jury, within section 2033.-State v. Carpenter (Mo.) 255.
An applicant for a marriage license, who testifies falsely, and under an oath administer- ed by the recorder, that the girl's parents have consented, held not guilty of a misdemeanor under Rev. St. § 2036.-State v. Carpenter (Mo.) 255.
§ 2. Prosecution and punishment.
An indictment for subornation of perjury held insufficient in not containing allegations that the false testimony was material.-Miller v. State (Tex. Cr. App.) 908.
On a prosecution for subornation of perjury, held error to charge that matters alleged in the indictment as inducement need not be proved.— Miller v. State (Tex. Cr. App.) 908.
In particular actions or proceedings. See "Attachment," §§ 1, 4; "Ejectment," § 2; "Equity," § 2; "Malicious Prosecution." § 1; "Mandamus," § 3; "Specific Performance,' § 1; "Trespass to Try Title," § 2; "Trover and Conversion," § 1.
Action for breach of contract, see "Contracts," §§ 2, 3.
Action for breach of warranty of goods sold, see "Sales," § 5.
Action for damages for wrongful execution, see "Execution," § 5. Action for recovery of value of property ex- changed, see "Exchange of Property.' Action for rent, see "Landlord and Tenant," § 3.
Action on appeal bond, see "Appeal and Error," $ 15.
Action on bond of indemnity against mechanics' liens, see "Mechanics' Liens," § 5. Action on note, see "Bills and Notes," § 4. Action to construe will, see "Wills," § 4. Action to enjoin sale of homestead, see "Home- stead," § 7.
A will providing that, 25 years from testa- tor's death, his estate should be divided among his children then living and the heirs of such as may be dead, and that during the 25 years none of the children should have power to dis- pose of his interest, is void.-Coleman v. Cole-Action to set aside deed, see "Deeds," § 1. man (Ky.) 832.
Action to enjoin sale under execution, see “Ex- ecution," 2. Action to establish mechanic's lien, see "Me- chanics' Liens," § 4.
PERSONAL INJURIES.
See "Assault and Battery," § 1; "Negligence." Measure of damages, see "Damages," § 3. To employé, see "Master and Servant," §§ 2-7. To passenger, see "Carriers," § 5.
To person on or near railroad tracks, see "Railroads," § 2.
To traveler on highway, see "Highways," & 4; "Municipal Corporations," § 8.
To traveler on highway crossing railroad, see "Railroads." § 2.
To trespasser, see "Railroads," § 2.
PHOTOGRAPHS.
As evidence, see "Evidence," § 8.
PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS.
As expert witnesses, see "Evidence," § 13. Employment at hospitals, see "Hospitals."
Attachment of property fraudulently conveyed, see "Fraudulent Conveyances," § 2. Election contest, see "Elections," § 5. Foreclosure, see "Mortgages," § 4.
Indictment or criminal information or
plaint, see "Indictment and Information." Pleas in criminal prosecutions, see "Criminal Law," § 6.
Proceeding to remove disabilities of infant, see "Infants," § 1.
§ 1. Form and allegations in general. The averment in a reply that one-fifth of a tax levied will not be collected is but a con- clusion of the pleader, and therefore insufficient to present an issue.-City of Lexington v. Board of Education of City of Lexington (Ky.) 827. § 2. Plea or answer, cross complaint, and affidavit of defense.
In an action against a city and others to test the validity of an ordinance, it was not an abuse of discretion to refuse to permit the city to file an answer 11 months after the petition was filed, and after issues had been formed between plaintiff and another defendant, and the case submitted by agreement.-City of Lexington v. Home Const. Co. (Ky.) 1.
Where the defendant, having affirmatively pleaded self-defense and accident, and elected
In criminal prosecution, see "Criminal Law," to rely upon the defense of accidental shooting, § 6.
Amendment of pleadings after limitation, see "Limitation of Actions," § 2. Conformity of judgment to pleadings, see "Judg- ment," § 3.
his answer stood as an admission that he did not do the shooting in self-defense.-Hollings- worth v. Warnock (Ky.) 163.
