gaining fome benefit or advantage, or in the fear of falling into fome mifchief or inconvenience. Now the divine nature being perfectly happy, and perfectly fecured in its own happinefs, is out of the reach of any of thefe temptations. Men are many times tempted to evil very strongly by thefe confiderations; they want many things to make them happy, and they fear many things which may make them miferable; and the hopes of the one, and the fears of the other, are apt to work very powerfully upon them, to reduce them from their duty, and to draw them to fin: but the divine nature is firm against all thefe attempts, by its own fulness and fecurity. So that you fee now the propofition upon which the Apostle grounds his argument, is evidently true, and beyond all excep tion, that God cannot be tempted with evil. Let us then, in the

to it.

(2) Second place, confider the confequence that clearly follows from it, that becaufe God cannot be tempted with evil, therefore he cannot tempt any man For why fhould he defire to draw men into that which he himself abhors, and which is fo contrary to his own nature and difpofition? When men tempt one another to fin, they do it to make others like themfelves; and when the devil tempts men to fin, it is either out of direct malice to God, er out of envy to men. But none of thefe confiderations can have any place in God, or be any motive to him to tempt men to fin.

Bad men tempt others to fin, to make them like themselves, and that with one of thefe two defigns; either for the comfort or pleasure of company, or for the countenance of it, that there may be fome kind of apology and excuse for them.

For the comfort and pleasure of company. Man does not love to be alone; and for this reafon bad men endeavour to make others like themfelves, that agreeing with them in the fame difpofition and manners, they may be fit company for them. For no man takes pleasure in the fociety and converfation of those who are of contrary tempers and inclinations to them, because they are continually warring Nn3.

and

and clashing with one another. And for this reason bad men hate and perfecute thofe that are good: Let us lie in wait (fay they) for the righteous, because he is not for our turn, and he is contrary to our doings; he is grievous unto us even to behold; for his life is not like other mens, and his ways are of another fashion as it is expreffed in the Wifdom of Solomon. So that wicked men tempt others to fin, that they may have the pleasure and contentment of their fociety. But now for this reafon God cannot be imagined to tempt men to fin; because that would be the way to make them unlike himself, and fuch as his foul could take no pleasure in.

Another defign that bad men have in feducing others to fin, is thereby to give countenance to their bad actions, and to be fome kind of excufe and apo logy for them. Among men, the multitude of offenders does fometimes procure impunity, but it always gives countenance to vice; and men are apt to alledge it in their excufe, that they are not alone guilty of fuch a fault, that they did not do it without company and example; which is the reafon of that law, Exod. xxiii. 2. Thou shalt not follow a multitude to do evil; implying, that men are very apt to take encouragement to any thing that is bad, from com. pany and example. But neither hath this reafon any place in God, who being far from doing evil himself, can have no reafon to tempt others to do fo, by way of excufe and vindication of himself.

And when the devil tempts men to fin, it is either out of direct malice to God, or out of envy to men. Out of malice to God, to fpoil his workmanship, and to pervert that which came innocent and upright out of his hands; to rob God of his fubjects, and to debauch them from their duty and allegiance to him ; to ftrengthen the rebellion which he has raifed against God, and to make him as many enemies as he can. But for this end God cannot tempt any man; for this would be to procure difhonour to himself, and to deface the work of his own hands.

Another reason why the devil tempts men, ist en vy. When he was fallen from God, and happiness,

and

and by his own rebellion had made himself miferable, he was difcontented to see the happy condition of man, and it grieved him at his very heart; and this moved him to tempt man to fin, that he might involve him in the fame mifery into which he had plunged him felf. It is a pleasure to envy to overturn the happi nefs of others, and to lay them level with themselves.. But the divine nature is full of goodness, and delights in the happiness of all his creatures. His own incom parable felicity has placed him as much above any temptation to envying others, as above any occafion of being contemned by them. He grudges no man's happiness, and therefore cannot tempt men to fin out of a defire to fee them miferable. So that none of thofe confiderations which move the devil to tempt men to fin, and evil men to tempt one another to do wickedly, can be imagined to have any place in God.

