26TH CONG....1ST SESS. acted over here a hundred times in varied forms during the last four years, though under the operation of gags which for refinement of absurdity can pretend to no equality with this. But, Mr. Speaker, there is another view in which the infringement of right by the rule in question appears yet more flagrant. It really amounts to an enactment by this House that no petition for the abolition of slavery or the slave trade shall be received. It seems, I know, to be otherwise. But it seems one thing while it is another; for, after the enactment of the farce which the rule contemplates, the petition is still left in the hands which presented it. This is the inevitable result from the nature of the proceeding. The order is, not that the petition shall be laid upon the table, but that the question of its reception shall be thus disposed of. But does the laying of the question of reception upon the table amount to the reception itself? It seems to me that this involves a manifest contradiction; for, if such is the effect of laying that question on the table, then it puts the House in possession of the petition, and thus accomplishes the very thing which the motion to lay the question of reception on the table was intended to prevent. The result to which this process of reasoning brings us is in accordance with the fact; for in point of fact the petition does not pass out of the hands of the member presenting it until the quietus is given to the question whether it shall pass out of his hands and be received, by the vote to lay that question on the table. All that has ever passed from the member to the Clerk is the mere annunciation of the petition. Nothing is, in fact, received but annunciation. The petition, therefore, in point of fact, as well as in contemplation of parliamentary law, remains in the hands of the member presenting it. So, then, whatever may be the strictly parliamentary result of the magic operation of this rule, the substance of it, all can see, is, that the petition has, to all substantial purposes, been rejected, and the petitioner treated with contempt. ABRIDGMENT OF THE RIGHT OF PETITION. The petitions being thus left in the hands of the members presenting them, we are brought to the main objection, namely, that the effect of the rule would be to abridge the right of petition. The Constitution (Article one of the Amendments) declares that: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." "Petition." What is it? To ask for something desired; and to ask of some being, individual or aggregate, who has ears to hear. It is essential, then, to the enjoyment of the right of petition that the petitioner should have access to the ear of power. It would be a mockery for power to say the right is perfect, and yet shut itself up beyond the reach of the vision or the voice of supplication. "The eyes of the Lord are upon the righteous, and His ears are open to their cry." What would the privilege of prayer be worth if the ears of divine mercy were not "open?" "Oh Thou that hearest prayer,' the exclamation of David. It has hence become a part of the description of the Almighty that He is the hearer of prayer. was Suppose we draw a line around this Capitol, and say to the people, hitherto may you come with your petitions, but no further; and then tell them that they still have the right of petition because they have the use of pen, ink, and paper, and may draw up their petitions. Would not this be an insulting mockery? If they may not come within that line, or, what is essentially the same thing, if they may not get their petitions to our ears, might they not just as well send them to the British Parliament as to send them here? Abolition of Slavery-Mr. Slade. in that case, to all practical purposes, the hearing and considering of the prayer is refused. Whatever speculations there may be as to the critical construction of the rule, every petitioner will see and feel that his petition is rejected. The language of the proceeding is, we will not hear you! If this does not abridge the right of petition, I should be glad to learn what would abridge it. Mr. Speaker, if we make the order now contemplated, how long think you will it be before we shall be called on to make an order that no petition touching the subject of slavery shall be presented here? Nothing would be more natural than such a transition; for, in the first place, the adoption of the rule now proposed will evince that there is no want of a disposition to go further, if necessary; and in the next place it will increase the disposition of the people to petition; and they will petition until, to get rid of the annoyance and to avoid the moral influence of the annunciation of their petitions here, their very presentation will be suppressed. And next will come a law making it penal to present such petitions. Let no one start at this suggestion, for such a law would not be a plainer violation of the Constitution than was the bill which came near passing the Senate, prohibiting the transportation of abolition papers by the mail. The rule before us may seem to some a very small affair; but smaller encroachments on popular rights than this have grown to a fearful magnitude. The history of all usurpations shows that the disposition for encroachment uniformly increases with its acquisitions of power. The voraciousness of appetite is augmented by the aliment on which it feeds. Sir, it is like the letting out of waters. There was a striking example of this in my own State. A few boys thought to have a little amusement by cutting a trench in the bank of a large pond, that they might see the discharge of the water into an adjoining ravine. The trench was cut, and the water began to run. But their amusement was soon changed into terror, for the running water gradually found its way to the quicksand, when the channel suddenly deepened, the earth trembled, and the boys escaped for their lives; while the rushing waters swept away the carrying before it trees, fences, mills, and dwellbank, and the whole pond soon moved onward, ings, in wild and wanton desolation, until it reached a neighboring lake. HO. OF REPS. petition! How bitter would be the cup, returned to their own lips, which they are now endeavoring to force to the lips of others! I have spoken of petitions from the South; but the application may be made to petitions from other quarters; to petitions, for example, from the North and East for an increase of duties for the protection of their industry. By and by, petitions may come pouring in here for an investigation into the corruptions and abuses of the Executive Government, (and I tell you, sir, they will come, unless abuses and corruptions are speedily checked,) and then it will be very convenient for power to take shelter behind such a sweeping rule as this. The fear of excitement is now a prominent reason for suppressing petitions; then it will be a fear of exposure! But while I am contending for the right of petition, and maintaining that the reception of petitions ought not to be refused, I do not claim that