In an action to recover special assessments on
city lots, evidence that the property was not
benefited for the use to which it was applied
held irrelevant.-Chicago Union Traction Co. v.
City of Chicago (Ill.) S03.

held properly added to a judgment on the delin-
quent list.-Gage v. People (Ill.) 80; McChes-
ney v. Same, Id.

On proceedings to confirm a special assess-
ment, the assessment roll is prima facie evidence
that the property was benefited to the extent
of the assessment on the correct legal theory.
-Chicago Union Traction Co. v. City of Chi-
cago (11.) 849.

The determination of benefits from a street
improvement is to be based on the increase in
the market value of the property, and not lim-
ited by the benefit conferred for the particular
use to which the property is then put.-Chicago
Union Traction Co. v. City of Chicago (Ill.) 849.
Hurd's Rev. St. 1901, p. 385, c. 24, § 546, held
not to apply to lots belonging to a street railway
company occupied by buildings used for storage
purposes, etc.-Chicago Union Traction Co. v.
City of Chicago (Ill.) 849.

Under Hurd's Rev. St. 1901, p. 385, c. 24, 88
546, 547, the assessment of several lots in one
parcel for a public improvement held proper.-
Chicago Union Traction Co. v. City of Chicago
(Ill.) 849.

A bill of the cost of construction of a side-
walk, filed with the town clerk, held insufficient
to sustain a special tax, under 1 Starr & C.
Ann. St. 1896, p. 858.-People v. Cash (Ill.) 904.
Though a city council, on the final hearing as
to benefits from a street improvement, errone-
ously regards itself as bound by the "front-foot"
rule, such fact does not render the proceedings
open to collateral attack.-Brown v. Central
Bermudez Co. (Ind. Sup.) 150.

An assessment for a municipal improvement
held not open to collateral attack because reso-
lution therefor was not made by two-thirds vote
of city council, as required by Rev. St. 1894, §
4292.-Brown v. Central Bermudez Co. (Ind.
Sup.) 150.

Under Acts 1901, p. 534 (Burns' Rev. St.
1901, § 3623a et seq.), notice of meeting of
common council for consideration of assess-
ments for street improvements held not to give
council jurisdiction to assess property not in-
cluded in report of city commissioners.-Spring
Steel Fence & Wire Co. v. City of Anderson
(Ind. App.) 404.

Acts 1901, p. 534 (Burns' Rev. St. 1901, §
3623a et seq.), held not to authorize common
council to assess property not reported assessed
for street improvement by city commissioners.
-Spring Steel Fence & Wire Co. v. City of
Anderson (Ind. App.) 404.

Under Acts 1901, p. 534 (Burns' Rev. St.
1901, § 3623a et seq.), notice of meeting of
common council for purpose of confirming or
modifying assessment by city commissioners for
street improvement, need not particularly de-
scribe property affected nor state names of own-
ers thereof.-Spring Steel Fence & Wire Co.
v. City of Anderson (Ind. App.) 404.
§ 10.

Enforcement of assessments

and special taxes.
Judgments for special assessments, appear-
ing to be "judgments of sale," and not judg-
ments finding the amounts due against the prop-
erty sought to be affected by the assessments,
held insufficient.-Gage v. People (Ill.) 80; Mc-
Chesney v. Same, Id.

Fees and costs allowed subsequent to the date
of the advertisement of a special assessment

An objection that an advertisement of delin-
quent special assessments did not state the
years for which they were due held unsustain-
able.-Gage v. People (Ill.) 80; McChesney v.
Same, Id.

In the absence of evidence of notice to the
collector of the name of the owner of property
sought to be charged by a special assessment,
he was not bound to insert the same in the pub-
lished notice of the assessment.-Gage v. Peo-
ple (Ill.) 80; McChesney v. Same, Id.

viously stated correctly the name of the owner
Where a special assessment collector had pre-
of property sought to be charged in the delin-
quent list, he was bound to publish the same in
the advertised notice thereof.-Gage v. People
(Ill.) 80; McChesney v. Same, Id.

A judgment in a suit to impose a lien on real
estate for special assessments, from which it is
impossible to tell the property sought to be
subjected, held insufficient.-Gage v. People (Ill.)
635.

In a suit to recover special assessments for
local improvement, defendant's contention that
the present application was different from the
one on which judgment had previously been
entered, which was reversed on appeal and was
still pending, held without merit.-Gage v. Peo-
ple (Ill.) 635.

