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in the state for five years, and this statute remained in force when the present Constitution was adopted. The people had also given to the offense of bribery the character of infamy by a provision in the Constitution of 1848. Section 31 of article 3 of that instrument was as follows: "The General Assembly shall have full power to exclude from the privilege of electing, or being elected, any person convicted of bribery, perjury, or other infamous crime." In the present Constitution the form of the provision for excluding persons from the elective franchise was changed, and it assumed the form, in section 7, of a command to the Legislature to exclude from the right of suffrage all persons convicted of infamous crimes; but the crime of bribery did not cease to be regarded as infamous. On the contrary, it was provided by section 4 of article 4 of the Constitution as follows: "No person who has been, or hereafter shall be, convicted of bribery, perjury, or other infamous crime, shall be eligible to the General Assembly, or to any office of profit or trust in this state." The offense of bribery in elections involves moral turpitude, and falls within the class of crimes deemed infamous, and in both the Constitution of 1848 and that of 1870 bribery was so classed by the people. In both instruments bribery of all kinds, which included bribery in elections, was classed with perjury, as rendering the offender infamous; one showing him to be insensible to the obligations of an oath, and the other proving him alike insensible to the obligations and duties of a citizen, and unfit to exercise the elective franchise. We do not see how it can be said that the framers of the Constitution or the people did not intend that bribery in elections should be included as an infamous crime within the meaning of section 7.

The other point in support of the motion to quash is that the indictment was defective in not alleging that Harris was a legal candidate, whose name was lawfully entitled to appear upon the official ballot. The indictment was substantially in the language of the statute creating the offense, setting it forth specifically in the statutory language, so as to fully inform the defendant of the nature of the charge. It alleged that Harris was then and there a candidate for sheriff of said county, and any candidate for office is a legal candidate, and entitled to have his name written on the ballot by those who are willing to vote for him. Sanner v. Patton, 155 III. 553, 40 N. E. 290. Harris had a right to be a candidate whether he was nominated by a political party or not, and it was no less a crime to request or demand money from him for procuring votes if he had not been so nominated. The allegations of the indictment were sufficient.

It is assigned for error that the court permitted the state's attorney, upon the examination of jurors, to read the statute, and, if they answered that they believed the statute

invalid, and were opposed to its provisions, they were challenged for cause, and excused by the court. None of these things appear in the record. Neither the examination of the jurors, nor any ruling of the court, nor exception thereto, is preserved for review. All that appears is a statement in the motion for a new trial, and it is not even supported by affidavit. That method of stating what occurred upon the trial is not sufficient. Mayes v. People, 106 Ill. 306, 46 Am. Rep. 698. Not conceding that a juror who did not believe in the validity of the law, and was conscientiously opposed to its enforcement, would be competent to sit in the case, the record does not raise the question.

It is next insisted that the court erred in modifying the fifth instruction asked by the defendant. The instruction was on the subject of the previous good character of the defendant, which there was evidence tending to prove. The part erased by the court is as follows: "And if, after a careful consideration of all the evidence in the case, including that bearing upon the defendant's good character as a man and citizen, the jury entertain any reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt, then it is their duty to acquit the defendant, and return a verdict of not guilty." The instruction as given allowed to the defendant the benefit of the evidence respecting his previous good character, as tending to show that he would not be likely to commit the offense alleged against him. The modification was in conformity with the rule established by our decisions, by which it has always been held to be error to call the especial attention of the jury to particular evidence, or a particular kind of evidence, so as to give it especial weight. The jury were repeatedly informed by other instructions that, if they entertained any reasonable doubt of defendant's guilt, it was their duty to acquit him; and it is not error to eliminate from an instruction a reference to particular facts or particular evidence so as to give it especial prominence.

The third and fourth instructions given at the request of the people are objected to because they refer the jury to the indictment, and do not contain in themselves the hypothesis of facts necessary to be proved to establish the defendant's guilt. They told the jury, in substance, that if they believed, from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendant committed the crime as charged in the indictment, they should find him guilty. The indictment stated all the facts necessary to the conviction, and, if the jury believed that those facts had been proved by the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, it was their duty to find the defendant guilty. Moreover, the defendant ought not to be heard to complain of that instruction, since he asked and the court gave an instruction referring the jury to the indictment, and telling them that the people were bound to prove every material allegation contained in the indictment

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which defendant procured to be given to the jury not only referred them to the indictment, but also allowed them to determine what allegations contained therein were material.

It is also alleged that the court erred in refusing to give the eighth, ninth, and tenth instructions asked by the defendant. They were on the question of reasonable doubt, and were repetitions of instructions given. It was not error to refuse them.

