Independent Treasury—Mr. Cooper.

issued was disparaged; the order of things was reversed; the banks first interposed to advance and prop individual credit; now individual credit is the sole support of bank credit. Why is this? I answer, it is because the banks have issued and put in circulation as money that which, not being money, is based upon and governed by somethey were bound to surrender at a moment's warning.

In 1835 the circulation rose to $103,000,000, and the deposits $83,000,000; specie to $43,000,000. The next year, and the year after, circulation rose to $140,000,000 and $149,000,000, deposits to $127,000,000; while the specie was reduced from $43,000,000 to $37,000,000. This brought about the suspension and all our distress, pressure, hard times, &c. The reasons why, I shall soon explain, if they are not already made manifest.

Here you perceive that the circulation rose to a ruinous height, being carried up by the deposits at the same time that the specie was diminished. We expect to show hereafter, that of the $149,000,000 of circulation then out, from $30,000,000 to $40,000,000 was issued on a false basis, or, in other words, on the fund of the depositors.

From 1837 to 1839 $43,000,000 of the deposits were used. This produced the contraction and pressure now felt; for it reduced the circulation in one year $58,000,000. This was not produced by a reduction of the specie basis, since it was diminished that year only $2,500,000.

In 1839 the banks made a powerful effort to reinstate the circulation to what it was in 1837. To effect this they added $10,000,000 to their specie in one year, and carried it to $45,000,000, far beyond what it ever had been. They were unable, however, to expand beyond $107,000,000, for the deposits did not rise above $90,000,000 and a small fraction.

This effort resulted in a further contraction in the circulation of $21,000,000 from 1839 to 1840; hence the deposits fell from $90,000,000 to $75,000,000.

Hence you perceive, sir, that what was true of the United States Bank as a manager of your funds, proved to be true of all the banks, particularly after the removal of your money from the former to the latter.

One fact let me call your attention to here. It is this: from 1834, the time the transfer of public money commenced from the United States Bank to the pet banks, to 1837, the time when the transfer was fully made, the aggregate expansion was $55,000,000. The amount of deposits transferred in this time was $52,000,000.

Again, from 1837 to 1840 the whole of the deposits were taken away, distributed, and used up, so that this year we have an empty Treasury. The aggregate amount so used and taken away is $52,000,000 in this period, (precisely the same that was put there from 1834 to 1837,) and the contraction was $63,000,000, a little more than the expansion, as might have been expected.

Here, sir, is a vibration in the circulation in six years from $94,000,000 to $149,000,000, a corresponding one in the deposits, while specie did not go to greater extremes than from $37,000,000|| and $45,000,000 in five of those years.

Do not all these facts conclusively establish the proposition I have laid down? They do. What, then, has been the effect of this policy of the banks?

1. An expansion and contraction of $55,000,000 from 1834 to 1840. The expansion put forth $55,000,000 of bank credits bearing no interest, issued on the faith of the deposits, to be substituted for the like amount of individual credits bearing interest and made payable to the banks, but resting, in seven cases out of ten, on the uncertain results of a speculation on any subject that might promise a speculation.

2. The contraction sent the bank notes home for redemption, which, being deprived of the public funds on which they were issued, were thrown for support on the notes of individuals received in exchange. These individuals having failed to realize the speculations, for the sake of which they bartered bank notes substituted for their own, failed to pay. A suspension was the consequence. The $85,000,000 of bank paper thus

||

3. The individuals upon whom rested the redeemable power of the $55,000,000 of bank issue, rose up as one community and petitioned the banks to suspend. Why? Because it was their own case. An extension to the banks was an extension to themselves. It was their case in a tenfold degree. It was virtually a case between these bank debtors and the community, who hold bank bills as money-a case in which the bank debtor had this advantage: if the banks should suspend he might gain, but could not lose. The community were certain to lose, and could never gain. He might buy at discount bank notes with which, at par, he could pay his own. Community lost the discount, but never shared the premium. It is more than equivalent to a voluntary act of bankruptcy, for it enabled a man to stop payment, keep his property, and pay his debts at twenty-five cents in the dollar. It was a copartnership in which one of the firm was bound to share the loss, having no portion of the profits.