this shall be regarded as a rule without any exception. I admit that this House, as well as every other legislative body, may entertain the question of reception, not, however, in the form now contemplated, by a sweeping rule, but upon motion as petitions may be presented. This the English rules of parliamentary practice, which we have adopted, clearly recognize, it being required by them that, "regularly, a motion for receiving it [the petition] must be made and seconded, and a question put whether it shall be received." The same right to entertain the question of reception is also recognized in the standing rules both of the Senate and of this House, each of them providing that "a brief statement of the contents" of petitions "shall verbally be made by the introducer;" and the former adding, expressly, that this shall be done "before any petition or memorial shall be received and read at the table." The right of petition, thus recognized in the Eng. lish and American parliamentary law, is founded in the obvious necessity that every legislative body should have the power of self-protection from abuse and insult, assailing it under the sacred garb of petitions for redress of grievance. There should also be a power of rejecting promptly all petitions for absurd, ridiculous, or impracticable objects, presented in a spirit of mere wantonness, examples of which will readily occur to every one. There is perhaps another ground on which the reception of petitions may be refused; and that is the unconstitutionality of the action which they ask Congress to take. This power is liable, how. ever, to great abuse, and should be exercised, as should the power of rejection in other cases, with extreme caution. The unconstitutionality of the action prayed for should be flagrant and unde Such was the emptying of Glover pond. It is but a faint emblem of what we may expect, if we let out the waters through the channel we are now cutting. Sir, our motto should be, obsta principiis, stand upon your principles. In such a case, let there not be the slightest abandoment of them; let no suggestions of temporary expediency beniable; since, in questions between freedom and listened to for a moment. Let it be remembered that the course which may be now adopted as an expedient to suppress the utterance of hostility to slavery may hereafter be drawn into a precedent to justify attempts to suppress the popular voice on other subjects, and that thus, gathering strength, encroachment may go on from conquering to conquer, until it shall sweep away the whole barrier which the Constitution has interposed as a security to the right of petition; and with it, at last, all the guarantees of popular rights. Mr. Speaker, the principle we are about to adopt has immense bearings. Let its tendency be well considered. There is no matter of public concernment to which it may not be made to apply; no great interest in the country which it may not reach. Suppose the South should, at some future time, find it necessary to petition for a reduction of a high tariff; what would hinder the application of the principle of the contemplated rule (which might have gained great strength by use) to that case? And how would southern gentlemen feel to be met here by the application and enforcement In defining the right of petition I have antici- of such a rule as this? How would they like a pated, to some extent, the question whether it sweeping order, under which the petitions of would be abridged by the adoption and enforce- their constituents should be considered as objected ment of the proposed rule. That rule, as I have to, and considered as laid upon the table? What shown, in effect refuses the reception of the peti- demonstrations of indignation and wrath might tion and leaves it in the hands of the petitioner; not be expected; and especially from the Repreor, if I am not correct in this view of the effect of sentatives of that State (Virginia) in which orithe rule, and under it the petition must go to theginated the amendment of the Constitution extable, it is substantially the same thing, because pressly inhibiting an abridgment of the right of power construction should always lean in favor of the former. Such clear and undoubted cases, would be, for example, petitions that Congress would establish a religion by law, or abolish the trial by jury, or grant titles of nobility, or per manently suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, or pass a bill of attaindes, or an ex post facto law. Prayers for such objects would clearly not be for a "redress of grievances." The grievance would rather be that Congress should be compelled to receive and consider such peti tions. In making the admission that the reception of petitions may be refused on the ground of the clear and undoubted unconstitutionality of the action prayed for, I have done it, knowing of course that it is on this ground that the reception of petitions praying for the abolition of slavery is objected to. I am willing to meet the question of reception with this incumbrance, if it be an incumbrance; for I intend before I shall have done to urge reasons and present authority in support of the right of Congress to abolish slavery and the slave trade here which shall put gentlemen upon showing, not merely that the constitutionality of such legislation is doubtful, but that it is not most clear and undeniable. I have admitted the exceptions to the general rule that petitions should be received and considered, not only from a regard to the principles which seem to demand them, but from a regard to the right of petition itself. My very desire to maintain the sacredness of the right leads me to 26TH CONG.... 1ST SESS. desire that it may not be incumbered with a claim to unlimited license. Thus limited and guarded from abuse, the right of petition is, next to the right of suffrage, the most important and efficient of the political rights secured to the people. It carries with it a tremendous power; for though it wears the modest garb of a right to request, it really possesses, by its moral influence and by the consciousness of responsibility which it awakens in the representative body, the power almost of command. The right of suffrage can be exercised but periodically, that of petition continually. It is a standing constitutional medium of communication from the people to their representatives. Its sacredness should be guarded, therefore, with the most wakeful jealousy; and it is thus guarded. There is no right concerning which the people are more jealous than this. Wo, wo, to the Representative who, under any pretense, however specious, treats it with contempt. To associate any cause, no matter what, with a practical denial of this right, will be sure to bring it into discredit, if not to overwhelm it with ruin. Thus far, Mr. Speaker, I have spoken of the proposed rule in reference to its application to petitions. But there is a class of papers to which it will apply, of a very different character. I mean resolutions of State Legislatures touching the subject of slavery. Such