Under Ky. St. § 4. giving a right of action to the widow and minor child of a person killed by the careless or malicious use of firearms "not in self-defense," evidence that the killing was in self-defense or was accidental is ad- missible under a common traverse of the peti-
Allegations as to particular facts, acts, or tion.-Hollingsworth v. Warnock (Ky.) 163.
See "Adverse Possession," § 3; "Damages," $ 5: "Estoppel," § 3; "Judgment," § 13; "Release," $ 2.
Nonjoinder of parties, see "Parties," § 2. Statute of limitations, see "Limitation of Ac- tions," § 4.
In actions by or against particular classes of parties.
See "Carriers." §§ 2, 3, 5; "Corporations," § 4; "Municipal Corporations," § 10.
Banks, see "Banks and Banking," § 2. Employers, see "Master and Servant," § 7.
3. Demurrer or exception.
A defendant who answers over after his de- murrer is overruled is not thereby precluded from demurring to an amended petition filed after his answer is filed.-Beattie Mfg. Co. v. Gerardi (Mo.) 1035.
Where, on exceptions to plaintiff's petition being sustained, he amends, any error in such ruling is waived.-Barrett v. Independent Tel. Co. (Tex. Civ. App.) 1128.
§ 4. Amended and supplemental plead- ings and repleader.
It was not an abuse of discretion to reject an amended answer which did not materially add
Insurance companies, see "Insurance," §§ 5, 6. to the defense.-Duis v. Fisher (Ky.) 337.
The court held not to have abused its discre- tion in rejecting an amended answer, tendered at the conclusion of the argument on the final hearing to conform to the proof.-Blalock v. Copeland (Ky.) 349.
An amended petition setting up a claim for demurrage and shortage in weights stated a cause of action which could be properly joined with a cause of action for the recovery of dam- ages for defects in quality.-Duckwall v. Brooke (Ky.) 357.
Under Rev. St. 1899, § 598, the question as to whether an amended petition changes the cause of action cannot be raised by demurrer, but must be raised by motion to strike out.- Beattie Mfg. Co. v. Gerardi (Mo.) 1035.
§ 5. Issues, proof, and variance.
In particular civil actions or proceedings. See "Ejectment"; "Habeas Corpus"; "Manda- mus," 3; "Prohibition"; "Trespass to Try Title," § 2.
Particular proceedings in actions.
See "Abatement and Revival"; "Continuance" "Costs"; "Damages," § 5; "Depositions" Evidence"; "Execution"; "Judgment"; "Ju- dicial Sales"; "Jury" "Limitation of Ac- tions"; "Parties"; "Pleading"; "Process"; "Reference"; "Removal of Causes"; "Stipula- tions"; "Trial"; "Venue." Verdict, see "Trial," § 10.
Particular remedies in or incident to actions. See "Attachment"; "Garnishment"; "Injunc- tion"; "Receivers"; "Tender."
Procedure in criminal prosecutions.
In action for the price of goods, held error to admit evidence and instruct in support of a See "Bail," § 1; "Criminal Law"; "Extradi- counterclaim arising under an alleged verbal contract, not pleaded.-Bloch Queensware Co. v. Metzger (Ark.) 929.
6. Defects and objections, waiver, and aider by verdict or judgment. In action for the price of goods, defendant having objected to evidence and the instruction thereon in support of a certain counterclaim, not pleaded, held, that after verdict the answer could not be regarded as amended, so as to have rendered such action proper.-Bloch Queensware Co. v. Metzger (Ark.) 929.
Where a creditor of a corporation by an agree- ment with its officers took charge of the corpo- ration for the purpose of applying the profits to his debt, he did not waive a lien on property pledged to him by a stockholder to secure the same debt.-Weiscopt v. Newman (Ky.) 808.
In an action to subject stock pledged to se- cure a debt, the court properly refused to re- quire plaintiff to subject real estate held by him as security for the same debt.-Weiscopt v. Newman (Ky.) 808.
