At the time the note was executed, appellant was the local collector of the lodge, and by virtue of his position may have exercised an undue influence on Katie Moore, and, if so, the doctrine of the Kentucky court would here be applicable. ment, hold that a debt of a deceased husband, tory arrangements were made with him. is not a sufficient consideration for a note executed by the widow, unless she receive assets from the estate. 8 C. J. p. 222, with cases under footnote 12. In the present case there was no property left by Dock Moore subject to the demands of his creditors. There is no contention that the widow in It might be contended that the cases of any wise helped to incur the debt, and there Bissinger v. Lawson, 57 Miss. 36, and Calwas neither moral nor legal obligation rest-houn v. Calhoun, 37 Miss. 668, though not ing upon her in the premises. On the point whether a moral or ethical obligation will supply the needed consideration in a contract of this character, the authorities are in conflict, and on this question we need not discuss the previous announcements or the position of this court. In the present case, we take it, there was no moral obliga-first-named case the deceased father owed a tion upon the widow. The effort here is to subject the proceeds of insurance, which the statute and the public policy of our state proclaim exempt. The equities, then, are more in favor of the widow. In the case of Hanway v. Robertshaw, 43 Miss. 758, the widow of one of the deceased partners of the firm of Bartholomew Hanway & Company joined the surviving partner in executing notes for a debt of the said firm. It appears that there were personal assets of the partnership left in the hands of the surviving partner. In addition to executing a note for the partnership debt, the widow executed a mortgage on certain real estate belonging to the firm. There was in that case a bill for a foreclosure of the mortgage, and upon contest our court held that "the widow of the deceased was not a member of the firm of Bartholomew Hanway & Company, and as the record does not show any consideration for her assumption of one half of the debt of said firm, it is difficult to perceive upon what principle she can be liable to the appellant for any part of his claim against the said firm." There was a second appeal of this case, as shown by the opinion in 52 Miss. 713, and the views expressed were reaffirmed. cited by counsel, are in conflict with our present holding. Our examination of these cases, as reported, convinces us that the court adhered to the general and sound rule that the consideration for a contract of this character may be the full extinguishment of the debt held against the deceased. In the valid and subsisting indebtedness, which the Aside from these considerations, however, we are impressed with the want of consideration in this case. The widow did not owe the obligation she attempted to assume. She received no estate which by law would descend to the administrator for the benefit of creditors. There was, then, neither benefit to the widow nor any substantial forbearance by the creditor. Affirmed. NORTH CAROLINA SUPREME mons, Deceased, Appt., In Tucker v. Denton, 32 Ky. L. Rep. 521, 15 L.R.A. (N.S.) 289, 106 S. W. 280, a daughter paid over certain money to secure the release of her parents from what she by mistake supposed to be an enforceable contract for the sale of real estate. Thereafter the daughter sued to recover the money, alleging a mistake of fact. The court R. H. MONEY, Admr., etc., of W. M. Salreached the conclusion that the contract entered into by, the parents, while not void, was unenforceable, held that the