and, if the jury believe he thought he was of age the parent cannot recover, without regard to the questions of negligence, contributory negligence, and assumption of risk.-Id.
Though the parent of a minor consents to his employment in a dangerous service, he being in- jured therein through the negligence of the mas- ter, she may recover for his diminished earn- ing capacity during his minority.-Id.
That the evening before plaintiff's minor son was injured in defendant's employment he ad- vised plaintiff, his mother, that he would not re- turn home that night, because he was employed by defendant to run his gin, is insufficient to raise the issue of her having consented to his employment.—Id.
§ 13 (Mo.App.) A parent may be liable for negligence in permitting a minor son to use a dangerous weapon by which plaintiff was injur- ed.-Charlton v. Jackson, 167 S. W. 670.
Where plaintiff, a caller in defendants' home was shot by defendants' minor son, 13 years of age, during the absence of the father, both mother and father were liable for their negli- gence in permitting the child to have and use the gun with knowledge of his careless habits. -Id.
Where plaintiff, as an uninvited guest, went to defendants' house to make a social call, she was entitled, even had she been a trespasser, to protection against injury by the negligent use of firearms by defendants' minor son.-Id.
PAROL EVIDENCE.
pass to one of them, or there could have been no other reasonable purpose, the law will car- ry out such intent, whether fully expressed in words or not.-Scott v. Watson, 167 S. W. 268. II. ACTIONS FOR PARTITION.
(B) Proceedings and Relief. § 46 (Tex.Civ.App.) All persons interested in the estate must be parties to a partition suit.— Vineyard v. Heard, 167 S. W. 22.
§ 110 (Mo.) Where a partition decree of a homestead and dower tract described it in ac- cordance with the partition report setting it off to the widow, which passed only the quantity specified, notwithstanding a conflict with one of the distances, and such quantity was marked by a fence well known to the purchaser, the deed passed only the quantity in the homestead and dower tract.-Walker v. Garner, 167 S. W. 955. PARTNERSHIP.
See Appeal and Error, § 1054; Evidence, 314 Insurance, § 328; Intoxicating Liquors, $$ 152, 171; Joint Adventures; Joint-Stock Companies; Witnesses, § 175.
I. THE RELATION.
(A) Creation and Requisites.
§ 5 (Mo.App.) The rule that a sharing of profits raises a prima facie presumption of a partnership as between the parties sharing in the profits is applicable only where there is no proof of actual agreement; and, where there is
See Criminal Law, § 444; Evidence, §§ 390- an actual agreement, the question of partnership 450.
See Abatement and Revival, § 73; Appeal and Error, 34; Carriers, § 76; Equity, § 91; Injunction, 114; Joint Adventures; Judg- ment, $$ 707-712; Limitation of Actions, 124; Mandamus, § 148; Partition, § 46 Municipal Corporations, § 845; Trusts, 8 366; Venue, §§ 27, 32.
V. DEFECTS, OBJECTIONS, AND
$76 (Ky.) Under Civ. Code Prac. §§ 92 and 118, objection that the action could not be main- tained against the defendant because it was a mere voluntary association was waived when not taken by special demurrer or answer by way of plea in abatement.-United Mine Workers of America v. Cromer, 167 S. W. 891.
See Boundaries, § 3; Deeds, § 211; Frauds, Statute of, § 68; Fraudulent Conveyances, § 179; Judgment, § 707; Partnership, § 315.
I. BY ACT OF PARTIES. $5 (Tex.Civ.App.) A parol partition of lands is valid. Scott v. Watson, 167 S. W. 268.
Where R., W., and S. sold land, reserving a vendor's lien, and R. and S. orally agreed with W.'s widow that she should have the notes and their two-thirds interest in the land for her one- third interest in another tract, in pursuance of which the notes were delivered to her, and she signed a deed for the other tract, the transac- tion constituted a parol partition.-Id.
$9 (Tex. Civ.App.) Where parents, in antici- pation of the death of one of them, made a par- tition of land among their children and each child and the mother and father pursuant to the agreement took possession of their respec- tive interests and improved the property, and continued so to do for several years after the mother's death, the partition would be enforced in equity.-Suggs v. Singley, 167 S. W. 241.
89 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where, in the partition of land, the facts show that it was the intention
must be determined therefrom.-In re Whit- low's Estate, 167 S. W. 463.