4. Another effect was that in the excitement of this expansion you created an artificial demand for money, which tempted out of its proper channels that capital which, being needed, was habitually used in the regular course of trade, and consequently kept on deposit with the banks. The abstraction of this and its diversion to unwise, uncertain, hopeless, helpless, and useless speculations, tended, like the "removal of the deposits," primarily to embarrass the banks, to test the soundness of their issues, and to make manifest (what existed before, but was unknown) the derangement of the currency.

5. One more effect I will speak of. In a crisis like this, in which the bank debtor had the decided advantage of community, and community has sustained loss without a gain, the banks had the advantage of both. If their bills depreciated, they would send into the market and buy them up; if they were forced to redeem, they too could force their debtors by a contest with them. By the power they possessed over the money and the credit of the country they had the whole property interests at their mercy.

Other and more remote effects of this unlawful and destructive use of public money I will point out hereafter, because my constituents are more interested, if possible, in them, and being more hidden, they are not so easily detected. For the present I will here set down to this account all the evils, moral, physical, commercial, and political, of a vitiated and debased paper currency.

I say, sir, this system of issuing upon and being governed by the public funds, is unlawful. You gave the stockholders a charter for a capital of commanding amount, $35,000,000. For what purpose? Was it not that it might be able, by the extent of that capital, to furnish a circulation large enough to spread over your Union?

For seventeen years they overlooked the consideration that their capital was large, and governed their circulation by the amount of money you let them keep; and your experience proves that if, by this bank you would furnish a circulation, you must not only give a charter with controlling capital, but you must habitually keep on deposit your money to the amount of bank circulation to be supplied. Did you not expect that in its bills you would at all times find a uniform and safe medium of exchange, North, South, East, and West? What do you see? Its capital loaned out or invested; its amount of specie inadequate; its circulation unsound, being based on and erned by your own money; irredeemable and debased; its affairs in a condition that (to use the words of its president, spoken in regard to the country at large)" all the banks in the Union cannot save it from bankruptcy."

gov

With a charter the most liberal; a capital the most commanding; stockholders, foreign as well

HO. OF REPS.

as domestic, lords and ladies, dukes and earls, plebeians and patricians, widows and orphans, and capitalists, great and small, operating twenty years, with an average annual Government deposit of nine or ten millions, free of interest, you have seen pressure after pressure, expansion and contraction repeated, till at the wind up it ends in discredit and bankruptcy, to the confusion of its friends and mortification of its administrators. Sir, we have seen its evils. Where are its benefits?

But, sir, gentlemen say our accumulated evils that elicit such loud complaints are the effects of the measure on your table. How can it be? It has not yet begun to operate. If it does go into operation it can only take from the banks that which does not belong to them. If they have not used them as a basis of issue, their removal cannot prejudice the circulation. If they have, the responsibility is on them, and the country will call them to answer for all the mischief.

What, sir! has it already come to this, that at this early period of our history the people dare not attempt to use their own money, deposited in bank for safe-keeping, without receiving through their agents insult and indignity at the hands of these corporate powers? Is it not enough that they have had the use of $10,000,000 for twenty years free of interest? Or must the people, in demanding their money, be told they shall suffer and be pressed until they not only withdraw the demand but grant this corporation all it asks? Sir, I trust there is patriotism and fortitude in the people to endure awhile until they shall be rid of this system of Hamilton and all its evils and abuses.

This system, Mr. Chairman, is thus shown to be unlawful and injurious, both in theory and practice. Its unconstitutionality is so well estab lished by my colleagues, who spoke in support of this bill, that any argument of mine is super

seded.

Who, then, is at a loss to assign the true causes of the hard times and the derangement in the currency? If there be one so willfully blind, so persevering in his purpose not to see, as to affect unbelief with these bank statements before him, let me call that one's attention to one more fact drawn from the two bank statements now before me, and already referred to. In 1833, when the deposits were removed from the United States Bank, they amounted to $12,752,543, which left of that bank's circulation $12,000,000 in round numbers resting on the deposits for support.

