Sand. & H. Dig. § 6243, imposing a penalty
for the nonpayment of wages to a discharged
railroad employé, does not protect an employé
hired and discharged in another state, though
performing part of the services sued for in
Arkansas.-Louisiana & N. W. Ry. Co. v.
Phelps (Ark.) 709.
In an action for breach of a contract to fur-
nish plaintiff medical attention, damages for
mental and physical suffering are recoverable.
-Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. Co. v. Rubio
(Tex. Civ. App.) 1126.
Damages by reason of plaintiff's being com-
pelled to walk to his home while sick herd too
remote, in an action for breach of a railroad's
contract to furnish him with medical and hos-
pital attention.-Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. Co.
v. Rubio (Tex. Civ. App.) 1126.
§ 2. Master's liability for injuries to
servant.
A servant who works during the dinner hour
held not a volunteer, so as to relieve the master
of liability for injury to him from a defect in
the premises.-Mitchell-Tranter Co. v. Ehmett
(Ky.) 835.
In the performance of work outside of the
line of his duty, plaintiff held a volunteer, and
the master owed him no duty to furnish him a
safe place to work.-Mitchell-Tranter Co. v.
Ehmett (Ky.) 835.
Where a bricklayer, as he was leaving de-
fendant's mill, directed plaintiff to do in his ab-
sence anything which any puddler or heater
might ask him to do, the order included only
such things as were in the line of plaintiff's
duty.-Mitchell-Tranter Co. v. Ehmett (Ky.)
835.
Where a servant, at the time he was injured
by the falling of the roof, was on it, not in the
discharge of a duty within the scope of his
employment, the master is not liable.-Mitchell-
Tranter Co. v. Ehmett (Ky.) 835.
Acts 1893, c. 159, held to apply to an action
by an infant against his employer for injuries
sustained while not engaged in work for de-
fendant.-Ornamental Iron & Wire Co. v. Green
(Tenn.) 399.
Under Acts 1893, c. 159, employment of an
infant under 12 years of age constitutes such
negligence as makes the employer liable for all
injuries sustained in course of employment.-
Ornamental Iron & Wire Co. v. Green (Tenn.)
The failure of a railroad company to make a
reasonable inspection of an appliance furnished
an employé will constitute negligence in the
company, though the duty of inspection was
committed to a servant.-Galveston, H. & S.
A. Ry. Co. v. Buch (Tex. Civ. App.) 681.
Where a servant has knowledge of certain dan-
ger incident to his employment, the failure of
the master to give adequate warning of such
danger does not render him liable for an in-
jury resulting therefrom.-Ladonia Cotton Oil
Co. v. Shaw (Tex. Civ. App.) 693.
§ 3.
Tools, Machinery, appliances,
and places for work.
Where a brakeman was struck by overhead
beam of a bridge, the master held negligent in
maintaining the overhead bridge so low.-Louis-
ville & N. R. Co. v. Tucker's Adm'r (Ky.) 453.
Where the timbers supporting the roof in the
entry to a mine were known by the master to
be unsafe, he was liable for an injury caused
thereby to a servant riding in a car to his place
of work.-Koltinsky v. Wood (Ky.) 848.
Under a city ordinance, held, that notice to
a person maintaining an elevator shaft that he
must keep the barriers around the shaft closed
when it was not in use was unnecessary.-
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An instruction as to liability of master to
furnish servant with reasonably safe instrument
held erroneous as placing too much of a burden
on plaintiff.-Smith v. Gulf, W. T. & P. Ry. Co.
(Tex. Civ. App.) 83.
Where a master knows, or could know by
the use of ordinary diligence, that the tools pro-
vided for the servant are unsafe, and the
servant without contributory fault suffers injury
thereby, the master is liable.-Smith v. Gulf,
W. T. & P. Ry. Co. (Tex. Civ. App.) 83.
In an action for death by wrongful act, an
instruction relating to the care and diligence of
defendant's car inspectors held proper.-Galves-
ton, H. & S. A. Ry. Co. v. Davis (Tex. Civ.
App.) 217.
In an action for death by wrongful act, where
a brakeman was killed by falling under a train
by the giving way of a stirrup attached to the
car he was attempting to ascend, held that the
negligence of defendant was for the jury.-
Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. Co. v. Davis (Tex.
Civ. App.) 217.
In an action by an employé for injuries re-
ceived, evidence held to show the master guilty
of actionable negligence.-Hillje v. Hettich
(Tex. Civ. App.) 491.