§ 9 (Mo.App.) An agreement between a con- tractor for railroad work and S., which shows that the contractor desired that S. should super- intend the work, and that in consideration thereof he should receive a half of the proceeds, did not create a partnership.-In re Whitlow's Estate, 167 S. W. 463.
§ 17 (Mo.App.) The existence of a partnership is a question of intention, and each case must be determined in its own facts.-Willoughby v. Hildreth, 167 S. W. 639.
members results from their agreement evidenc- § 22 (Mo.App.) A partnership as between the ing an intention to create a partnership.- In re Whitlow's Estate, 167 S. W. 463.
Where parties entered into a written agree- ment, the question whether they formed thereby a partnership must be determined by ascertain- ing their intention from a construction of the writing itself, in view of the surrounding cir cumstances.-Id.
§ 44 (Mo.App.) Participation in the profits of a business raises a presumption of the exist ence of a partnership.-Willoughby v. Hildreth, 167 S. W. 639.
$ 46 (Mo.App.) Until a prima facie case is made out that a partnership exists, its existence cannot be proved by acts and declarations of an alleged partner.-Willoughby v. Hildreth, 167 S. W. 639.
§ 52 (Mo.App.) In joint ownership of person- al property, community of interest does not nee essarily evidence a partnership; and when such community of interest is held by members of a social or fraternal organization, the presump- tion is against its existence.-Willoughby v. Hildreth, 167 S. W. 639.
§ 55 (Mo.App.) In an action against certain members of the "Farmers' Co-Operative League," in which it was sought to hold de- fendants as partners, evidence held not to show that defendants intended to form a partnership, nor an agreement among defendants to share profits.-Willoughby v. Hildreth, 167 S. W. 639. $56 (Mo.App.) In an action to recover for
"Farmers' Co-Operative League," in which it was sought to hold defendants as partners, evi- dence held not to show that defendants held themselves out as partners, or that plaintiff supposed they were partners, and hence insuf- ficient to establish a partnership by estoppel. Willoughby v. Hildreth, 167 S. W. 639.
IV. RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES AS TO THIRD PERSONS.
(D) Actions by or Against Firms or Part-
$ 219 (Tex.Civ.App.) In an action against several carriers, as partners, for negligent delay and rough handling of live stock, where the pleadings of defendants denying the charge were unverified, plaintiff could recover the whole sum against either of the defendants.-Ft. Worth & D. C. Ry. Co. v. Shank & Dean, 167 S. W. 1093.
VI. DEATH OF PARTNER, AND SUR- VIVING PARTNERS.
§ 251 (Mo.App.) An administrator of a part- nership estate is not entitled to possession of chattels not the assets of the partnership.-In re Whitlow's Estate, 167 S. W. 463.
§ 252 (Mo.App.) Rev. St. 1909, §§ 240, 241, held applicable to partnership assets by virtue of section 99, and the administrator of a part- nership estate may be allowed a credit for debts charged in the inventory as due the estate, where the same cannot be collected by due dili- gence. In re Whitlow's Estate, 167 S. W. 463.
VII. DISSOLUTION, SETTLEMENT, AND ACCOUNTING.
(D) Actions for Dissolution and Account- ing.
§ 317 (Tex.Civ.App.) That partner invested money in partnership to defeat his creditors held not to prevent a partition and accounting from the other partner.-Freidenbloom v. Mc- Afee, 167 S. W. 28.
§ 336 (Ky.) In an action by a survivor against the estate of a deceased partner for an account- ing, evidence held to support a finding that the deceased partner died indebted to the surviving partner in the sum of $10,274.38.-Newberry's Adm'x v. Rhinehart, 167 S. W. 674.
PART PAYMENT.
See Limitation of Actions, § 155.
PASSENGERS.
See Carriers, §§ 247-408.
PAYMENT.
See Accord and Satisfaction; Compromise and Settlement; Insane Persons, $ 70; Insur- ance, 602; Limitation of Actions, § 155; Mortgages, 88 84, 283; Taxation, §§ 524, 543.
$45 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where a petition in an action to foreclose several chattel mortgages did not show how the mortgagor's payments, which were sufficient to pay the first mortgage, had been credited, they would be applied to the pay- ment of the first mortgage.-Marshall v. G. A. Stowers Furniture Co., 167 S. W. 230.