The funds were transferred to the pet banks in 1834, 1835, and 1836, during which time their circulation was increased to $55,000,000 without a corresponding increase of capital. This, added to that of the United States Bank, makes the sum of $67,000,000 of circulation in 1837, most of which rested on the $12,000,000 of Government funds. But the Government, in the next two years, used this fund and left (as appears this year by the undenied statement of the gentlemen from Maine and Pennsylvania, both on the Ways and Means Committee) an empty Treasury-a condition enviable to freemen.

Where is the power to redeem this fifty or sixty millions of irredeemable paper? It lies in the sweat of the brow, or under the sheriff's hammer. What will be the cost of redemption? Much toil, large amount of interest, or a great sacrifice of property. Who must endure the toil? The laboring man. Who pays the interest? The community pays it; whether debtor to the banks or not, they pay the tribute. Who will say what shall be sacrificed on property? I answer, the banks, and they alone.

It is not in the power of this bill to affect either. What if the banks had not used the Government funds to loan its credits on, how could the taking or using of it affect the bank debtors or community otherwise than beneficially? So long as you pay in gold and silver you cannot affect the measure of value between me and my customer, nor can you, by that, increase or lessen my power to accumulate by the sweat of my brow or by the exertion of my talents.

It is the maladministration of the banks, then, that has induced hard times; a maladministration, too, in that particular wherein this bill alone, by effecting a total divorce, can effect even the in

26TH CONG....1ST SESS.

ducement to a remedy. Then let us have it; by all that is good and wise and charitable and patriotic and merciful, let us have it.

You now see, Mr. Chairman, that, under the operation of this great Federal measure of Alexander Hamilton, your public money has been habitually used by the bank for its own purposes; and when you would demand it, or offer to change your policy to one more safe and certain, all your public agents are denounced by the bank and its adherents as disorganizers.

I now propose to show what has been the cost of this bank system to the people in a pecuniary point of view. The average deposit on which the people received no interest for twenty years was $10,000,000; interest on this at six per cent. per annum is $600,000. This is annually sunk by the lying idle of that amount on deposit. But as a substitute for it, and to render it active, they say, the bank issued its notes and loaned them to the people, for which it made the people pay six per cent. more, which is $600,000. In these two items of expense the loss in one year is $1,200,000. Add to this the wear and tear, and loss by fire and water on bank notes, and the like by forgery, and you have some idea of the actual and unavoidable annual expense of keeping up this system. It will not fall short of $1,500,000 per annum, or $30,000,000 in the twenty years. This is what the free people of this country have paid to the banks. For what have they paid it? For no other purpose than to receive it and pay it out to them. What benefit has the bank derived? First, $600,000 yearly in interest; secondly, the profit by destruction of its bills, &c.; and lastly, the profits on exchange, in which it was enabled, by the deposits, to deal to the best advantage, the sum of which I am unable to state here; but on any estimate they must be great.

Other expenses incident and contingent to this system, corresponding to such as have been charged to the sub-Treasury bill, might be mentioned.

the account.

In this estimate, made by me before the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. SERGEANT] spoke, I have the high gratification to say, on his authority, that every item named is properly included in For, he on similar data has endeavored to exhibit the expense of the sub-Treasury scheme, and I congratulate myself when I find that after being so fortunate as to adopt his mode of investigating and his plan of argument, the balance, on the score of economy alone, after including all his incidental and contingent items, and excluding mine, is at least $500,000 annually in favor of the plan I advocate. Now, add to this the contingent and unavoidable items incident to the bank system, to wit, the depreciation or loss on paper money from time to time by which arise the fluctuations in value and prices, and you will have at least a loss of ten per cent. on the amount of deposits, or $1,000,000.

To what end, sir, is all this to be suffered and submitted to, but to perpetuate the Federal plan of Hamilton; to establish a bank with its arrogant and domineering power over you to rule your Government, dictate its revenue, direct its expenditure, appoint your President, use your money, change your Constitution, mold your policy, control your trade and commerce, and finally to de

clare war and make peace?

Mr. Chairman, if it was right to remove the deposits, it is more abundantly proper to keep

them out of the banks.