See "Municipal Corporations," § 4.
Of municipality, see "Municipal Corporations," § 6.
Of insurance, see "Insurance."
POLITICAL RIGHTS.
See "Constitutional Law," § 4.
POSSESSION.
See "Adverse Possession." Of office, see "Officers," § 1.
Of sale in mortgage, see "Mortgages," § 3.
Procedure of particular courts, see "Courts." Prosecution of actions in general, see "Ac- tion," § 2.
Procedure in exercise of special jurisdictions. In equity, see "Equity." In justices' courts, see "Justices of the Peace," § 3.
See "Appeal and Error"; "Exceptions, Bill of"; "Justices of the Peace," § 4; "New Trial."
Authority of the agent to make an alleged arrangement held a question for the jury.- Barker Cedar Co. v. Roberts (Ky.) 123.
An agent to sell goods on commission, who had taken from a buyer notes for the price
payable to his principal, had no authority, aft- er the maturity of the notes, without express authority from his principal, to accept any- thing in payment save money.-Woodruff v. American Road Mach. Co. (Ky.) 600.
The purchaser of a piano from an agent was bound to know that the agent had no authority to take notes payable to himself, in the absence of anything to show that he did have such au- thority. Baldwin v. Tucker (Ky.) 841.
PRINCIPAL AND SURETY.
See "Bail"; "Guaranty."
Liabilities of sureties on attachment bond, see "Attachment," § 1.
§ 1. Nature and extent of liability of surety.
The bond of a broker held to bind the surety only for loss due to the fraud or dishonesty of the principal. United States Fidelity & Guar- anty Co. v. Merkley (Ky.) 614.
§ 2. Discharge of surety.
Where a building contract allowed the owner to retain 25 per cent. of the contract price, his payment of the entire amount did not release the contractor's sureties.-Meyers v. Wood (Tex. Civ. App.) 671.
Of mortgages, see "Mortgages," § 2.
to the plaintiff before a warning order can be legally made.-McMahan v. Smith (Ark.) 459.
Under Sand. & H. Dig. § 5681, authorizing a warning order against unknown heirs, the complaint must allege that the "names" of the heirs are unknown to plaintiff before a warn- ing order can be legally made.-McMahan v. Smith (Ark.) 459.
Of traffic in intoxicating liquors, see "Intoxi- cating Liquors."
§ 1. Nature and grounds.
An order directing a comparison of ballots cast with voting lists may be restrained by writ of prohibition.-State ex rel. Funkhouser v. Spencer (Mo.) 981.
The objection that the state is not the proper party to maintain a suit to enjoin the selling of pools, etc., under a license fraudulently pro-
cured, under Rev. St. 1899, c. 105, art. 2, will not authorize a writ by the supreme court pro- hibiting further proceedings in the injunction suit.-State ex rel. Delmar Jockey Club v. Zach- ritz (Mo.) 999.
Where a circuit court had jurisdiction to cor- rect nunc pro tune its judgment and a satis- faction thereof, prohibition will not lie to re- strain its further proceedings in the cause.- Wand v. Ryan (Mo.) 1025.
Where, on appeal, no bond was filed or supersedeas obtained, the court had jurisdiction to issue a scire facias, and its further action will not be prohibited.-Wand v. Ryan (Mo.) 1025.
PROMISSORY NOTES.
The sheriff held entitled to compensation from the county for keeping prisoners senten- ced to the workhouse under commitments from the justice between their conviction and their See "Bills and Notes." transfer to the workhouse.-Knox County v. Fox (Tenn.) 404.
PRIVATE ROADS
Rights of way, see "Easements."
PROBATE.
Of will, see "Wills," § 3.
Defective return of service of process ground for collateral attack on judgment. see "Judgment," § 7.
In actions against particular classes of parties. Foreign corporations, see "Corporations," § 7. Foreign insurance companies, see "Insurance,' $5.
In particular actions or proceedings. See "Partition," § 1.
