which has been thoroughly fermented contains less of that commodity than ordinary tobacco, and that on this account it is less harmful.

cigarettes should not be manufactured within its limits. No one could say that such legislation trenched upon the liberty of the citizen by preventing him from pursuing a lawful business."

We do not believe that we have to inquire strictly into the motives or reasons which actuated the legislature. We can only set aside a statute of this kind, if we cannot possibly see any reasonable neces

possible and reasonable reference to the public health or morality or to the real public good.

We certainly can take cognizance of the fact that the schoolboy can secretly use tobacco in the form of snuff, when he would be liable to be detected in any other form of use. One who chews or masticates tobacco can be easily detected in the process. One of the strongest arguments, indeed, in favor of the crusade against the cigarette, is that cigarettes are easily and cheaply obtained, and that the boy is liable to be tempted by that fact, and that the use of tobacco will thus be increased. The same argument is certainly applicable in the case of snuff which is used, not in the nose, but upon the gums or between the lip and the gum.

There is a wide difference in the attitude of the courts toward statutes which restrict that which is harmful and those which restrict that which is harmless. The courts can certainly take judicial notice that the use of tobacco in any form is uncleanly, and that its excessive use is in-sity for its enactment; that is to say, no jurious. They can take judicial notice of the fact that its use by the young is especially so. Tobacco, in short, is under the ban. We realize, of course, that the Is not the very fact that snuff is generally Supreme Court of the United States re- used by holding it between the lip and the fused, in the case of Austin v. Tennessee, gum without mastication or by plaster179 U. S. 343, 45 L. ed. 224, 21 Sup. Ct. ing it upon the gums, a valid reason for the Rep. 132, to hold that tobacco was so much legislature condemning it, while leaving a nuisance as not to be a legitimate sub- ordinary chewing tobacco alone? We beject of interstate commerce. The case, how-lieve that we can take judicial notice of the ever, fully upheld the supreme court of fact that many contend that the use of Tennessee in holding that it was within the snuff between the lip and the gum has a power of the state to absolutely prohibit tendency to paralyze the nerves of that the sale of cigarettes within its borders portion of the face. when once the original package had been broken, even though the Supreme Court of the nation itself refused to take judicial notice that tobacco in the form of cigarettes was more noxious than in any other form. "Cigarettes," the court said, "do not seem until recently to have attracted the attention of the public as more injurious than other forms of tobacco; nor are we now prepared to take judicial notice of any special injury resulting from their use, or to indorse the opinion of the supreme court of Tennessee that they are inherently bad, and bad only.' At the same time, we should be shutting our eyes to what is constantly passing before them were we to affect an ignorance of the fact that a belief in their deleterious effects, particularly upon young people, has become very general, and that communications are constantly finding their way into the public press denouncing their use as fraught with great danger to the youth of both sexes. Without undertaking to affirm or deny their evil effects, we think it within the province of the legislature to say how far they may be sold, or to prohibit their sale entirely after they have been taken from the original packages or have left the hands of the importer, provided no discrimination be used as against such as are imported from other states, and there be no reason to doubt that the act in question is designated for the protection of the public health. .. There is doubtless fair ground for dispute as to whether the use of cigarettes is not hurtful to the community, and therefore it would be competent for a state, with reference to its own people, to declare, under penalties, that

So, too, we cannot be blind to the general fear that drugs and opium are, and that drugs and opium certainly can be, easily mingled with snuff, and perhaps less readily detected than in other forms of tobacco.

Nor does the fact that the legislature made an exception in favor of "ordinary plug, fine cut, or long cut chewing tobacco, as now commonly known to the trade of this state," render the statute unconstitutional. The modern trend of authority is certainly in favor of the proposition that police laws need not necessarily be omnibus in their character, and that it is permissible to legislate against one form of evil even though many other and similar evils have not been condemned. "It may often happen," says the Supreme Court of the United States in Cotting v. Kansas City Stock Yards Co. (Cotting v. Godard) 183 U. S. 111, 46 L. ed. 109, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 43, "that some classes are subjected to regulations, and some individuals are burdened with obliga

quire further supervision, especially a product which, on account of its fineness, could be more easily drugged and more easily concealed, and whose intended use was absorption, and not mastication.