In action by a drawbridge tender, injured by
the breaking of the wrench furnished for turn-
ing the draw, a finding that the company was
negligent held justified.-Galveston, H. & N.
Ry. Co. v. Newport (Tex. Civ. App.) 657.
Evidence in an action for injuries to an en-
gineer caused by the turning of the engine
step held to justify a finding that negligent in-
spection was the cause of the injury. San An-
tonio & A. P. Ry. Co. v. Lindsey (Tex. Civ.
App.) 668.
In an action by a railroad employé for in-
juries from a defective appliance, a finding that
no suflicient inspection was made held sustain-
ed by the evidence.-Galveston, H. & S. A.
Ry. Co. v. Buch (Tex. Civ. App.) 681.
An employé of a railroad company, injured
by the dropping of a brake rod, cannot recover
if the defect existing in the appliance was
latent, and could not have been discovered by
the company by the use of ordinary care.-
Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. Co. v. Buch (Tex.
Civ. App.) 681.
Failure of a master to remedy defects in a
machine, by which a servant is injured, held
negligence.-Ladonia Cotton Oil Co. v. Shaw
(Tex. Civ. App.) 693.
A master is not liable for an injury caused
by the negligence of a fellow servant.-Hawk
v. McLeod Lumber Co. (Mo.) 1022.
The fact that a servant, injured by the negli-
gence of a fellow servant, is inferior in grade
to the latter, will not render the master liable
for the injury.-Hawk v. McLeod Lumber Co.
(Mo.) 1022.
A deck hand in a sawmill and the sawyer
held to be fellow servants.-Hawk v. McLeod
Lumber Co. (Mo.) 1022.
lessly and with indifference to the consequen-
ces, and not in the discharge of his duty, ex-
posed himself to the danger of being struck
by the bridge."-Louisville & N. R. Co. v.
Tucker's Adm'r (Ky.) 453.
Failure to furnish a reasonably safe place
for a servant to work, though with the servant's
knowledge, does not make the danger arising
therefrom a risk assumed by the servant.-
Wendler v. People's House Furnishing Co.
(Mo.) 737.
A servant has the right to assume, in the ab-
sence of knowledge to the contrary, that the
tools furnished him by his master for use in
doing specific work are reasonably safe and
suitable therefor.-Smith v. Gulf, W. T. & P.
Ry. Co. (Tex. Civ. App.) 83.
One entering the service of a railroad com-
pany held not to assume the risk arising from
the company's negligence.-San Antonio & A.
P. Ry. Co. v. Waller (Tex. Civ. App.) 210.
Facts held not to show knowledge by brake-
man of the defective condition of the side
track, by reason of which he was subsequently
killed.-San Antonio & A. P. Ry. Co. v. Wal-
ler (Tex. Civ. App.) 210.
In an action for death by wrongful act, an
instruction that, if deceased knew the charac-
ter of the inspection given by defendant to its
cars and remained in its employ after acquiring
such knowledge, then he assumed the risk,
held properly refused.-Galveston, H. & S. A.
Ry. Co. v. Davis (Tex. Civ. App.) 217.
An employé, continuing to work after com-
plaint, on a promise to rectify defect, does not
assume the risk of the danger.-Hillje v. Het-
tich (Tex. Civ. App.) 491.
In an action by a servant for injuries from
a failure to furnish sufficient light after a
promise to do so by the foreman, evidence
held to show that the foreman was authorized
to make such promise.-Hillje v. Hettich (Tex.
Civ. App.) 491.
Defective fastening of a locomotive step, by
which the engineer was injured, held not suffi-
ciently obvious to work an assumption of risk.-
San Antonio & A. P. Ry. Co. v. Lindsey (Tex.
Civ. App.) 668.
Facts held to show that a section foreman,
injured while unloading ties from a moving
train, had assumed the risk.-Webb v. Gulf, C.
& S. F. Ry. Co. (Tex. Civ. App.) 684.
A servant held, under the evidence, to have
assumed the dangers resulting in his injury.-
Ladonia Cotton Oil Co. v. Shaw (Tex. Civ.
App.) 693.
Instructions in action for injury to railroad
employé by jumping from moving car review-
ed.-Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. Co. v. Sanchez
(Tex. Civ. App.) 893.