Action on claimant's bond in distress proceed- ings, see "Landlord and Tenant," § 3. On appeal, see "Appeal and Error," § 4.
Particular forms of writs or other process. See "Attachment." $ 2: "Execution"; “Gar- nishment": "Injunction"; "Mandamus"; "Prohibition."
Under Sand. & H. Dig. § 5681, authorizing a warning order against unknown heirs, an affi-
Of loss insured against, see "Insurance," § 4.
See "Animals"; "Fixtures"; "Mines and Min- erals."
Adverse possession, see "Adverse Possession.” Constitutional guaranties of rights of proper ty, see "Constitutional Law," § 9. Dedication to public use, see "Dedication.” Taking for public use, see "Eminent Domain.”
PROSECUTING ATTORNEYS.
See "District and Prosecuting Attorneys."
Of bill or note, see "Bills and Notes," § 3. PROVINCE OF COURT AND JURY. In criminal prosecutions, see "Criminal Law," $ 19.
PROXIMATE CAUSE.
Direct or remote consequences of injury, see "Damages," § 1.
davit filed with the complaint cannot be the Service of process, see "Process," § 1. basis for a warning order.-McMahan
Under Sand. & H. Dig. § 5681, authorizing a
warning order against unknown heirs, the com- See "Counties," § 2; "Municipal Corporations," plaint must allege that the heirs are unknown
Mineral lands, see "Mines and Minerals," § 1. § 1. Disposal of lands of the states.
Act 1888, applicable alone to Pulaski county, containing certain provisions protecting the rights of junior patentees within grants that were void for uncertainty, does not apply to valid senior grants; but, even if it was intend- ed to so apply, it would be void, as a patent issued by the state is a grant in the nature of a contract between the patentee and the state, which cannot be invalidated by any subsequent act of the state.-Kidd v. Central Trust & Safe Deposit Co. (Ky.) 355.
A patent is not void for uncertainty in the location of previously patented lands recited as excluded.-Kidd v. Central Trust & Safe De- posit Co. (Ky.) 355.
A patent was not void for uncertainty, though one of the calls did not designate the course; it appearing that the course can be found by retracing one of the lines.-Kidd v. Central Trust & Safe Deposit Co. (Ky.) 355. Land embraced in a void patent cannot again be patented as vacant or unappropriated land. Eastern Kentucky Land Co. v. Ferguson (Ky.) $30.
Under Act April 16, 1895, § 8, a settler on a section classed as dry grazing lands held not en- titled to purchase additional sections of pastoral land of the state.-Terry v. Dale (Tex. Civ. App.) 51.
Act April 16, 1895, authorizing the purchase of state lands, held repealed by Act Aug. 20, 1897, and a purchaser under the former stat- ute, who did not take the steps required to per- fect his purchase until after such act, acquired no title.-Terry v. Dale (Tex. Civ. App.) 51.
Facts in trespass to try title held to show plaintiff entitled to the land in question.-Ham- ilton v. McAuley (Tex. Civ. App.) 205.
Laws 1889, p. 48, § 1, relating to acquiring title to unappropriated public land, held in conflict with Const. art. 14, § 6, relating to homesteads.-Yoacham v. McCurdy (Tex. Civ. App.) 213.
PUBLIC SCHOOLS.
See "Schools and School Districts," § 1.
In civil actions, see "Trial," § 5.
QUIETING TITLE.
§ 1. Right of action and defenses.
Under Rev. St. 1899, § 650, action may be maintained during intervening life estate to determine interest in land of remainder-men and advancements made during life of the common ancestor.-Garrison v. Frazier (Mo.) 229.
§ 2. Proceedings and relief.
in a suit to determine the interest of remainder- A remainder-man who disclaims any interest men is not a Frazier (Mo.) 229. necessary party.-Garrison v.
to rents and profits and an injunction restrain- ing defendant from interfering with the remov- Plaintiff held not entitled to an accounting as al of houses from certain property in an action to determine title, under Rev. St. 1899, § 650. Seidel v. Cornwell (Mo.) 971.