money was paid under mistake, and permitted the daughter to recover. It is difficult to know the importance the chancellor attached to the testimony to the effect that appellant represented to the widow that she would never collect her insurance unless satisfac V. TRAVELERS' HOTEL COMPANY et al. (N. C. 93 S. E. 964.) for safety of Innkeeper liability An hotelkeeper who provides for the use of guests a safe passenger elevator, and a S. B. Patterson was a guest of the hotel, and occupied room 307. On the day the intestate of the plaintiff was killed, he met Patterson on the street, about 10 or 11 o'clock in the morning, and upon his invitation went with him to his room in the hotel, in company with one or two others, and there remained until lunch time, when the party took lunch with Patterson at the hotel. All the members of the party were drinking while in the room. After lunch, all of them went together to a circus, where they remained for some time, and they then returned to the room in the hotel for the purpose of getting another drink. After taking the drink, they started back to the circus; but, finding that the performance was concluded, Patterson and the intestate, Salmons, returned to room 307, where they remained until the intestate left the room, between 6 and 7 o'clock, and in the meantime they were drinking in the room. At about 7 o'clock Salmons, the intestate, left Note. The liability of an innkeeper for personal injuries to a guest from the condition of the premises is discussed in the note to Ritter v. Norman, 43 L.R.A. (N.S.) 657; and see later cases, Baker v. Butterworth, L.R.A.1916F, 1287, and Hoopes v. Creighton, L.R.A.1917C, 1146. The general subject of the liability for injury to an elevator passenger is considered in the notes to Edwards v. Manufacturers' Bldg. Co. 2 L.R.A. (N.S.) 744, and Tippecanoe Loan & T. Co. v. Jester, L.R.A. 1915E, 722: and see later cases, Putnam v. the room and walked about 10 feet to the main passageway. He then turned to the right and walked 95 feet. He again turned to the right and walked along another passage 27 feet, and then again turned to the right and walked along the hall in which the freight elevator was located, and he Pacific Monthly Co. L.R.A.1915F, 782; Elsey v. J. L. Hudson Co. L.R.A. 1916B, 1284; Rumetsch V. John Wanamaker, L.R.A. 1916C, 1245; Jacobi v. Builders' Realty Co. L.R.A.1917E, 696: and Ross v. Sisters of Charity, L.R.A. 1917F, 260. Specifically, as to freight elevators, see page 732, of the last-mentioned note. As to presumption of negligence from injury to elevator passenger, see notes in 13 L.R.A. (N.S.) 619; 29 L.R.A. (N.S.) 816; and L.R.A.1916C, 378. hallway did not excuse the defendants from exercising reasonable care to see that he was not injured by the dangerous condition of this part of the third floor. Glaser v. Rothschild, 17 Ann. Cas. 591, note; Barman v. Spencer, Ind. 44 L.R.A. 815, 49 N. E. 9. The defendants should, in the exercise of reasonable care, have anticipated that the then opened the door of the freight elevator, which was insecurely fastened, and fell down the shaft and was killed. The passenger elevator was within 10 feet of the door of room 307, on the right, going from the room, and the stairway, for the use of guests and leading to the lobby, was within 20 feet of the room and on the left. The hall on which the freight elevator was located, and where the intestate of the plain-maintenance of this unguarded and partly tiff was killed, was narrower than the other halls. There were no rooms for guests on this hall, and it was used solely for a linen | room and a dressing room for employees and for the freight elevator. At the conclusion of the evidence, his Honor entered judgment of nonsuit, and the plaintiff excepted and appealed. closed elevator shaft would likely cause injury to others, and in failing to properly guard and effectively close this shaft, they were guilty of gross negligence. Hudson v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. 