The evidence was conflicting, the witness Harris testifying to facts establishing the defendant's guilt, while the defendant testified to the contrary. The evidence of another witness tended to corroborate Harris, and there was testimony of a number of witnesses as to the good character of the defendant as a law-abiding citizen. We cannot say that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. The judgment is affirmed. Judgment affirmed.

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1. In proceedings for the condemnation of land the jury may base their verdict on knowledge gained from inspection of the premises, as well as upon the testimony of witnesses whose statements were mere opinions and conclusions as to the extent of damages.

2. Where the amount allowed in condemnation proceedings for damage to lands not taken is within the range of the testimony, the award for such damage should not be disturbed for errors in instructions which could not have operated to petitioner's prejudice.

3. The fact that the jury in condemnation proceedings arrived at the damages, to be allowed each landowner, by a preliminary agreement that each juror should set down the amount that he believed should be awarded, and that the aggregate should be divided among the number of jurors, does not vitiate their verdict, in the absence of a binding agreement by them to accept the quotient as their verdict.

4. The affidavit of the right of way agent of a railroad that the jury adopted a quotient verdict by previous agreement, which did not disclose whether affiant spoke from knowledge or information, will be presumed to have been made on information alone, and to be therefore incompetent, as affiant could not lawfully have been in the jury room during the deliberation.

5. In condemnation proceedings the court properly refused to regard the verdict as arrived at by chance, where six of the eight jurors filed affidavits that they regarded merely the evidence and instructions, and that the verdict was not arrived at by chance, and five of them filed supplemental affidavits stating that, while a quotient estimate was made, it was not pursuant to an agreement to accept the same as their verdict, but merely as a comparative estimate of the views of the jurors.

Appeal from Jackson County Court; W. F. Ellis, Judge.

Petition by the Groves & Sand Ridge Railroad Company against John Herman and

others. From judgment on cross-petition for defendants, petitioner appeals. Affirmed.

W. W. Barr (J. M. Dickinson, of counsel), for appellant. Wm. A. Schwartz, R. E. Doty and Herbert & Levy, for appellees.

PER CURIAM. The appellant company filed in the county court of Jackson county its petition for the condemnation of the right of way for its railroad through certain lands belonging to the appellees. The appellee John Herman was the owner of 40 acres of land, out of which a strip along the east side, containing 3.57 acres, was asked to be condemned. The appellee Amil Sherman owned a farm of 100 acres, from which a strip of land containing 4.96 acres was asked to be taken. The other appellees, being the widow and heirs of Silas Crossin, deceased, were the owners of a farm of 120 acres of land, out of which about 9 acres were to be taken for the right of way of the railroad. These landowners filed cross-petitions, alleging they were entitled to an award for damages to the land not taken. The issues under the petition and cross-petition were submitted to the same jury. Many witnesses testified in behalf of the respective parties, and the jury visited and inspected the lands. The verdict of the jury was that compensation for land taken should be allowed as follows: Herman, $201.57, Sherman, $484.39, and widow and heirs of Crossin, $856.25; and as damages to the land not taken, as follows: Herman, $118.50, Sherman, $694.38, and widow and heirs of Crossin, $796.25. Judgment was entered upon the verdict, and the petitioner has brought the record of the proceedings into this court by appeal.

We have attentively examined the testimony of the various witnesses, and consulted the record in many instances. We think it clear many of the witnesses, in estimating the value of the strips of land to be taken, took into consideration, to some extent, the injury which would result to the remainder of the tract or to the farm by the severance of the strip, and in considering the damage to the remainder of the tract which was not taken would again consider the injury that would result from the severance of the strip to be taken. Cross-examination operated in some instances to remedy this error, but perhaps in others it did not. If the amounts allowed for land taken had been smaller, it would have more nearly coincided with our views of the right and justice of the matter. But many witnesses testified to their judgment of the value of the strips of land, and, while their estimates were widely variant, the amounts fixed by the jury are within the compass of the testimony. In addition, the jury visited and inspected the premises, and had the right to base their verdict on the knowledge gained by the personal inspection, as well as upon the testimony of the witnesses. The instructions on that branch of the case seem to be unobjectionable, and our

conclusion on the whole matter is that no substantial grounds can be pointed out on which to justify the declaration on our part that the verdict is palpably against the evidence.

