nical legal language, and that William L. Deemer had an illegitimate child which the testator sought to exclude from taking under the will by the use of the term "lawful heirs," and, further, that it appears from the codicil the testator executed the same with a view to cut down the devise to William L. De mer from a fee to a life estate. As the language in the will has a settled legal meaning, we deem the extrinsic facts referred to of no importance; and as the testator, in framing the codicil, used language the legal effect of which was to vest in the son the fee, the intention thus expressed must control in giving a construction to the will, regardless of whatever unexpressed intention may have existed in the mind of the testator. The decree of the circuit court will be affirmed. Decree affirmed. RUDGEAR et al. v. UNITED STATES LEATHER CO. et al. (Supreme Court of Illinois. Dec. 16, 1903.) REFERENCE-REOPENING CAUSE AFTER DECREE-SECONDARY EVIDENCE. 1. Where, on a creditors' bill to recover money alleged to have been misappropriated by defendant from the assets of an insolvent corporation, it appeared that he had taken the money and the books of the corporation from Illinois to his home in California, and that notice to produce the books before a master had been given to him, which he disregarded, and he was present at the taking of the deposition of a witness in California with reference to his misappropriation, but made no effort to testify in his own behalf, and it did not appear that his evidence would change the result, it was not error for the master to refuse to open the cause after decree in order to permit defendant to testify. 2. Where original checks by which defendant was charged to have misappropriated the money of a corporation sought to be recovered in a suit by a receiver had been destroyed while in defendant's hands, and before such destruction he had disregarded an order to produce them, copies of the checks were properly admitted in evidence. Appeal from Appellate Court, First District. Action by the Chicago Title & Trust Company and another against Andrew Rudgear and others. From a judgment in favor of plaintiffs, affirmed by the Appellate Court (108 Ill. App. 227), defendants appeal. Affirmed. W. A. Sheridan, for appellants. Ashcraft & Ashcraft (E. M. Ashcraft, of counsel), for appellees. WILKIN, J. In July, 1898, the appellees, the United States Leather Company, a corporation, and Kullman, Salz & Co., also a corporation, each obtained a judgment against the Columbian Leather Company, a corporation of this state-the former for the sum of $1.660.47, and the latter for $117.88. Executions were issued upon each of said judgments, and returned "No property found." On April 14, 1899, said first-named corporations filed their creditors' bill in the superior court of Cook county against the appellants, A. Rudgear, Eleanor Turnes, and Celeste K. Haskins and others. The facts in the case are as follows: In 1896 the Columbian Leather Company was organized as a corporation under the laws of this state, with a capital stock of $25,000; and on May 23, 1898, William Kurzenknabe became the owner of all of the stock of said corporation, but on that date assigned the same to his two daughters, Eleanor Kurzenknabe (now Eleanor Turnes) and Celeste Kurzenknabe (now Celeste Haskins), two of the appellants herein. On the date of said assignment said William Kurzenknabe died, and immediately his two daughters entered into possession of all the property of said corporation; and an inventory was taken, showing assets of the firm amounting to $17,574.40, and liabilities of $9,057.43. Almost immediately after the death of the said William Kurzenknabe the creditors of said corporation began to insist upon the payment of their claims, and on May 25, 1898, a meeting of the said creditors was held, at which Eleanor Turnes and Celeste Haskins, the stockholders, and who had in the meantime been elected as officers of said corporation, were present. At that meeting it was agreed by all parties that the affairs of the corporation should be wound up, and a man by the name of De Boer, who had been a trusted employé of the corporation during its existence, was selected to assist in winding up its affairs, and to countersign all checks issued in the process of closing up its busi ness. Shortly after this meeting of creditors, officers, and stockholders, the other appellant herein, A. Rudgear, an uncle of the said Celeste Haskins and Eleanor Turnes, arrived in Chicago from his home in California, and from the date of his arrival seems to have been the moving spirit in managing the affairs of the corporation and the control of his nieces. A dispute soon arose between him and the bookkeeper, De Boer, resulting in the latter's discharge. On June 14, 1898, the said Eleanor was married to one Turnes, and on the same date the check of the company for the sum of $1,603.67 was drawn upon the First National Bank of Chicago by her, as Eleanor Turnes, and her sister, Celeste Haskins, payable to the said A. Rudgear, and by him indorsed, and the money paid by the said bank. Just who received the money on that check is one of the disputed facts in this suit. On the same date another check of the company was signed by both of said sisters, and drawn on the same bank, for the sum of $4,635.09, payable to "currency," which was indorsed by the two sisters, and the money paid to Celeste Haskins. Both of these checks were paid out of funds belonging to said Columbian Leather Company, and on the next day the said A. Rudgear and Celeste Haskins departed for California, taking of error to the Appellate Court for the First District, and the branch of that court affirmed the decree of the superior court, rom