142 N. C. 206, 55 S. E. 103: Drum v. Miller, 135 N. C. 204, 65 L.R.A. 900, 102 Am. St. Rep. 528, 47 S. E. 421, 16 Am. Neg. Rep. 215; Ferrell v. Durham Traction Co. 172 Messrs. A. E. Holton and Eller & N. C. 682, L.R.A.1917B, 1291, 90 S. E. 893. Stockton, for appellant: Salmons, at the time he received his fatal injury, was an invitee on the third floor of defendants' hotel. Messrs. David H. Blair and Manly, Hendren, & Womble, for appellees: There was no evidence of negligence, in that defendant had not breached any duty due from it to the deceased, and, with relation to him, the condition of the entrance to the elevator shaft did not indicate a failure to exercise reasonable care. Tudor v. Bowen, 152 N. C. 441, 30 L.R.A. (N.S.) 804, 136 Am. St. Rep. 836, 67 S. E. 1015, 21 Ann. Cas. 646; Forsyth v. Zebulon Cotton Oil Mill Co. 167 N. C. 179, 83 S. E. Patrick v. Springs, 154 N. C. 272, 70 S. E. 395, Ann. Cas. 1912A, 1209, 2 N. C. C. A. 642; Nicholson v. Southern Exp. Co. 170 N. C. 69, 86 S. E. 786; Gordon v. Cummings, 152 Mass. 513, 9 L.R.A. 640, 23 Am. St. Rep. 846, 25 N. E. 978: McHugh v. Rubenstein, 185 Ill. App. 235; Houston Belt & Terminal R. Co. v. Winerich, Tex. Civ. App., 162 S. W. 903; Davis v. Central | 320; McAtee v. Branning Mfg. Co. 166 N. C. Cong. Soc. 129 Mass. 367, 37 Am. Rep. 368; Hayward v. Merrill, 94 Ill. 349, 34 Am. Rep. 229; Camp v. Wood, 76 N. Y. 92, 32 Am. Rep. 282; English v. Thomas, 48 Okla. 247, L.R.A.1916F, 1112, 149 Pac. 906; 29 Cyc. 457. The defendants owed the same duty to plaintiff's deceased that they owed to Patterson. Thomas v. Lane, L.R.A.1916F, 1089, note. Plaintiff's deceased having been invited to the third floor of defendants' hotel, it was their duty to be reasonably sure that the premises were safe. Ritter v. Norman, 71 Wash. 563, 43 L.R.A. (N.S.) 657, 129 Pac. 103; Merchants' Cotton Press & Storage Co. v. Miller, L.R.A. 1916F, 1146, and note; Bennett v. Louisville & N. R. Co. 102 U. S. 577, 26 L. ed. 235, 7 Am. Neg. Cas. 349; Atlanta Cotton-Seed Oil Mills v. Coffey, 80 Ga. 145, 12 Am. St. Rep. 244, 4 S. E. 759; Glaser v. Rothschild, 221 Mo. 180, 22 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1045, 120 S. W. 1, 17 Ann. Cas. 576; Lyttle v. Denny, 222 Pa. 395, 20 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1027, 128 Am. St. Rep. 814, 71 Atl. 841, 15 Ann. Cas. 925, 21 Am. Neg. Rep. 351; Mauzy v. Kinzel, 19 Ill. App. 571; Trulock v. Willey, 112 C. C. A. 1. 187 Fed. 956. The fact that Salmons had gone outside of Patterson's room and to the other end of the 448, 82 S. E. 857; Pierce v. Whitcomb, 48 Vt. 127, 21 Am. Rep. 120; Hart v. Grennell, 122 N. Y. 371, 25 Ñ. E. 354; Castoriano v. Miller, 15 Misc. 254, 36 N. Y. Supp. 419: Glaser v. Rothschild, 106 Mo. App. 418, 80 S. W. 332, 221 Mo. 180, 22 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1045, 120 S. W. 1, 17. Ann. Cas. 576; Shaw v. Goldman, 116 Mo. App. 332, 92 S. W. 165; Menteer v. Scalzo Fruit Co. 240 Mo. 177, 144 S. W. 833; Kinney v. Onsted, 113 Mich. 96, 38 L.R.A. 665, 67 Am. St. Rep. 455, 71 N. W. 482; Flanagan v. Atlantic Alcatraz Asphalt Co. 37 App. Div. 476, 56 N. Y. Supp. 18, 5 Am. Neg. Rep. 694; Kennedy v. Chase, 119 Cal. 637, 63 Am. St. Rep. 153, 52 Pac. 33, 3 Am. Neg. Rep. 520; Walker v. Midland R. Co. 55 L. T. N. S. 489, 51 J. P. 116; Clark v. Fehlhaber, 106 Va. 803, 13 