'attribute,' 'relation,' 'quantity,' 'quality,' &c. in the chapter on 'Nameable Things' is opposed to it. In fact, throughout his chapters on 'Terms' he recognises the distinction as applicable to abstract terms, and one single statement with 'probably' qualifying it does not certainly carry much of the weight of his opinion.

(2) Some Logicians hold that all abstract terms are singular. -“I should doubt," says Mr Keynes, "if any attribute can, strictly speaking, be conceived as many. An attribute in itself is one and indivisible, and does not admit of numerical distinctions 1." Mr Monck says, "Abstract terms would seem to be singular when considered logically 2."

(3) Some Logicians hold that all abstract terms are general in as much as an attribute may be possessed by each of a number of individual things.

(4) Some Logicians hold that abstract terms, like concrete, should be divided into singular and general. Mill says:-“Do abstract names belong to the class of general, or to that of singular names? Some of them are certainly general, I mean those which are names not of one single and definite attribute, but of a class of attributes. Such is the word colour, which is a name common to whiteness, redness, &c. Such is even the word whiteness, in respect of the different shades of whiteness to which it is applied in common: the word magnitude in respect of the various degrees of magnitude and the various dimensions of space; the word weight in respect of the various degrees of weight. Such also is the word attribute itself, the common name of all particular attributes. But when only one attribute, neither variable in degree nor in kind, is designated by the name; as visibleness; tangibleness; equality; squareness; milkwhiteness; then the name can hardly be considered general; for though it denotes an attribute of many different objects, the attribute itself is always conceived as one, not many 3." Hamilton says:-"The

1 Formal Logic, p. 11.

2 Introductive Logic, p. 102.

3 Logic, p. 30.

notion of the figure of the desk before me is an abstract ideaan idea that makes part of the total notion of that body, and on which I have concentrated my attention, in order to consider it exclusively. This idea is abstract, but it is at the same time individual; it represents the figure of this particular desk, and not the figure of any other body 1."

Ueberweg says:-"The general conception (in opposition to the individual conception) is not to be confounded with the abstract (in opposition to the concrete, see § 47). The divisions cross each other. There are concrete and abstract individual conceptions and concrete and abstract general conceptions?."

It is evident that the question as to whether the distinction of singular and general is applicable to abstract terms cannot be satisfactorily solved without stating clearly as to what is meant by a singular and what by a general term. If a singular term is a name applicable to one object of thought, and if a general term is a name applicable to each of a number of objects of thought, then the distinction is certainly applicable to abstract terms: for attributes as well as phenomena and substances may be objects of thought; and an abstract term, like a concrete, may be a name of one object of thought or a name of each of a number of objects of thought. The abstract terms, for instance, “the figure of the desk before me," "the colour of the rose near me," "the solidity of this stone," as well as 'squareness,' 'equality,' 'visibleness,' &c., are each of them applicable to one object of thought -to a single definite individual attribute, while the abstract terms 'relation,' 'quality,' 'quantity,' 'figure,' 'attribute,' 'virtue,' &c., are each of them applicable to each of a number of objects of thought, that is, to each of a class of attributes: 'relation,' for example, is a name applicable to any relation whatever,-succession, coexistence, resemblance, difference, &c.; 'quality' is a name applicable to any quality of any object whatever.

1 Lectures, Vol. 1. p. 287-8.

2 Logic, p. 127. See also pp. 114-115.

According to some Logicians, abstract terms, when they become general, pass into the class of concrete terms. In other words, there is no absolute distinction according to them, between abstract and concrete terms, between attributes and things. The same term may be abstract from one point of view and concrete from another point of view; and the distinction between abstract and concrete terms is only a relative one. This question can not be satisfactorily solved without stating clearly as to what is meant by an abstract term and what by a concrete term. The definition of a concrete term as 'the name of a thing,' is of course ambiguous; for the word thing may mean either a substance, or a phenomenon, or an attribute possessing another attribute. The definition of an abstract term as 'the name of an attribute' is also ambiguous; for the word attribute may mean simply an attribute, or an attribute possessing another attribute, or an attribute of an attribute, apart from the substances or phenomena in which they exist.

