Mr. JAMESON wished to know of the SPEAKER whether it was in order for a gentleman now, after a question had been acted upon by the House, and debated for two days, to take an appeal, under the general parliamentary law. He wished to know whether the gentleman ought not to have made that motion when the question was first brought before the House. He contended that it was not in order for the gentleman to take an appeal at the present time.

Mr. W. C. JOHNSON then withdrew his appeal, but gave notice that he should introduce his proposition at the earliest possible period.

Mr. WISE then obtained the floor, and was about proceeding with his remarks, when

Mr. BEATTY raised a point of order, whether the gentleman from Virginia, under the thirty-fifth rule, which declares that no member shall speak more than twice until all the other members who choose to do so have spoken, was entitled to speak?

Mr. WISE denied that he had spoken at all on this question.

Mr. BEATTY would appeal to gentlemen around him to say whether the gentleman from Virginia had not spoken twenty times on this same subject since the second of December.

The CHAIR said the thirty-fifth rule was not adopted by the House, and would not apply to the present case.

Mr. WISE then took the floor, and addressed the House at great length on the subject of his resolution.

He thought that they had been fighting under an equal contest, but within the past two days, two gentlemen, who had professed to be in favor of the New Jersey gentlemen with certificates taking their seats, and who had previously voted upon that principle, had deserted, and thought proper now to take a different view of it. He did not, however, wish to shoot them as deserters, though he deeply regretted the loss of their votes. Mr. W. said the Administration party had defeated them by the tie vote, and had tied up the Constitution and laws. But he regretted exceedingly to have to complain of the friends of the New Jersey Representatives who held the certificates. Well might the gentleman from North Carolina [Mr. RAYNER] on yesterday exclaim, speaking of the friends of State Rights doctrine: "Save me from my friends " The gentleman from South Carolina, [Mr. RHETT] who professed to be with us, made an appeal to the House to proceed with the business. He asked that gentleman what was the business of the House; what was the first thing proper for them to do? The first thing was to organize, and to acknowledge all rightful representation, and then adopt it here. He must say, that for the delay of its organization, that gentleman was more responsible than any other member; yes, more than any ten members on that floor. It was not with a view of impeaching that gentleman's motives, that he made him responsible to make his position good. But for that gentleman's course, the House would have been organized, and the members from New Jersey would have been admitted days ago. That gentleman's course, however reconcile able to himself, was irreconcileable to him; and had been inconsistent throughout every state of the proceedings of the House; and he had found that his votes were too soon, and his speeches too late. Mr. W. then went into an examination of Mr. R's votes, his subsequent proposition, and the three propositions of himself, and the decisions on them, for the purpose of showing that Mr. R's course was not reconcileable with the reasons he gave a few days ago for a change of it. He hoped the gentleman would pardon him for being thus particular in scanning his course. He was one of the few on whom he relied-his vote, heavy or light, kicked the beam; and the gentleman would there. fore excuse him in having thus questioned his votes as he had. What reason the gentleman could have had for voting for his (Mr. W's) direct proposition, substantially the same as that he subsequently voted against, he could not conceive. Certainly he wonld not ascribe it to personal vantity. So it was, he has given us notice, that after having voted for the proposition once, and voted against it, he would now

vote against us; and on what grounds -on the grounds of res judicata. It was known to us all, he said, that on the discussion of the Mississippi question, we were all disgusted even to nausea with this res judicala. Mr. W. then referred to the case of Messrs. Claiborne and Gholson, and which was, upon an ex parte report, decided that they should be qualified, and which decision he considered erroneous. Mr. W. then commented on the manner in which Mr. R. applied the res judicata.