L.R.A. (N.S.) 442, 56 S. E. 817; Quantz v. Southern R. Co. 137 N. C. 136, 49 S. E. 79; Sjogren v. Hall, 53 Mich. 274, 18 N. W 812; Speck v. Northern P. R. Co. 108 Minn. 435, 24 L.R.A. (N.S.) 249, 122 N. W. 497, 17 Ann. Cas. 460; McNaughton v. Illinois C. R. Co. 136 Iowa, 177, 113 N. W. 844; Toomey v. London, B. & S. C. R. Co. 3 C. B. N. S. 146, 140 Eng. Reprint, 694, 27 L. J. C. P. N. S. 39, 6 Week. Rep. 44; Sturgis v. Detroit, G. H. & M. R. Co. 72 Mich. 619, 40 N. W. 914, 4 Am. Neg. Cas. 76; Sweeny v. Barrett, 151 Pa. 600, 25 Atl. 148; Parker v. of duty to the plaintiff. McGhee v. Norfolk & S. R. Co. 147 N. C. 145, 24 L.R.A. (N.S.) 119, 60 S. E. 913. "In order to sustain an Portland Pub. Co. 69 Me. 173, 31 Am. Rep. 262; Price v. Pecos Valley & N. E. R. Co. 15 N. M. 348, L.R.A.1915B, 827, 110 Pac. 565; Faris v. Hoberg, 134 Ind. 269, 39 Am.action, the plaintiff must state and prove St. Rep. 261, 33 N. E. 1028; Bedell v. Berkey, 76 Mich. 435, 15 Am. St. Rep. 370, 43 N. W. 308; Rohrbacher v. Gillig, 203 N. Y. 413, 96 N. E. 733; Phillips v. Library Co. 55 N. J. L. 307, 27 Atl. 478; Ryerson v. Bathgate, 67 N. J. L. 337, 57 L.R.A. 307, 51 Atl. 708, 11 Am. Neg. Rep. 300; Bonfield v. Blackmore, N. J. Eq. 100 Atl. 161; Flaherty v. Nieman, 125 Iowa, 546, 101 N. W. 280, 17 Am. Neg. Rep. 54. Salmons was guilty of contributory negligence in going into a dark and unknown hallway. Parker v. Portland Pub. Co. 69 Me. 173, 31 Am. Rep. 262; Brugher v. Buchtenkirch, 167 N. Y. 153, 60 N. E. 420; Capen v. Hall, 21 R. I. 364, 43 Atl. 847, 6 Am. Neg. Rep. 397; Kammerer v. Gallagher, 58 Ill. App. 561; Gleason v. Boehm, 58 N. J. L. 475, 32 L.R.A. 645, 34 Atl. 886; Baumler v. Wilm, 136 App. Div. 857, 122 N. Y. Supp. 98; Dunnevant v. Southern R. Co. 167 N. C. 232, 83 S. E. 347; Greenwell v. Washing ton Market Co. 21 D. C. 298; Massey v. Seller, 45 Or. 267, 77 Pac. 397, 16 Am. Neg. Rep. 553; Bridger v. Gresham, 111 Ga. 814, 35 S. E. 677, 7 Am. Neg. Rep. 524. Opening and walking through a door, whether locked or unlocked, without looking to see where the door leads, is contributory negligence. Ballou v. Collamore, 160 Mass. 246, 35 N. E. 463; Donahue v. Braaf, 122 App. Div. 552, 107 N. Y. Supp. 377; Rohrbacher v. Gillig, 203 N. Y. 413, 96 N. E. 733; Hilsenbeck v. Guhring, 131 N. Y. 674, 30 N. E. 580; Wheeler v. Hotel Stevens Co. 71 Wash. 142, 127 Pac. 840, Ann. Cas. 1914C, 576: Steger v. Immen, 157 Mich. 494, 24 L.R.A. (N.S.) 246, 122 N. W. 104: Speck v. Northern P. R. Co. 108 Minn. 435, 24 L.R.A. (N.S.) 249, 122 N. W. 497, 17 Ann. Cas. 460. Salmons was not an invitee, but a licensee, because he had exceeded the limits of the invitation; and the only duty he could claim from the defendant was that it should refrain from wanton or wilful injury to him. South Bend Iron Works v. Larger, 11 Ind. App. 367, 39 N. E. 209: Bennett v. Butterfield, 112 Mich. 96, 70 N. W. 410, 1 Am. Neg. Rep. 629; Schmidt v. Bauer, 80 Cal. 565, 5 L.R.A. 580, 22 Pac. 256; Menteer v. Scalzo Fruit Co. 240 Mo. 177, 144 S. W. 833; Shaw v. Goldman, 116 Mo. App. 332, 92 S. W. 165. Allen, J., delivered the opinion of the court: Actionable negligence consists in a breach facts sufficient to show what the duty is, and that the defendant owes it to him."" Shepherd, J., in Emry v. Roanoke Nav. & Water Power Co. 111 N. C. 94, 17 L.R.A. 699, 16 S. E. 18. "It has been often pointed out that a person cannot be held liable for negligence, unless he owed some duty to the plaintiff and that duty was neglected." Lane v. Cox [1897] 1 Q. B. Div. 415. The plaintiff has offered evidence tending to prove negligent conduct on the part of the defendant, in that it permitted the fastening of the freight