resolutions I now hold in my hand, adopted by the Legislature of my own State at its last session, and which it is my purpose to present to this House as soon as it shall be in order to do so. Under the operation of the proposed rule the reception of those resolutions will be "considered" as objected to, and the consideration of their reception will be considered as laid upon the table! Abolition of Slavery-Mr. Slade. that the States to whose jurisdiction the territory In the next place, it extends to "all cases what- And this extent of the power of its legislation HO. OF REPS. adoption of the Constitution. Virginia authority, I think, must be good here on this subject. On looking into these debates, I find that the clause of the Constitution now in question was objected to by several leading members of the convention, expressly on the ground of the unlimited extent of the power which it conferred on Congress. Mr. Grayson said that, "after mature deliberation, he could not find that the ten miles square was to be looked upon even as part of a State; but to be totally independent of all, and subject to the exclusive legislation of Congress." Mr. Mason said "this clause gives an unlimited authority, in every possible case, within the District." Patrick Henry called it "unlimited, unbounded authority." Mr. Madison, who participated in the debate, admitted the correctness of the construction to which I have referred by replying to the argument against the adoption of the Constitution, thus drawn from the "unlimited, unbounded authority" which is conferred, that "there must be a particular cession by particular States of the District to Congress; and the States may settle the terms of the cession," and "may make what stip But further. Look at the sweeping language I have thus shown, from the express language of the Constitution, from the necessary exclusiveness of the jurisdiction of Congress, from the language of the grant of power in this case, in contrast with the other grants of power, from the absence of everything from the Constitution which can enable us to determine what exercise of legislative power, if any, shall be excepted from the grant in question, and from contemporaneous construction, that Congress possesses the consti tutional power to abolish slavery and the slave trade in the District of Columbia. Now, sir, I put it to the State-rights members Now, why was the language changed in the And now, Mr. Speaker, let me show you what of this House, as well as to all others, whether seventeenth clause of the eighth article, from the construction has since been put upon this grant they are ready to adopt a rule which shall thus specification, as in the previous sixteen clauses, by Congress, by committees of Congress, by act on resolutions of the sovereign States of this of particular cases in which Congress might legis- members of Congress from slaveholding States, Union. The States do not present themselves late, to the general grant of power to legislate by the people of this District, and by men now here in the attitude of petitioners; they are sov- "in all cases whatsoever?" Why did not the Occupying the highest stations in this Government. ereign States; they ask nothing; they exercise the seventeenth clause also specify the particular cases On the 1st of March, 1816, the House of Rep. right of resolving, and of making known to us in which Congress might legislate for the Dis-resentatives, on motion of Mr. Randolph, of Virtheir wishes. Such is their true character and trict? No other answer can be given to this ques-ginia, passed the following resolution: position. We are not at liberty to assume the tion than that it was intended to grant all legislative possibilty of their passing any resolutions which power; to make no exception; to leave nothing this House can rightfully refuse to receive, either for the control, either of the people of the District, on account of their manner or their matter. And, or of any other power; so that the great design sir, in accordance with this view of their character of setting apart a separate district for the seat and their relation to this body, I shall, when I of the Government of the United States might be present the resolutions to which I have referred, fully answered; namely, that of having it subannounce that I present resolutions of the Legis-jected to the jurisdiction and control of no other lature of the State of Vermont, which, in the name of that State, I demand to have read and considered. And now, sir, I again ask, will State-rights gentlemen vote for a rule which shall cast down the sovereign States of this Union from the high and independent position they thus rightfully occupy when their resolves are presented for consideration here? Sir, they cannot, they will not do it. POWER OF CONGRESS TO ABOLISH SLAVERY AND BIA. I come now, Mr. Speaker, to a grave and important question, namely, that of the constitutional power of Congress to abolish slavery and the slave trade in the District of Columbia. The right to adopt the rule before us, and thereby reject all petitions and other papers touching that subject, is claimed on the ground that no such power exists. I have asserted that it does exist, and I will now proceed to prove it. All power over this subject is derived from the grant of power in the Constitution, which declares (section eight, article one) that "Congress shall have power to exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever over such district (not exceeding ten miles square) as may, by cession of particular States, and the acceptance of Congress, become the seat of the Government of the United States." What is the extent of the power of legislation here granted? In the first place it is "exclusive." There is no other concurrent jurisdiction. To the full extent of its power of legislation, whatever it may be, Congress excludes all other legislation, so power. But again: if the power of Congress to legislate for the District is limited, who is to determine what the limitation shall be? Why exclude the subject of slavery rather than any other subject? Ifall cases whatsoever" mean only some cases, who is to determine what those some cases are? One may exclude slavery; another the matter of the currency; another the prohibition of lotteries; another the suppression of dueling; another of gambling; and another the power to punish crimes. What is right? Who shall determine? Who can determine? Mr. Speaker, if we leave the plain, intelligible terms of the grant of power in this case and resort to implication, we leave a solid rock for the trembling quicksand, which will sink beneath us. But do any still doubt with regard to the completeness of the power of Congress over this District? If my reasoning has failed to convince them, let me call your attention to the exposition given to this clause of the Constitution by distinguished men at the time of its adoption. Mr. Madison has been justly styled the father of the Constitution. In the forty-third number of the Federalist, speaking of the clause in question, he said: "The