He then denied that the principle had been adjudged, and that it was res judicata. He then went on and contended that the House was in an imperfect state of organization, when the decision was made; that the members were not sworn; there was no Speaker; and that they were not then competent to decide, having taken no oath as the Constitution required. The matter was non coram judice; and, therefore, there could be no legal decision. He then went on to explain what constituted a House of Representatives, and considered three things essential to it; 1st, representation; 24, organization; and 3d, legislative power; and any thing short of that was not a Hous'. He said, in the first place, when the decision of the House was made, that body was merely an assemblage of members elect, and had not the power even to send for the President's message, or communicate with the Senate-it had no Sergeant-at-Arms, and could not even protect itself from a mob. In calling the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. ADAMS] to the Chair, and in adopting rules of proceeding, it merely instituted parliamentary proceedings for the purpose of organization. He continued at some length to show that, before they were organized and sworn, they were not a House of Representatives.

The question, he said, had arisen in this case, whether we can go behind the Governor's certificate? We are, under the Constitution of the United States, the judges of election, qualification, and returns of members. Now, sir, what does the word "returns" mean? The gentleman fron South Carolina, [Mr. RHETT,] the other day, in one of the ablest efforts I ever heard him make, committed but one mistake, and that was, the distinction between the return and the commission. The only one meant in the Constitution, was the return from the State to the Speaker; the commission of the Governor was the return contemplated by the Constitution, and so was the certificate of a sheriff in Virginia. There was no distinction between them; and Mr. W. went on to argue this point, contending that the return, contemplated as a return to the House, was the ultimate return, and not the subordinate returns from the judges of elections to the Governor. The return behind it belonged to the State itself, and to her archives, over which the House had no control. The State authorities may make the ultimate returns what they please, and we have no authority to prevent it. But gen'lemen insist that there are other returns-that there are returns from the county court clerks to the Governor and Council; that you may go behind these ultimate returns, and go to the subordinate returns, which belong to the State. Gentlemen assume that there were subordinate returns of the clerks, which were suppressed. He denied that there was any evidence that they were suppressednot deeming newspaper evidence, or the certificates of the Secretary of State, such evidence, not being authorized by the laws of New Jersey. Again, the admissions of the gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. RANDOLPH, were relied on as evidence. Were we constituted a court of justice, to take evidence ore tenus, and was he cross-examined? Was the House trying the cause? Again, if you take part of the evidence, you must take all.

He then went into a history of the Millville and South Amboy returns, and argued that, according to the laws of New Jersey, these returns were not excluded by the Governor. He denied that the Secretary of State was the keeper of the returns of the judges of elections; and, consequently, he had no right to certify respecting them. Mr. W. then went on to answer that part of Mr. PICKENS's argument, in regard to the power of the States to purge the polls, after they were counted; which argument he considered a novel and extraordinary doctrine,

and referred to a law of Virginia, now repealed, which constituted a commission to examine the polls which may have been taken by the sheriff, and with power to strike out the names of all who were not entitled to vote. He said the gentleman from South Carolina, [Mr. PICKENS,] a State Rights man, had pronounced that law unconstitu tional.

Mr. RIVES said his colleague bad quoted a law, which, in consequence of its bad effects, had been repealed.

Mr. WISE inquired of his colleague whether he said that this law was repealed because it was unconstitutional.

Mr. RIVES answered Mr. W. that the law was repealed for two reasons. One party, who opposed it, believed that it was unconstitutional; and the other party opposed it, because they believed that such a power ought not to be trusted to persons who might abuse it. For these reasons the law was repealed by a very large majority.

Mr. WISE thought his colleague was mistaken. He had another colleague, he said, by his side, who was in the Legislature at the time, and who said that no objection was made to the law on constitutional grounds.

Mr. RIVES asked when that law was repealed; and Mr. WISE replying that it was in 1834, Mr. R. rejoined that he was in the Senate of Virginia at the time.

Mr. WISE still thought that his colleague was mistaken, and that the law was opposed by no one on constitutional grounds; and then went on in a lengthy argument to show the unconstitutionality of the assumption that a State had no right to pass laws to purge the polls, after they had been taken. He then went into a refutation of the arguments of Mr. DROMGOOLE, the other day, and, in the first place, in opposition to the assumptions of that gentleman, contended that it was the States that were parties to the federal compact in the combined senses of territory, Government, and peopls, and not "the people of the States," as Mr. D. said, who were parties to that compact. This was the first State Rights doctrine that he had learned. It was in the aggregate capacity of people, territory, and Government combined, that these States were parties to the Federal compact. This was the doctrine he had always entertained, and it was the doctrine of Mr. Madison. He then proceeded to answer Mr. D's arguments throughout, and commented on the precedents cited by that gentleman, which he contended did not sustain the positions assumed by him.

