the windows and entrance of the same, not on account of the order of suspension, but on account of the act of the legislature which went into effect on that day, and which prohibits unlicensed persons from holding themselves out as attorneys at law. Laws 1917, chap. 4, § 4. He alleged that all of the acts with which he is charged were done without any intent to violate the order of suspension, and in the bona fide belief, after advice of counsel, that, the order of suspension prohibited him from practice in this court and the district courts only, and that he was still permitted to practise law in the probate courts and justices of the peace and otherwise to the same extent as an unlicensed person. He is charged in the tenth paragraph of the information with having violated said order of suspension in this: That he represented one Roy McDonald as administrator of the estate of A. J. Hawley, deceased, in the probate court of Bernalillo county, New Mexico, with reference to the preparation of papers, pleadings, and orders, the commencement of said proceedings, the appearance in said cause on behalf of said McDonald, and advising said client upon questions of a legal nature relative to said matter. The respondent answered that during the year. 1915, prior to September, 1916, he had represented the estate of A. J. Hawley, deceased, and Roy McDonald as administrator of said estate, and had performed services in the premises of the value of more than $35, and that subsequent to September, 1916, at the request of said Roy McDonald, and to save expense, he assisted in the preparation of his final report as administrator, and drew certain orders in the probate court to close the account; that the estate was a small one, heavily indebted, and that the respondent made no claim for any compensation for services performed after September, 1916, and that said services were so rendered in the full and honest belief on the part of respondent, that, under the provisions of our statute, he was not barred or forbidden by the order of suspension from appearing for or repre He is charged in the fourth paragraph of the information with violating the said order of suspension in this: That on October 19, 1916, he prepared, or caused to be prepared in his said law office in Albuquerque, a complaint, affidavit, and bond in attachment which were thereafter filed in the district court of Bernalillo county in an action entitled, "State National Bank v. F. J. Dye," No. 10,647, on the civil docket of said court. That the name of William A. Keleher appears upon said files as attorney for the plaintiff, but that in truth and in fact the said Marron was the attorney for the plaintiff, and that said Keleher was appearing for him. Respondent answered that he was instructed by the officers and directors of the State National Bank of Albu-senting persons in the probate court. querque, the plaintiff in said cause, and of which he is one of the directors, to take measures to enforce the note held by the bank against the said F. J. Dye, and to have proceedings instituted to procure a writ of attachment against Dye to enforce the note, and to procure an attorney to institute and conduct said proceedings on behalf of the bank, and that he turned the note over to his stenographer, and instructed her to procure the services of either Mr. George S. Klock or Mr. William A. Keleher to act for the bank, and that his stenographer reported that Mr. Klock was out of town and Mr. Keleher was engaged in court, and, haste being necessary to protect the interests of the bank, he directed his stenographer to copy a form used in an attachment suit, deliver it to Mr. Keleher, and assist him in getting up the papers for the attachment, and that his stenographer did so assist Mr. Keleher, and thereupon Mr. Keleher filed the same, and has since had entire charge, direction, and control of said action, and that he (respondent) never was directly or indirectly attorney for the plaintiff in said cause, and that said Keleher was not appearing for him, but was appearing for the plaintiff. The information contains several other specific charges, some of which are denied by the respondent and some of which are admitted with certain explanations attending the circumstances. It will not be necessary to consider these other charges and they are, therefore, not here set out. The attorney general filed a demurrer to each of the answers of the respondent hereinbefore outlined upon the ground that the same failed to state facts constituting a defense to the charges above specified. demurrer we have sustained. This The same order of suspension was made by this court on September 23d against the respondent Francis E. Wood, the said Marron and Wood being partners in the praetice of the law at Albuquerque, New Mexico. The information as to the said Wood, in ¶ 3 thereof, makes the same allegation as is made against the respondent Marron, in regard to maintaining and keeping open a law office in the State National Bank Building in the city of Albuquerque, the displaying of signs, the use of stationery, and the sending of the same through the mail, the inserting of the names in the telephone directory and in Worley's Albuquerque