In an action to recover an assessment for
street improvements, evidence held sufficient to
establish a prima facie case.-Chicago Union
Traction Co. v. City of Chicago (Ill.) 803.

A judgment for sale in proceedings for col-
lection of a special assessment for the building
of a sewer is defective, unless it conforms as
nearly as possible to the judgment prescribed
by Hurd's Rev. St. 1899, c. 120, § 191, for judg-
ment and order of sale in general tax proceed-
ings.-Gage v. People (Ill.) 840.

Evidence that the assessment of other prop-
erty owners, amounting to one-third of the whole
assessment, had been reduced 20 per cent. by
agreement, after their appeal from the judg
ment of confirmation, is not admissible to defeat
an application for judgment and order of sale.
--Gage v. People (Ill.) 840.

The fact that the engineer's itemized esti-
mate of the cost of building a sewer is not in-
cluded in the first resolution of the board of
public improvement, not having been taken ad-
vantage of on the judgment of confirmation,
cannot be urged against the judgment and order
of sale.-Gage v. People (Ill.) 840.

The fact that specifications for street paving
would not justify refusing a judgment for sale
improvements contain an alien labor clause
to satisfy the special assessment, where the rec-

ord shows that the bid was not based on such

specifications, which in no way affected the cost
of the improvement.-Thompson v. People (Ill.)
842.

That the engineer's estimate of the cost of a
street paving improvement was not made a part
of the record of the first resolution of the board
of local improvements does not constitute a
valid objection, when raised for the first time
on application for judgment for sale.-Thomp-
son v. People (Ill.) 842.

It is essential to the right of a city to recover
a judgment for special tax for building a side-

walk that it should prove affirmatively that the
ordinance was complied with.-People v. Cash
(III.) 904.

A statute providing for an attorney's fee and

for foreclosure of a lien based on assessment
for a public improvement held not unconstitu-
tional. Brown v. Central Bermudez Co. (Ind.
Sup.) 150.

§ 11. Use and regulation of public pla-

ces, property, and works.

The fact that a number of streets and alleys
in a village have never been improved, and have
been for some years within the inclosure of
private persons, does not prevent their recovery
by the village.-Village of Lee v. Harris (Ill.)
230.

Evidence in ejectment by village to recover
streets held to sustain finding of extension of
street.-Village of Lee v. Harris (Ill.) 230.

Village held entitled, under 1 Starr & C. Ann.
St. 1896, p. 689, c. 24, art. 5, par. 63, § 1, subd.
7, to effect extension of street by acceptance of
prolongation created by travel and use.-Vil-
lage of Lee v. Harris (Ill.) 230.

Right to control street dedicated to public
passed to the authorities of a town afterwards
incorporated.-Owen v. Village of Brookport (Ill.)

952.

An order of a city council vacating a part of
a street, in spite of the objections of adjacent
property owners, is void, and is open to col-
lateral attack by injunction.-Lowe v. Law-
renceburg Roller Mills Co. (Ind. Sup.) 148.

Burns' Rev. St. 1901, §§ 3648-3650, held to
prohibit a city council from vacating a part of a
street on one side of it, when the owners of
property abutting on the other side of the street
object thereto.-Lowe v. Lawrenceburg Roller
Mills Co. (Ind. Sup.) 148.

On appeal in proceedings for the opening of
a street, the question as to the unconstitution-
ality of the statute and proceedings cannot be
presented by way of independent assignments
of error, but only by assignments of errors on
rulings of the court, etc.-Pittsburgh, C., C. &
St. L. Ry. Co. v. Town of Wolcott (Ind. Sup.)

451.

Burns' Rev. St. 1901, §8 4404-4410, relative
to opening street, held not unconstitutional.-
Pittsburgh, C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Town of
Wolcott (Ind. Sup.) 451.

Where a railroad company without authority
occupies a public street with a permanent abut-
ment, and refuses to restore the street to its
former condition, it may be compelled to do so
by mandamus, without a right to compensation
for the expense.-Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. Co.
v. City of Elyria (Ohio) 738.

Rev. St. § 3283, does not authorize a city to
agree with a railroad company for the perma-
nent and exclusive occupation of a public street
with abutments supporting an overhead cross-
ing.-Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. Co. v. City of
Elyria (Ohio) 738.