which judgment of affirmance this appeal is with them in currency about $6,000 of the Immediately upon the filing of this bill the superior court, on May 17, 1899, appointed the Chicago Title & Trust Company as receiver of the corporation, the said Columhian Leather Company, and ordered that all of the assets of said corporation be turned over to it. To the bill the appellants filed their answer, and the cause was referred to the master to take the evidence, and report the same, together with his conclusions of law and fact. The hearing was set for December 12, 1899, and on November 27th a notice was mailed to the appellants A. Rudgear and Celeste Haskins, in California, notifying them to appear before the master on the date of taking said evidence, and produce all of the books and papers of said corporation. On the date of the hearing they failed to appear, and also failed to produce said books. The hearing was postponed until January 3, 1900, when the evidence was taken; said appellants Rudgear and Haskins not appearing, and without their having produced said books; they also having failed and neglected to turn over to the receiver the assets of the corporation in their hands. On February 17, 1900, a dedimus was issued to take their depositions. The taking of such depositions was postponed from day to day until November 21, 1900, when that of Celeste Haskins was taken; but between the issuing of said dedimus and the taking of her deposition the books and all the papers of said corporation stored in appellant Rudgear's warehouse, in California, were entirely destroyed by fire. On May 22, 1901, the master prepared his report, and sent a copy to appellants Rudgear and Haskins, in California; and on June 17, 1901, Rudgear filed his application, supported by affidavit, to have the cause reopened, in order that he might give his evidence concerning the money alleged to have been received by him, which application the master denied. Objections were filed to the master's report, and overruled by him, and the objections stood as exceptions before the court, which were also overruled by the chancellor, and a decree entered in accordance with the findings and report of the master. The decree found that the defendants, Rudgear, Turnes, and Haskins, took and appropriated to their own use assets of the Columbian Leather Company exceeding the value of $1,600, and that they were indebted to said company therefor, with interest at the rate of 5 per cent. per annum from the 13th day of July, 1898, and ordered that they pay that amount to the Chicago Title & Trust Company, receiver for the corporation, for the benefit of the complainants, and that they pay the costs of the suit. From this decree the appellants prosecuted their writ On the merits of the case the decision below is manifestly right-in fact, more favorable to the appellants than they could reasonably ask. The evidence shows, beyond controversy, that Rudgear and Celeste Haskins took from the First National Bank of Chicago more than $6,000 of the company's money, and carried it, in currency, to the state of California, and thereafter wholly failed to render any account therefor. The grounds upon which a reversal is here urged are technical, rather than substantial. In his affidavit in support of the petition to have the case reopened, Rudgear swears that the check for $1,603.47 made to his order by the company was drawn by mistake, and that he indorsed it and returned it to the president of the company. He does not, however, pretend to explain what was done with the money. He also based that petition upon the alleged ground that he did not receive notice of the taking of the testimony before the master, and seems to think that, because the complainants did not seek to take his testimony at the time the deposition of Celeste Haskins was taken, at which he was present, he was excused from taking any steps to testify in his own behalf. He was a defendant to the action, and filed his answer to the bill, which charged him and his codefendants with fraudulently receiving moneys belonging to the corporation for the purpose of hindering and delaying its creditors. Certainly the law imposed upon him the duty of exercising some diligence in looking after his own defense to that charge. It further appears that notice had been sent him to produce the books and papers belonging to the corporation, service of which he had accepted before their destruction; but, so far as appears, he made no effort to produce them before the master, or excuse himself from so doing. We think the court was clearly justified, on his own showing, in refusing to reopen the case and permit him to make a defense which he had wholly neglected and failed to present prior to the report of the master finding him liable. We are also convinced that, if he had been permitted to testify to all the facts set up in his affidavit, they would by no means have been conclusive in his favor, being abundantly contradicted by the evidence in the case, and for that reason his motion to reopen the case was properly overruled. Oliver v. Wilhite, 201 Ill. 552, 66 N. E. 837. It is next insisted that error was committed in receiving in evidence copies of the checks upon which the company's money was drawn out of the bank. It is not pretended that the copies introduced were not true copies of the originals, and the evidence shows that the originals were destroyed by fire while in the custody and control of the defendants, and notice to produce them before their destruction had been ignored. Under these circumstances, the copies were the best remaining evidence of the execution and contents of the originals, and were clearly competent. The errors assigned by appellants are without