if the Senate were a proper forum in which to debate or decide judicial questions arising under our own laws, he thought he could convince the body that the first constrution of the compromise act, which had prevailed for six years, was correct, and that the late construction was not warranted by the spirit of that law.

In what condition had this recent construction placed our umbrella manufacturers? All the articles entering into the manufacture of umbrellas, such as whalebone, brass, and iron, now paid a considerable duty. To the extent of this duty, the foreign manufacturer enjoyed a premium over the domestic manufacturer; because the umbrellas of the former were imported altogether free of duty. He did not believe that any Senator who voted for the compromise bill, would say that he intended this act should receive any such construction, or pro. duce any such effect.

Mr. B. trusted that the Committee on Finance would determine that a revenue duty of twenty per cent. should be imposed on the importation of fcreign silks, and this would relieve the petitioners. Or, if this should not be the case, that they would report an explanatory bill, placing the umbrella manufacturers in the same position they had occupied for the six years previous to March, 1839.

The memorials were then referred to the Committee on Finance, and ordered to be printed, with the accompanying document from Samuel Wright and William A. Drown, the Committee of Umbrella Manufacturers.

Mr. YOUNG presented a report, addressed to the Right Hon. Charles Poulett Thompson, President of the Board of Trade in Great Britain, on the subjest of an inquiry into the number of accidents on board of vessels propelled by steam, the causes leading to such accidents, and the best mode of prevention; containing much valuable information, drawn from the experience of that country, as well

as the countries of France, Belgium, and Holland; which was referred to the Committee on Com.

merce.

Mr. SOUTHARD presented the memorial of John Hancock and others, praying the increase of a duty on foreign silks; which was referred to the Committee on Finance.

Mr. S. also presented the memorial of a number of citizens of New Jersey, remonstrating against the use of bloodhounds in the Florida war; which was referred to the Committee on Military Affairs.

Mr. FULTON presented the memorial of a committee of the Polish exiles, praying the passage of an act to authorize the immediate occupation and settlement, on their part, of the lands heretofore appropriated by Congress for their use; which was referred to the Committee on the Public Lands.

Mr. NICHOLAS presented the petition of J. E. Plauche, praying to be allowed to locate on any unappropriated public land in the State of Louisiana, the amount of a Spanish concession made to his father in the year 1789, but rejected by the commissioner of the land office west of Pearl ri ver; which was referred to the Committee on Private Land Claims.

Mr. BENTON, from the Committee on Finance, to which was referred certain documents con. nected with the salt duty, reported them back to the Senate, with a motion that they be printed.

On this motion a debate ensued, which took a wide and discursive range, in which Messrs. BENTON, TAPPAN, DAVIS, CLAY of Kentucky, PRESTON, ALLEN, WEBSTER, WRIGHT, and CALHOUN, par icipated; when, without taking a question,

On motion of Mr. WALKER, the Senate adjourned till Monday next.

Mr. RIVES asked the consent of the House to permit him to offer a resolution to have all the papers and testimony now before the Committee of Elections in relation to the New Jersey disputed election, printed for the information of the House. Mr. STANLY and others objected.

Mr. RIVES moved to suspend the rules for that purpose.

Mr. WISE begged his colleague [Mr. RIVES] not to press his motion at this time. His colleague [Mr. Boris,] who was on that committee, and who was now absent, (anticipating that such a mation could be made,) had requested him, if it were made, to endeavor to prevail upon the mover not to insist. He would oppose it if he were present.

Mr. RIVES was understood to say it would af ford him pleasure to do so, but he could not consent, consistently with a sense of duty. The papers were voluminous, and if they were ordered to be printed now, it would afford members an oppertunity to form correct views of the merits of the question, and enable them to vote understandingly when they were required to vote.

Mr. RANDOLPH inquired of the gentleman from Virginia, [Mr. Rives,] if such a resolution had not been before the committee, and rejected by a majority of it.

Mr. RIVES said he believed such was the fact; and it was for that reason that he had brought the subject before the House.

Mr. RANDOLPH moved a call of the House; which was refused.

Mr. CAMPBELL (chairman of the Committee of Elections) said he was perfectly aware that there could be no debate on this question; but, from what he could see of the temper of the House, he presumed the ru'es would not be suspended, and therefore he would be much gratified if he could be permitted to make a few remarks. He knew that he could not do so without permission of

the House.

Several members objecting to Mr. CAMPBELL'S proceeding, the question was taken, and resulted -yeas 85, bays 73, equivalent to a decision in the