A switchman, injured in attempting to make
a coupling, held guilty of contributory negli-
gence.-Brown's Adm'x v. Louisville, H. & St.
L. Ry. Co. (Ky.) 588.
In an action against a railway company for
injuries, evidence held sufficient to show that
the proximate cause was the act of a fellow
servant, to which plaintiff's own negligence
contributed.-Southern Pac. Co. v. Wellington
(Tex. Civ. App.) 219.
A locomotive engineer is not charged with the
duty of inspecting his engine for dangerous de-
fects, though furnished with tools to make re-
pairs during trips.-San Antonio & A. P. Ry.
Co. v. Lindsey (Tex. Civ. App.) 668.
A locomotive engineer held not guilty of con-
tributory negligence in failing to notice the de-
fective fastening of a step, by the turning of
which he was injured.-San Antonio & A. P.
Ry. Co. v. Lindsey (Tex. Civ. App.) 668.
Actions.
Defendant, having pleaded specific act of con-
tributory negligence, cannot rely on any other
act of contributory negligence.-Ward v. Louis-
ville & N. R. Co. (Ky.) 2.
It being the duty of the foreman to see that
the hand car was properly loaded, plaintiff did
not assume the risk of poor loading unless it
was such that an ordinarily prudent person
situated as he was would by the exercise of
ordinary care have perceived and avoided it.-
Ward v. Louisville & N. R. Co. (Ky.) 2.
The questions whether plaintiff's intestate
was in discharge of his duty and whether he
exercised ordinary care were for the jury.-
Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Tucker's Adm'r
(Ky.) 453.
The brakeman being injured while in the
discharge of his duty by the negligence of the
master, it cannot defeat recovery by showing
that the brakeman could have avoided the in-
jury by not performing the duty until a later
period of time, or by performing it earlier.
Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Tucker's Adm'r (Ky.)
453.
of the car on which he was when he was
It being the duty of a brakeman to go on top
struck, the jury was authorized to conclude
that he was in the discharge of his duty at
that time.-Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Tucker's
Adm'r (Ky.) 453.
Defendant was entitled to a peremptory in-
struction, where the facts proved did not ad-
mit of different opinions on the question of
contributory negligence.-Brown's Adm'x V.
Louisville, H. & St. L. Ry. Co. (Ky.) 588.
Where plaintiff was scalded by stepping into
a vat of hot dye, which was uncovered, the
questions of negligence and contributory neg-
ligence were for the jury.-Reliance Textile &
Dye Works v. Martin (Ky.) 809.
An instruction that, in order to find for plain-
tiff, the jury must believe that the failure to
have "said hole. sewer, or drain" covered was
due to the negligence of the defendant, prop-
erly submitted the question of negligence in
leaving the vat uncovered.-Reliance Textile &
Dye Works v. Martin (Ky.) 809.
Where the workers in a mine were accus-
tomed to ride in a car to their place of work,
they had a right to be on the car; and whether
plaintiff, who was injured while thus riding,
used ordinary care, was a question for the jury.
Where an elevator which plaintiff was en-
gaged in repairing was suddenly started, caus--Koltinsky v. Wood (Ky.) 848.
ing him to jump and receive injuries, when he
would not have been injured if he had remained
in the elevator, a verdict for defendant will
not be set aside.-Ford v. Robinson-Pettett Co.
(Ky.) 793.
Where a railway brakeman did not know of
the defective condition of a switch, the fact
that he might have gained such knowledge by
inspecting it is no defense in an action for his
death. San Antonio & A. P. Ry. Co. v. Wal-
ler (Tex. Civ. App.) 210.
In a suit for injuries received by an employé
from falling into an elevator shaft, the evidence
examined, and held, that a nonsuit was prop-
erly refused.-Wendler v. People's House Fur-
nishing Co. (Mo.) 737.
In an action for injuries received by an em-
ployé from falling into an elevator shaft, an
instruction held not erroneous in failing to call
the jury's attention to the electric light bulb
near the shaft.-Wendler v. People's House
Furnishing Co. (Mo.) 737.
An instruction held not erroneous, as singling
out and giving undue prominence to the facts
stated therein.-Wendler v. People's House Fur-
nishing Co. (Mo.) 737.
Where an injured person was capable of earn-
ing more at another trade than the one in which
he was engaged when injured, he is not required
to prove that such fact was known to his em-
Petition in an action for injuries to a brake-ployer. Chicago, R. I. & T. Ry. Co. v. Long
man from a negligent operation of the train
held to state a cause of action.-Cambron v.