tions, which do not rest upon other classes, any more similar products into the state or other individuals not similarly situated. which would add to the common vice or reLicense taxes are imposed upon certain classes of business while others are exempt. It would practically defeat legislation if it was laid down as a rule that a statute was necessarily adjudged invalid if it did not bring all within its scope or subject all to the same burdens. It would strip the legislature of its inherent power to determine generally what is for the general interests, which interests may often be promoted by regulations affecting one class which do not affect another,—certain burdens imposed on one which do not rest upon another." A beginning must be made somewhere. It is not necessary that we should condemn all vice in order that any reformation shall be made. Would anyone say that a statute would be void for class legislation which should prohibit the use of whisky, but at the same time contain no prohibition against the use of beer?

We do not think that there is any merit in the contention that the title of the act refers merely to snuff, and that right cut is, at the most, merely a substitute for snuff; that the contention of the appellant is largely that it is a substitute for Copenhagen, and that even Copenhagen is not snuff. The brief of counsel for appellant contains a long and extremely interesting history of snuff and of its manufacture, and from this we may deduce the fact that for a long time, in order that an article might be deemed snuff, it was necessary that it should have been powdered or pulverized and fermented, and intended to be taken in the nose. We have before us, however, a definition of snuff in the statute, and though the word "snuff" alone is used in the title, and not snuff "as defined by this statute," we believe that any court in constru ing the meaning of words in a statute should give to those words the meaning that is given to them in its own jurisdiction, even though their meaning in the world at large may be different. The Englishman, for in

the meaning that we give, but would call them "traces." When we speak of "lines" in connection with harness, we use the word in the place of the English word "reins." The words, it is true, are now to be found in the dictionaries, but they did not appear in the dictionaries in the sense in which we use them until quite recently.

No criminal should be allowed to complain or to escape punishment because some one else is more of a criminal or more dangerous to society than he; nor should any product which is injurious to the community escape regulation and condemnation because there are others equally injurious which are not at the same time regulated or for bidden. There is, in fact, no vested right or instance, would never give to the word "tugs" terest in that which is a nuisance, or the use of which is injurious to the public weal. Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Haber, 169 U. S. 613, 42 L. ed. 878, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 488; Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623, 31 L. ed. 205, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 273; Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U. S. 1, 32 L. ed. 346, 2 Inters. Com. Rep. 232, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 6; 23 Cyc. 77. So, too, is it not perfectly reasonable for the legislature to say that in its opinion it is better to make a beginning and to enact a law which can be uniformly enforced, rather than a more sweeping one which could not be; for it to say, in short, that it will begin with snuff, and then later on, if it chooses, extend the condemnation throughout the whole range of tobacco? It can and has done this in the case of cigarettes. See Austin v. State, 101 Tenn. 563, 50 L.R.A. 478, 70 Am. St. Rep. 703, 48 S. W. 305; Austin v. Tennessee, 179 U. S. 343, 45 L. ed. 224, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 132. Why can it not do it in the case of snuff? It is true that "ordinary plug, fine cut, or long cut chewing tobacco, as now commonly known to the trade of this state," has many characteristics in common with snuff and with right cut. It may, however, also be that the legislature may have said that they knew these products and could watch them, but that they did not desire the entry of

Dictionaries do not give to words their meaning. The meanings of most of our words were given by usage long before dietionaries were ever heard of. All that the dictionary does is to chronicle that which has been done. They are added to, and different meanings are given to the same word as the word comes to be used in a different sense. This is true even of the word "snuff." Webster and Worcester, it is true, speak only of its use in the nose, but the Standard Dictionary also speaks of the use upon the gums. Though, too, counsel for appellant also insists upon the prerequisite of fermentation, no mention is made of this element in Worcester's, Webster's, or the Century Dictionaries, but in the Standard alone. There even only "slight" fermentation is spoken of. We realize, of course. that the Encyclopedia Americana, the Encyclopædia Britannica, and Werner's Textbook on Tobacco speak of this fermentation; but what we seek to emphasize is