Here, sir, I plant myself triumphantly on the ground once occupied by a distinguished Representative of Georgia, (George R. Gilmer,) at a time when, being about to measure arms with the bank, your late President, Andrew Jackson, the only man who could “take the responsibility," seized the only measure to succeed, and dared to remove the deposits.

Governor Gilmer then made an argument which, in many features, is extremely pertinent now. Some of those arguments, if applied here, enforced by the energy and sincerity of Mr. Gilmer, would be to my colleagues who oppose me here as burning firebrands, the scorching effect of which could only be avoided, as they now seek to avoid this, the true issue, by getting out of its way.

Independent Treasury-Mr. Cooper.

On that occasion Mr. Gilmer made the following remarks, among others.

Speaking of the safety of the public funds, which is one of the leading objects of this bill, Mr. Gilmer said:

"If safety had been the sole reason for placing the public money in the bank, it might have been permitted to remain in the hands of the collectors or receivers, or placed in the Treasury, where money had never yet been placed."

Speaking of the Secretary's reasons for removing the deposits, he said:

"He differed with him as to the sufficiency of all the reasons which he had assigned, except that which charged the bank with producing commercial embarrassment by withholding the accommodations from the people which the possession of the public deposits enabled it to give." He here charges that the bank held and used the public money as a means of power to effect its object. He said:

"He was resolved not to be drawn aside from the course of his remarks by the extraordinary arts which had been used by the advocates of the bank and those who were zealously engaged in the struggle for party, to persuade the people that the restoration of the deposits had no connection with the recharter of the bank. He should not degrade the cause of truth and of his country by entering into such a controversy. To be convinced that the recharter of the bank was connected with the restoration of the public deposits, it is only necessary to trace out the conduct of the bank, and what must obviously be its future course. The end of a bank was to make profit. The charter of the bank was near expiring. To obtain a recharter was greatly more important to the bank than any profit which could be derived from its ordinary business. All its operations of late had been and would continue to be directed to the accomplishment of that purpose."

Sir, it has become my duty to "trace out the conduct of the bank," and I have now shown that his every charge is true. He, in 1834, preferred the indictment. In 1840 4, bearing the same relation to the grand inquest, have adduced the proof.

In 1834 "the advocates of the bank, zealously engaged in the struggle for party, used extraordinary arts to persuade the people that the restoration of the deposits had no connection with the recharter of the bank."

Mr. Gilmer, in sovereign contempt for those "acts," said "he would not disgrace the cause of truth and of his country by entering into such a controversy." To be convinced of it, it was only necessary "to trace out the conduct of the bank," and see that "all its operations of late had been directed to the accomplishment of that end."

Sir, at this very day the same party, represented by some of the same men, are "advocates of the bank, "zealously engaged in the struggle for party. They use the most "extraordinary arts" to persuade the people that this bill has nothing to do

with "a recharter of the United States Bank."

I will not "degrade the cause of truth and of my country" by entering into such a controversy; but to convince all concerned I have "traced the

conduct" of that bank, and have proved that it used the public money and directed all its late operations to the accomplishment of its purpose.

In 1840 I find myself at the same point where Mr. Gilmer made battle in 1834. I have the same party on this floor to fight against, and the same men of that party; I fight with the same weapons, under the same banner, with the same purpose; and, furthermore, I have the same allies, (saving and excepting always a certain very distinguished Senator,) and what do I perceive? Why, sir, within sixty days past I perceive those who in 1834 scorned the "arts" used by the advocates of the bank "to persuade the people to believe a lie," who refused to "degrade the cause of truth and of their country" by discussing these attempts to deceive the people, now that I have the conduct of the bank," and proved all "traced Mr. Gilmer then said to be true, marching in allignment with that party which he then fought. Yes, I behold among them my colleagues, interposing in behalf of that party to arrest my arm, to foil my attack, weaken my defense, or turn the edge of my weapons. Sir, they invite me to enlist with them and fight with other weapons, under another banner. Being zealously engaged in the struggle for party," they use very "extraordinary arts to persuade the people" that the sub-Treasury has no connection with the restoration of the deposits or charter of a bank. They now strive to convince me that it will not degrade the cause of truth and of their coun

66

HO. OF REPS.

try" to enter into such a controversy. Sir, unwilling as I am to deal a single blow at them, still I strike for the cause of truth and of my country.