The award for damages to lands not taken seems amply supported by the testimony produced from witnesses. The jury, having inspected the premises, had the right to base their verdict on the knowledge thus gained as well as upon the testimony of the witnesses, whose statements were but their opinlons and conclusions as to the extent to which the lands not taken would be damaged. In Sexton v. Union Stockyards Co., 200 Ill. 244, 65 N. E. 638, upon the authority of many cases there cited, in response to the insistence the award was inadequate, we said (page 251, 200 Ill., page 640, 65 N. E.): "The evidence consisted most largely of opinions of ralues entertained by the different witnesses. Their judgment varied widely, and their opinions were likewise variant. The amount allowed, though much less than the estimates of the witnesses produced in appellants' behalf. is larger than that of the witnesses produced by the appellee company. We cannot know the effect which was produced on the minds of the jurors by the actual inspection of the premises. The rule in such cases is not to disturb a verdict if it is within the range of the testimony, unless we can clearly see that injustice has been done and that passion or prejudice influenced the action of the jury." These remarks are applicable here, though the contention is the award is excessive. The record does not justify the condemnation of the verdict on the ground the jury were influenced by passion or prejudice in rendering it.

The instructions as to the element of damages to lands not taken are criticised, and in some respects they are not accurate. The inaccuracies are not, however, of a character that could have misled the jury, when it is kept in view the jury visited the premises, and acted, in part at least, from the information obtained by such personal inspection. Furthermore, as we have before observed, the amount allowed for damages to lands not taken is within the range of the testimony, and it is therefore clear that the award for such damages should not be disturbed for errors in instructions which could not have operated to the prejudice of the appellant.

It was urged as ground for new trial that the jury had arrived at the compensation and damages to be allowed to each landowner by a preliminary agreement that each juror should set down the amount he believed should be awarded, and that the aggregate should be divided by the number of jurors. The affidavit of the bailiff in charge of the jury during their deliberations was filed in support of this ground of the motion. But the affiant does not state that the jurors entered into any agreement binding them to join in accepting the quotient as their verdict. It is

not inconsistent with the statement of the affiant that the jurors adopted this process for the purpose of seeing how nearly the average of the views of all would suit the views of different jurors. A mere experiment of that kind does not condemn a verdict. City of Pekin v. Winkel, 77 Ill. 56.

The affidavit of the right of way agent of the appellant company was filed, which averred that a quotient verdict was adopted by previous agreement. This latter affidavit does not disclose whether the affiant speaks from personal knowledge or on information. He could not lawfully have been in the jury room during their deliberations, and it will be presumed he was not permitted to hear what occurred there. It must therefore be | presumed this affidavit was based upon information merely, and for that reason it ought not to have been considered. City of Pekin v. Winkel, supra.

The jury, by agreement, consisted of but eight jurors. The affidavit of six of them was filed, and on a later day a supplemental affidavit of five of the six was filed. The affidavit of the six jurors does not specifically deny or affirm that during the course of their deliberations the aggregate of the different amounts the jurors believed ought to be allowed was ascertained and the same divided by eight, but contains the following statement: "That during the deliberations of the jury he, as said juror, was only and solely influenced by the evidence in the case and the instructions of the court in arriving at what he deemed was the just compensation for the land actually taken, and as to the damage to the adjacent land not taken, as to each and all of the said several tracts of land; that the amounts of the compensation for the land actually taken, and of the damage to the adjacent land not taken, as to each and all of the said several tracts of land, as returned by the jury to the court, and as shown by the report of the jury on file herein, was not arrived at by the jury by chance, accident, or by average, but was based by the jury on the evidence in the case, and was the deliberate judgment of the jury." In the supplemental affidavit the jurors stated "that, while the jury in this case did put down the several amounts that each and every juror was in favor of giving the owners of each and all the several tracts of land being condemned in this proceeding, as compensation for the land taken, and the amounts they were in favor of giving said owners as damage to their adjacent land not taken, and that they did add the several amounts as to each and every tract separately, and that they divided the result of said addition by eight, the number of jurors herein, but that said jury did not agree, at any time during their deliberations, nor at any time, that the said several quotients should be the amounts of the compensation for the land actually taken, and as damage to the adjacent land not taken, as to any or either of said several tracts of land.

