[271 b] HOLLIS' CASE. Of the authority of the privy council and of their committee. [272] Star Chamber. Bill of forgery in the star by adding MEYRES' CASE. A bill of forgery fails, if the instrument produced in evidence does not contain all that is averred in the bill. THE attorney-general did inform against John Meyres, chamber, fails in the behalf of the Lord Digbie, supposing that he had forged a lease of divers lands, parcel of the possessions of Sherborne, being now his in the name of Sir Walter Rawleigh, when he had it. somewhat that is not in the writing. M. 17 Jac. Mc Nally 513. * The case now coming to the hearing, and being heard, it now fell out that the information said, that the lease was of divers things by name, whereof one piece of ground called Long Meare was one. Now the lease pretended and supposed to be forged, being produced, the ground called Long Meare was not contained in it, neither by name nor by general words, but all the rest of the things were in it. Now the defendant pleaded to the forgery 'not guilty;' and so the court adjudged that as the bill was laid he was not guilty; for it is not the same lease; and it was an unnecessary curiosity and specialty that marred the case; for being of a stranger's act, if it had been at the common law, he might have made his information general, that the forgery had been of some one parcel, whereof he had been most certain, (for some parcel certain there must be) inter alia; as hath been formerly adjudged and ruled in Patrick and Coke's case, to the like effect. LANCASTELL vs. SIDLEY. [272 a] If an executor obtain judgment upon an obligation made to the testator, and the Post. 282. 1 Cr. S. C. Debt must be in the 79. Ant. 264. STEPHEN LANCASTELL, executor of Richard Lancastell, Jenk. Cent.300. his father, did recover by a judgment in the king's bench, 225. 2 Cro.545. against Sir Ralph Sidley, a debt of one hundred pounds, upon escape, upon an obligation made by the said Sir Ralph Sidley to by executor, the said Richard, and four pounds for costs. Sir Ralph detinet. Hutt. Sidley afterwards was committed to Sir George Reinolds, 1 Saund. 112. n. being marshal of the marshalsey, in the execution of the said debt and costs, who suffered the said Sir Ralph Sidley to escape, the plaintiff being not satisfied of the said debt and costs; upon which escape the said Stephen, as executor of the said Richard, brought an action of debt of one hundred and four pounds, against the said marshal, and declared in debet and detinet: and upon non permisit ire ad largum pleaded by the said marshal, Stephen Lancastell, the plaintiff, had a verdict and judgment against the said marshal for one hundred and four pounds debt, and ten pounds ten shillings costs. The marshal, upon a writ of error, assigneth for errors, 1. That the said action, brought against him by the said executor, ought to have been in the detinet only, and not in the debet and detinet. Vide Co. lib. 5. 31. 2. That the said executor, in his declaration against the marshal, hath not showed forth the will of the testator, his 5 Co. 31. b. Ant. 38, 264. 2 Cr. 394. 3 Cr. 326. 1 Ro. R. Ant. 38, 218. cap. 8. 2 Cr. 36, 299. Ant. 233. Cr. Jac. 300. father, but concludeth his declaration with et inde produ- 2 Cr. 409, 412. cit sect., and doth not say et profert hic in cur. literas 3 Cr. 551, 592. testimentarias pred. Rich. Lancastell, &c. The judgment is reversed in the exchequer chamber. (1) (1) The doctrine of this case is in accordance with several decisions in the old books, but seems to be now overruled. Thus in Crawford v. Whittal, Doug. 4, n. (1.) which was an action of indebitatus assumpsit, brought by the plaintiff upon a foreign judgment recovered by him as administrator of one Hargrave, the defendant demurred specially to the declaration, because there was no profert of the letters of administration. Upon this point the court held that profert of the letters of administration was unnecessary, because, in this action, the plaintiff had no occa [272 b] sion to have described himself as administrator. So in Bonafous v. Walker, 2 T. R. 128, which was an action of debt against the sheriff for [273] Vide Residuum CLANRICKARD & ux. vs. SIDNEY. A grant of the grantor's estate of the third part of certain lands, for the life of the grantor, with a covenant for further assurance of his estate of and in the premises to the grantee, his heirs and assigns, conveys only one third part of the lands, and for the life of the grantor only. (1) If the grantor, at the time of such grant, was seised of the reversion of the whole estate, and after the determination of the preceding estate, bring his writ of formedon for the whole, and his grant of the third part appear of his own showing, his writ shall abate for the whole. But such defect is aided after verdict, by stat. of jeofailes, and the demandant may recover judgment for the other two third parts. The demandant, in a writ of formedon in reverter, need not state, in his count, any alteration in his estate, which does not change it so as to make it a different reversion from what it was before. The same sentence or clause in a deed may have different operations, according to the nature of the