Necessity of judgment in quo warranto to en- title contestant to office, see "Officers," § 1.
Apportionment of railroad tax among schools, As employers, see "Master and Servant," Carriage of goods and passengers, see “Car- see "Schools and School Districts," § 1.
Garnishment of railroad, see "Garnishment," Liability of railroad property to local taxation $ 1. by cities, see "Municipal Corporations," § 9. § 1. Right of way and other interests in land.
right of way, depot grounds, and a Y, to hold so long as used for the railroad, it did not Where a railroad company purchased land for lose its right to any part of its purchase by Graham v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. permitting the vendor to use it until needed. (Ark.) 1048.
certain plank crossings held not to work a for- Failure of a railroad company to construct feiture of the right of way under the terms of the grant.-Gratz v. Highland Scenic R. Co. (Mo.) 223.
Verdict against railroad company for killing a horse held not justified.-St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Cline (Ark.) 427.
It is not the absolute duty of persons running a train to stop it to avoid an injury, even if it can be done.--Arkansas & L. Ry. Co. v. San- ders (Ark.) 428.
an instruction that all the employés of the com- In an action for a horse killed by an engine, pany must keep the lookout required by stat- ute, and making the company liable for the neglect of any of them, is erroneous.-Arkan- sas & L. Ry. Co. v. Sanders (Ark.) 428.
Railroad company is under no obligation to keep its right of way cleared of obstacles, so that animals can pass over and across its track freely. Arkansas & L. Ry. Co. v. Sanders (Ark) 428.
In an action to recover damages for death at a railroad crossing, the court should have in- structed that, though defendant, in charge of the train, did not exercise ordinary care as de- fined in the preceding instructions, still if de- ceased knew of the approach of the train, and with this knowledge undertook to pass over the crossing ahead of the train, he assumed the
In criminal prosecutions, see "Criminal Law," risk, and defendant was not liable.-Illinois
Cent. R. Co. v. Jackson's Adm'r (Ky.) 342.
A railroad company is liable for an injury to a person passing along a street, resulting from the negligence of its servants in knocking off nuts and bolts from the rails of its track.- Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co. v. Bercaw (Ky.) 434. Where plaintiff was injured at a crossing, held a question for the jury whether she was guilty of contributory negligence.-Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Cooper (Ky.) 795.
It was for the jury whether the failure to give signal of the approach of the train to a street crossing and to keep a lookout was gross neglect, so as to authorize punitive damages. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Cooper (Ky.) 795.
The failure of a train to signal its approach to a street crossing in a small town and to keep a lookout for persons on the street was negli- gence.-Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Cooper (Ky.)
It was not the duty of the servants in charge of a train approaching a bridge to keep a look- out for trespassers; but it was their duty, if they discovered the peril of a trespasser, to use all reasonable efforts to avoid injuring him.- Vanarsdell's Adm'r v. Louisville & N. R. Co. (Ky.) 858.
The question whether the servants in charge of a train saw a trespasser on a bridge in time to have avoided striking him by ordinary care was for the jury.-Vanarsdell's Adm'r v. Louis- ville & N. R. Co. (Ky.) 858.
Evidence as to the stopping of a train, run- ning at the same speed as the train which struck plaintiff's intestate, held admissible; the length of time in which a train could be stopped being material.-Vanarsdell's Adm'r v. Louisville & N. R. Co. (Ky.) 858.
A declaration against a railroad company for personal injuries held sufficient, and not subject to motion to make more specific.-Crowley v. Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. Ry. Co. (Tenn.) 411. In an action for death, an instruction that, though deceased was guilty of contributory neg- ligence, defendant would be liable if its servants discovered his peril and failed to use ordinary care to avoid the injury, where there was no evdence that defendant's servants had knowl- edge of his perilous position, is inapplicable.- Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. of Texas v. Haltom (Tex. Sup.) 625.
as to burden of proof considered, and held er- roneous.-Highland v. Houston, E. & W. T. Ry. Co. (Tex. Civ. App.) 649.