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And these affiants further say that, while said jury did resort to the process mentioned in the affidavit of A. W. Skinner as to adding the said several amounts that each juror was in favor of giving the landowners herein as compensation and damages, and dividing the result of said addition by eight, said jury did so as a mere experiment, and for the purpose only of ascertaining how nearly the result accomplished by said addition and division would suit the views of the different jurors; but that these affiants emphatically say that it was not agreed by the said jury that the several quotients reached by said addition and division, as to both compensation for the land taken and as to the damage to the land not taken, should be the verdict of the jury either as to compensation for land taken, or as to damage to adjacent land not taken, as to either or any of the several tracts of land herein. Affiants further say, as they have already stated in their affidavits, that the report that the jury made to the court herein was the result of their deliberate judgment,. and was based on all the evidence in the case." It is quite clear the court correctly refused to regard the verdict as the result of an agreement to arrive at a conclusion by way of averages or by chance.

The judgment of the county court must be, and is, affirmed. Judgment affirmed.

McCHESNEY et al. v. CITY OF CHICAGO. (Supreme Court of Illinois. Dec. 16, 1903.) MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-SPECIAL ASSESSMENT-ORDINANCE-REPEAL IN PART-READJUSTMENT OF ASSESSMENT-CONFIRMA

TION.

1. Subsequent to an assessment under an ordinance requiring the cost of making the assessment to be paid by the assessment, the act of May 9, 1901 (Laws 1901, p. 117) took effect, which provided that the cost of making and collecting the assessment should be paid by the city from its general fund, and thereafter the assessment roll was recast by deducting the illegal item, the property owners were given a hearing, and the roll confirmed. Held, that the confirmation was valid, the ordinance not having become wholly void, and the court under the circumstances having had jurisdiction.

Appeal from Cook County Court; Frank Harry, Judge.

Proceedings for the confirmation of a special assessment for a local improvement by the city of Chicago. From a judgment of confirmation, A. B. McChesney and others appeal. Affirmed.

F. W. Becker, for appellants. Robert Redfield and William M. Pindell (Edgar Bronson Tolman, Corp. Counsel, of counsel), for appellee.

CARTWRIGHT, J. This case was here on a former appeal, when it was decided that the judgment of confirmation of a special assessment, entered after the act took effect,

by which it was provided that the cost of making and collecting such assessment should be paid by the city out of its general funds, was erroneous in including such cost. McChesney v. City of Chicago, 201 Ill. 344, 66 N. E. 217. For that error the cause was remanded to the county court, and, being reinstated there, appellants filed additional objections, alleging that the ordinance for the improvement was void because it contained a provision that the whole cost of the improvement, including the cost of making and collecting the special assessment, should be paid by such assessment, and therefore the court had no jurisdiction to proceed further. Appellee moved the court to recast the assessment roll as to the property of appellants, by deducting therefrom the cost of making and collecting the assessment. The court granted the motion, recast the assessment roll accordingly, and thereupon overruled the objections. A jury being waived, the question of benefits was submitted to the court, and on a hearing the assessment as reduced was confirmed.

It is contended by appellants that the ordinance was void, for the reason that it, and the estimate on which it was based, included the item of cost; that the defect could only be cured, if at all, by a new estimate, a new ordinance, and a new proceeding; and that the court was without jurisdiction to enter the judgment of confirmation. If an ordinance for a special assessment is void, it is a nullity, and a court cannot acquire jurisdiction to confirm an assessment by virtue of it. An ordinance by which a city attempts to levy a special assessment not authorized by law is of that nature, as where it provides that the cost of paving approaches to a viaduct, or other space which it is the duty of a railroad company to pave, shall be paid by special assessment levied upon the property of individuals. City of Chicago v. Nodeck, 202 Ill. 257, 67 N. E. 39; American Hide & Leather Co. v. City of Chicago, 203 Ill. 451, 67 N. E. 979. If an improvement cannot, in law, be paid for by special assessment, an ordinance providing that it shall be so paid for is void, because not within the power of the city. In this case, however, the ordinance, when passed, was fully authorized by law, and was legal and valid. The amendatory act in force May 9, 1901 (Laws 1901, p. 117) took effect after the proceedings for special assessment were instituted. It provided that the cost of making and collecting the assessment should be paid by the city out of its general fund, and in that respect superseded the provision of the ordinance. The ordinance became inoperative in a matter which lightened the burden, upon the property to be assessed, to the benefit of appellants, but the ordinance as a whole did not become void by reason of the subsequent act. The assessment could only be spread for the estimated cost of the work, not including the cost of making and collect

ing the assessment. Gage v. City of Chicago, 195 Ill. 490, 63 N. E. 184.