Mr. W. concluded by withdrawing his own proposition, and, in compliance with a pledge made to Mr. TURNEY, who had yielded to him the floor, renewed the proposition of that gentleman, and called for the previous question upon the same.

[Mr. TURNEY'S proposition was, in substance, to refer the subject of the contested seats to the Committee of Elections, when appointed, and that neither party of the claimants should be entitled to seats until the committee shall have investigated and reported upon the same.]

Mr. W. C. JOHNSON then raised the point of order. which he had waved this morning, and hoped it would not be considered out of order to support the Constitution of the United States. He contended that the previous question could not be moved while five gentlemen were at the bar of the House demanding to be sworn.

Mr. BEATTY called the gentleman to order, and required that he should reduce his point of crder to writing.

Mr. CHAPMAN asked if it would be in order new to take up his motion to reconsider the vote by which the resolution for the adoption of rules was laid on the table.

The CHAIR said thati would not be in order, because the gentleman from Maryland had the floor upon another question.

Mr. W. C. JOHNSON then submitted his point of order in this form: "The motion to take the previous question is not in order until the rules of the House are adopted, and when there are members present who desire to be sworn in." Mr. J. was proceeding to debate this question, and was referring to the law of 1789 in regard to the admi

26TH CONG.......... 1ST SESS.

BY BLAIR & RIVES.

[Continued from No. 4 ] nistering of oaths, and to the 6.h article of the Constitution of the United States, when

Mr. TURNEY rose to a point of order, and inquired if it was in order to debate this question?

The CHAIR decided that it was debatable, but the gentleman must confine himself to the question of order.

Mr. TURNEY. Then there is no end to this question.

Mr. W. C. JOHNSON then proceeded with his remarks, referring to several authorities to show that the SPEAKE was bound to administer the oath to the New Jersey members holding the Governor's certificate.

The CHAIR again interrupted the gentleman, and desired that he would confine himself to the point of order which he had raised.

Mr. JOHNSON again proceeded with his remarks, and contended that the previous question could not be put, when

Mr. JAMESON called him to order, and inquired the state of the question.

The CHAIR said he understood the gentleman to raise a question of order, as to the right of the gentleman from Virginia to move the previous question. Under the general parliamentary law, the CHAIR felt constrained to say that the previous question was a question which must govern the House. But the previous question, under that general law, was a different thing from the previous question under the rules of the last House. In regard to the duty of the CHAIR in swearing the New Jersey members, which had been referred to by the gentleman, he would say that he was merely the organ of the House, and whether it was a House de jure, or a House de facto, was not a question for him to decide; but being its organ, he was bound to carry out the decisions which it had made, and which were staring him in the face. This was the opinion of the CHAIR; and if the gentleman desired to sustain contrary views, he must appeal from this decision.

Mr. JOHNSON then appealed from the latter part of the decision of the CHAIR, and was proceeding again to refer to the authorities before him, when

Mr. RIVES called him to order, because he was pursuing the same course of argument which the CHAIR had decided to be out of order.

The CHAIR said the gentleman must confine himself to the point of order.

Mr. JOHNSON proceeded, and was reading a clause from the law of New Jersey on the subject of the elections, when

He

Mr. JAMESON rose to a point of order. contended that if gentlemen were permitted to take an appeal from but a single point of the decision of the CHAIR, they might appeal on fifty different points in decision, and there would be no end to the question. He thought the gentleman was begging the question by the course which he was pursuing.

Mr. JOHNSON then withdrew his appeal, and submitted a point of order in writing, that the gentleman from Virginia could not make his motion when there were five members at the bar demanding to be sworn.