V. RECOVERY OF PAYMENTS. $85 (Mo.App.) Where a mistake of $565.75 was made in figuring an inventory by which plaintiff purchased goods from defendant, through her husband, acting as her agent, and it was not claimed that the husband fraudu- lently received the over payment, it would be regarded as having been made by mutual mis-
take so as to entitle plaintiff to recover the same.-Bone v. Friday, 167 S. W. 599. bank
$85 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where defendant twice collected a debt which plaintiff oil com- pany owed a shipper of cotton seed, the bank was in possession of money of the oil company which it ought not to keep, and which the oil company was entitled to recover in a suit for money had and received.-Jewett State Bank v. Corsicana Nat. Bank, 167 S. W. 747.
§ 87 (Ky.) Mortgagor's voluntary payment of 1 per cent., in addition to the 6 per cent. rate on the loan, in consideration of the mortgagee's surrender of its right to carry the loan to ma- turity and earn the interest, held not made un- der duress so as to entitle the mortgagor to re- cover.-Hamilton v. Kentucky Title Savings Bank & Trust Co., 167 S. W. 898.
§ 89 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where plaintiff oil com- pany paid to defendant bank its debt to a ship- per of cotton seed, and the bank used the bill of lading to collect a second time for the same debt, the oil company's act in taking up the bill entitled it to recover the second payment. Jewett State Bank v. Corsicana Nat. Bank, 167 S. W. 747.
See Carriers, § 20; Commerce, § 47; Costs, § 260; Damages, §§ 78-85; Usury, § 138.
PERSONAL INJURIES.
See Appeal and Error, §§ 1064, 1066, 1068; Assault and Battery, §§ 27, 39; Attorney and Client, §§ 143-190; Carriers, §§ 280-348; Charities, 45; Corporations, § 590; Dam- ages, §§ 132, 185, 216; Electricity; Evidence, $ 506; Master and Servant, $$ 88-311; Municipal Corporations, §§ 763-822; Negli- gence; Parent and Child, §§ 7, 13; Pleading, §18; Railroads, §§ 22, 259-401; Release, 17; Street Railroads, §§ 93-117; Trial, 88 48, 191, 251-253, 296.
PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS.
See Damages, § 177; Evidence, § 506'; Rape, § 38; Witnesses, § 220.
86 (Tex.Cr.App.) Under Pen. Code 1911, art. 750, information for practicing medicine unlaw- fully held fatally defective, where it did not al- lege defendant's residence and that he had not registered his authority or license in the dis- trict clerk's office of the county of his residence. -Young v. State, 167 S. W. 1112.
See Appeal and Error, §§ 193, 195, 233, 238, 877, 1040, 1042; Appearance, § 13; Car- riers, 408; Chattel Mortgages, § 287; Continuance, §§ 14, 30; Contracts, § 335; Counties, $ 89; Courts, §§ 122, 170, 480; Damages, $8 143, 158; Death, 8 57; Di- vorce, 214; Elections, § 286; Equity, § 241; Frauds, Statute of, 160; Guaranty, § 86; Highways, § 184; Husband and Wife, 332; Indictment and Information; Injunc- tion, §§ 114, 118, 122, 231; Insurance, § 645; Intoxicating Liquors, § 279; Judgment, 18, 85, 101, 251; Justice of the Peace $8 91, 135, 174; Libel and Slander, §§ SO, 94; Limitation of Actions, §§ 33, 127; Malicious Prosecution, § 34; Mandamus, §§ 154, 160; Master and Servant, §§ 256-264; Municipal Corporations, §§ 122, 816, 978; New Trial, § 26; Nuisance, $$ 48, 86; Partnership, § 219 Payment, § 45; Principal and Surety, § 101; Sales, §§ 267, 353; Specific Per-
For cases in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key No. Series & Indexes see same topic and section (§) NUMBER
formance, 1164; Statutes, § 279; Taxa- tion, § 592; Trespass to Try Title, § 32; Trial, 88 250-253; Venue, §§ 32, 77, 78.
I. FORM AND ALLEGATIONS IN
88 (Mo.) A petition charging fraud which merely charges fraud without specifications is, as a general rule, insufficient, as stating a mere conclusion.-Lee v. Lee, 167 S. W. 1030.
88 (Mo.App.) The allegation of the answer that at the time of the accident plaintiff's horse was driven in violation of the ordinance, with- out alleging in what respect it was being vio- lated, is a mere conclusion of the pleader.- Brickell v. Williams, 167 S. W. 607.