In North Dakota the word "snuff" has a well-established meaning in the popular mind, and is used in the sense of the definition that is given in the statute. The manufacturers of the tobacco in the case at bar must have been aware of the fact, for it is a matter not merely of proof in the record before us, but of common notoriety, that for many years they put upon the market a product called “Copenhagen” and labeled it snuff, though it was intended to be used, and the overwhelming majority of its users used it, upon the gums and between the lips and the gums, and not in the nose. We hold therefore, and we believe, that there is enough of state sovereignty still left in America for us to hold that, no matter how the word "snuff" may be limited in its meaning in other jurisdictions, in North Dakota it embraces tobacco which is intended to be used upon the gums as well as tobacco that is intended to be used in the

that the dictionaries and encyclopedias do dryness, and it must be drawn somewhere. not create words or processes or give to It is undisputed that both right cut and them their meaning. They chronicle mere- Copenhagen are drier and finer than the toly, and must of necessity be constantly baccos excepted. It is also undisputed, and corrected and added to. The use, however, the evidence tends to show, that they were must precede the chronicling. both intended to be used in the same way, that is to say, upon the gums and between the lip and the gums, and that such use is not the ordinary, and we might say necessary, use of even the finest of the other tobaccos mentioned. We can take judicial notice of the fact that it was the use upon the gums and between the lip and the gums that was condemned by popular sentiment in North Dakota. We are not prepared to say, therefore, that the legislature drew the line at the wrong place; neither can we agree with counsel for appellant in his statement that, "if right cut be construed as being under the ban of the act, the court by such a construction would in effect make the proviso read thus, 'Provided, however, that right cut chewing tobacco, manufactured by Weyman-Bruton Company, shall be included in this definition, but ordinary plug, fine cuts, and long cuts shall not be so included.'" This court knows nothing of the firm of Weyman-Bruton Company, nor did the legislature. It does know, however, of the pernicious effects of the use of snuff. What we hold is not that all other fine cuts shall be excluded, but only those fine cuts which are not cut so fine, or otherwise manufactured, so that their natural use is upon the gums and between the lip and the gums, and which use involves not mastication, but absorption. When any manufactured tobacco comes physically and chemically within the class of Copenhagen or right cut, it is condemned by the statute, no matter by whom manufactured. We hold, in short, that fine cut "chewing tobacco is generally excluded, but that fine cut "snuff" is not. Counsel does not quote the language of the exception correctly in his illustration. It is "ordinary plug, fine cut, or long cut chewing tobacco," and not "ordinary plug, fine cuts, and long cuts." In the statute the words "snuff” and “chewing tobacco" are both used and antithesized. They must have been intended to have had different meanings.

nose.

Nor is there any merit in the contention that right cut is a substitute for snuff or Copenhagen, and that the title of the act only uses the word "snuff." We believe that it is just as much a snuff as is Copenhagen; but, even if it were a substitute, that the title of the act is broad enough to include it. A title which evinces the intention to prohibit the sale of an article is, we believe, broad enough to prohibit the sale of a substitute for that article when that substitute is open to the same objection as the principal article itself. Section 2 does nothing more than to exclude from its provisions chewing tobacco as commonly known to the trade. We are quite satisfied that right cut was not chewing tobacco, but snuff.

In answer to the proposition that, "if the act be construed without reference to its title, and it should be accordingly held that it is operative to all tobaccos except those named in the provisions, then it is unconstitutional in its entirety, and the whole act must fail," we hold, in short, that the title of the act should be used in the construction thereof not as adding to the act, but as a means of determining the legislative intent, and that the act is an antisnuff act. We hold that, as the term is used in North Dakota, both Copenhagen and right cut are snuffs, while the tobaccos excepted from the provisions of the act are not. Some of them, it is true, come close to the line, but that line is and must be drawn largely upon the basis of fineness and

We are quite satisfied that the evidence in the case at bar justifies the conclusion at which we have arrived. When passing upon the validity of the statute as a whole, however, and in seeking to determine what does or does not come within the meaning of the word "snuff," and in considering the necessity of prohibiting the sale of tobacco which is finely cut or ground and dried in order that the same may be taken into the mouth and absorbed, even if not into the nose, or its adaptation to either or both uses,

for many years, and is universally spoken all of the nicotine ultimately enters the sysof as such throughout the Northwest. Both tem. It is argued, of course, that saliva Copenhagen and right cut are fully covered by the definition of snuff in the statute, being "intended to be taken by the mouth or nose." As compared with other forms of tobacco, they contain but little moisture. They are the finest cut or ground of all the brands of tobacco covered by the statute and in use in North Dakota. They are capable of being used in the nose, being cut fine and being dried. Their natural and ordinary and intended use is that they shall be used in the mouth, but not masticated. Tobacco made in and intended to be used in such form is, both under the definition of the statute and in universal acceptation in the Northwest, snuff. The manufacturers, in short, have through many years called such tobacco snuff, and now solemnly come before us and tell us that through such years they have been defrauding and misleading the people.