merit. Appellees have assigned cross-error on the refusal of the court below to hold the defendants liable upon unpaid stock. The evidence was insufficient to authorize such a decree. The judgment of the Appellate Court will be affirmed. Judgment affirmed. FICIENCY OF EVIDENCE-AMENDMENTS-AUTHORITY OF COURT TO MAKE. 1. A lease of water power which provided that, if the lessor failed to furnish sufficient water, the lessee should have the right, on giving 30 days' notice in writing, to declare the "lease forfeited, terminated and at an end," and the lessor should then pay to the lessee, in lieu of damages, that portion of the rent paid in advance as should then be unearned, gave to the lessor 30 days after notice from the lessee within which to comply with the lease and furnish sufficient water power, and, on his failure to do so, the lessee would have a reasonable time thereafter within which to remove his effects from the premises. 2. Evidence that a lessee under a lease providing for its termination on 30 days' notice, on a certain contingency, gave such notice, and thereafter removed all his property from the premises, and delivered the key to the lessor, was sufficient to show a surrender of the lease. 3. The court, in an action brought by an administratrix, had the right to amend the record of the entry of judgment for defendant after the term had closed, and after the case was in the Appellate Court, by striking out the words "and that execution issue therefor," and inserting the words "to be paid in due course of administration," which amendment may be filed in the Appellate Court. Appeal from Appellate Court, Second District. Action by Josephine M. Channel, as administratrix of John W. Channel, deceased, against Louis W. Merrifield. Judgment for defendant affirmed by Appellate Court (106 Ill. App. 243) and defendant appeals. Reversed. Butters & Carr, for appellant. Jarvis R. Burrows and Charles E. Woodward, for appellee. RICKS, J. This is an action of assumpsit brought by Josephine M. Channel, as administratrix of the estate of John W. Channel, deceased, in the circuit court of La Salle county, against Louis W. Merrifield. The declaration consists of counts for goods sold and delivered, etc., and a special count setting out in full a written lease between Louis W. Merrifield and John W. Channel, which, in part, is as follows: "This indenture, made this 13th day of February, 1899, between L. W. Merrifield, party of the first part, and John W. Channel, party of the second part, witnesseth: That the party of the first part, in consideration of the covenants of the party of the second part, hereinafter set forth, do by these presents lease * * * and the party of the first part does also hereby, by these presents, lease to the party of the second part, water power equivalent to thirtyfour horse power; also such further additional water power as may be sufficient to run and operate the machinery now on said property; but it is herein expressly provided that in case said party of the first part shall be unable to furnish such further additional water power, in excess of said thirty-four horse power, as may be sufficient to run and operate said machinery, then, in that case, said second party shall have the right and option, upon serving said first party with a thirty days' notice in writing, to declare this lease forfeited, terminated and at an end, and the party of the first part shall then, in such case, be obligated to pay to the party of the second part, in lieu of all damages by reason of such forfeiture, as aforesaid, such part or portion, if any, of the amount of said $1,000 rent paid in advance as shall be unearned at the time of such forfeiture; and the first party reserves the right to substitute any other kind of power in lieu of water power, if he sees fit, without additional cost to the party of the second part. To have and to hold the same to the party of the second part from the 13th day of February, 1899, to the 13th day of February, 1904. And the party of the second part, in consideration of the leasing the premises as above set forth," agrees to pay to the party of the first part the sum of $1,800, payable $1,000 in cash, being in full of the first three years of the lease, and the balance in 24 equal payments, etc. The plea of general issue, with notice of set-off, etc., was filed. The cause came to a hearing, and at the conclusion of the plaintiff's testimony the trial judge directed the jury to render a verdict in favor of the defendant. Judgment was rendered upon the verdict for costs. An appeal was prayed and allowed to the Appellate Court, and the judgment affirmed, and, upon a certificate of importance by that court, a writ of error is prosecuted from this court. The legal question arises from the giving of the instruction by the court directing a verdict for the defendant. The record discloses that upon the trial of the cause it was proven the premises leased contained a tile and brick factory operated solely by water power, and that the same was useless without sufficient water power or some other power with which to run and operate the machinery, and that for a considerable length of time the water power had been wholly insufficient for the running of the machinery, and a 30-days notice was given by appellant, as provided for in the lease, which was, in substance, that inasmuch as appellee failed, on his part, to furnish a sufficient quantity of water to operate the machinery, appellant had decided to forfeit the lease, and to declare the same terminated and at an end, and demanded, at the expiration of 30 days from the date, to cancel said lease, and demanded the damages provided for by the said lease. The notice was dated May 25, 1901. The