indispensable necessity of complete authority at the seat of Government carries its own evidence with it It is a power exercised by every Legislature of the Union, I might say of the world, by virtue of its general supremacy." "Complete" was the simple, significant, comprehensive term used by Mr. Madison to express his idea of the power. Let me next turn to the debates in the Virginia convention, during its deliberations upon the "Resolved, That a committee be appointed to inquire Into the existence of an inhuman and illegal traffic In slaves, carried on in and through the District of Columbia, and to report whether any, and what, measures are necessary for putting a stop to the same." This resolution, it will be observed, did not contemplate the mere regulation of the slave trade, but the annihilation of it. Nobody can pretend that the action of Congress which the resolution contemplated did not involve the whole question of slavery here, the power to abolish the slave trade manifestly including the power to abolish slavery. The committee appointed under this resolution were Messrs. Randolph and Kerr of Virginia, Maryatt of South Carolina, Goldsborough of Maryland, and Hopkinson of Pennsylvania. This committee, four of whom were from slaveholding States, manifested their concurrence with the House in its acknowledgment of the power of Congress over the subject of slavery by asking for authority to send for persons and papers, which the House granted. The committee on the 30th of April reported sundry depositions taken by them, which were ordered to lie on the table. And here terminated the whole proceeding. Although Mr. Randolph on offering the resolution urged the necessity of immediate action, and declared that " if the busi ness was declined by the House he would undertake it himself, and ferret out of their holes and corners the villains who carried it on," yet "the business" was never prosecuted beyond the taking and reporting of the depositions, which deposi tions, by the way, are not now to be found on the files of this House! The zeal of Mr. Randolph and of the committee appears to have suddenly evaporated! They dis covered that they were attacking the " patriarchal institutions," and shaking what has since been called "the corner-stone of our republican fice," and desisted! But they showed, and the House showed, that they considered the power of Congress over the subject of slavery here to be as complete as over any other subject. 26TH CONG.... 1ST SESS. Abolition of Slavery-Mr. Slade. On the 11th of January, 1827, the Committee for the District of Columbia, by their chairman, Mr. Powell, of Virginia, said, in a report to the House: "The Congress of the United States has, by the Constitution, exclusive jurisdiction over this District; and has the power upon this sub- | ject, (the imprisonment of free negroes as runaways, and their sale into slavery,) as upon all other subjects of legislation, to exercise unlimited discretion.' "Unlimited" was the very word used by Patrick Henry in the Virginia conven-manding legislative redress." tion to express his idea of the extent of the power. I come now to a still more distinct recognition of the power for which I contend. pate the slaves in the District of Columbia, or, if you prefer it, to emancipate those born hereafter." From these recognitions of the power in question I turn to admissions of the power by the people of this District. On the 9th of January, 1829, the House of Representatives, on motion of Mr. Miner, of Pennsylvania, adopted the following resolution: "Resolved, That the Committee for the District of Columbia be instructed to inquire into the expediency of providing by law for the gradual abolition of slavery within the District, in such a manner that the interest of no individual shall be injured thereby." This resolution was passed by a vote of 114 to 66; and it is worthy of remark that, of those who voted in the affirmative, eleven were from the slave States, namely, one from Delaware, two from Maryland, three from Virginia, one from North Carolina, one from Tennessee, and three from Kentucky. On the 29th of January the Committee for the District of Columbia reported a bill, providing, among other things, that no slave should be imported into the District; and that upon such importation the slave should be free, on leaving the District within ten days. Of the committee of seven who thus recognized the power of Congress over the subject of slavery here, there were four from slave States, namely, two from Virginia, and two from Maryland. It further appears that on the 20th of April, 1830, a similar bill was reported by Mr. Washington, of Maryland, chairman of the Committee for the District of Columbia. In April, 1836, Mr. Pinckney, of South Carolina, chairman of a committee on abolition, read the following resolutions: "Resolved, That Congress possess no constitutional authority to interfere, in any way, with the institution of slavery in any of the States of this Confederacy. "Resolved, That Congress ought not to interfere, in any way, with slavery in the District of Columbia," Here, again, the power to legislate on the subject of slavery here is clearly admitted, by the marked difference in the phraseology of the two resolutions, the first expressly declaring that Congress have no constitutional power to interfere with slavery in the States, while the second merely declares that Congress ought not to interfere in this District, omitting all reference to the Constitution. In accordance with these proceedings, which show the recognition by the House of Represent atives and its committees of the power in question, is the presentation by members of Congress from the slave States of abolition memorials, namely: In the year 1802 the grand jury of the county of Alexandria made a formal presentment of the slave trade as a "grievance." Having described the trade with its horrible, heart-rending atrocities, they say, "We consider these grievances de Let me stop a moment to consider the language of this presentment-"grievances!" We have been told that slavery and the slave trade here are no grievance whose redress can be prayed for, because Congress have no power over the subject. Not so thought the grand jury of Alexandria. And then, again, we are told that slavery and the slave trade are no grievance to the people of the North, because their interests are not affected by them. How were the interests of the grand jurors of Alexandria affected by what they presented as a grievance? It did not take away their property, it did not destroy their health, or endanger their lives, but it outraged their feelings, and therefore it was a "grievance." It outrages the feelings of my constituents, and therefore it is a grievance to them. It is an outrage committed under the authority of the laws of Congress, for which they share a responsibility, and therefore they ask for their repeal. But I have in my hand a still stronger expression on the subject from this District. It is a memorial earnestly praying for the abolition of slavery and the