The CHAIR. If the gentleman withdraws his appeal, the question is upon the previous ques

tion.

Mr. JOHNSON. Then I withdraw my point of order, and renew the appeal. Mr. J. was again proceeding to read the law of New Jersey, when, The CHAIR called him to order.

Mr. CAMPBELL of Tennessee moved that the gentleman from Maryland have leave to proceed with his remark, which was agreed to.

Mr. JOHNSON then addressed the House at length upon his appeal, contending that the CHAIR was bound to swear in the members from New Jersey having the Governor's certificates, and referring to a great many authorities under the arti

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 31, 1839.

-WEEKLY.

cles of Confederation, the Constitution of the United States and the State Constitution.

Mr. ADAMS next obtained the floor, expressed his intention of addressing the House, and moved an adjournment.

Mr. FRANCIS THOMAS called for the yeas and nays on the adjournment; which were ordered, and were-yeas 117, nays 107.

The house then adjourned.

IN SENATE,

FRIDAY, December 20, 1839.

A message was received from the President of the United States, and being of an Executive character,

The Senate went in into an Executive session, and afterwards, Adjourned.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

FRIDAY, December 20, 1839.

The question pending was on an appeal taken by the gentleman from Maryland [Mr. JOHNSON] that a proposition could be submitted while there were members of the House waiting to be sworn.

Mr. CHAPMAN said that he had made a motion the other day to reconsider the vote by which the resolution for the adoption of rules had been laid on the table, which motion had been entered, and on yesterday he had moved that this motion be taken up, but it had been decided by the CHATB that it could not be taken up while the motion then pending, which was the resolution of Mr. WISE, was before the House; that resolution, however, had been withdrawn and another moved, and he held that his motion to reconsider had precedence of this latter motion.

The CHAIR stated that the motion had been entered on the journal, he presumed, to enable the gentleman to bring it up at a future time. The CHAIR, however, was of opinion, on an examination of the subject, that the right to make that motion was given under the rules of the House, which had not yet been adopted, it being a motion not known to the parliamentary law. He would, however, suggest to the gentleman that he could obtain his object by moving that the rules of the last House be adopted for the government of this body, which motion would be in order at any time when there was no motion pending. At present, however, there was a question pending on an appeal from the decision of the CHAIR, taken by the gentleman from Maryland.

Mr. JAMESON. Do I understand the CHAIR to say that the motion to reconsider is not known to the parliamentary law?

The CHAIR. That is the impression of the Chair.

Mr. JAMESON said, if gentlemen would refer to the book, they would see that that was one of first established principles of parliamentary law. It was of far older dates than the rules of the House. If, therefore, the CHAIR Still held to the opinion expressed, he would feel bound to take an appeal.

Mr. BRIGGS contended that the question before the House was a question of privilege, therefore a motion to reconsider could not be made until it was disposed of.

Mr. POPE said the first business under the Constitution which could come before the House, was the election of a Speaker, and the next was the swearing in of the members. Now, as the members had not all been sworn in, no other business could come up, until that was disposed of.

Mr. VANDERPOEL inquired whether the question of priority of business was not under the control of a majority of the House, and whether, if the majority desired to adopt the rules of the rules of the House, they could not do so now, or at any time.

The CHAIR thought it was in the power of the majority of the House to adopt rules.

Mr. VANDERPOEL then moved that the rules of the last House be adopted for the Government

VOLUME 8...........No. 5.

PRICE $1 PER SESSION.

of this House, and on that motion moved the previous question.

Mr. WISE raised a point of order, whether any motion could be made until the question before the House was disposed of.

The CHAIR decided that the motion of the gentleman from New York could not be made while there was another question before the House.

Mr. CHAPMAN appealed from the decision of the CHAIR.

Mr. ADAMS, who was entitled to the floor on Mr. JOHNSON's appeal made yesterday, claimed the floor, and proceeded to address the House.

Mr. CHAPMAN called the gentleman from Massachusetts to order.