City Directory. The same answer thereto is in all of the courts of the state, is it a contempt of this court for an attorney to hold himself out as an attorney at law, by means of keeping open an office and displaying a sign or signs upon the window and at the entrance of his said office, indicating that the same is a law office and that he is an attorney at law, and by using and sending through the mails stationery indicating that the sender is an attorney at law, and by permitting his name to be published in a telephone directory as an attorney at law, or in a city directory? Second. Does an order of suspension from practice in all of the courts of this state prohibit an attorney at law from practice in the probate or other inferior courts during the term of such suspension? Upon both reason and authority both of these questions must be answered in the affirmative. terposed by the respondent Wood as was This record presents two questions for interposed by the respondent Marron. Cer- consideration: First. After an order of tain other charges are made against the re-suspension by this court from practice in spondent Wood, to the effect that he drew a mortgage and charged a fee of $10 therefor, and that he did appear at a hearing before the state engineer of New Mexico, and examined and cross-examined various witnesses, and did interpose objections to evidence, and that he did examine certain abstracts of title and give legal opinions thereon. It will not be necessary to treat these charges or the denial or the explanations thereof made by the respondent Wood. In the eighth paragraph of the information the respondent Wood is charged with the same act in regard to the action en. titled "State National Bank v. F. J. Dye," No. 10,645, as are charged against the respondent Marron. Respondent Wood, however, denies, in his answer, that he had any connection whatever with the said action and was absent from the city of Albuquerque when the action was brought, and knew nothing of it until he learned of it afterwards. Certain other charges are contained in the information against the respondent Wood which the attorney general has elected to dismiss. The respondent Wood avers generally, in regard to the charges, that each and every act done by him, as charged or otherwise, was done under the honest belief that he had a right to do the act, and that he was not deprived by the order of suspension from any of the privileges enjoyed by citizens generally who are not admitted to practise as attorneys and counselors at law, and that he had taken counsel as to his rights in the premises, and had been advised to that effect, and that his acts were without any purpose or intent to disobey or violate the order of suspension of this court. 1. It must be apparent to any fair-minded person that the holding of himself out as an attorney at law, by means of the keeping open of the same law office, the displaying of the same signs upon the windows and at the entrance thereof, the use of the same stationery and the sending of the same through the mails, the permitting of his name to be published in a telephone and in a city directory, by an attorney, exactly the same as he had done before the order of suspension from practice, necessarily brings him into direct antagonism of the order. So far as the public are concerned, the invitation to visit the office and consult the attorney remains unchanged, and the order of the court, if known to them, would be seen to be of no avail. To the other members of the bar, who necessarily know of the order, his conduct inevitably must be reThe attorney general filed a demurrer to garded as a reflection upon the dignity and certain paragraphs of the answer which in- authority of the court making the order. cluded the answer to the charge of keeping So far as the court itself is concerned, while open a law office, the keeping of signs upon always carefully and sparingly exercising the window and at the entrance thereof, the the high and more or less arbitrary power causing to be inserted in the telephone di- of disbarment or suspension of an attorrectory of the city of Albuquerque the said ney, when once an order is made, it owes names and the using of the stationery, and it to itself, the members of the bar, and the causing to be inserted the names in the the public, to see that the order is fully Albuquerque City Directory, upon the and fairly obeyed, and to punish for its ground that the same did not state facts violation. That such acts as the respondsufficient to constitute a defense to said ents are shown to have committed are a concharge. This demurrer was sustained by tempt of the court, see Re Lizotte, 32 R. I. the court. Upon the sustaining of the de- 386, 35 L.R.A. (N.S.) 794, 79 Atl. 960; murrers the attorney general moved for State v. Richardson, 125 La. 644, 51 So. 673; judgment on the pleadings, the respondents 2 R. C. L. Attys. at Law, § 203. It follows both declining to plead further and filing that both of the respondents must be held a statement of their inability to plead other-guilty of contempt of this court. wise than in their said answers. The mo 2. The respondent Marron is alone contion of the attorney general has been