slave trade here, signed by more than eleven hundred citizens of the District, presented to Congress in 1828, among the signers of which were Chief Justice Cranch, Judge Morsell, and General Van Ness, besides a large number of others of the most intelligent and respectable of the inhabitants of the District. And now, sir, listen to the expression of their opinion upon the power of Congress. After describing in glowing language the horrors of the slave trade here, comparing it with the foreign slave trade, denounced and punished as piracy, and speaking of " the reproach of inconsistency cast upon the free institutions established among us," they say: "We behold these scenes continually taking place among us, and lament our inability to prevent them. The people of this District have, within theinseives, no means of legislative redress; and we therefore appeal to your honorable body as the only one invested by the American Constitution with the power to relieve us." Two years after the presentation of this memorial, namely, in January, 1830, the grand jury of the county of Washington expressed their conviction of the power of Congress over this subject in a communication addressed to the chairman of the Committee for the District of Columbia, in which they gave an appalling description of the slave trade, and declared that the inhuman practice is so shocking to the moral sense of the community as to call loudly for the interposition of Congress." By Mr. Rhea, of Tennessee, January 14, 1822, Let me present you, Mr. Speaker, with the from citizens of that State, for the gradual aboli- additional testimony of two distinguished men, tion of slavery in the District of Columbia. and I shall have done with the question of conBy Mr. Saunders, of North Carolina, Decem-stitutional power. I refer to the declarations of ber 13, 1824, from citizens of that State, praying the two highest officers of this Government. for the gradual abolition of slavery in the United States. By Mr. A. H. Shepperd, of North Carolina, March 30, 1828, from citizens of that State, praying Congress to take measures for the entire abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia; and By Mr. Washington, of Maryland, March 5, 1830, from inhabitants of the county of Frederick, in that State, for the same object. To these expressions of opinion by individual members of Congress from slave States I add that of Alexander Smyth, of Virginia, in the debate on the Missouri question, in January, 1820, in which he said: "If the future freedom of the black is your real object, and not a mere pretense, why do you not begin here? Within the ten miles square you have undoubted power to exercise exclusive legislation. Produce a bill to cmanci In the United States Senate, on the 1st of February, 1820, in the debate on the Missouri question, Richard M. Johnson, of Kentucky, said: "In the District of Columbia, containing a population of thirty thousand souls, and probably as many slaves as the whole Territory of Missouri, the power of providing for their emancipation rests with Congress alone. Why, then, this heart-rending sympathy for the slaves of Missouri, and this cold insensibility, this eternal apathy toward the slaves in the District of Columbia?" And now I give you the testimony of the present Chief Magistrate of the United States, whom no one will suspect of a want of inclination to please the South, by denying the constitutional power of Congress over this subject, if it were possible to find even plausible reasons for such a denial. In a letter to a committee of gentlemen in North Carolina, of the 6th March, 1836, Mr. VAN BUREN said: "I would not, from the lights now before me, feel myself safe in pronouncing that Congress does not possess the power of abolishing slavery in the District of Columbia!" HO. OF REPS. This was Mr. Van Buren's way of affirming the power of Congress to abolish slavery here. IS THE ABOLITION OF SLAVERY WITHIN THE COMPETENCY OF LEGISLATION? Having thus shown that the language of the grant of power to legislate for this District, necessarily, in the absence of express limitation, extends to every possible "case" of legislation, and that this is in accordance both with ancient construction and modern practice, I come to consider some objections which are urged against the exercise of the power. It is said that it is not competent for legislative power to abolish slavery; and that inasmuch as the grant of power to Congress must necessarily be limited to "cases" within the competency of legislation, therefore the "all cases whatsoever" of the Constitution cannot be taken to embrace the "case" of slavery. No legislative power is, I admit, competent to do everything. It cannot, for example, act by law upon the consciences or the faith of men; it cannot compel or sanction the commission of crime; it cannot enact that husbands shall not protect their wives, or that parents shall not provide for their children, or that female chastity shall be exposed to violation; and so of many other cases I might specify. It cannot pass such laws, for the very same reason that it could not rightfully pass the laws by which the slaves are holden here; and for the very reason why it is bound to repeal them, namely, because such laws are contrary to the great law of nature, which no human legislation may violate. But what is it to abolish slavery? Slavery, it should be remembered, is the mere creature of statute, or positive law. It is unknown to the common law. "It is," (said Lord Mansfield, near seventy years ago, in the celebrated case of the negro Somersett, which every lawyer has of course read,) "It is so odious, that nothing can be suffered to support it but positive law." What is it, then, to abolish slavery? It is simply to repeal the positive laws which sustain it; to open the foul dungeon, locked by the key of unjust legislation, and permit the slave to walk forth and breathe the pure, invigorating atmosphere of the common law. It is to restore to its just efficacy the great fundamental law of natural justice, on which the common law is founded; a law written upon every man's conscience, and in every man's heart. This Congress is called on to do by the petitions which we are now contriving means sumUnited States, and by them alone, that men are marily to reject. It is by the statute laws of the made slaves in this District. The Congress of the United States have passed laws repealing the law of eternal justice; and the petitioners ask us to repeal the repealing laws, and restore the law repealed to its full force and efficacy. They ask us to remove the crushing weight we have placed upon the soul and the body of the slave, and permit him to rise up and walk. They ask this in the name of justice. And are we to be told that we have no power to grant their request? Had we power to enact these laws? Where did we If the Constitution gave it, (which I get it? deny,) does it not give us power to repeal them? Have we power to pass a law making men the property of their fellow-men, and have we no power to pass a law restoring to