§8 (Mo.App.) A pleading alleging that a con- tract is valid and binding is an allegation of a mere legal conclusion.-Bird v. Rowell, 167 S. W. 1172.
§ 8 (Tex.Civ.App.) An allegation in a plea of privilege that the suit did not come within any of the exceptions provided by law, authorizing suit to be brought in the county of Milam or outside the county of Harris, held a conclusion of law, and ineffective.-Anderson, Clayton & Co. v. Terry, 167 S. W. 1.
§ 18 (Ark.) In alleging a cause of action, the particular grounds upon which plaintiff seeks to hold defendant liable should be stated with as much certainty as possible, but more specific details are to be developed by the testimony.- Kansas City Southern Ry. Co. v. Leslie, 167 S. W. 83.
§ 18 (Tenn.) Not only may plaintiff allege that the personal injury for which she sues was inflicted "on or about" a certain day, but, be- ing unable to do so, she may not be required to allege the date with greater particularity, and may recover on her testimony that the ac- cident occurred in the month alleged, and to the best of her recollection on the day alleged. -May v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 167 S. W. 477. § 21 (Tex.Civ.App.) Allegations of a petition, in an action for lumber sold, declaring upon a cause of action for lumber delivered at defend- ant's special instance and request, were not am- biguous nor inconsistent with allegations declar- ing upon a written contract, and hence defend- ant's exception was properly overruled.-Fink v. San Augustine Grocery Co., 167 S. W. 35.
§ 22 (Ark.) That portions of a complaint were redundant, and that it contained unnecessary details, did not render it defective.-Kansas City Southern Ry. Co. v. Leslie, 167 S. W. 83.
venue in the county of one's residence, mention- ed in "articles 1194, 1585, of the Revised Stat- utes,' instead of articles 1830, 2308, as re- quired by Rev. St. 1911, art. 1903, existed in the case, was insufficient.-Anderson, Clayton & Co. v. Terry, 167 S. W. 1.
§11 (Tex.Civ.App.) On a claim of privilege it is not necessary to introduce evidence as to residence which is admitted by the pleadings of both parties.-Lester v. Hutson, 167 S. W. 321.
(C) Traverses or Denials and Admissions, § 120 (Mo.App.) An answer, in terms denying "each and every material allegation" in the petition "except such as are hereinafter spe- cifically admitted," raises no issue except as to matters subsequently specifically alleged.- Brickell v. Williams, 167 S. W. 607.
127 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where a paragraph of the petition alleged that the defendant had stated that plaintiff had stolen all he raised on defendant's place, and was a thief, an answer denying the language used as set forth in that paragraph, but pleading the truth of any charge made that the plaintiff had been guilty of fraud- ulent acquisition of property and conversion thereof to his own use, is not an admission of the speaking of the words charged.-Burkhiser v. Lyons, 167 S. W. 244.
(E) Set-Off, Counterclaim, and Cross-Com- plaint.
§ 147 (Tex.Civ.App.) A cross-action must contain allegations which, given every reason- able intendment, would justify evidence of facts essential to be shown to obtain a judgment.- Reserve Loan Life Ins. Co. v. Benson, 167 S. W. 266.
IV. REPLICATION OR REPLY AND SUBSEQUENT PLEADINGS.
§ 174 (Mo.App.) Where an answer alleged the execution of a contract and set out the contract, and then alleged that it was binding on both parties thereto, a reply specifically admitting the contract, followed by a general denial, did not deny the legal conclusion of the validity of the contract, but to do so the reply must set up the facts showing invalidity.-Bird v. Rowell, 167 S. W. 1172.
$180 (Ky.) Where the petition, in an action to enforce a lien for reconstructing a vessel, showed that the sum claimed was due under three contracts of March, May, and August, 1911, and that the contract of March provided for extra work, a reply to the answer, relying exclusively on the contract of March, was not a departure, and a judgment for plaintiff was not in violation of Civ. Code Prac. §§ 98, 101.- II. DECLARATION, COMPLAINT, PE- Rounds v. Cloverport Foundry & Machine Co., TITION, OR STATEMENT. 167 S. W. 384.
§ 32 (Mo.App.) Where a written contract is pleaded and set out in full, the facts are stated from which a legal conclusion follows.-Bird v. Rowell, 167 S. W. 1172.
§ 49 (Tex.Civ.App.) The designation of an action as one to remove a cloud does not neces- sarily make it such, but the character of the suit is to be determined by the facts alleged therein.-Lester v. Hutson, 167 S. W. 321.