grant- cerned with the second question above statBefore considering that question it ed. ed. may be stated that it appears that respondent Marron is clearly guilty of the violation of the order of suspension in causing to be prepared the pleadings, affidavit, and bond in the attachment proceeding heretofore mentioned. He did indirectly what he was forbidden to do directly, viz., practise law in the district court. No matter how urgent haste may have been, the fact re. mains that respondent was debarred by the order from doing the acts which he did. There were many other attorneys in Albuquerque to whom the business might have been intrusted if neither of the two attor neys desired could be secured. Respondent also practised law in the probate court, and this brings us to a consideration of the second question. We do not understand counsel for respondent to contend that this court has not power to suspend or disbar from practice in the inferior courts, but he contends that, in view of the provisions of the statute, the order in this case did not effectuate that result. The argument is based upon the provisions of § 352, Code 1915, which is as follows: "No person can practise in any of the courts of this state except probate courts and courts of justices of the peace, nor can any person commence, conduct or defend any action or proceeding in any of said courts unless he shall first have obtained a temporary license as herein provided, or shall have been granted a certificate of admission to the bar under the provisions of this chapter, and any person violating the provisions of this section is guilty of contempt of court." It is argued that inasmuch as the right to practise law in the probate court and courts of the justices of the peace is not derived from any order of admission to practise by this court, an order of suspension from practice by this court must necessarily refer to the practice in those courts where an order of admission is necessary; viz., the supreme and district courts. The argument is faulty. Section 374, Code 1915, defines the effect of suspension and disbarment to be to deprive the attorney of the right to appear in "any of the courts of this state." It requires construction to narrow the meaning of the words "any of the courts" so as to include only this court and the district courts. And there is no reason for so narrowing the definition of the words. If an attorney has been guilty of conduct requiring, in the judgment of the court, his suspension or disbarment from practice in this and the district courts, the disqualification causing the suspension or disbarment likewise and to the same degree affects his fitness to practise in the probate or other inferior courts, where often some of the most important matters ever coming before courts are heard. Nor are we constrained by rules of statutory construction to so narrow the meaning of the words. The mere fact that the practitioners in probate courts and courts of the justice of the peace require no order of admission to practise is of no controlling force in the construction of the words of the statute. If, after an attorney has been elected into a special class among the citizens, possessed of many high privileges and prerogatives, he is found wanting and is expelled, either temporarily or permanently, from such class, it is not only competent, but the part of wisdom, we think, for the legislature to provide, as we hold it has done, that he shall also lose the right possessed by the unlicensed citizen; viz., to practise in the inferior courts. It may be stated in passing that a decision of this question is not necessary to a decision of the case and makes no difference in the result reached; but, as it is presented and is properly to be decided, we have considered the same. 3. It thus appears that respondents are guilty of contempt of this court, and it remains to fix their punishment. In approaching such a subject the court does so with great caution, fully realizing the arbitrary nature of the power exercised, and the inability of the respondents to have the action reviewed, thus requiring the court, in common justice, to take care lest injustice be done. In the first place it is to be observed that both respondents disclaim any intent to violate the order of suspension. This disclaimer is entitled to consideration by the court, and under many circumstances might so mitigate the offense as to require no more punishment than a reprimand. They both allege that they took counsel as to their rights under the order and were advised that their course of conduct was proper. This fact reflects upon the degree of punishment required, but has no effect in relieving respondents of the contempt itself. State v. Richardson, 125 La. 644, 51 So. 673. On the other hand, there is something in the conduct of respondents which smacks of contumacy. They are attorneys of great learning and ability and wide experience, and are among the leaders of the bar of the state. It is difficult for the court to convict them of ignorance of the law and of the fact that holding themselves out as attorneys the same as before the order was a direct contempt of the court making the order. Evidence of complete