them the ownership of themselves? Will any one talk of vested rights which we should thereby violate? I deny that there are, or ever can be, in justice, any vested rights in such a case. It has been said by a great statesman that" that is property which the law makes property." If by this proposition is meant that what the law makes property is property, according to law, I do not, of course, deny it. This would be merely saying that law is law. But if it is intended to affirm that what the law makes property is rightfully and justly property, then I deny it utterly. The law may make the declaration, and the power of the State may enforce it, and the community may, of necessity, submit; but, after all, it will be a mere law of force, and not of right, unless, according to the philosophy of the infidel Hobbes, "the sole foundation of right and wrong is the civil law." That is the philos 26TH CONG....1ST SESS. ophy for slavery, but not for the freedom which finds the rule of right and wrong in a higher law than that of the State. Let me test this proposition to which I have referred, by an example. Suppose we enact a law declaring that the first red man from the western wilds who may chance to fall within your power shall be your property; would our law make him property? Would not the voice of nature, and the voice of this nation, unite in thundering an indignant "no" to such an inquiry? Whence is derived the original idea of property? It is not the creature of statute law. There are no statutes declaring that lands and houses and cattle and the productions of human skill and industry shall be property. There are statute laws regulating their alienation and descent, but none declaring that they may be the subjects of || ownership by man. And this for the best of reasons. There is a law older than all human laws, and above all human laws, which has settled the || matter. It is the law of nature; which is nothing more nor less than the will of the great original proprietor. That proprietor never stamped on man the quality of property. He never authorized one man to own another man; nor did He ever authorize a Legislature to make a law giving such ownership. Ownership in man? You may as well talk of owning the stars or the sun. No. Man was made to be the owner of himself. Every quality of his noble nature, and every aspiration of his undying spirit, proclaim it. Having shown that the abolition of slavery is, upon the principles of natural justice, within the competency of legislation, let me advert, briefly, to the history of abolition to show how extensively these principles have been acted on. It may surprise those who habitually regard abolition as the mere fungus creation of moon-struck fanaticism to learn the extent to which its "abstractions," as they are called in derision, have been actually made the basis of legislation. I hold in my hand the fifth number of the AntiSlavery Examiner, in which I find the following very brief summary of the history of Abolition, which I beg permission to read: "The abolition decree of the Great Council of England was passed in 1102. The memorable Irish decree, that all English slaves in the whole of Ireland be immediately emancipated and restored to their former liberty,' was issued in 1171. Slavery in England was abolished by a general charter of emancipation in 1381. Passing over many instances of the abolition of slavery by law, both during the middle ages and since the Reformation, we find them inultiplying as we approach our own times. In 1776 slavery was abolished in Prussia by special ediet. In St. Domingo, Cayenne, Guadaloupe, and Martinique, in 1794, where more than six hundred thousand slaves were emancipated by the French Government. In Java, 1811; in Pinkney and Martin of Maryland, and Washington, Jefferson, Madison, Henry, Pendleton, Mason, Wythe, Lee, and St. George Tucker, of Virginia. I shall refer more fully to the declarations of some of them hereafter for another purpose. I will only here say that General Washington repeatedly declared that the abolition of slavery ought to be effected by legislative au-pated by the constitution of Indiana, adopted in thority," and that "at a period not remote." But I have further authority on this point in the action of this Government itself, to which I desire now to call your attention, and in which you will find the power of abolishing slavery exercised in cases in which it was much less clearly authorized than it is in the case before us. The abolition of the slave trade, no one will deny, involves the great principle of the right to abolish slavery. That trade, on the high seas, in American vessels, Congress has abolished, or attempted to abolish. It has authorized the commanders of its armed vessels to capture the slave ship, take from its owner his cargo of men, and bring in his vessel for condemnation and himself for trial as a pirate. Now, by what authority has Congress thus interfered to wrest from citizens of the United States men bought with their money? By what authority has it interfered with "vested rights?" By what authority does it thus take "private property?" Does the Constitution say that Congress may legislate in "all cases whatsoever" touching the African slave trade? No; it simply declares that "the Congress shall have power to regulate commerce with foreign nations." It is upon the foundation of this simple grant of power that Congress has reared its structure of slavetrade-prohibiting legislation, and has brought up, for the top-stone of the noble edifice, the punish ment of death. But further: Congress, by an act passed on the 7th of April, 1798, prohibited, under a heavy penalty, the importation of slaves from any place with out the limits of the United States into the Territory of Mississippi, and declared that, upon such importation, such slaves should be free. It also, on the 26th of March, 1801, enacted a similar prohibition of the importation of slaves into the Territory of Orleans, with a similar provision for their freedom. By what authority were these abolition acts passed? Simply in virtue of that clause of the Constitution which declares that "the Congress shall have power to dispose of, and make all needful rules and regulations respecting, the territory or other property belonging to the United States;" a power by no means as clearly reach Ceylon, 1815; in Buenos Ayres, 1816; in St. Helena, 1819;ing the "case" of abolition as that of legislating in Colombia, 1821; by the Congress of Chili in 1821; in Cape Colony, 1823; in Malacca, 1825; in the southern provinces of Burmah, 1826; in Bolivia, 1826; in Peru, Guatemala, and Montevideo, 1828; in Jamaica, Barbadoes, the Bermudas, the Bahamas, Anguilla, Mauritius, St. Christopher's, Nevis, the Virgin Islands, (British,) Antigua, Montserrat, Dominica, St. Vincent's, Grenada, Berbice, Tobago, St. Lucia, Trinidad, Honduras, Demerara, Essequibo, and the Cape of Good Hope, on the 1st of August, 1834. But waiving details, suffice it to say that England, France, Spain, Portugal, Deumark, Russia, Austria, Prussia, and Germany, have