Mr. Gilmer further said:

"After the President had put his veto to the bill for a recharter, did the bank commence the gradual reduction of business, with the view of closing its concerns? Assuredly not. By enlarging its accommodations from $45,000,000 to $70,000,000, it proved its determination to buy up popular favor for its candidate for the Presidency; that its life might, at the end of four years, be renewed for twenty more. This attempt to bribe the people had proved as great a failure as the effort to deter the President from vetoing the bill for a recharter."

Are not the party, which then and now advocate a bank, that thus attempted to "bribe" the people and "deter" the President, the same which I oppose now? Is not the candidate which was

then in the field the candidate who has now my opposition? And do not my colleagues support him?

"If the positions which be had assumed were true, (and they seemed to him to be self-evident,) the distress could only have been brought about by the Bank of the United States. It might not be possible to trace out with exactness all the means which had been used by the bank for that purpose; the curtailment of its issues from $70,000,000 to $52,000,000, with the great and increasing effort which the friends of the bank had made to produce alarm and general distrust of credit, (unparalleled in the history of banking,) was, he believed, the true cause of most of the commercial embarrassment which had been felt in the country.

Here Mr. Gilmer, in 1834, assigning the true causes of the embarrassment of the country, charges it to the United States Bank, and never intimates a charge against the Government, or the President, who removed the deposits. The causes that produced it then, continued to operate till 1840, and are now the causes. Speaking of the consequences of rechartering the banks, Mr. Gilmer said:

"Such an institution would necessarily have the power of rendering the Government, in some degree, subsidiary to it in time of war, and of changing, at its will, the price of all property by its command of the currency. There were other objections to which he desired to call the special attention of the friends of constitutional liberty and the rights of the States. He urged the friends of the rights of the States to resist every attempt to confirmi to the United States its usurped power over the money of the people by the recharter of the bank. The effort must be made now or never. Unite the bank and the Government for twenty years longer, and the advocation of the rights of the States would become folly. Upon this question was formed the first marked distinction between the Federal and anti-Federal parties; between the advocates of the individual freedom of the citizen and the advocates for controlling power in, the Government."

Here, sir, are plain truths, strongly told in Mr. Gilmer's proper style. Is it not strange that Staterights men are unwilling to resist the attempt now making at a United States Bank, and are willing to abandon the "advocation of the rights of the States," or lie down under this charge of "folly," by resisting the only policy that can supersede a bank, and opposing the only party that will vote against it?

"It was with regret that he found many of those who professed the same general political opinions with himself separated from him upon the subject of the proper dispo» sition of the public deposits and the reebarter of the United States Bank."

If permitted, I will join in this expression of regret. The proper disposition of the public deposits is still the question, and so is the bank. In 1834, there were three plans: first, the United States bank; second, the pet banks; third, the subTreasury.

The Federalists took the first, and still adhere to it. The Conservatives, with General Jackson's party, tried the second, and have given it up as the worst of all. And the State-rights men of the South took the third, or sub-Treasury, but, strange to tell, very many of them give it up just as we are able to try it, mainly to preserve that consistency of position in reference to men, and unite with that party who adopted the first plan; who, being placed in power, will unite the bank with the Government, and then, as Mr. Gilmer said, "all advocation of the rights of the States will become folly."

Mr. Gilmer said:

"He but discharged the obligation he owed to those he represented, when he urged them not to be carried off from the maintenance of the rights of the States and the people by the contest for power among the ambitious aspirants for the first office of the country."

26TH CONG....1ST SESS.

So we all "urged," so I still urge. Nevertheless, it is true that very many of our State-rights men have changed their policy in this regard, and are willing to enter into "the contest" for the first office in the country, and elect that man and put in power that party who were in 1834, and still are, the "advocates of the bank," and who, being in power, will" charter a bank" and there by render the "advocation of the rights of the States folly.'