several things to which it is applied, and to carry into effect the will and intent of the parties. Particular covenants are to be construed with reference to the whole context and intent of the deed. If tenant in tail in possession, and tenant for life in reversion, join in a conveyance in fee, this is not a discontinuance of the estate tail, or forfeiture of the estate for life. THE demandant brings a formedon in the reverter of lands in Ewhurst and Salehurst, and declares, that Robert Earl of Essex, and Frances his wife, 33 Eliz., levied a fine thereof to Gerrard and Mill, which fine was to the use of Elizabeth Sidney in tail, the reversion to the Lady Frances, the demandant, and her heirs, and that Elizabeth is dead without issue, and that the right of the tenement is reverted to the Lady Frances, per formam doni. The tenant (1) See 16 Johns. 110, Jackson v. Stephens. 13 Mass. 464, Hapgood v. Whitman. vouches Richard Glyde and Kenrick Parry. The vouchees [273 a] confessed the seisin, fine, and use, ut supra; but they further say, that Elizabeth married Roger Earl of Rutland ; that the Earl of Essex died; and the demandant intermarried; and that they, for the consideration of money, did levy a fine of the said land (inter alia) unto Roger Ant. 24. Earl of Rutland, and his heirs, An. 3. Jac., by force whereof the Earl of Rutland was seised of the reversion of the tenement to him and his heirs. And then they add, that the said Roger and Elizabeth his wife, 7 Jac., levied another fine of the tenements to Caston and Screvin; which fine was to the use of the said Elizabeth and her heirs ; and then show, that the Earl Roger died, and Elizabeth died without issue, and that the tenements descended from her to the tenant Viscount Lisle, as her uncle and heir so this last fine was pleaded to bring the title of the reversion to the tenant. But all the case and questions of it arise from the two fines, 33 Eliz. and 3 Jac., saving that upon the fine 7 Jac. the supposed extinguishing of the estate, for the life of Roger Earl of Rutland, depends. The demandants reply as to one third part of the said tenement, that the said fine levied by the demandant to the said Roger Earl of Rutland, was to the use of the said Roger and his heirs, during the life of the said Lady Frances the demandant; and as to the other parts of the said tenements, the said fine was to the use of the said Lady Frances and her heirs. The vouchees rejoin to the third part, &c., that the use was to the earl and his heirs, and traverse the limitation during life. And to the two parts residue, they say, that the use was to the earl and his heirs, and traverse the use to the Lady Frances and her heirs. The jury find, as to the issue for the third part, the seisin of Roger and Elizabeth in tail, the reversion to the said Frances in fee, and that the demandant had no other estate in those lands in Ewhurst and Salehurst, (so no dower there ;) and then they find the indenture, 17 Jac. 3 Jac., between the demandant and the Earl Roger, for money, containing a demise and grant of their estate of [273 b] the third part of the said lands, (inter alia,) to Earl Roger and his heirs, during the life of the Lady Frances demandant, and the covenant to make and do such further reasonable acts and things as shall be reasonably devised for the better assurance, surety, and suremaking of their estate, of and in the said premises, to the said Earl of Rutland, his heirs and assigns as aforesaid, and the fine 3 Jac. upon it. And the jury likewise find, as to the issue of the other two parts, the entail and reversion, and no other title of the demandant, and the indenture of bargain and sale of the third part, and the covenant of further assurance, ut supra; and that there was no other agreement to lead the use of the fine but the said indenture. 1 C. 110. In the judgment of this case, I have considered these points. 1. What quantity of land contained in the fine, 3 Jac., doth pass unto the Earl of Rutland, unto his own use, and of what estate; and I am of opinion, that there passeth but a third part, and that but during the life of the said Lady Frances, notwithstanding the general covenant of the deed. 2. This being admitted, since the demandants have passed a third part during her life away, she cannot demand the third part, nor, by consequence, the whole, as she hath done, except by some means the estate given in [274] that third be determined and extinct, which is made a second point wherein I hold, that it is not extinct; but that the tenant in this action ought to hold the third part against the demandant, during the lady's life, and that she cannot maintain her formedon against her own conveyance. Out of this it will follow, that she must be barred of that third part of her own showing; for she hath expressly confessed, by her replication, her alienation of that third part during her own life, by the fine, 3 Jac. 3. But then the question is, whether she shall be barred only of that third part, and have judgment for the other two parts; or whether her whole writ shall abate, inasmuch as she hath, by her own confession, falsified her writ and demand of the whole, as she hath made it. And I hold, |