And thus you fee the force of the Apoftle's argument, that because God cannot be tempted to evil, therefore he can tempt no man. None tempt others to be bad, but those who are firft fo themfelves. I fhall

now,

2dly, Confider the nature and kind of the argu ment which the Apostle here ufeth, Let no man fay, when he is tempted, I am tempted of God; for God cannot be tempted with evil, neither tempteth he any man. He does not reject this impious propofition barely upon his own authority; but he argues against it from the nature and perfection of God; and therein appeals to the common notions of mankind concerning God. We might very well have refted in his authority, being an Apostle commiffioned by our Saviour, and extraordinarily affifted and witneffed to by the miraculous gifts of the Holy Ghoft, wherewith he was endued. But he condescends to give a reafon of what he fays, and appeals to the common principles of mankind. For all men will readily agree to this, that God hath all imagi nable perfection: but it is a plain imperfection to be liable to be tempted to evil, and therefore God cannot be tempted to evil, And if fo, it is as impoffible

that

that he should tempt others to it; for none can have either an inclination or intereft to feduce others to evil, but thofe who have been firft feduced to it themselves.

Now in this method of arguing, the Apostle teacheth us one of the fureft ways of reafoning in reli gion; namely, from the natural notions which men have of God. So that all doctrines plainly contrary to those natural notions which men have of God, are to be rejected, what authority foever they pretend to. Whatever plainly derogates from the goodnefs or juftice of God, or any other of his perfections, is certainly falfe, what authority foever it may claim from the judgement of learned and pious men ; yea though it pretend to be countenanced from the texts and expreffions of holy fcripture; because nothing can be entertained as a divine revelation which plainly contradicts the common natural notions which mankind have of God. For all reafoning about divine revelation, and whether that which pretends to be fo, be really fo or not, is to be governed by thofe natural notions. And if any thing that pretends to be a revelation from God, fhould teach men that there is no God, or that he is not wife, and good, and just, and powerful, this is reafon enough to reject it, how confident foever the pretence be, that it is a divine revelation.

And if any thing be, upon good grounds in reafon, received for a divine revelation, (as the holy feriptures are amongft Chriftians), no man ought to be regarded, who from thence pretends to maintain any doctrine contrary to the natural notions which men have of God; fuch as clearly contradict his ho linefs, or goodnefs, or juftice, or do by plain and undeniable confequence make God the author of fin, or the like; becaufe the very attempt to prove any fuch thing out of the fcripture, does ftrike at the divine authority of thofe books. For if they be from God, it is certain they can contain no fuch thing. So that no man ought to fuffer himself to be feduced into any fuch opinions, upon pretence that there are expreffions in fcripture which feem to

countenance

countenance them. For if they really did fo, the confequence would not be the confirming of fuch opinions, but the weakening of the authority of the fcripture itfelf; for juft fo many arguments as any man can draw from fcripture for any fuch opinion, fo many weapons he puts into the hands of Atheists against the fcripture itself.

I do not speak this, as if I thought there were any ground from fcripture for any fuch doctrine; I am very certain there is not.. And if there be any particular expreffions which, to prejudiced men, may feem to import any fuch thing, every man ought to govern himself in the interpretation of fuch paffages, by what is clear and plain, and agreeable to the main fcope and tenor of the Bible, and to thofe natural notions which men have of God, and of his perfections. For when all is done, this is one of the fureft ways of reafoning in religion; and whoever guides himself, and fteers by this compafs, can never err much: but whoever fuffers himself to be led away by the appearance of fome more obfcure phrafes in the expreffions of fcripture, and the gloffes of men upon them, without regard to this rule, may run into the greateft delufions, may wander eternally, and lofe himself in one mistake after another, and fhall never find his way out of this endless labyrinth, but by this clue.

If St James had not been an apoftle, the argument which he used would have convinced any reasonable man, that God tempts no man to fin, because he cannot be tempted with evil himself, and therefore it is is unreasonable to imagine he fhould tempt any man: for he argues from fuch a principle, as all mankind will, at first hearing, affent to.

And thus I have done with the first thing afferted by the Apostle here in the text, That God tempts no man to fin. Let no man fay, when he is tempted, I am tempted of God: for God cannot be tempt ed of evil, neither tempteth be any man. Before I proceed to the fecond affertion, That every man is his own greatest tempter, I fhould draw fome ufeful inferences from what has been already delivered ::

but