"The bank was now curtailing its business, either with the view of its approaching end, or for the purpose of distressing the people. If for the purpose of closing its concerns, the deposits could be of no advantage to it; if with

the design of distressing the people, in order to procure a recharter, could Congress aid such a purpose by placing the public money in its hands? He should not only oppose the restoration of the deposits to the Bank of the United States, but every other measure which had for its object the recharter of the bank."

I know, sir, that the grand measure of those who oppose the bill on your table is that which "has for its object" the charter of a United States

Bank, and that without this bill a bank will be adopted. No gentleman of intelligence and candor now doubts or will deny it. This bill merely proposes to put the money "in the Treasury where it never yet has been," as Mr. Gilmer said, and where, as he also said, it will be more safe.

After concluding this speech, the ablest he ever delivered, Mr. Gilmer offered a series of resolutions, strong and emphatic; among others, this:

"Resolved, That the creation of a national bank, or the recharter of the present Bank of the United States, is not only an exercise of power not authorized by the Constitution, but dangerous to the individual independence of the people, to the power of the States to resist the usurpation of their rights and to the continuance of our preseent free institutions."

Sir, Mr. Gilmer is well known as a fearless defender of truth, and I hope these sentiments will be appreciated.

On the same occasion, another son of Georgia, (Colonel Seaborn Jones,) then a Senator, distinguished himself by one of his ablest efforts; to which, owing to the shortness of my time, I am only permitted to make a general reference. He and Mr. Gilmer sustained General Jackson in refusing to restore the deposits. These two Representatives of Georgia were of the State-rights party. In doing what they then did, they did and said as much to conflict their party prejudices and party principles as we do now in supporting this bill; and yet that party, with all their opposition to what was esteemed a high-handed move in the President, sustained them, while now we are denounced. How does it happen?

Sir, I beg pardon for the question; it is for the people of Georgia to answer, not for you. That people will furnish the answer when they reflect and know that the issue is now what it then was, what it has continued to be, bank or no bank. That then the party, without controversy, was anti-bank; but that now, in action, a bold, talented, and intolerant influence for the bank shows its front, which then was forced to lie behind a screen. That is the solution. And no man of common candor and ordinary perception who has spent one season in New York, Philadelphia, and Boston, with privilege of a seat here and an in- | sight into the principles and action of the Staterights party in Georgia, can for one moment deny the assertion that the great issue now is, what Governor Troup declares it to be, "bank or no bank.

Mr. Chairman, having, as I think, demonstrated the truth of my first proposition in regard to practical banking in this country, pointing at some of its actual and comparative evils when contrasted with the measure on your table, I now proceed to a second. It is this:

When the money deposits are abstracted, thereby removing the basis of issue, resort is had to public stocks or corporation stocks or produce going to market to furnish a basis.

This, too, may be proved by the bank reports or statements already referred to, and that of the United States Bank of Pennsylvania, which I now exhibit. I consider it as little more than the

March, 1836 $18,155,396

July 4, 1836

July, January, 1837

11,447,968 17,251,165

1837

$26,800,000

36,146,587

26,230,468 21,917,081 30,515,730

$29,008,111 $29,422,189

Statement from the Pennsylvania Bank of the United States for 1836 and 1837.

The bank returns for 1838 and 1840 show these

several items to be what I here exhibit them to be. (See Reports to the Treasurer and Hazard's Statistics, volume two, page 170.)

In the estimates I make, I use, in some instances, round numbers, as the object is merely to arrive at a principle of action.

I said, sir, that, after the deposits were removed, the bank resorted to stocks or produce as a basis. You will observe by the column of" loans and discounts," in the tabular statement first referred to, that in 1831 the sum was $44,000,000, and by July, 1832, it rose to $67,000,000. The expansion was $23,000,000. Mark this sum. On what kind of securities was it, personal securities or on stocks? We shall see presently. From this time till 1836, (the expiration of the charter,) this item fluctuated from $45,000,000 to $60,000,000.

I now call your attention to the table just before us, that of the Pennsylvania Bank of the United States.