Where a railroad company, to support its
overhead crossing of a city street, erects abut-
ments in a portion of the street, under a con-
tract made with the city council, it must appear
that the council was authorized by statute to
make such contract.-Lake Shore & M. S. Ry.
Co. v. City of Elyria (Ohio) 738.

$ 12. Torts.

In action against city for injuries owing to a
defective sidewalk, an instruction held erroneous
as qualifying the rule placing on plaintiff the
burden of proving that he did not contribute to
the injury.-City of Macon v. Holcomb (Ill.) 79.

In an action against city owing to a defective
sidewalk, an instruction that the city was bound
to use all reasonable care and diligence was not
prejudicially erroneous because of the use of the
word "all."-City of Macon v. Holcomb (Ill.)
79.

In action against city for injuries from de-
fect in a street, the question whether plain-
tiff knew of the existence of the defect held
one for the jury.-City of Lafayette v. Fitch
(Ind. App.) 414.

In action against city a special finding held
not to warrant inference that plaintiff was
bound to anticipate injury from walking over
a temporary crosswalk.-City of Mishawaka
v. Kirby (Ind. App.) 481.

Under Burns' Rev. St. 1901, § 4405, held not
essential to the validity of proceedings for open-
ing of street that a preliminary order should
be made declaring that the prayer of the peti-
tion was granted.-Pittsburgh, C., C. & St. L.
Ry. Co. v. Town of Wolcott (Ind. Sup.) 451.

Failure of the report of the commissioners
on opening of a street to contain the value of
the land appropriated held not ground for dis-
missing or vacating the proceedings.-Pitts-
burgh, C., C. & St. L Ry. Co. v. Town of Wol-
cott (Ind. Sup.) 451.

Where a defect in a city sidewalk existed for
such a length of time that the city, in the exer-
cise of ordinary care, could have ascertained
the same, notice thereof will be presumed.—
Michigan City v. Phillips (Ind. App.) 700.

In an action for injuries from a defect in a
city street, evidence held admissible to rebut
the city's claim of freedom from negligence by
reason of its inability from lack of funds to
repair defects in the streets of the nature of
that in question.-O'Brien v. City of Woburn
(Mass.) 350.

On appeal to circuit court in proceedings for
opening of street, held, that the only question
to be determined was the amount of damages
sustained.-Pittsburgh, C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co.
v. Town of Wolcott (Ind. Sup.) 451.

The fact that a proposed street crosses rail-
road tracks is not of itself sufficient to enable
the railroad company to defeat the opening of
the street and appropriation of its land there-
for.-Pittsburgh, C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v.
Town of Wolcott (Ind. Sup.) 451.

admissible on the question of negligence.-
O'Brien v. City of Woburn (Mass.) 350.

Evidence in suit by plaintiff against a city
for injury received from a billboard, which was
blown out of an alley on to the street. held
to authorize direction of a verdict for defend-
ant.-City of Fremont v. Dunlap (Ohio) 561.

§ 13. Fiscal management, public debt,
securities, and taxation.

Under Hurd's Rev. St. 1899, c. 24, par. 89,
a city appropriation ordinance cannot be amend-
ed, so as to insert further appropriations, with-

out the consent of a majority of the voters of
the city. People v. Florville (Ill.) 623.

An appropriation for library purposes, includ-
ed in a general city appropriation ordinance
which was void, also held invalid, under Library
Act (Hurd's Rev. St. 1899, c. 81, § 13).-Peo-
ple v. Florville (Ill.) 623.

Under Hurd's Rev. St. 1899, c. 24, pars. 64,
89, 111, a city tax levy ordinance, passed be-
fore the publication of an appropriation ordi-
nance, held void.-People v. Florville (Ill.) 623.
A tax levy by a village held invalid.-Cin-
cinnati, I. & W. Ry. Co. v. People (Ill.) 938.

The borrowing of money by the issuance of
bonds to pay the judgment indebtedness of a
city is a pledge of its credit for corporate pur-
poses, within the meaning of City and Village
Act, art. 5, § 1, par. 5 (Hurd's Rev. St. 1901,
c. 24, § 62), authorizing bonds for such purposes.
-Stone v. City of Chicago (III.) 970.

der Rev. Laws, c. 25, § 100, providing that
courts may restrain such acts.-Draper v. Grime
(Mass.) 1068.

MUTUAL BENEFIT INSURANCE.
See "Insurance," § 10.

MUTUAL BENEFIT SOCIETIES.

See "Beneficial Associations."

NAMES.