Appellants rely upon the decision in Thompson v. City of Chicago, 197 Ill. 599, 64 N. E. 392, where it was urged by the city that we should remand the cause with directions to the county court to strike out the item of costs, following the course alleged to have been pursued in Dobler v. Village of Warren, 174 Ill. 92, 50 N. E. 1048. In the latter case the error of the court was in entering judgment upon the verdict, and it was within the power of the court to direct a proper judgment, which was done. In the former case the error was not in entering an improper judgment on a correct finding or verdict, but in overruling objections to an illegal item. It was held that where an assessment was spread for too large an amount there must be a new assessment roll, to be confirmed by the court. In such a case, upon reversal of the judgment, the parties are entitled to a new trial, and we have no authority to direct the court to strike out an item and enter a judgment. In this case the assessment roll was recast by deducting the illegal item, and, as so recast, appellants had a hearing, and the roll was confirmed. The court had jurisdiction, and there was no error in the proceedings. The judgment is affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

CINCINNATI, L. & C. RY. CO. v. PEOPLE ex rel. HALSEY, County Treasurer. (Supreme Court of Illinois. Dec. 16, 1903.) TOWNS TAXATION-LEVY-VALIDITY-BONDS.

1. Under Hurd's Rev. St. 1899, p. 1706, c. 139, art. 4, § 3, authorizing the electors at the annual town meeting to direct the raising of money by taxation for certain specified town purposes, a ratification by the electors at a town meeting of an attempted levy for proper purposes by the board of auditors amounted to a direction that the specified amount of money should be raised for the purposes specified, and was a sufficient compliance with the statute.

2. By Hurd's Rev. St. 1899, p. 1715, c. 139, art. 13. §§ 3, 7, town auditors are given power to audit all charges and demands against the town and certify the same to the town clerk. A record of a meeting of town auditors showed a motion that bonds for $3,000 to pay the expense of building a bridge be issued for $1,000 each, payable in one, two, and three years from the date of issue, and the town clerk certified to the county clerk the amount of $1,000, plus a certain sum for town expenses, to be levied as a tax for town purposes. Thereafter the electors of the town at town meeting voted the levy of the amount certified by the town treasurer. Held that, in the absence of any showing that there were no outstanding bonds as to which the auditors might properly have allowed a claim against the town, the action of the town meeting could not be regarded as illegal on the ground that it was a direction to issue bonds which the town meeting had no authority to make.

3. Under a charter limiting a school district's power to incur indebtedness for building purposes to a certain sum, the limitation extended to the incurring of indebtedness only, and did

not prohibit the levying of a tax for building purposes after the district was already indebted to the limit.

Appeal from Kankakee County Court; A. F. Deselm, Judge.

Application by the people, on the relation of the county treasurer and ex officio collector of Kankakee county against the Cincinnati, Lafayette & Chicago Railway Company, for judgment against the property of respondent for delinquent taxes. From a judgment for relator, respondent appeals. Affirmed.

W. R. Hunter, for appellant. Bert L. Cooper, for appellee.

CARTWRIGHT, J. To the application of the county collector of Kankakee county to the county court for judgment against property of appellant for delinquent taxes, appellant filed objections, which were sustained except as to two items-the town tax of the town of Aroma, and the excess above the amount necessary to pay maturing bonds, and interest on outstanding bonds, of a tax levied by a school district in the city of Kankakee for building purposes. As to those items the objections were overruled and a judgment was entered, from which this appeal was prosecuted.

The board of town auditors of the town of Aroma met in March, 1902, for the purpose of auditing town accounts, and their record recites that, after having audited the same, and the tax levy being under consideration, it was estimated that they required the following amounts as a town tax, to be levied and collected for the following purposes: "For the salaries of town officers, $200; for the care and support of the poor, $100; for the miscellaneous expenses, $100; for the payment of the Sugar Island bridge bonds, $3,000." The record of the town meeting held April 1, 1902, contains the following: "The clerk also read the auditor's certificate of tax levy, asking for $200 for salaries of town officers, $100 for the care of town poor, $100 for miscellaneous expenses, $3,000 for payment of Sugar Island bridge bonds. Motion by S. W. Scott that the $400 for town expenses be allowed. Motion carried. Motion by S. W. Scott that the bonds for $3,000 to pay expense of building the bridge be issued for $1,000 each, payable in one, two, and three years from date of issue." An amendment having been offered and lost, the original motion was voted on and carried. The town clerk certified to the county clerk the amount of $1,400 to be levied as a tax for town purposes, as appearing "from the record of entries of moneys voted to be raised at the town meeting, and from the certificate of the board of town auditors of said town." The town tax objected to was levied in pursuance of that certificate.

There are separate objections to the $400, made up of the first three items, and to the remaining $1,000. The objections to the tax to the extent of $400 are that the auditors had no power to make any certificate as to what

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