Omaha & St. L. R. Co. (Mo.) 745.
Evidence held to justify a finding that the
absence of brake shoes from a locomotive was
the cause of an accident, resulting from at-
tempting a coupling while the train was run-
ning at an unsafe speed.-Cambron v. Omaha
& St. L. R. Co. (Mo.) 745.
Petition in an action for injuries to a brake-
man by negligent operation of the train held
not to show plaintiff guilty of contributory neg-
ligence as a matter of law.-Cambron v. Omaha
& St. L. R. Co. (Mo.) 745.
Instruction in an action against a railway
company for injuries to a brakeman from the
engineer's failure to obey signals held not ob-
jectionable because permitting a recovery, with-
out a finding that the engineer saw the signals.
-Cambron v. Omaha & St. L. R. Co. (Mo.)
In an action by servant to recover for per-
sonal injuries, held, that the question whether
defendant had furnished him with a safe place
to work was properly submitted to the jury.
-Virginia Iron, Coal & Coke Co. v. Hamilton
(Tenn.) 401.
In a suit by an employé for injuries received
while lining rails on a bridge with an imple
ment unsuitable for such purpose, facts held
to entitle plaintiff to recover.-Smith v. Gulf,
W. T. & P. Ry. Co. (Tex. Civ. App.) 83.
In an action by an employé for personal in-
juries due to an unsuitable tool, an instruc-
tion that plaintiff assumed all risks commonly
incident to the work held erroneous.-Smith v.
Gulf, W. T. & P. Ry. Co. (Tex. Civ. App.) 83.
Evidence in an action against a railway com-
pany for negligently causing death of a brake-
man held sufficient to justify submission to the
jury. San Antonio & A. P. Ry. Co. v. Waller
(Tex. Civ. App.) 210.
In an action against a railway company for
the death of a brakeman, evidence that the
place occupied by deceased at the time of the
accident was the usual customary place for
brakemen to ride held admissible.-San Anto-
nio & A. P. Ry. Co. v. Waller (Tex. Civ. App.)
210.
Alleged variance between the petition and
the proof held immaterial.-Hillje v. Hettich
(Tex. Civ. App.) 491.
Though a person, when injured, was earn-
ing but $1.25 per day, he can plead and prove
that he was skilled in another trade and capa-
ble of earning more.-Chicago, R. I. & T. Ry.
Co. v. Long (Tex. Civ. App.) 882.
Evidence in an action by locomotive fireman
for personal injuries caused by negligence of
the engineer held to support a verdict for plain-
tiff.-Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. Co. v. San-
ders (Tex. Civ. App.) 889.
Testimony of a railway employé in an action
credible as to cause the verdict to be set aside.
to recover for personal injuries held not so in-
-Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. Co. v. Sanchez
(Tex. Civ. App.) 893.
Evidence that an employé was injured by
obeying an order to jump from a train going
five or six miles an hour held not to show con-
tributory negligence per se.-Galveston, H. &
S. A. Ry. Co. v. Sanchez (Tex. Civ. App.)
893.
Where an employé acts suddenly on an im-
perative order, and the danger is not certain,
the questions of negligence and assumed risk
are for the jury.-Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry.
Co. v. Sanchez (Tex. Civ. App.) 893.
Evidence held to show that an instruction
submitting whether "any command was given
to plaintiff to jump from the train, which was
imperative and left no time for calculation and
deliberation," was not without support in the
evidence.-Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. Co. v.
Sanchez (Tex. Civ. App.) 893.
In an action against a railway, after allega-
tions that "defendant's servants, M. and C.,"
gave plaintiff certain orders, an instruction that,
if "defendant" gave such orders, etc., was not
objectionable.-Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. Co.
v. Sanchez (Tex. Civ. App.) 893.
Indictment held to sufficiently charge the of-
fense of wounding and disfiguring prosecuting
witness under Rev. St. 1899, § 1819.-State v.
Vaughan (Mo.) 236.
Authority to take acknowledgments, see "Ac-
knowledgment," § 1.
In an action for personal injury sustained by
a railroad drawbridge tender, a charge as to
risk assumed by an employé, and as to his See "Damages," § 3.
knowledge of defects, considered, and held not
objectionable.-Galveston, H. & N. Ry. Co. v.
Newport (Tex. Civ. App.) 657.