§ 69 (Tex. Civ.App.) In an action to reform a policy by inserting the name of plaintiff as mortgagee and payee, an allegation in the peti- tion that the person named insured was build- ing on the premises, and had no interest there- in at the time of loss or at any time, held not an admission that such insured had no interest in the building, so as to avoid the policy for want of insurable interest.-Western Assur. Co. v. Hillyer-Deutsch-Jarrett Co., 167 S. W. 816. III. PLEA OR ANSWER, CROSS-COM. PLAINT, AND AFFIDAVIT OF DEFENSE.
(B) Dilatory Pleas and Matter in Abate-
$104 (Tex.Civ.App.) A plea of privilege, re-
V. DEMURRER OR EXCEPTION. §193 (Ark.) Where the complaint was suffi- cient to inferentially show that the land in suit was the homestead of plaintiff's ancestor, the defect that it did not directly allege that fact cannot be questioned by demurrer.-Jarrett v. Jarrett, 167 S. W. 482.
§ 193 (Mo.App.) The causes of action, joined in a single count of a petition, being such as, by separate counts, might, under Rev. St. 1909, § 1795, be properly united in the petition, de- murrer, under section 1800, "that several caus- es of action have been improperly joined" will not lie.-De Field v. Harding Dredge Co., 167 S. W. 593; Wilkinson v. Same, Id. 595.
§ 205 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where the causal con- nection betwen the negligence of the master and the injury to the servant is sufficiently shown by reasonable deduction from the facts set up in the petition, the petition is good against general demurrer, although a special exception to its
well taken.-Hotel Dieu v. Armendariz, 167 S., fective in not showing causal connection be- W. 181.
$214 (Mo.) On demurrer, the truth of all matters well pleaded in a petition is admitted. -State ex rel. Garesche v. Roach, 167 S. W. 1008; Same v. Drabelle, Id. 1016.
8214 (Tex.Civ.App.) Defendant, demurring or pleading to the jurisdiction of the court, admits the facts charged in plaintiff's petition to be true, and only denies that they present a case within the jurisdiction of the court.-Key v. Key, 167 S. W. 173.
tween the master's negligence and the injury, an answer, which alleged that the proximate cause of the injuries, if any, was the negligence of fellow servants, cured the defect in the peti- tion.-Hotel Dieu v. Armendariz, 167 S. W. 181. § 406 (Mo.App.) Where, in an action for a nuisance, prosecuted after plaintiff's death by her administrator, both parties tried the case on the theory that plaintiff's death did not result from the nuisance, the defect in that the peti- tion did not show that her death did not result therefrom was cured.-Roth v. City of St. Jo-
$214 (Tex.Civ.App.) A general demurrer ad- mits the truth of the allegations of a petition.-seph, 167 S. W. 1155. Lastinger v. Toyah Valley Irr. Co., 167 S. W. 788.
VI. AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL PLEADINGS AND REPLEADER.
§ 262 (Ky.) Where an amended answer setting up additional damages under a counterclaim was filed several months before trial, plaintiff could not successfully claim surprise.-Louis P. Hy- man & Co. v. H. H. Snyder Co., 167 S. W. 146.
$423 (Ky.) Though under Civ. Code Prac. § 120, the proper practice is to file any evidence of indebtedness, upon which an action is found- ed, failure to do so does not invalidate the judgment where no objection was made.- Hughes v. Grogan, 167 S. W. 381.
§ 432 (Tex.Civ.App.) The objection of vari- ance cannot be raised after verdict.-Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Taylor, 167 S. W. 289.
§ 433 (Mo.App.) Where defendant, prior to the rendition of verdict, does not question the sufficiency or form of the complaint, any de- fects therein, not vital, are cured by the ver-
dict.-Falloon v. Fenton, 167 S. W. 591.
§ 349 (Mo.App.) Where, in an action by a broker for damages caused by defendant pre- venting the collection of a commission from a third person, earned in procuring defendant and the third person to contract for the exchange See Corporations, § 123. of their lands, the answer alleged the execution of a binding contract of exchange, and that de- fendant was financially able to perform, and
the broker by reply admitted the execution of See Constitutional Law, § 81. the contract and defendant's financial ability to comply therewith, but denied every other al- legation, defendant was entitled to judgment on
the pleadings.-Bird v. Rowell, 167 S. W. 1172. See Insurance.