evidence discloses there was no effort on the part of appellee to furnish the power necessary to run the machinery, and during the first part of July appellant began moving her property from the premises preparatory to abandoning them, and, as there was considerable tile and brick, it necessarily took some time to get them all removed, but she had her property all removed by July 30, 1901. Appellee contends that appellant waived her rights under the notice by not abandoning the premises within 30 days; that the notice was a forfeiture, and she thereby waived her forfeiture; and he argues that the rule "that forfeiture clauses are not favored in either law or equity, and their effect will be limited by a strict construction," applies in this case. We are unable to perceive how this rule could apply here. The tenant gave notice to the lessor that inasmuch as the lessor was not furnishing the necessary power, as provided in the lease, she had decided, at the expiration of 30 days, to terminate the contract and declare the same forfeited, and demanded the damages provided for in the lease. Under our construction of the lease, the 30-days notice meant that, after the notice was given, appellee had 30 days within which to comply with the terms of the lease in furnishing sufficient power to run the machinery, and, if he neglected or refused to comply with the request, appellant would then have a reasonable time within which to remove her effects from the premises. The main purpose of this clause in the lease was to confine or limit the amount of damages appellant could recover in an action for the breach of covenant of the lease. The word "forfeiture," as used in the lease and notice, has no significance. The whole expression of which it is a part simply means to "terminate" or "end" the lease as provided, as it is not in the province of a tenant to compel a forfeiture by a landlord. Provisions for forfeitures of leases for breach of covenants or conditions are construed as voidable only at the option of the lessor. 18 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law (2d Ed.) 380-382. All of the cases cited by appellee are where the tenant has done some act whereby the lessor decided to terminate the tenancy and declare a forfeiture, and the lessor afterwards did some act whereby he waived the forfeiture, and are, therefore, not in point. It is also insisted there was no surrender of the lease. The evidence shows that appellant moved all her property from the premises and delivered the key to appellee, and 69 N.E.-3 we think there is sufficient evidence tending to show a surrender. It is also insisted by appellant that there was error in the trial court permitting appellee, on motion and notice to amend the record of the entry of judgment after the term had closed, and after the case was in the Appellate Court, by striking out the words "and that execution issue therefor," and inserting in lieu thereof "to be paid in due course of administration"; and, on suggestion of diminution of record, appellee was granted leave to file, and filed in the Appellate Court, an amended record showing the amendment. But we think there was no error in this, as "the statute of amendments and jeofails authorizes the court, at a subsequent term, to rectify any defect or imperfection, in matter of form, contained in the record, pleadings, process, entries, returns, or other proceedings in the cause, in affirmance of the judgment, so that the judgment shall not be reversed or annulled." Tosetti Brewing Co. v. Koehler, 200 Ill. 369, 65 N. E. 636. Other errors are argued, but, inasmuch as the cause will have to be reversed and remanded, we do not deem it necessary to pass upon them. We are of the opinion that the evidence tended to prove the cause of action as set forth in the declaration, and that it was error for the court to direct a verdict for the defendant. The judgments of the circuit court of La Salle county and Appellate Court are reversed, and the cause is remanded to the circuit court of La Salle county for further proceedings. Reversed and remanded. CHRISTIE v. PEOPLE. (Supreme Court of Illinois. Dec. 16, 1903.) CRIMINAL LAW-BRIBERY AT ELECTIONS-INFAMOUS CRIME-DISFRANCHISEMENT - CONSTITUTIONAL LAW INDICTMENT-CHARAC TER EVIDENCE-TRIAL-INSTRUCTIONS. 1. Rev. St. 1845, c. 30, § 143, div. 11, provided for the punishment of any person convicted of bribery in elections by a fine not exceeding $500 and disqualification for voting at any election for five years, and Const. 1848. art. 3, § 31, authorized the General Assembly to exclude from the privilege of electing or being elected any person convicted of bribery, perjury, or other infamous crime. Held that, such sections being in force at the time of the adoption of Const. 1870, § 7, authorizing the General Assembly to pass laws excluding from the right of suffrage persons convicted of infamous crimes, the crime of bribery at elections was infamous within such section, and authorized the Legislature to pass Hurd's Rev. St. 1899, c. 46, § 83, punishing any person who should receive any money for the purpose of influencing his vote or that of any other person by disfranchisement. 2. An indictment for soliciting money from a candidate for a public office with intent to influence the votes of others, substantially in the language of Hurd's Rev. St. 1899, c. 46, § 83, creating such offense, was not objectionable for failure to allege that the person from whom the money was solicited was a legal candidate, whose name was lawfully entitled to appear on the official ballot. 