In an action for personal injuries by an em-
ployé, the burden is upon employé to prove con-
tributory negligence.-San Antonio & A. P. Ry.
Co. v. Lindsey (Tex. Civ. App.) 668.
The practice, in an action by an employé for
injuries, of requiring the jury to find a speci-
fied group of facts constituting a cause of ac-
tion or defense, and of instructing that, if they
so find, they shall return a verdict in favor of
the respective party, held proper.-Galveston, H.
& S. A. Ry. Co. v. Buch (Tex. Civ. App.) 681.
In an action by an employé against a rail-
road company, issues as to whether appliance
was properly constructed held properly submit-
ted to the jury.-Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry.
Co. v. Buch (Tex. Civ. App.) 681.
MECHANICS' LIENS.
§ 1. Right to lien.
Under the statute empowering married wo-
men to make contracts, it is not necessary, to
create a material man's lien upon the real es-
tate of a married woman, that the contract
for the improvement should be in writing.-
Johnson v. Bush (Ky.) 158.
Where J., who was employed by the owners
to get out ties, sublet the contract to C., to
whose laborers D. furnished supplies, D., to
whom C. delivered the ties as security, is not
entitled to a lien thereon as against the own-
ers.-Duis v. Fisher (Ky.) 337.
In a suit to enforce a subcontractor's lien
for putting in a fire extinguishing apparatus,
contract held such as to sustain the specifica-
tions of the subcontract, so as to entitle plaintiff | § 3. Operation and effect.
to a lien for work done under such specifica-
tions. General Fire Extinguisher Co. V.
Schwartz Bros. Commission Co. (Mo.) 318.
2. Proceedings to perfect.
In a suit to enforce a subcontractor's lien, a
contention that certain work was in the nature
of repairs, and not the last work on the con-
tract, held without merit.-General Fire Extin-
guisher Co. v. Schwartz Bros. Commission Co.
(Mo.) 318.
In action to enforce a mechanic's lien, certain
evidence held proper for consideration, as show-
ing whether there had been an acceptance of
the work at a certain time, and whether certain
work done by plaintiff was for the purpose of
extending the time for filing his lien.-General
Fire Extinguisher Co. v. Schwartz Bros. Com-
mission Co. (Mo.) 318.
In suit to enforce a mechanic's lien, facts
held not to show an acceptance of the work
by the owner prior to the time when certain
work was done.-General Fire Extinguisher
Co. v. Schwartz Bros. Commission Co. (Mo.)
In action to enforce a mechanic's lien, evi-
dence held not to show the work completed
when the same was approved by the board of
underwriters of the city.-General Fire Extin-
guisher Co. v. Schwartz Bros. Commission Co.
(Mo.) 318.
Rev. St. 1889, § 4207, requires a contract-
or's lien to be filed within four months after
the work is finished.-General Fire Extinguish-
er Co. v. Schwartz Bros. Commission Co.
(Mo.) 318.
Where work done by a contractor is sub-
stantially complete and accepted by the own-
er, the former cannot, by performing some
part of the work called for, but which was
omitted, extend the period for filing a mechan-
ic's lien.-General Fire Extinguisher Co. V.
Schwartz Bros. Commission Co. (Mo.) 318.
Where a structure is substantially complete,
and so delivered, and only a few particulars
remain to be done, and the owner accepts the
contractor's promise to do them, the time for
filing a mechanic's lien runs from the time of
such delivery.-General Fire Extinguisher Co.
v. Schwartz Bros. Commission Co. (Mo.) 318.
The period after the completion of the work
within which a mechanic's lien may be filed
does not begin to run until the last item called
for by the contract is finished, or the last work
under it is done.-General Fire Extinguisher
Co. v. Schwartz Bros. Commission Co. (Mo.)
318.
A material man's itemized account, without
date, held not to fix a lien under Rev. St. art.
3296.-Meyers v. Wood (Tex. Sup.) 174.
Material man's account, containing but one
date and numerous articles, held a sufficient
compliance with Rev. St. art. 3296, so far as
the items specified might have been delivered
on the same date.-Meyers v. Wood (Tex. Sup.)
174.
Account filed to fix a material man's lien
held not sufficiently itemized to comply with
Rev. St. art. 3296.-Meyers v. Wood (Tex.
Sup.) 174.
Under Rev. St. art. 3296, an account filed
to fix a mechanic's lien by a material man for
goods furnished a contractor, not itemized, but
merely referring to the goods as furnished by
contract, held insufficient.-Meyers v. Wood
(Tex. Civ. App.) 671.