§ 367 (Ark.) Where the complaint was suffi- cient to inferentially show that the land in suit
was the homestead of plaintiff's ancestor, the See Licenses, § 7. defect that it did not directly allege that fact must be raised by motion to make more certain. -Jarrett v. Jarrett, 167 S. W. 482.
$368 (Mo.App.) Where causes of action, join- See Evidence, § 12. ed in a single count of a petition, are such as, by separate counts, might, under Rev. St. 1909, § 1795, be properly united in the petition, the remedy is by motion for separate statement.- De Field v. Harding Dredge Co., 167 S. W. 593; Wilkinson v. Same, Id. 595.
XII. ISSUES, PROOF, AND VARIANCE.
8378 (Tex.Civ.App.) A general denial puts in issue every material fact alleged in the peti- tion.-Wilkerson & Satterfield v. McMurry, 167 S. W. 275.
$399 (Ky.) Under the express provisions of Civ. Code Prac. § 131, if the allegation to which the proof is directed be unproved, not in some particular or particulars only, but in its general scope and meaning, it is not a case of variance, but a failure of proof.-Prestons- burg Coal Co. v. Wallen, 167 S. W. 395.
XIII. DEFECTS AND OBJECTIONS, WAIVER, AND AIDER BY VER- DICT OR JUDGMENT.
§ 402 (Tex.Civ.App.) Allegations in a supple- mental petition will not cure defects or omis- sions in the original petition, but such defects must be cured by amendment.-Fink v. San Augustine Grocery Co., 167 S. W. 35.
§ 403 (Ky.) Where error in a petition was corrected by answer, and plaintiff by reply accepted the correction, any variance between the petition and the proof, which corresponded to the allegations of the answer, was imma- terial. Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co. v. Jesse, 167 S. W. 407.
§ 403 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where a servant's peti- tion for damages for injuries sustained was de-
See Adverse Possession; Mechanics' Liens, 8 59; Officers, §§ 81, 82; Tenancy in Common, § 11.
For practice in particular actions and proceed- ings, see the various specific topics.
See Appeal and Error, §§ 1029-1072; Criminal Law, 88 1172-1177.
PREMIUMS.
See Insurance, §§ 186, 198.
PRESCRIPTION.
See Adverse Possession; Limitation of Actions.
See Appeal and Error, §§ 907-934; Evidence, §§ 59-83.
PRIMARY ELECTIONS.
See Elections, § 126.
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT.
See Appeal and Error, § 1050; Attorney and Client; Brokers; Carriers, § 47; Corpora- tions, 88 283, 333, 410; Counties, 89; Estoppel, 856; Evidence, § 427; Injunction, § 114; Insurance, §§ 76, 186, 378, 379, 388; Railroads, § 17.
(A) Creation and Existence. §3 (Mo.App.) One who burned down an old mill, standing partly on the railroad right of way and partly on his own ground, in conse- quence of which a shipper's ties were burned, did not act as agent of the railroad company merely because, being anxious to get it away, and he wrote the company that he would do so, he was told to do it.-Eads v. St. Louis, Í. M. & S. Ry., 167 S. W. 577.
§ 20 (Tex.Civ.App.) In an action for the pur- chase price of coal furnished an alleged agent, certain evidence held admissible to show the relation of principal and agent.-Kohlberg V. Awbrey & Semple, 167 S. W. 828.
§ 22 (Tex.Civ.App.) In action on note given insurance agent and transferred by him to plaintiff, in which defendant asked judgment over against the insurance company, the agent's declarations that he was the company's agent held admissible; this being proved by other evidence and, in effect, admitted by the com- pany in its answer.-Reserve Loan Life Ins. Co. v. Benson, 167 S. W. 266.
§ 22 (Tex.Civ.App.) In an action for the pur- chase price of coal claimed to have been deliv- ered to defendant's agent, testimony by the agent as to conversations with defendant's hus- band which fixed his status held admissible.- Kohlberg v. Awbrey & Semple, 167 S. W. 828. Agency cannot be established by declarations of the agent.-Id.
$23 (Tex.Civ.App.) In an action for the pur- chase price of coal claimed to have been fur- nished to defendant's agent, evidence held in- sufficient to show the relationship of principal and agent.-Kohlberg v. Awbrey & Semple, 167 S. W. 828.