submission to the letter and spirit of the order and a willingness to pay the penalty heretofore imposed seems to be lacking. It therefore becomes the unpleasant duty of the court to impose, the city of Albuquerque, a complaint and punishment of a substantial character. The judgment of the court is that each of the respondents pay a fine to the state of New Mexico in the sum of $500, and that each stands committed until his fine is paid. Parker, J., concurs. Roberts, J., dissenting: affidavit for attachment and bond in attachment, which was thereafter filed in the district court of Bernalillo county in an action entitled, "State National Bank v. F. J. Dye;" that the name of attorney for plaintiff appearing upon the files of the record in said cause was William A. Keleher, but that in truth and in fact the said Owen N. Marron was attorney for plaintiff in said cause. The tenth paragraph charges that said Marron, in the months of October, November, and December, 1916, in the city of Albuquerque, in the county of Bernalillo, state of New Mexico, unlawfully, wilfully, and knowlingly violated and disobeyed said order and judgment, and did practise law in this, that he represented one Roy McDonald, as administrator of the estate of A. J. Hawley, deceased, in the probate court of Bernalillo county, New Mexico, with reference to the preparation of papers, pleadings, and orders relative to said estate. Paragraphs 5-9 of the information were, upon leave of the court, dismissed by the attorney general; hence need not be referred to here. By the fourth paragraph of the information against Wood, it is charged that said Wood, on the 7th day of December, 1916, in the county of Bernalillo, violated said order, in that he then and there drew a certain mortgage contract for one W. H. Chrisman, and advised the said Chrisman upon questions of a legal nature, and did then and there charge a fee of $10 for such service rendered. The state, on the relation of its attorney general, instituted separate proceedings against each of the above-named respondents for the purpose of punishing them for contempt of court. As the charges against each respondent are predicated upon a violation of the same order and the facts are somewhat identical, I will treat the two cases in one opinion. The respondents were, prior to the 23d day of September, 1916, members of the bar of this state, regularly admitted to the practice of the law in this court, and were practising their profession in the city of Albuquerque. They were partners in the practice of the law. Upon the date above mentioned, by order of this court, they were suspended "from practice in the courts of this state for the full period of one year." The information filed in these cases charges that such attorneys have violated the order of the court, and that they have practised law in violation of the same. As to both respondents it is charged that, after the order of suspension was entered, they continued to maintain law offices in the city of Albuquerque, and by signs upon the doors and windows thereof and by printed letterheads held themselves By the fifth paragraph it is charged that out to the public as practising attorneys; said Wood, on the 18th day of October, 1916, further, that each of said respondents had, in the town of Bluewater, county of Vafrom time to time, advised former clients lencia, violated said order, in that he then and others as to questions of law relating to and there appeared for, advised and reprevarious matters submitted to them. As sented, certain inhabitants of the Bluewater to the respondent Marron, it is charged that Irrigation District, at a hearing before the in the month of October, 1916, he did unlaw-state engineer of the state of New Mexico, fully, wilfully, and knowingly violate and and at such hearing did examine and crossdisobey the said order of the court, and examine various witnesses, and did interdid practise law in this: "That he appeared pose objections to the evidence introduced, for, advised, and represented the Gallup etc. State Bank in the matter of foreclosure proceedings in settlement of certain chattel mortgage which said bank held against the Navajo Live Stock & Trading Company, and charged and collected from said bank an attorney's fee of $250 for such services rendered." By the sixth paragraph it is charged that said Wood, on the 30th day of September, 1916, in the county of Bernalillo, violated said order, in that he examined a certain abstract of title for the State National Bank and rendered a legal opinion thereon, and charged said State Bank a fee for such services, and then and there advised said bank and its officers upon questions of a legal nature, and that upon other occasions said Wood rendered legal services for said bank. In paragraph 4 it is charged that said Marron, on or about the 19th day of October, 1916, in said county of Bernalillo, unlawfully, wilfully, and knowingly violated and disobeyed the said order and judgment, and did practise law, in that he prepared, By the seventh paragraph it is charged or caused to be prepared, in his office in' that on the 24th day of January, 1914, in the county of Bernalillo, said Wood ex-, above stated: that it still