elevator door to become and remain insecure, but he has failed to show that the defendant owed the deceased any duty at the time of his injury and death, except to abstain from wilful injury, of which there is no evidence. The deceased, according to the evidence of the plaintiff, was on the premises of the defendant by the invitation of Patterson, a guest of the hotel, for social purposes, and as such he was under an implied license, revocable at the will of the proprietor of the hotel. The question was fully considered in State v. Steele, 106 N. C. 782, 8 L.R.A. 516, 19 Am. St. Rep. 573, 11 S. E. 478, where the court states as one of its conclusions from a review of the authorities that "when persons, unobjectionable on account of character or race, enter a hotel, not as guests, but intent on pleasure or profit, to be derived from intercourse with its inmates, they are there not of right, but under an implied license, that the landlord may revoke at any time." "One who engages in the keeping of a public inn by that fact surrenders certain rights which, as the owner or occupier of a mere private dwelling, he would have, and with qualifications which will be noticed hereafter it may be said that an innkeeper gives a general license to all persons to enter his house. Consequently, it is not a trespass to enter an inn without a previous actual invitation. The innkeeper may, how ever, exclude those who, by reason of their character, conduct, or physical condition, are obnoxious, and he may also remove, with force, if necessary, those who are disorderly, or for any reason objectionable to the patrons of his place. When persons enter a hotel or inn, not as guests, but intent on pleasure or profit, to be derived from intercourse with its inmates, they are there, not of right, but under an implied license that the landlord may revoke at any time." 14 R. C. L. 537. If this was the status of the deceased, & licensee, there is no liability on the defend ant, as his death was not caused by a hidden or concealed danger along or near to the usual and customary route provided for entering and leaving the hotel, and there is no evidence of an invitation, express or implied, to go where he was injured. In Sweeny v. Old Colony & N. R. Co. 10 Allen, 368, 87 Am. Dec. 644, which is a leading authority, Bigelow, Ch. J., states the doctrine as follows: "A licensee, who enters on premises by permission only, without any enticement, allurement, or inducement being held out to him by the owner or occupant, cannot recover damages for injuries caused by obstructions or pitfalls. He goes there at his own risk, and enjoys the license, subject to its concomitant perils. No duty is imposed by law on the owner or occupant to keep his premises in a suitable condition for those who come there solely for their own convenience or pleasure.” 36 W. Va. 329, 16 L.R.A. 271, 32 Am. St. Rep. 859, 15 S. E. 81; 3 Elliott, Railroads, §§ 1250, 1251; Whart. Neg. § 351; 7 Thomp. Neg. §§ 945-947, 949; Whittaker's Smith, Neg. pp. 60-63, and note." The principle is unquestionably sound as applied in the authorities cited, and is controlling in this case; but it requires some qualification as to persons on premises by permission or under license, express or implied, whose presence could be reasonably anticipated at or near the point of danger, and this modification is recognized in the Sweeny Case and those following it. If, however, the deceased was entitled to the protection of a guest, there could be no recovery on this record, because he was injured in a part of the hotel reserved for employees, and to which there was no express or implied invitation. The deceased was invited to room No. 307, which was This case is approved in Quantz v. South- within 10 feet of the passenger elevator and ern R. Co. 137 N. C. 136, 49 S. E. 79, and within 20 feet of a stairway leading to the the above excerpt from the opinion is quoted lobby, which were the two ways provided in Muse v. Seaboard Air Line R. Co. 149 N. for guests in entering and leaving the hotel. C. 448, 19 L.R.A. (N.S.) 453, 63 S. E. 102, He left the room and walked about 10 feet and in Monroe v. Atlantic Coast Line R. to a main passageway, going by the pasCo. 