Under Rev. St. art. 3296, a mechanic's lien
cannot be established by an account which does
not show the dates when the items were fur-
nished. Meyers v. Wood (Tex. Civ. App.) 671.
Under Rev. St. 1889, § 4207, in suit to enforce
a mechanic's lien, facts held to show plaintiff
entitled to a lien, not only on an addition to the
building, but on the entire structure.-General
Fire Extinguisher Co. v. Schwartz Bros. Com-
mission Co. (Mo.) 318.
A judgment confirming the sale of land is not
presented for review, where it does not appear
from the statement filed with the transcript
that any appeal is prosecuted therefrom.-
Johnson v. Bush (Ky.) 158.
A mechanic's lien claimant, whose claim
was rejected by a commissioner, to whom the
cause was referred, for want of proof, hav-
ing excepted to the report because he had no
notice of a hearing, the court should have sus-
tained his exceptions and given him an oppor-
tunity to be heard.-Carl v. Grosse (Ky.) 604.
instruction held not erroneous as an instruction
In suit to enforce a mechanic's lien, a certain
tain work was, by a new agreement of the par-
to the effect that the jury might find that cer-
ties, the last work done under a contract.-Gen-
eral Fire Extinguisher Co. v. Schwartz Bros.
Commission Co. (Mo.) 318.
In a suit to enforce a mechanic's lien, an in-
struction held to have given all of one request-
ed by plaintiff that was proper.-General Fire
Extinguisher Co. v. Schwartz Bros. Commission
Co. (Mo.) 318.
lien for putting in a fire extinguishing appara-
Where, in a suit to enforce a subcontractor's
tus, it appeared that a deed of trust on the
property was not delivered until after the plain-
tiff's contract was made, the trustee's interest
did not impair the plaintiff's right to a judg-
ment.-General Fire Extinguisher Co.
Schwartz Bros. Commission Co. (Mo.) 318.
In proceedings to foreclose a mechanic's lien
tached, the original debtor held a necessary
on property transferred after the lien had at-
party. Walter v. Dearing (Tex. Civ. App.) 380.
In an action to foreclose a mechanic's lien
on the homestead, in the execution of which
the wife joined, the action being brought after
limitations has run against the claim, she is a
necessary party. - San Antonio Real Estate
Building & Loan Ass'n v. Stewart (Tex. Civ.
App.) 665.
In an action to establish a mechanic's lien, a
cross bill alleging delay in completing the build-
ing and damages thereby, for which certain
sureties were liable, held to state a cause of
action as against the sureties.-Meyers v. Wood
(Tex. Civ. App.) 671.
§ 5. Indemnity against liens.
Defendant's demurrer to complaint held not
to have placed the allegations of his special
answer before the court as true, and hence to
have been improperly sustained.-Meyers v.
Wood (Tex. Sup.) 174.
Of municipal council, see "Municipal Corpora-
tions," § 3.
MINES AND MINERALS.
Laws requiring coal to be weighed before
screened as impairing right to contract, see
"Constitutional Law," § 4.
Liability of person operating mine for injuries
to servant, see "Master and Servant," § 3.
Mining regulations as class legislation, see
"Constitutional Law," § 7.
§ 1. Public mineral lands.
Under Rev. St. U. S. § 2324, 20 days' work,
which, according to a rate fixed by a local min-
Ground for reformation of contract, see "Ref-
ormation of Instruments," § 1.
Recovery of payments made by mistake, see
"Payment," § 3.
Of damages, see "Damages," § 1.
Where a deed of trust provided for a trustee,
and a substitute upon the refusal of the former
to act, evidence held sufficient to support a find-
ing that the trustee had not refused to act, so
as to warrant the substitute acting.-Kelsay v.
Farmers' & Traders' Bank (Mo.) 1007.
The grantor in a deed of trust held not es-
topped from showing the invalidity of a sale
under the deed of trust by an order of a court
directing the disposition of a part of the pur-
chase price, when the grantor had no notice of
the order. - Kelsay v. Farmers' & Traders'
Bank (Mo.) 1007.
Sales under deeds of trust, whereby nearly
double the amount of the debts secured by the
deeds was realized, held to authorize the grantor
in the deeds of trust to set sales aside, when
purchasers had knowledge of the facts.-Kel-
say v. Farmers' & Traders' Bank (Mo.) 1007.