Where plaintiff's real estate had no market value, a charge that the measure of damages for negligently burning his barn was the dif- ference between the market value of the real estate immediately before and immediately aft- er the fire was erroneous.-Highland v. Hous- ton, E. & W. T. Ry. Co. (Tex. Civ. App.) 649.
Under Batts' Ann. Civ. St. art. 4528, a rail- road company, having fenced its track, held liable for stock injured only when such injury results from want of ordinary care or failing to keep fence in repair.-Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. Co. v. Reitz (Tex. Civ. App.) 1088.
Discretion of court as to punishment as affect- ing right to jury trial, see "Jury," § 1. Effect of partial invalidity of statute relating to punishment, see "Statutes," § 1.
1. Offenses and responsibility there- for.
It is no defense to a prosecution for rape of a child under the age of consent that defendant was ignorant of such fact.-Manning v. State (Tex. Cr. App.) 920.
§ 2. Prosecution and punishment.
Under an indictment for rape, an instruction as to the offense charged held to present the whole law of the case.-Lowry v. Common- wealth (Ky.) 434.
Under a trial for rape, the testimony of the prosecuting witness that defendant had "raped" her, without detailing the acts done consti- tuting the offense, held sufficient to authorize a conviction.-Lowry v. Commonwealth (Ky.) 434.
An indictment for rape held sufficient under Laws 1895, p. 149.-State v. Hall (Mo.) 248. The supreme court will not pass on the weight of evidence in a criminal case.-State v. Huff (Mo.) 256.
In a prosecution for assault with intent to commit rape, evidence held to sustain a convic- tion.-State v. Huff (Mo.) 256.
In an action against a railroad company to There can be no conviction under Rev. St. recover damages for injuries sustained in at- 1899, § 1838, where the sexual connection was tempting to board a moving train, an instruc- procured by force.-State v. Hamey (Mo.) 946. tion that, though plaintiff were a trespasser, Evidence held insufficient to support a con- it was the duty of defendant's servants to as-viction of rape.-State v. Hamey (Mo.) 946. sist plaintiff, without any reference to his being in imminent and known peril, held erroneous. -Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. of Texas v. Mills (Tex. Civ. App.) 74.
Where, in a prosecution for rape on a girl under the age of 15 years, she testifies fully to the intercourse, and a child was the result, it is not error to fail to submit the issue of penetration.-Proctor v. State (Tex. Cr. App.)
Where injury occurs by reason of the viola- tion of a city ordinance regulating the speed of railway engines, such violation is negligence per se, though recovery therefor may be de-of age, it is error to permit a child which is On a trial for rape of a girl under 15 years feated by contributory negligence.-Chicago, R. I. & T. Ry. Co. v. Erwin (Tex. Civ. App.)
Evidence in an action for the killing of a mule by defendant's train held to sustain a judgment for defendant.-Henry v. Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. (Tex. Civ. App.) 644.
In an action to recover for a barn and con- tents destroyed by a fire, a charge that defend- ant was not liable for the destruction of the fowls and animals in the barn, unless it could reasonably have foreseen that they would be destroyed by burning the barn at that time, held error.-Highland v. Houston, E. & W. T. Ry. Co. (Tex. Civ. App.) 649.
In an action to recover for property destroyed by fire started by defendant's engine, a charge
claimed to be the result of the intercourse char- ged to be exhibited to the jury.-Gray v. State (Tex. Cr. App.) 375.
age of 15 years, the evidence considered, and In a prosecution for rape on a girl under the held not to justify a verdict of guilty.-Kee v. State (Tex. Cr. App.) 517.
Evidence held inadmissible in a prosecution for rape.-Manning v. State (Tex. Cr. App.) 920.
Evidence on a prosecution for rape held insuffi- cient to sustain a conviction.-Adkins v. State (Tex. Cr. App.) 924.
An indictment for rape on a girl under 15 years of age considered, and held not duplici- tous.-Gray v. State (Tex. Civ. App.) 375.
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