II. MUTUAL RIGHTS, DUTIES, AND LIABILITIES.
(B) Compensation and Lien of Agent. § 84 (Mo.App.) One suing for commissions for the sale of oils in certain territory was not obliged to account for sales made by another representative of defendant on credit; plaintiff merely making the deliveries and payment be- ing made direct to defendant.-Whitaker v. Bell Oil Co., 167 S. W. 619.
§ 89 (Mo.App.) Evidence in an action for commissions, in which defendant set up a coun- terclaim, held to support a verdict for plaintiff in the amount claimed.-Whitaker v. Bell Oil Co., 167 S. W. 619.
There was no error in admitting evidence in an action for commissions as to plaintiff's right to a certain commission, where the claim was admitted in the answer.-Id.
There was no error in permitting plaintiff, in an action for commissions, to inquire of de- fendant's auditor concerning certain correspond- ence, where he did not undertake to testify as to its contents, stating that he could not do so. -Id.
In an action for commissions for selling oils, wherein defendant set up a counterclaim for sales and oil not accounted for, evidence as to freight and rent paid by plaintiff for defendant was admissible without being alleged, as bear- ing on the counterclaim.-Id.
III. RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES AS TO THIRD PERSONS.
(A) Powers of Agent.
§ 101 (Mo.App.) Where plaintiffs authorized their agent to deliver certain cattle to defendant, the agent, in the absence of any agreement be tween the parties, had apparent authority to state the terms on which the cattle were so de- livered.-Cotton v. Gorrell, 167 S. W. 1187. $104 (Ky.) A sales agent of a foreign corpo- ration held apparently authorized to warrant that a pump sold for a particular purpose
8171 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where the owner of a note directed its delivery to her brother-in-law, who transferred it without authority, the fact that she received a portion of the proceeds, not knowing the money was from such source, did not estop her to deny the brother's authority.— Sloan v. Gilmore, 167 S. W. 1089.
§ 175 (Mo.App.) While as between principal and agent more is required than between the principal and third persons dealing with the agent to show ratification, an agent violating his instructions is not liable, if the principal, with knowledge of the facts, ratifies, expressly or impliedly, his acts.-Title Guaranty & Sure- ty Co. v. Drennon, 167 S. W. 1181.
PRINCIPAL AND SURETY.
See Appeal and Error, § 1152; Bail; Estoppel, 63; Guaranty; Injunction, $$ 239, 252; Landlord and Tenant, § 291; Limitation of Actions, §§ 22, 25; Mechanics' Liens, § 315. II. NATURE AND EXTENT OF LIA- BILITY OF SURETY.
§ 86 (Mo.App.) A bond, indemnifying a surety on a contractor's bond saving harmless the own- er from any liens for work or material, does not require the surety thereon to incur expens- es of actions on liens and claims; but, if sat- isfied that a claim is correct, he may pay it and recover from a cosurety a contribution.-Sin- clair v. Wismann, 167 S. W. 580.
III. DISCHARGE OF SURETY. § 101 (Ark.) Where a maker falsely represent- ed to the payee that the sureties had agreed to an alteration of the note by raising the interest rate in consideration of extension of time, the sureties were not discharged unless the payee acted under the agreement after learning that the sureties refused to assent thereto.-Waugh v. Cook, 167 S. W. 103.
Where a payee, suing on a note as altered by raising the interest rate in consideration of an extension of time, in reliance on a fraudulent representation of the maker, did not know that a surety had not assented to the alteration, she could repudiate rights under the note as altered and file an amended complaint on the original note.-Id.
IV. REMEDIES OF CREDITORS. § 161 (Ky.) In an action on a demand note, evidence held insufficient to show that the hold- maker, agreed to extend the time of payment, er, in accepting payments of interest from the thereby discharging the surety. Southern Nat. Bank v. Schimpler, 167 S. W. 148.
V. RIGHTS AND REMEDIES OF SURETY.
(C) As to Cosurety.
§ 194 (Ky.) Where A. and B., willing to as- sume two thirds of the liability on an official bond and sign as sureties, and C., willing to assume one-third, but refusing to sign, made a contract by which C. assumed one-third of the liability, and the negotiations did not contem- plate that a third person should sign as surety, A. and B., making up a shortage of the princi- pal, could recover a third from J., who also signed as surety, after deducting the amount Adm'r v. Bogard's paid by C.-Jefferson's Adm'rs, 167 S. W. 150.
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