A grantor in a deed of trust, bringing an ac
tion in February to set aside a sale under the
deed in December preceding, held not guilty of
laches.-Kelsay v. Farmers' & Traders' Bank
(Mo.) 1007.
The grantor in a deed of trust held not es-
topped from showing the invalidity of a sale
under such deed by failing to enjoin the sale,
where purchasers were not misled.-Kelsay v.
Of judgment or order on appeal, see "Appeal Farmers' & Traders' Bank (Mo.) 1007.
and Error," § 14.
MONEY RECEIVED.
Recovery of payment in general, see "Pay-
ment," § 3.
Recovery of price paid for land, see "Vendor
and Purchaser," § 5.
Recovery of tax paid, see "Taxation," § 32.
In fraud of creditors, see "Fraudulent Convey-
ances," § 1.
Statutory restrictions on sales under trust
deeds as impairing obligation of contract,
see "Constitutional Law," § 5.
Mortgages by particular classes of parties.
Married women, see "Husband and Wife," § 3.
Mortgages of particular species of property.
See "Fixtures"; "Homestead," § 4.
Personal property, see "Chattel Mortgages."
Separate estate of married woman, see "Hus-
band and Wife," § 3.
1. Requisites and validity.
Description in trust deed of note secured held
suflicient for identification, by rejecting er-
roneous recitals.-Thompson v. Cobb (Tex.
Sup.) 1090.
Where one of two joint purchasers of real
estate at a sale under a deed of trust by a sub-
stitute trustee had notice of the illegality of the
sale, held, that notice to one purchaser was no-
tice to both.-Kelsay v. Farmers' & Traders'
Bank (Mo.) 1007.
Words "within lawful hours," in a deed of
trust, held not to require sale on a day pre-
scribed in a statute specifying the hours on
such day when sales should be made.-Thomp-
son v. Cobb (Tex. Sup.) 1090.
If a deed describe the note secured so suffi-
ciently that it may be identified by the rejec
tion of erroneous recitals, the trustee may en-
force the deed in the manner prescribed there-
in without first reforming the description in
equity. Thompson v. Cobb (Tex. Sup.) 1090.
§ 4. Foreclosure by action.
Where foreclosure sale is disapproved for in-
adequacy of price, it is customary to set aside
the sale altogether.-Stephenson v. Kilpatrick
(Mo.) 773.
A suit to foreclose a trust deed, brought more
than 10 years from the date of the deed, held
not barred by limitations.-Brown v. Brown
(Tenn.) 413.
Where a judgment creditor alleged that,
prior to acquiring his lien, the debtor fraudu-
lently transferred his property, but did not
allege that plaintiff, who held a deed of trust
on the land, had notice of the fraud, evidence
thereof was inadmissible against plaintiff.-
White v. Provident Nat. Bank (Tex. Civ.
App.) 498.
§ 2. Construction and operation.
Where a mortgagor, in payinent of the debt,
surrenders possession of the premises to a mort-
gagee, who retains possession until limitation
has run against his mortgage, his title should
be affirmed as against a second mortgage, exe- Where a purchaser is allowed a certain time
cuted by the mortgagor after such surrender, to redeem, he will be relieved in equity when
but before the execution of a deed to the mort-prevented from doing so by fraud, accident,
gagee.-Garretson v. White (Ark.) 115.
§ 3. Foreclosure by exercise of power
Where a deed of trust provided for a trustee,
and a substitute upon the refusal of the trustee
to act, the creditor must show that the trustee
refused to act before the substitute has the
right to proceed.--Kelsay v. Farmers' & Traders'
Bank (Mo.) 1007.
Question of the refusal of a trustee in a deed
of trust to act held to be determined from his
conduct after creditor's request to act has
been made.-Kelsay v. Fariners' & Traders'
Bank (Mo.) 1007.
or mistake.-Stephenson v. Kilpatrick (Mo.) 773.
to redeem from mortgage is granted.—Stephen-
Six months is a reasonable time, where a right
son v. Kilpatrick (Mo.) 773.
The burden is on those claiming to be bona
fide purchasers without notice to sustain their
plea.-Stephenson v. Kilpatrick (Mo.) 773.
Affirmance of judgment, see "Appeal and Er-
ror," § 14.
Arrest of judgment in criminal prosecutions,
see "Criminal Law," § 24.
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