all, and often, given their testimony to the competency of the legislative power to abolish slavery. In our own country, the Legislature of Pennsylvania passed an act of abolition in 1780, Connecticut in 1784, Rhode Island in 1784, New York in 1799, New Jersey in 1804, Vermont by constitution in 1777, Massachusetts in 1780, and New Hampshire in 1784." Here, sir, are the "abstractions" of abolition, embodied in the legislation of Europe and America during the last five hundred years; and yet we are told that legislative power is incompetent to the abolition of slavery! To the evidence thus furnished of the recognition of the competency of legislative power to abolish slavery, by its actual abolition, I may add the admission of it clearly implied in the constitutions of five of the slaveholding States of this Union, namely, those of Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, Kentucky, and Arkansas, all of which expressly prohibit the Legislatures of those States from passing laws for emancipating slaves without the consent of their owners; thereby admitting that, without such prohibition, the power to pass such laws would exist. To all this I might add the authority of numerous distinguished names from among slaveholding statesmen and jurists of our country; such as "in all cases whatsoever" within and for the "ten miles square." "Let it not be said that the prohibitions to which I have just alluded were enacted under the authority of that clause of the Constitution to which I have before referred the abolition of the foreign slave trade, since the authority derived from that clause, to prohibit the importation of slaves, was prohibited to be exercised prior to the year 1808; while these acts prohibiting their importation into the Territories of Mississippi and Orleans were passed in 1798 and 1804. year 1816. How the case came up for adjudication in Mississippi does not appear. It was fully argued upon a motion for a new trial, and the court decided that the slaves were emancipated by the Ordinance of 1787. One of the points made in the case was, that whatever might be the effect of the ordinance, the slaves were emanci 1816 This was resisted on the ground that to give it such an effect would be to violate vested rights. The decision of the court on this point, coming from the highest judicial tribunal of a slave State, is worthy of special notice. Say the court "What are these vested rights? Are they derived from nature, or from the municipal law? Slavery is condemned by reason and the laws of nature. It exists, and can only exist, through municipal regulations; and, in matters of doubt, is it not an unquestioned rule that courts must lean in favorem vitæ et libertatis? Admitting it was a doubtful point whether the constitution was to be considered prospective in its operation or not, the defendants say, you take from us a vested right arising from municipal law. The petitioners say, you would deprive us of a natural right guarantied by the Ordinance and constitution? How should the court deeide, if construction was really to determine it? In favor of liberty." That the practical effect of the Ordinance was to emancipate the slaves within the Territory at the time of its adoption, (and that, too, let it be remembered, without compensation,) appear from the fact that slaveholders in the Territory petitioned Congress for a repeal of that part of the Ordinance touching the subject of slavery, upon the ground that it had such an effect. I refer to the memorial of "the inhabitants of the counties of St. Clair and Randolph," Illinois, presented to Congress on the 12th of January, 1796. It is an interesting document, embodying as it does the principal arguments now urged, and always urged, against the emancipation of slaves without the consent of their owners; and showing the tenacity with which slavery clings to its wrongful possessions. Let me state the substance of it. The memorialists declared the Ordinance to be contrary to a fundamental principle in all free countries, "that no ex post facto law should ever be made." They stated that they were, at the date of the Ordinance, possessed of a number of slaves, which the sixth article "seemed to deprive them of without their consent or concurrence;" and they complained that the effect of that article was to deprive them, not only of the slaves holden by them at its date, but, what was a great grievance, of the children of those slaves born after that date; their right to whom they affirmed, and, as I think, with great truth, to be as indefeasible as the right to their parents. They close their complaint by saying that, so far as it respected them, the Ordinance was altogether ex parte; and that, if they had been consulted, they would never have made a compact depriving them of their most valuable property. Such was the Ordinance of 1787; an Ordinance passed unanimously, with the exception of a single vote. It is worthy of remark that, although this Ordinance was drawn by a distinguished member from Massachusetts, [Mr. DANE,] yet the idea of abolishing slavery in the Northwestern Territory was originally brought out by Mr. Jefhis report as chairman of a committee of Congress ferson, having been suggested by him in 1784 in of a plan for the government of the Territory. And now, sir, by what authority did the Con western Territory? Was there any power to do it conferred by the Articles of Confederation which will at all compare with the authority given to Congress in the present Constitution to abolish slavery here? None will pretend it. And yet the Ordinance was passed and slavery abolIshed; so strong was the anti-slavery feeling of that day, so ready were the men of the Revolution to strain authority to the very utmost for the But there is a still more striking illustration of the pushing of legislation to "the verge" of constitutional power in favor of human liberty, in the celebrated Ordinance of 1787" for the govern-gress of 1787 thus abolish slavery in the Northment of the Territory of the United States northwest of the river Ohio." The sixth of the "articles of compact" of that Ordinance declares that "there shall be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude in the said Territory, otherwise than in the punishment of crimes." This article not only prohibited the future introduction of slaves into the Northwestern Territory, but, in effect, abolished the slavery which then existed there. This is sufficiently obvious from the terms of the Ordinance. And such is the effect which has been given to it by judicial decision. I refer to the case of Harvey and others vs. Decker and Hopkins, decided by the supreme court of Mississippi in the year 1818. (Walker's Reports, page 36.) This was the case of three slaves who had been taken by Decker from Virginia to the Northwestern Territory in 1784, where they remained until after the Ordinance of 1787, and until the purpose of banishing slavery from the land which freemen's blood had been profusely poured out to redeem from oppression's power. OBJECTION-PROPERTY CANNOT BE TAKEN