HO. OF REPS.

and other securities," for that peculiar item does not figure in the previous statements of the United States Bank, while the deposits flourished. In July, 1837, it is first set down, and at the outset it is $26,000,000; in November, 1838, it is $24,000,000; February 1, 1840, it is $21,000,000. "This is for three years. What is the average? Twentythree million dollars. Now, what did I show the expansion in 1831 and 1832 by the United States Bank in loans and discounts? It was $23,000,000. Here is a coincidence, at least, from which I draw the just inference that stocks were resorted to as a basis of issue. How was it done? Why just as our southern banks issue on cotton, which my colleague from Glynn says is the proper basis. The stocks are shipped to Europe, put in market for sale or an advance, and the proceeds become the basis of exchange, which the bank sells for a profit. With the proceeds of its exchange the bank redeems its notes, or more frequently makes a second issue.

The result of this operation tempted corporations and States to go in debt more than they could pay; their stocks have consequently sunk below the advance price, and the bank not only suspends, having no redeeming funds, but fails to pay both here and in Europe, as Mr. Biddle's bank did.

After "stocks" failed, the next, and really a more reliable pretext for a basis of circulation, was that which my colleague thinks the true one"produce." If this were of uniform value, as gold and silver, it might in a degree answer, but it is not. Hence the result was the same as that on the operation on stocks. The bank, like all speculators, was liable to break.

As regards the produce and the owner of it, they are, by the operation, placed in the predicament of the people and the public deposits. The banks use it and them to make interest and discount account rise, and to realize exchange on. But the planter or merchant dare not withdraw it or control it, lest he should bring about a suspension and a pressure. In the South the planter begins to understand this, and I doubt not the western wheat-grower or stock-drover has had a taste of it. The United States Bank fairly tried cotton as a basis. The fate of that experiment was, no doubt, an addition to the "other liabilities" of the bank, and a loss to the planter.

Either of these expedients to support bank issues results in this: that these corporations issue notes, not on their money or capital, but on the public money, that of others, or the products of labor, and on these issues make profit out of the very men who furnish the capital; and what do these men receive for it? Paper, sir, at twenty cents in the dollar, exchange at ten per cent. premium, after a suspension and pressure. They entail on posterity the inheritance, not of freemen, but of slaves.

Mr. Biddle, too, tried this basis of produce, and went into the cotton region, and that and his stock

ing to those of the United States Bank. The specie, if any, divided, I presume. But as the deposits and specie together could not support a circulation of $18,000,000, it had to look out for the ways and means. Hence, first, it makes the United States Bank owe it $29,000,000, and, in turn, admits itself debtor to the United States Bank $29,000,000.

Now, sir, are you not ready to ask how it could so suddenly put $18,000,000 in circulation? I understand both these concerns were kept in one building. How else could it be done, except by paying that amount of its notes to the United States Bank for such an amount of its 'notes? How else could the United States Bank become so suddenly indebted to this new concern just going into operation? What was this for? It was done, sir, to put the notes in circulation, instead of the United States Bank, whose charter had expired. And why this large mutual indebtedness of $29,000,000? Merely that each might have the notes of the other to pay with. Accordingly, we saw the new bank selling the notes of the old in Georgia at five and six per cent. premium. This, sir, was but an egg-shell con

cern.

Now, notice the column of "discounts on stocks

out a third attempt at a blow, which is always the last, to wit: his drafts on the future unknownI mean post notes.

In 1837, 1838, 1839, and 1840, they are enumerated by proper names-" post notes."

In 1840, also, you find another item, called "other liabilities," after naming every sort you could conceive. The sum of these is that unfortunate amount of $26,000,000, put forth originally in 1832, no doubt, for the twofold object of supplying the deposits and stimulating the people to oppose Jackson, who removed them, and Mr. Gilmer, who would not restore them.

Now, Mr. Chairman, you talk about "experiments upon the currency." This bank has experimented in all ways. The last is the worst, but the first led to it. The banks have the currency in their own hands. Jackson, with all his strength, was powerless in any attempt to injure the currency. The only necessary effect of all he did was to prove its unsoundness, develop the causes, and suggest a remedy, so far as the affairs of the people were concerned. That remedy is on your table. That, too, is powerless, except to prevent mischief that might result from an improper use of the public money by those who habitually control the currency, and through the