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is necessary for digestion, and that a habit is injurious which causes much expectoration. It is therefore argued that chewing tobacco is more injurious than the use as snuff. The argument, however, works both ways and is not conclusive. It is admitted that a flow of saliva is necessary to digestion, and that such does not arise without mastication. Even, therefore, if it be true that in chewing saliva is expelled, it is also true that it is mingled with the tobacco that is swallowed and in a measure neutralizes it. In the case of snuff, however, where there is little or no mastication, and therefore little or no saliva, the tobacco is absorbed without being neutralized by the saliva. The proof, as we have before shown, also tends to show that the nicotine absorbed is greater in the case of snuff than in that of chewing tobacco. At any rate, all of these matters were for the legislature to pass upon. There were two methods of using tobacco before them. They evidently seemed to think that one was more injuri ous to the general public than the other. We are not prepared to oppose our judgment to theirs, nor are we prepared to say that the classification made is not a reasonable one. Austin v. State, 101 Tenn. 563, 50 L.R.A. 478, 70 Am. St. Rep. 703, 48 S. W. 305; Austin v. Tennessee, 179 U. S. 343, 45 L. ed. 224, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 132; Wenham v. State, 65 Neb. 394, 58 L.R.A. 825, 91 N. W. 421; Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U. S. 678, 32 L. ed. 253, Sup. Ct. Rep. 992, 1257; Gundling v. Chicago, 177 U. S. 183, 44 L. ed. 725, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 633, id. 176 Ill. 340, 48 L.R.A. 230, 52 N. E. 44; Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366, 42 L. ed. 780, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 383; People v. Lochner, 73 App. Div. 120, 76 N. Y. Supp. 396, id. 177 N. Y. 145, 101 Am. St. Rep. 773, 69 N. E. 373; People v. Bellet, 99 Mich. 151, 22 L.R.A. 696, 41 Am. St. Rep. 589, 57 N. W. 1094; People v. Smith, 108 Mich. 527, 32 L.R.A. 853, 62 Am. St. Rep. 715, 66 N. W. 382; State v. Nichols, 28 Wash. 628, 69 Pac. 372; People v. Havnor, 149 N. Y. 195, 31 L.R.A. 689, 52 Am. St. Rep. 707, 43 N. E. 541; Ex parte Northrup, 41 Or. 489, 69 Pac. 445.

Nor can we say that the legislature creat ed a purely fictitious classification in distinguishing forms of tobacco such as Copenhagen and right cut from "that ordinary plug, fine cut, or long cut chewing tobacco, as now commonly known to the trade of this state." It is admitted by all parties that right cut and Copenhagen were and are the finest cut of all the tobaccos, and the driest; that as such they were not intended to be chewed as the term is ordinarily used. They were to be retained in the mouth merely and gradually absorbed, and were not intended to be masticated. Aside from the question of secrecy and the possibility of stimulating a widespread habit among minors which would be difficult of detection by their parents, there is much in the evidence to show, and the legislature may reasonably have inferred, that such use of tobacco and such forms of tobacco were more injurious than those connected with the kinds excluded from the operation of the act. There is evidence, in short, and common experience reinforces the evidence, that he who masticates tobacco expectorates a large portion of it, and that his expectoration is freest when the nicotine is the strongest; in other words, that he expectorates the most freely when the tobacco is moist and is first placed in his mouth, and that when he has drawn from it the nicotine and the residue is a mere pulp, he expectorates but little. In such a process, therefore, much of the nicotine is expelled. In the case of the use of snuff, however, under the lip or smeared upon the gums, there is p. 15), little or no expectoration, and practically Ct. Rep. 13.

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The judgment of the District Court is affirmed.

Petition for writ of error dismissed by the Supreme Court of the United States, October 17, 1917 (U. S. Adv. Ops. 1917,

. U. S. - 62 L. ed. 38 Sup.