WITHOUT PROCESS OF LAW, NOR WITHOUT COMPEN SATION. But it is said that the power to legislate" in all cases whatsoever" is restrained from abolishing slavery, by the fifth of the amendments to the 26TH CONG....1ST SESS. IMPLIED FAITH TO VIRGINIA AND MARYLAND. It is further objected to the exercise of our power of abolishing slavery and the slave trade here, that it would be a violation of the "good faith to Virginia and Maryland, implied in the cession and acceptance" by Congress to the ter Constitution, which declares that "no person the people of this District. This objection has ernment that the people should be acted on by If it be said that this construction would not make the Constitution prohibit individuals from depriving slaveholders of their slaves without process of law, I admit it. The guarantee extending, for the reason mentioned, in nowise to slaves, their owners" are, of course, left to their rights as existing independent of the guarantee. The honorable member from Georgia [Mr. COOPER] refers to that clause of the amendment which prohibits the "taking of private property for public use without just compensation," and finds in that an argument against abolishing slavery. "Is it pretended," says he, "that this If this reasoning be correct, the assent of the Government has a public use' for this prop- people of this District to the constitutional action erty?" Sir, I admit that abolition does not take of Congress is implied; and to require that it be for "public use." But I at the same time main-expressed asserts a principle which would absolve tain that it does not take at all, within the meaning of the Constitution. It performs a nobler work than taking slaves for public use. It takes off from them the crushing weight of laws which consign them, without compensation, to the use of others, and restores them to the use of themselves. This is abolition. But I have another reply to the argument drawn from the amendment of the Constitution referred to. It is, that the Government of the United States has always refused to recognize slaves "as property" for which compensation might be claimed under the Constitution. In numerous cases in which they were taken into the service of their masters as waiters, and killed in the service, has Congress refused compensation, though it has uniformly made it for horses and other property destroyed by the enemy while employed in such service. the people of the whole country from all obliga- And here it should be borne in mind that the But let us see how the new principle contended for is to be carried out. How is the new piece of timber to be put into the building which has been so "fitly framed?" they are called, and come to act, upon what prin- "Good faith implied in the cession and acceptance;" what does this mean? It must mean this: that there was something in the cession and acceptance, or in the circumstances connected with them, that raised a confidence in Virginia and Maryland that the Government of the United States would not abolish slavery or the slave trade in this District; this confidence, from whichever of these sources derived, carrying with it a corresponding pledge on the part of the United States that such action should not take place. Now, it is manifest that there could have been no such pledge implied, because there could properly have been none such expressed. Congress had no power to make such pledge. It would have been utterly void if fade, because the Constitution having given to Congress power to "exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever over the District, no one Congress can, by any act, restrict a subsequent Congress to the exercise of that power in some cases only; if it could, it would have the power to alter the Constitution by act of legislation. But, waiving this, let us look into the acts of cession and of acceptance, and see whether anything can be found from which the supposed confidence could be raised on one side, or the supposed pledge implied on the other. The acts of cession, one dated December 3, 1789, and the other December 19, 1791, are as follows: "Be it enacted by the General Assembly, That a tract of country not exceeding ten miles square, or any lesser quantity, to be located within the limits of the State, and in any part thereof, as Congress may by law direct, shall be, and the same is hereby, forever ceded and relinquished to the Congress and Government of the United States, in full and absolute right, and exclusive jurisdiction as well of soil as of persons residing or to reside thereon, pursuant to the tenor and effect of the eighth section of the first article of the Constitution of the Government of the United States." Such were the cessions. "Full and absolute right and exclusive jurisdiction of soil and persons residing or to reside thereon." And that there should be no hesitancy on the part of the United States to accept the cessions, on account of any supposed failure to make the grants they contained coextensive with the grant of power to Congress in the Constitution, it was added, "pursuant to the tenor and effect of the eighth section of the first article of the Constitution of the United States," The acts of Congress accepting these cessions are mere acts of acceptance, containing nothing which has the slightest bearing on the present There must, it is said, be an express assent of And then, in what form and under what cir- Congress has hitherto always proceeded on the CONSENT OF THE PEOPLE OF THE DISTRICT. It is in the next place said that Congress may not abolish slavery here without the consent of we have a right to exercise? Or what power are Now, what is there in these cessions and their acceptance to raise an expectation on one side, or imply a pledge on the other, that the power to abolish slavery was to become a practical exception from the "exclusive jurisdiction" expressed in the cessions, or from the authority to legislate "in all cases whatsoever," given in the Constitution, to which they refer? What sort of "good faith" is it which, in the face of so plain a grant of all power, excepts, without any language expressing or implying such exception, the important power now in question? Could not the ceding States have incorporated in their acts a proviso that nothing herein contained shall be construed to vest in the United States or to recognize, in any manner, the power to abolish slavery in the c ded territory? And shall they, having failed to nake or attempt to make such stipulation, now claim that it was implied in the cessions and acceptance of the territory? This omission to except the case of the abolition of slavery is the more significant because there was, in these acts, a reservation really made, namely, "that nothing herein contained shall be construed to vest in the United States any right of property in the soil, or to affect the rights of individuals therein, otherwise than the same shall or may be transferred by such individuals to the United States." Now, why was there not connected with this reservation the stipulation I have suggested in |