Εικόνες σελίδας
PDF
Ηλεκτρ. έκδοση

Consul Cathcart is undoubtedly correct when he states that "two of our frigates and four gun boats would bring the Bashaw of Tripoli to terms :" but the propriety of his opinion, that it would be best to make him a voluntary present, may be questioned. If Malta should revert again to its ancient form of government, what could it avail us? what benefit have we ever expected from its. Constitutional hatred to Mussulmen?

[ocr errors]

Genoa has received a new master sufficiently majesterial, it is presumed, to protect her from Barbary insolence. This deprives them of a very considerable resource. All their booty in the Mediterranean is falling into the hands of abler freebooters. They must seek it then in foreign markets. It is no less the interest of all commercial Europe to point them to America, than it is theirs to take that direction.. We must either bribe their avarice or chastise their audacity. Giving only increases their avidity for more. We have the only alternative then to yield unconditional accord to their claims, or straighten ourselves up a little, and look them out of countenance. This position must at some period be taken. Does the present moment forbid it? or shall we wait a little longer till we shall have reinforced their navy by our naval and military regalia, until they become formidable to us? When we are unlading these regalia in their ports. Are we not shedding the blood of our countrymen? It is devoutly to be hoped that the United State may have the honor (very easily obtained) of setting the first example, among the tributaries, of chastising the insolence of their lords. If Tripoli persist, does not Tripoli invite the experiment; and is not the occasion à good one? Show him two or three of our strongest, best built frigates. Set life and death before him. Leave to him the choice. If he prefer the latter, give it him. There is nothing impracticable in the thing. The Turks are a contemptible military, and at sea, lubbers. I have, by accident, been three days and

two nights in one of their corsairs at sea. Our seamen of the north may give them cent per cent, in numbers, odds, and meet them on any ground of war, boarding excepted.

It would be well, on their return or passage out, that the frigates visit Tunis. I will invite the Sapitapa and a brace of the Bey's governors to dine in the Commodore. I will point them to his guns and say, "See there our executive power commissioned to keep treaties." Do these sentiments look hostile? They are the only sure guarantee of peace! All ra tional nature may be adduced to evidence it; and France besides. It is more strikingly true in a country where all respect is denied to every thing but arms.

Consistently with these sentiments therefore, the questions submitted by Consul Cathcart to the Consul General, O'Brien, and on which the opinion of this consulate is demanded, have received the following answers.

Ques. "1st. Whether it would not be to the interest of the United States to make the Bashaw a present, to content him at least till some of our frigates come into the Mediterranean ? if in the affirmative, to what amount ought the present to be made, that is, supposing there is no alternative ?"

Ans. I should not have intruded my counsel in any matters relative to your administration, had you not desired it.

The Bashaw of Tripoli has given written document as evidence of his entire satisfaction with the presents he has received from the United States as the condition of a perpetual peace. Whence then

arise these claims ? It is not sufficient that he asserts a right to be placed on a footing with the other Regencies. He may be informed that it is owing to the treachery of French agents that the latter have been so liberally paid. Were this otherwise, his claim is nevertheless inadmissible, being barred by

his own voluntary act. A demand, therefore, of this sort is at least an infringement upon the treaty.

But it is to be doubted whether any extension of the President's instructions may be construed to a discretion of giving or even stipulating additional presents. It is a latitude which seems not to have been intended, even in cases more pressing than the present. It is a happy circumstance for us, and ought to satisfy the Bashaw, that we are thus circumscribed. That the "Bashaw has condescended to beg a present," will not warrant us the discretion of giving.

To revert to your figure to Captain O'Brien, that "we are sentinels of an advanced picquet." It is our duty to give the alarm on an enemy's approach ; but by no means to concede one inch of ground which we are stationed to defend.

From these premises my opinion may be easily inferred; that the Bashaw of Tripoli must wait the answer of the President of the United States to his demands. And my opinion may be also as easily inferred, that the President will highly approve of your conduct in the mode you have adopted to resist, or at least to delay his claims, until such answer be received.

❝ 2d. Should any of our vessels be sent in here on any pretence whatever, and their cargoes condemned, how would you advise me to act? After such a violation of our treaty shall I refuse the Corsairs of Tripoli American passports, or shall I issue them as if nothing had happened ?"

Should an event of this kind happen, which does not, from any thing to be gathered from your communications, seem immediately to menace us, imperious circumstances must be yielded to, and the best provisions possible, made for the crews, until the result of the government be known: but, passports, being evidence of the good understanding subsisting between the Government of the United States and the Bashaw, cannot, in truth nor propriety be granted

after that good understanding shall be interrupted. Besides, this concession would furnish the enemy a decoy to entrap our merchantmen, and even our vessels of war, at the same time that it would shield the corsaires against reprisal from our ships of_war which might be detached on this very duty. Passports therefore, cannot be granted after an overt infraction, in fact, of the treaty, on the part of the Bashaw of Tripoli or his subjects.

"3d. Do you imagine that the Dey of Algiers would send four or five of his cruisers to demand any American vessels that might be captured? And if he would, would it not cost more to fee him than to content the Bashaw of Tripoli? I am of opinion that if the Dey of Algiers would take the above step, he would succeed; but all the letters in the world would at most produce only a civil answer, mixed with lies and prevarications.

I do not know how these conclusions, in answer to Mr. Cathcart's questions, may correspond with the feelings and decisions of government. If they betray some alkali, it is because the intemperance of the climate forces it.

The plague is every day becoming more serious. Our hope is in the approaching heat of summer. The last spring and present month of June, have been unusually cold and humid.

No precautions whatever are used by the ordinary Moors to prevent the malady communicating. Ask a Mussulman the cause of this neglect: "What" says he, "do you suppose I have lost confidence in God ?"

I have the honor, &c.
WILLIAM EATON.

Honorable Secretary of the United States.

To Mr. SMITH, MINISTER at LISBON.

Tunis, June 27th, 1800. To meet the extraordinary demands of the Bey of Tunis, I stated to government in terms which I supposed would attract some consideration, that a display of force would be the only effectual argument. The President has done me the honor of approving of my stile of conduct and communication, but has permitted the Hero, an old ship of between five and six hundred tons, navigated by twenty men, (only one of them a native of America,) mounting two four pounders, and but one barrel of powder, charged with a cargo upon which nothing less depended here than our peace, to leave New York without convoy for Tunis. Happily, she arrived; and the desired effect is secured, at least until the residue of the regalia arrive. But the weak, the crazy situation of the vessel and equipage tended to confirm an opinion, long since conceived, and never fairly controverted among the Tunissians, that the Americans are a feeble sect of Christians, and that their Independence was the gift of France. This opinion has been cultivated by our cidevant agent, a base slave of the projects of this court, and a remorseless traitor to his trusts. He has never ceased to thwart me; till at length his projects of injury against our citizens, and his personal insults to myself, became so glaring and insufferable, that, finding myself without support, at once to convince Tunis and its slaves that Americans are not entirely devoid of resentment, nor obliged to Frenchmen for independence, I gave him, (tell it not in Gath) at the marine gate, among an hundred people, the discipline of my horsewhip. This kindled the flame I intended it should. He summoned me to the tribunal of a pirate. I met him there : joined issue and proceeded to argument. The court, at the commencement of the action, was manifestly prepossessed in favor of the much injured Famin. My reasons to the Bey were laconically these. I

« ΠροηγούμενηΣυνέχεια »