Terms expressive of phenomena are usually regarded as concrete. A phenomenon is a thing as it appears to us. It is a change of a thing, thought of with reference to the thing. It is, in fact, the thing in the state of that particular change. The terms, for instance, 'the rising of the sun,' 'the boiling of water,' 'the anger which I felt yesterday,' 'the present state of my mind,' &c. are concrete: 'the rising of the sun' means ‘the sun in the state of rising'; 'the boiling of water' means 'water in the state of boiling.' If the appearances of things are thought of, or signified, apart from the things, then they really become the attributes of those things. Terms expressive of mere appearances, circumstances, or aspects apart from things, should be regarded as abstract: 'the rising of the sun' would be abstract, if it simply meant the circumstance or aspect of rising apart from the thing 'sun'; 'the boiling of water' would be abstract, if it simply meant the appearance or state of boiling apart from the thing 'water.' But this is a matter on which there may be difference of opinion; and until the terms 'concrete' and 'abstract' are more definitely defined,

I do not think there can be any satisfactory solution of the difficulty.

§ 5. The fourth division of terms is into positive, negative, and privative. A positive term signifies the presence of an attribute or a substance; a negative term, its absence; a privative term signifies the present absence of an attribute and implies the capacity for it. For example, 'man' and 'human' are positive; 'not-man' and 'not-human' are negative; and 'blind,' 'lame,' &c., are privative. The term 'pleasant' is positive, 'not-pleasant' negative, while 'unpleasant' would seem to be positive as signifying not merely the absence of pleasure but the presence of some positive pain; 'convenient,' 'not-convenient,' and 'inconvenient,' 'moral,' 'not-moral,' and 'immoral' are likewise positive, negative, and positive respectively. 'Organic' is positive and 'inorganic' negative; 'metallic' and 'metal' are positive, while 'non-metallic' and 'non-metal' are negative; 'wise' is positive and 'not-wise' negative, while 'ignorant' might be regarded as negative or privative according to circumstances. It is evident from the examples given above that these terms may be concrete or abstract,-concrete when implying the presence or absence of things or substances, and abstract when of attributes only.

§ 6. The fifth division of terms is into correlative and absolute. A correlative term is a name of an attribute or substance implying another attribute or substance. It implies another term related to it. Both in relation to each other are called correlatives. For example, 'father' and 'child,' 'husband' and 'wife,' 'greater' and 'less,' 'cause' and 'effect,' 'murderer' and 'murdered,' are all pairs of correlatives, one member of a pair implying the other member. An absolute term is, on the other hand, a name of a substance or attribute, which does not imply another substance or attribute, as 'water,' 'air,' 'horse,' 'tree,' 'the solar system,' 'gold,' 'silver,' ' bird,' 'flower,' 'body,' 'man.'

§ 7. The next and last division of terms is into connotative and non-connotative. "A connotative term is one which denotes a subject and implies an attribute, By a subject is here meant

anything which possesses attributes 1." 1 A subject may be a substance, a phenomenon, or an attribute possessing another 'attribute./A connotative term has, in fact, two significations or | meanings, one direct as applied to subjects, that is, to things or objects of thought possessing attributes, and the other indirect as implying attributes. For example, the term 'man' is connotative, inasmuch as it signifies directly each of an indefinite number of things or substances called men, and connotes or implies, at the same time, an attribute or collection of attributes, which is possessed, in common, by all men, and in virtue of which it is applied to them; the term 'metal' signifies likewise a number of substances taken separately, and implies, at the same time, the attribute or attributes which are common to them, and which distinguish them from other substances; the term 'colour' is connotative in as much as it stands for each of a number of attributes such as redness, likeness, greenness, &c., and connotes or implies, at the same time, an attribute in which those attributes agree. Similarly, the terms 'animal,' 'horse,' 'plant,' 'tree,' 'flower,' 'mineral,' 'house,' 'table,' 'paper,' 'figure,' \'virtue,' 'quality,' are all connotative, having each two significations, one direct, called the denotation, and the other indirect, called the connotation of the term. /A non-connotative term is, on the other hand, "one which signifies a subject only or an attribute only," that is, it has only one signification, either of a thing, or of an attribute, and does not imply anything else./ For example, the terms 'squareness,' 'visibleness,' &c., signifying each an attribute only, are non-connotative.

To the class of connotative terms belong the following:(1)/All concrete terms that are also general, or all general terms that are also concrete for example, ‘man,' 'bird,' 'fish,' ‘river,' 'lake,' 'library,' 'nation' signifying directly an indefinite number of things, and implying attributes which they possess in common, are connotative2. (2)/All abstract terms that are general,

1 Mill's Logic, Vol. 1. p. 31.

2 To this head belong also adjectives when used substantively, that