left this defendamined a certain abstract of title for the ant an attorney at law, but merely susState National Bank and rendered a legal pended his right to appear for or represent opinion thereon in the matter of title in clients, either directly or indirectly, in prowhich O. Kelly Knight and another were ceedings in the district courts or the interested. supreme court of the state, and had no further effect, and left him meantime free to do anything which a person not admitted to the bar might lawfully do; that under the facts and circumstances of this case, and as the law stood at the time of such suspension, this defendant was not required to change the signs or lettering on his offices or make any change in his office stationery. That this defendant annexes hereto and returns as a part of this answer the affidavit of Mr. Renehan as to the advice so given. And this defendant further shows that whatever was done as hereinafter admitted, set forth, and alleged was done by this defendant openly and in good faith, and in the full and honest belief that in so doing he was not violating or disobeying the order of suspension, and without any purpose or intent upon his part to disobey or violate the judgment or order of this court suspending him." To these informations respondents answered the accusations generally, as follows: "Answering generally the said in formation and each and several of the charges therein contained, this defendant respectfully shows to the court that it is and was at all times his understanding and honest belief that the order of suspension made by the court herein in accordance with its terms and with the provisions of the statute then in effect only revoked the license that had previously been issued to him to practise in the courts of the state of New Mexico during the period of such suspension, and that the said order did not deprive him of any of the rights or privileges possessed or enjoyed generally by citizens of the state of New Mexico, and only suspended such additional privileges not enjoyed by citizens generally as were conferred upon him by the order admitting him to practise as an attorney and counselor at law; that it was the understanding and the honest belief of this defendant that the effect of the order of suspension was to forbid him during the period prescribed from appearing or representing clients or conducting any proceedings for clients in any of the district courts or in the supreme court of the state, but that it left this defendant free to draw contracts, conveyances, make collections, and advise in matters not connected with the conduct of suits in the said courts, to act as director, manager, or agent of corporations, etc., to the same extent that persons not admitted to practise law could and might lawfully do; that the language used in one part of the opinion and order suspending this defendant expressly referring to the district courts and the supreme court as the ones from which he was suspended from practising, taken in connection with the express provisions of the statute forbidding persons not admitted to practise law from practising in any court except the probate court and justice's courts of this state, and the further provision that the effect of the order of suspension was to forbid this defendant from appearing in the courts were plain and definite, and was the measure of the effect of the order of suspension; that this defendant consulted with his counsel Mr. A. B. Renehan, a counselor of this court, as to his rights and duties under said order, and was advised by said counsel, who had full knowledge of all the facts, that the measure, effect, and construction of the order was as As to the charge contained in both informations, as to the keeping open of law offices, displaying signs, and using printed letterheads, and carrying their names in telephone directories, both respondents answered in substantially the same language, which was as follows (quoting from the answer filed by Marron): "Answering ¶ 2 of the said information this defendant denies that since the 23d day of September, 1916, he did, knowingly or otherwise, violate and disobey the said order and judgment of this court, and denies that, except as hereinafter stated, he has kept open a law office or habitually advised with clients, or habitually rendered legal service since said date, or that the words 'law office' has been displayed on the windows or entrance to the said offices at all times since said date, or that envelops printed with the return card bearing the words 'Marron & Wood, Attorneys and Counselors,' were at any time used, or authorized to be used, by this defendant, or that this defendant caused to be inserted in the telephone directory or the city directory of the city of Albuquerque, the name Marron & Wood, Attys.' or 'Marron & Wood, Attorneys.' "And, further answering the matters and things stated in 2 of said information, this defendant respectfully states to the court that the facts concerning said matters are as follows, and not otherwise: "That at and for many years prior to the time of such suspension, the firm of Marron & Wood, composed of this defendant and Francis E. Wood, had and maintained in |