151 N. C. 376, 27 L.R.A. (N.S.) 193, 66 senger elevator on his right and the stairS. E. 315, Justice Manning adding in the way on his left. He then turned to the last case, immediately after the quotation: right and walked along the passage 95 feet, "This doctrine has been approved by this when he again turned to the right and court in the following cases: Quantz v. walked along another passage 27 feet, and Southern R. Co. 137 N. C. 136, 49 S. E. 79; then again to the right 15 feet, to the Peterson v. South & Western R. Co. 143 freight elevator shaft where he was injured. N. C. 260, 8 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1240, 118 Am. The passage on which the freight elevator St. Rep. 799, 55 S. E. 618; McGhee v. Nor- was located was narrower than the others, folk & S. R. Co. 147 N. C. 142, 24 L.R.A. and on it was a linen room, a dressing room (N.S.) 119, 60 S. E. 912; Briscoe v. Hender- for employees, and the elevator, which was There is no evison Lighting & Power Co. 148 N. C. 396, 19 not used for passengers. L.R.A. (N.S.) 1116, 62 S. E. 600; Bailey v. dence that the deceased was ever in the North Carolina R. Co. 149 N. C. 169, 62 S. hotel before the day of his death, or that he E. 912; Muse v. Seaboard Air Line R. Co. knew there was a freight elevator, or a 149 N. C. 443, 19 L.R.A. (N.S.) 453, 63 S. toilet on his left as he entered the passage E. 102. It has also been approved in where he was injured, and the uncontradictthe following decisions of other courts, and ed evidence is that there was a toilet in by the text-book writers: Gillis v. Pennsyl-room 307, which was used frequently during vania R. Co. 59 Pa. 129, 98 Am. Dec. 317; the day by Patterson and his visitors, and Zoebisch v. Tarbell, 10 Allen, 385, 87 Am. that the deceased knew the location of the Dec. 660; Norfolk & W. R. Co. v. DeBoard passenger elevator. (Norfolk & W. R. Co. v. Wheeler) 91 Va. It is the duty of hotel proprietors to pro700, 29 L.R.A. 825, 22 S. E. 514; Pittsburgh, vide reasonably safe ways of ingress and Ft. W. & C. R. Co. v. Bingham, 29 Ohio St. egress for guests, and a slight departure 364, 23 Am. Rep. 751; Evansville & T. II. R. from these ways will not prevent a recovery Co. v. Griffin, 100 Ind. 221, 50 Am. Rep. of damages; but they owe no duty to the 783; Reardon v. Thompson, 149 Mass. 267, guest to keep in safe condition parts of the 21 N. E. 369; Redigan v. Boston & M. R. premises reserved for employees and where Co. 155 Mass. 44, 14 L.R.A. 276, 31 Am. the presence of the guest could not be reaSt. Rep. 520, 28 N. E. 1133; Burbank v. sonably anticipated. In Pierce v. Whitcomb, Illinois C. R. Co. 42 La. Ann. 1156, 11 48 Vt. 131, 21 Am. Rep. 120, the court says: L.R.A. 720, 8 So. 580, 9 Am. Neg. Cas. 398; "No one has a right to provide a path for Benson v. Baltimore Traction Co. 77 Md. access to his house, shop, or store, and in535, 20 L.R.A. 714, 39 Am. St. Rep. 436, 26 vite guests and patrons thereto, and provide Atl. 973: Woolwine v. Chesapeake & O. R. or permit pitfalls in the way, to their inCo. (Manning v. Chesapeake & O. R. Co.) | jury; for in all such cases there is an im |