Names used in the two counts of an informa-
tion for forgery held idem sonans.-Selby v.
State (Ind. Sup.) 463.

NATURALIZATION.

of Chicago (Ill.) 970.

The general power conferred by City and Vil-
lage Act. art. 5, § 1, par. 5 (Hurd's Rev. St.
1901, c. 24, § 62), to issue and sell 20-year bonds,
is not affected by the power to issue funding
bonds. conferred by Act Feb. 13. 1865, as
amended (Hurd's Rev. St. 1899, c. 113) as the
latter act on its face did not in any way purport
to be exclusive.-Stone v. City of Chicago (Ill.)

970.

Where the money with which to pay the float:
ing indebtedness of the city is in the treasury, it
should not be computed in determining the
amount of its indebtedness under the constitu-
tional limitation; but it is otherwise as to the
accrued interest thereon.-Stone v. City of Chi-
cago (Ill.) 970.

The amount held by the city treasurer as due
the sinking fund is not a debt, within the sense
of the constitutional limitation, and should be
deducted from its bonded indebtedness, which is
included within such limitation.-Stone v. City
of Chicago (Ill.) 970.

The amount of anticipation tax bonds is not
a debt of the city, within the sense of the con-
stitutional limitation.-Stone v. City of Chi-
cago (Ill.) 970.

The "water fund debt" of a city is a debt,
within the sense of the constitutional limitation.
-Stone v. City of Chicago (Ill.) 970.

The amounts which a city has been assessed
for public benefits in assessment cases, and
which remained unpaid, is not a debt, in the
sense of the constitutional limitation.-Stone v.
City of Chicago (Ill.) 970.

The amount held in a city treasury with which
to pay special assessment bonds is not a debt,
in the sense of the constitutional limitation.-
Stone v. City of Chicago (Ill.) 970.

Judgments against a city, unprovided for,
should be included in determining its indebt-
edness with reference to the constitutional lim-
itation.-Stone v. City of Chicago (Ill.) 970.

The World's Fair indebtedness of the city of
Chicago held not to be a part of its indebted-
ness, within the meaning of the constitutional
limitation.-Stone v. City of Chicago (Ill.) 970.
Injunction held to be the proper remedy for
abuse of corporate power of city by mayor, un-

NEGLIGENCE.

Causing death, see "Death," § 1.
Damages for injuries caused by, see "Dam-
Harmless error in admission of evidence, see
"Appeal and Error," § 21.

ages.'

See "Carriers," § 1-3; Municipal Corpora-
By particular classes of parties.
tions," § 12; "Railroads,” §§ 1–6.
Employers, see "Master and Servant," §§ 2-12.
Condition or use of particular species of property,
works, or machinery.

See "Highways," § 4; "Railroads," §§ 2-6;
"Street Railroads," § 2.
Production, supply, and use of gas, see "Gas."
Contributory negligence.

11.

Of consumer of gas, see "Gas."
Of employé, see "Master and Servant," §§ 7, 10,
Of employé on train, see "Railroads," § 4.
Of licensee on railroad track, see "Railroads,"
§ 3.

Of passenger, see "Carriers," § 3.
Of person injured at railroad crossing, see
"Railroads." § 5.
Of person injured by defect in sidewalk in city,
see "Municipal Corporations," § 12.
Of person injured through defective construc-
tion of railroad, see "Railroads," § 1.
Of servant, see "Master and Servant," § 8.
Of traveler crossing street railroad track, see
"Street Railroads," § 2.
Of traveler on highway, see "Highways," § 4.
1. Contributory negligence.

The doctrine of comparative negligence does
not exist in Illinois.-City of Macon v. Hol-
comb (Ill.) 79.

If a fireman is not charged with manage-
ment of an engine on which he is employed, but
is under orders of his engineer, negligence of
engineer should not be imputed to him.-South-
ern Indiana Ry. Co. v. Davis (Ind. App.) 550.
§ 2. Actions.

Contributory negligence held provable by a
preponderance of evidence, given by either or
both parties.-Indianapolis & G. Rapid Transit
Co. v. Haines (Ind. App.) 187.

Whether an owner of land was guilty of ac-
tionable negligence, based on his maintaining
dangerous premises, held for the jury.-Cincin-
nati & H. Spring Co. v. Brown (Ind. App.) 197.

Whether a child who, while playing with oth-
er children, ran into a barbed wire fence at the
boundary of a third person's land, was guilty of
contributory negligence, held for the jury.-Cin-