Mr. HOFFMAN then rose, and said, if gentlemen were desirous of adopting rules to prevent diorder in the House, and relieve the CHAIR from embarrassme t, without having any other object in view, he would submit a proposition, which would effect the desired object. Mr. H. then presented a resolution, which was read, that the rules and orders of the last Congress be adopted for the government of this House, except the last rule, [the viva vocc rule ]

Mr. VANDERPOEL. The viva voce rule is one of great importance, and there can be no god reason for laying it aside at this t me. If the mction which he had made a few minutes ago was in order, he desired that it might be put to the House.

Mr. ADAMS object d to the intro luction of any resolution for the adoption of rules until the House had organized according to the Constitution and laws of the United States. By the act of 224 May, 1832," the House of Representatives sha!! be composed of members electe ”—

Mr. VANDERPOEL cal ed the gentleman to order. He had made a motion, which had been entertained by the CHAIR, and the gentleman could not speak on another question.

Mr. ADAMS said he was speaking to a point of o der, which had precedence of the other.

The CHAIR said the gentleman from Massachusetts must take his seat. There was a point of order now before the CHAIR on an appeal taken by the gentleman from Alabama.

Mr. ADAMS. Does the CHAIR decide that while I am speaking on a point of order, that another point of order can be made which will override the one I am speaking on?

The CHAIR said he had decided against a certain motion. The gentleman from Alabama had appealed from that decision, and the CHAIR was bound to entertain that appeal.

Mr. ADAMS. 1h n I may make another point of order, and if the CHAIR decides against me, I may appeal from that decision, and it will take precedence. Another gentleman may then raise another point and appeal, and so we may go on in an eternal wheel, without there being any end to the matter.

Mr. CHAPMAN said that the point he had made was with regard to the priority of business, and if the CHAIR en ertained his mot on, it was impossible for gentlemen to overleap it and supersede it with something else.

Mr. ADAMS contended that the very point he was desirous of discussing, was with regard to the priority of business. It was that the House could do no other business, until all its members were

sworn.

Mr. CHAPMAN then rose, and stated that as the gentleman from Massachusetts was anxious to occupy the floor, and as he had been requested by several gentlemen to withdraw his motion, he would do so, giving notice, however, that he would bring it it forward again at the earlest perioi possible, and he hoped no objection would then be made to it.

Mr ADAMS, who was entitled to the floor on the point of order raised by Mr. JOHNSON of Mary land, contended that it was not competent for the House to entertain the previous question, or any other motion, while the question of the right of

his colleague had appealed, because he alleged that the House could entertain no question while the members from New Jersey were waiting to be sworn in. The gentleman from Tennessee would see that he would make confusion worse confounded, if he succeeded in showing that the greatest latitude should be allowed to the debatnow, because such latitude must be allowed after the decision of the House that the previous question shall be put. He was for confining the House to the single proposition then before it, which was the appeal of his colleague. When that question was decided, he would be willing to meet the gentleman from Tennessee with his authorities. The gentleman from Massachusetts was entitled to the floor to discuss the subject of the appeal taken by his colleague; but he was not authorized to indulge in the latitude of debate which he had thought proper to take.

Mr. BELL said he understood all that had been said by the gentleman from Maryland, and agreed with him; and he was proceeding to show that the play was not worth the candle, while the proposition of the member from North Carolina was the most rational one; for the moment the question of appeal was decided, and the previous question secondel, the gentleman from Massachusetts could have the greatest latitude of debate allowed him. For his own part he had no objection to deciding the question of appeal at once, and to affirm the decision of the CHAIR. He would also go for the decision of the CHAIR that the question before the House involved the very question as to the admission of the New Jersey members.