3. Where the court charged that defendant was entitled to the benefit of evidence of good character as tending to show that he would not be likely to commit the offense charged, it was not error to refuse to charge that if, on consideration of all the evidence, including that bearing on defendant's character, the jury entertained a reasonable doubt of his guilt, it was their duty to acquit. 4. Instructions that if the jury believed from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant committed the crime charged in the indictment, they should find him guilty, were not objectionable for referring to the indictment instead of setting forth the hypothesis of the facts necessary to be proved to establish defendant's guilt. 5. Where defendant asked the court to give instructions referring the jury to the indictment, he could not object on appeal that the instructions of the court referred to the indictment for the facts necessary to be found in order to authorize a conviction, instead of reciting such facts. Error to Williamson County Court; Rufus Neely, Judge. Jim Christie was convicted of attempted bribery at elections, and he brings error. Affirmed. Geo. W. Young and Burnett & Slater, for plaintiff in error. H. J. Hamlin, Atty. Gen., L. D. Hartwell, State's Atty., and Geo. B. Gillespie, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the People. CARTWRIGHT, J. Plaintiff in error was indicted in the circuit court of Williamson county under section 83 of chapter 46, Rev. St., for soliciting, requesting, and demanding $80 from one H. S. Harris, a candidate for sheriff of said county, to procure the votes of the legal voters of Eight-Mile Precinct for said candidate. That section provides that any person who shall solicit, request, demand, or receive, directly or indirectly, any money, intoxicating liquor, or other thing of value, or the promise thereof, either to influence his vote, or to be used, or under the pretense of being used, to procure the vote of any other person or persons, or to be used at any poll or other place, prior to or on the day of an election, for or against any candidate for of fice, shall be deemed guilty of the infamous crime of bribery in elections, and upon conviction thereof in any court of record shall be sentenced to disfranchisement by the judge of such court for a term of not less than five years nor more than fifteen years, and to imprisonment in the county jail not less than three months nor more than one year, and to pay the costs of prosecution. Hurd's Rev. St. 1899, p. 749. The indictment was certified to the county court for process and trial. The defendant moved the court to quash the indictment on the grounds that the section upon which it was founded was in violation of the Constitution, and that the indictment was insufficient for a failure to allege that Harris was a legal candidáte, whose name was lawfully entitled to appear upon the official ballot. The motion was overruled, and the defendant pleaded not guilty. Upon a trial the jury found him guilty, and he was sentenced to disfranchisement for a term of five years and to imprisonment in the county jail for three months. It is contended that the statute under which the defendant was convicted is in conflict with section 1 of article 7 of the Constitution, which confers the right of the elective franchise upon resident citizens having the qualifications prescribed in that section. The argument in support of that proposition is that any person entitled to vote at an election in this state under the provisions of section 1 cannot be deprived of that right except upon conviction of an infamous crime, as provided by section 7 of the same article; that bribery in elections was not an infamous crime in the law at the time of the adoption of the Constitution; that in determining what crimes are infamous we must give the words the same meaning and effect that they had at the time they were written in the Constitution, and that by adopting that rule the crime of bribery in elections is not infamous, within the meaning of section 7. The Attorney General contends that the Legislature have power to take away the elective franchise as a punishment for crime in like manner as the citizen may be deprived of rights to life, liberty, and property secured to him by the Constitution. But, if we find that the crime of bribery in elections was deemed infamous when the Constitution was adopted, it will not be necessary to consider the other question. Section 7, above referred to, is as follows: "The General Assembly shall pass laws excluding from the right of suffrage persons convicted of infamous crimes," and by the statute in question the crime of which defendant was convicted was declared to be infamous, and disfranchisement was imposed as a penalty. At common law certain crimes were of such character that infamy arose from their commission, and the criminal was deemed infamous. In this state the common law was superseded by a statute enumerating infamous crimes. The statute in force at the time of the adoption of the present Constitution, in 1870, was section 174, div. 15, c. 30, Rev. St. 1845, by which the Legislature designated certain crimes, and provided that each and every person who might thereafter be convicted of any such crime should be deemed infamous, and should forever thereafter be rendered incapable of holding any office of honor, trust, or profit, of voting at an election, of serving as a juror, and of giving testimony. This statute did not include the crime of bribery in general or bribery in elections. Said statute, however, did not embrace all the law relating to the subject of bribery or bribery in elections. Section 143, div. 11, of the same chapter of the Revised Statutes of 1845, provided for the punishment of any person convicted of bribery in elections by a fine not exceeding $500, and disqualification for voting at any election |