After some remarks from Mr. MERCER on the point of order involved,

Mr. ADAMS, by general consent, resumel and concluded his remarks, when

Mr. RHETT addressed the House at some length, in reply to the remarks of Mr. WISE, charging him with having acted inconsistently in regard to the New Jersey members, and in reply to the remarks of Mr. ADAMS; but his remarks were indistinctly heard by the reporter. He commenced by saying that, in his observations the other day, he had expressed the opinion that when we had then passed a resolution, refusing to the New Jersey members seats, we were a House of Representatives, and he had stated farther, that being a House, and having adjudicated on the case, it was contrary to parliamentary usage to take up the same case again for adjudica tion. No gentleman who had addressed the House since, had controverted this position. The case of Claiborne and Gholson, referred to by the gentlemen from Massachusetts, had no application at all to the present case.

In

that case, seats had been given 10 those gentleman at one session, and he next session this decision had been reversed, and certainly one Congress had the right to rever e the decision of a former session. What he contended for was this: When the House had once made a decision, and determined upon a question, it was not competent for any gentleman, according to parliamentary law, to bring up that proposition again: and that proposition had not been controverted. But the gentleman from Massachusets held that it was contrary to morality, and contrary to what was right, for him (Mr. B) to hold to this opinion. Then, said Mr. R. according to this docuine, if the House has done wrong, in my view, in making a decision, I must not act according to parliamentary usage, but must go directly against it, for the purpose of accomplishing what I believe to be right. Is this the principle which gentlemen desire that I should act upon? He would not question the conduct of any gentleman on this floor-he would condemn no man here; but while he did not do this, he would certainly exercise his own views as to what became him as a member on this floor, disregarding the opinions or the sophistry of any man. He had sait further, when he addressed the House the other day, that as the people were looking to this body to do something speedily, and as the great interests of the country required us to act, he was prepared to support that proposition which would bring this dbate to a speedy termination. With a view of

getting at the business which was of such vital interest to the country at large, he felt bound to support that proposition, whatever it might be, which would preclude debate.

With regard to this New Jersey case, he did not estimate it as some gentlemen seemed to do. He considered that the House, having the power to determine, did determine it; not disfranchising the people of New Jersey, but as he understood, even by the resolution of the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. W SE] himself, it was to be made a matter of contested election, to be decided by the House hereafter, in the proper and constitutional manner. Then it can be no disfranchisement.

we

correct.

He had never contended that the title, which gentlemen laid so much stress upon, should be violated. On the contrary, be had contended that we were to be the judges of the title, and that that was the matter which were bound to decide upon. The House consented to this course in the case of Messis. Naylor and Ingersoll. The titles which both these gentlemen held, were read, and he had voted for Mr. NAYL R. This was the course proposed in regard to the New Jersey members; and, in this case, he had held that you could not invalidate the title, but were bound to look into it. Well, sir, when you came to look into the papers on the Clerk's table, what was the state of things presented? In the first place, there was a certificate of title from the Governor of New Jersey; secondly, an impugnment of that title; and thirdly, a certificate that that impugnment was The House took up this matter, and upon this evidence, decided that the five members, having the certificate of Governor, should not take their seals. Then the position which he maintained was, that the matter had been adjudicated upon by a competent body; and could gentlemen doubt the correctness of this position? Was this the House of Representatives, were we members of Congress, when we made this decision? It we were not members of Congress, as had been contended by the gentleman from Virginia, [Mr. WISE,] then he agreed that our determination of the question was null and void. But if this was a House of Representatives at the time it made the decision, it was perfectly competent for it to adjudicate the matter; and, having done so, that adjudication must be final until the question was brought up as a matter of contested election. The gentleman from Virginia, and other gentlemen, had charged him with inc nsistency; but when gentlemen make those charges, they should recollect that they who live in glass houses ought not to throw stones. When gentlemen made charges of inconsistency against others, they should be certain that their own course was consistent. It will be recollected that the gentleman from Virginia has declared over and over again, in debate on this floor, that the House has made no decision upon this question, and that there was no Houre to make a decision; yet that gentleman had introduced resolutions in that body which he declared was no House, calling it a House, and calling us the Representatives in the Congies of the United States. The gentleman's first resolution, introduced before the gentleman from Massachusetts was called to the Chair, read as follows:

Resolved, That the Representatives of the Congress of the United States now assembled, to relieve themselves from the embarrassment and difficulties which at present obstruct the organization of the House, will proceed, by the Acting Clerk, to call the names of gentlemen whose rights to seats are not disputed or contested; and, after the names of such members are all called, and before they proceed to elect a Speaker or other officer, or to organize in any manner, they shall, provided there be a quorum of such present, hear and decide upon all credentials, certificates, or commissions of persons claiming seats in the House of Representatives under the Constitution of the United States and the laws of the respective States.

Here the gentleman confesses that we were at that time the "Representatives of the Congress of the United States;" and in the latter part of the resolution he speaks of the disputed members as "claiming seats in the House of Representative:;" and he grants that House the power, by his resolu

tion, to "hear and decide" upon all credentials, certificates, and commissions, of persons claiming sea's. Here, then, the gentleman granted that the House could exercise judicial power at the time he submitted his resolution, because he made it, or attempted to make it, the duty of the House, by his resolution, to "hear and decide" upon the credentials, certificates, or cemmi-sions, of the five members from New Jersey. This was the ground taken by the gentleman from Virginia in the first instance; and he (Mr. R.) with this resolution before him, and with other propesitions which had been made to the House before him, had submitted a proposition to the House at a later period in the following words:

Resolved, That the House will proceed to call the names of gentlemen whose rights to seats are not disputed or contested; and after the names of such members are called, and before a Speaker is elected, they shall, provided there be a quorum of such present, then hear and adjudge upon the elections, returns, and qualifications of all claimants to the seats contested on this floor.

This resolution, as he had stated at the time of introducing it, was substantially the same as that presented by the gentleman from Virginia; sub. stantially the same as the one presented by a gentleman from Kentucky; and substantially the same as the one presented at the last session of Congress by the gentleman from Massachusetts; and he did expect that it would meet with the support of those gentlemen. He had expected that every one of those gentlemen would rally upon this resolution, and he never had expected that those gentlemen would stand up and oppose, much less had he expected that they would rise up here and deny, the doctrines set forth in their own resolutions, and deny that it was either right, proper, constitutional, or parliamentary for the House to make a decision on the question at that time.

Mr. WISE rose to explain. By the resolution of the gentleman from South Carolina, which had just been read, the House was to decide on the "elections, returns, and qualifications" of claimants, and he denied the power of the House, at that stage, to go into the elections.

Mr. RHETT. The ground the gentleman took in his argument was, that we had no right to adjudicate on this matter, but by his resolution he yielded the power to the House to hear and decide upon the commissions of all claimants.

Mr. WISE rose again to explain. He contended now, as he had contended before, that the Clerk was the ministerial officer to compare the credentials which the gentlemen from New Jersey brought here under the laws of New Jersey; and when we deposed the Clerk, we became he ininisterial officers. We then became the ministerial officers to hear the credentials, and decide upon them-that is, to decide whether they corresponded with the laws of New Jersey; and his position was that we could decide nothing else; therefore it was, that he had used the terms credentials, certificates and commissions.

He

Mr. RHETT resumed. When this resolution of the gentleman from Virginia was presented, he (Mr. R) was asked by a member of the House whether it covered all the papers on the Clerk's table, the certificates of the Governor, the certificates of the Secretary of State and all other papers on the subject; and when the gentleman from Virginia found that it did cover all these papers, he withdrew his resolution. Now, when he (Mr. R.) proposed his resolution, he made use of the terms "elections, returns, and qualifications," because he thought they were the appropriate terms. contended that the House had again and again exercised judicial power. When the question in regard to the Pennsylvania election came up, the Clerk, by the consent of the House, read the credentials on both sides. He did not adjudge whether Mr. INGERSOLL or Mr. NAYLOR was entitled to the seat, but the House decided that Mr. NAYLOR was entitled to his seat. The gentleman from Virginia had said on yesterday that the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. NAYLOR) could not be turned cut except by a vote of twothirds; but, sir, how did he get into his seat