For cases in Dec.Dig. & Am.Dig. Key-No.Series & Indexes see same topic and KEY-NUMBER
niece in his will, signed a will prepared by
the husband, leaving the remainder of wife's
estate, after her husband's death, to another,
the niece, upon husband's failure to provide
for her in his will, is entitled to enforce the
contract as one made for her benefit.-Seaver
v. Ransom, 120 N. E. 639, 224 N. Y. 233.

(D) Place and Time.

allegation in several declarations that certain
portions of work which contractor was entitled
to perform were taken from him and given to
other parties, whereby he was deprived of prof-
it, held insufficient to state cause of action.-
Marsch v. Southern New England R. Corp., 120
N. E. 120.

CONVERSION.

212(2) (11.) A mere privilege of selling land See Trover and Conversion.
and receiving half the profits in excess of a cer-
tain amount, no time being specified, cannot
be enforced; any reasonable time for its ex-
ercise having expired without sale.-Widell v.
Carmichael, 120 N. E. 529.

CONVICTS.

See Criminal Law, 417, 1137.

CORONERS.

V. PERFORMANCE OR BREACH.
284(1) (Mass.) Engineer or architect of par- See Witnesses, 379.
ty to contract legally may act as arbitrator, if,
in absence of bad faith he shall be chosen by
all parties, acting with knowledge of his em-
ployment by one, though from nature of employ-
ment he may be biased.-Marsch v. Southern
New England R. Corp., 120 N. E. 120.

292 (Mass.) Where contract for construc-
tion of railroad provided arbitrator engineer's
certificate should be condition to contractor's
right of action, unless fraudulently refused, ac-
tion of railroads in preventing engineer from giv-
ing certificate was fraud, leaving provision for
obtaining certificate of no effect.-Marsch v.
Southern New England R. Corp., 120 N. E. 120.

CORPORATIONS.

See Appeal and Error, 1056, 1064; Assign-
ments, 41; Banks and Banking; Bur-
glary, 22; Carriers; Constitutional Law,
129, 249, 277, 305; Electricity; Evidence,
166; Executors and Administrators,
158; Frauds, Statute of, 129; Fraudu-
lent Conveyances, 205; Gas; Injunction,

105; Master and Servant, 367; Mo-
nopolies, 21, 24; Municipal Corporations;
Pawnbrokers and Money Lenders, 3; Per-
petuities, 9; Public Service Commissions;
Railroads; Statutes, 75, 115, 141; Street
Railroads; Taxation, 98, 121, 130, 319,
40, 470; Telegraphs and Telephones; Trover
and Conversion, 47; Trusts, 272, 291;
Use and Occupation, 1; Wills, 684,
852.

VI. ACTIONS FOR BREACH. ·
332(4) (Mass.) Under Rev. Laws, c. 173, §
6, cl. 11, in actions by contractor to build rail-
road, allegation in declarations he had done all
acts which he was required to perform was in-
sufficient on which to found right of action; it
should have been averred that condition preced-
ent of obtaining certificate of approval of engi-
neer of one of defendant railroads was per-
formed, or want of performance excused.-
Marsch v. Southern New England R. Corp., 12017 (Ind.App.) In action on note for price

N. E. 120.

In action or breach of contract for construc-
tion of railroad, allegation of declaration that
arbitrator engineer was prevented by interfer-
ence of defendants from giving to contractor cer-
tificate representing true measurements and val-
uations, imported not only undue influence on
engineer, but also that he yielded.-Id.

In contractor's actions for breach of contract
for construction of railroad, which required cer-
tificate of arbitrator engineer as to measurements
as condition precedent to right of action, allega-
tion engineer was under control of defendant
held not sufficient allegation of bias, fraud, or
prejudice to show collusion and fraud, and not
enough to require judicial inquiry.-Id.

IV. CAPITAL, STOCK, AND DIVI-
DENDS.

(D) Transfer of Shares.

of corporate stock, defendant, who had not
made or offered to make restoration of the
stock, could not prevail on ground of fraud
inducing purchase, however gross, without evi-
dence that the stock was worthless when he
purchased it.-Brumbaugh v. Mellinger, 120 N.
E. 676.

Certificates of corporate stock were not the
stock, and did not constitute title thereto, but
were only evidence of purchaser's title, so that
he could have offered to restore stock, in re-
scinding the purchase for fraud, though he
had never received the certificates, thus en-
abling him to avoid payment of his note.-Id.
~121(5) (Ind.App.) In indorsee's action on
note given for corporate stock, defendant set-
ting up fraud, evidence held not to sustain de-
fendant's answer of want of consideration.-
Brumbaugh v. Mellinger, 120 N. E. 676.
ble on notes procured one of its officers to
133 (Ill.) Where corporation primarily lia-
sign them and deposited them as collateral with
the bank and discharged the officer, procuring
the bank to sue upon the notes and attach
337(2) (Mass.) In contractor's actions for the stock in its hands, which the officer had in
breach of contract for construction of railroad, the meantime sold to third persons, and the
allegations in several declarations against sev corporation refused to transfer it to such per-
eral railroads that though contractor was at all sons, there was a conversion for which the cor-
times ready to perform, work was repeatedly in-poration was liable.-Gorham v. Massillon Iron
terrupted and suspended by railroads, to induce & Steel Co., 120 N. E. 467.

In contractor's actions for breach of con-
tract for construction of railroad, allegations in
declarations against several railroads, defend-
ants, that defendants had wholly failed to carry
out agreement in that extra work was required
of contractor, and that arbitrator engineer had
fraudulently refused to issue certificates, held

insufficient statement of cause of action.-Id.

contractor to refuse to proceed, held insufficient

as cause of action.-Marsch v. Southern New (E) Interest, Dividends, and New Stock,
England R. Corp., 120 N. E. 120.

In contractor's actions for breach of contract
for construction of railroad, allegation in several
declarations that particular defendant railroad
had failed to carry out agreement, in that it
had neglected to cause instructions to be given
for clearing of right of way, held insufficient to
state cause of action.-Id.

337(3) (Mass.) In contractor's actions for
breach of contract for construction of railroad,

151 (Mass.) Though company could have re-
tained its surplus resulting in part from pay-
ments for privilege to subscribe to new stock un-
diminished, under whatever name denoted, yet, it
having issued warrants for partial distribution
to stockholders in cash, so much of the fund
thereupon became income for use of stockhold-
ers. Smith v. Cotting, 120 N. E. 177.

155(2) (Mass.) A dividend declared from a
corporation's surplus ordinarily and legally im-

ports its distribution among stockholders.-Smith v. Cotting, 120 N. E. 177.

The directors by valid vote having actually set apart as a dividend part of the company's surplus funds derived in part from payments for the privilege to subscribe to new stock, the dividend became the property of the stockholders distributively.-Id.

VI. TAXATION.

208 (N.Y.) It is the duty of the clerk of the court to insert in the judgment or final order the amount of costs as taxed under Code Civ. Proc. § 3262, it not being necessary to enter a new and amended order or judgment for the purpose of including the amount of costs therein after the same are taxed.-People ex rel. Rochester, S. & E. R. Co. v. Moroney, 120 N. E. 149, 224 N. Y. 114.

155(4) (Mass.) Where directors declared valid dividend and set funds apart, dividend would not have passed to purchaser of stock owned by trustees, if, after declaration, trustees had sold COUNTERCLAIM. their old stock with accompanying right to subscribe for new stock, payments for such right See Set-Off and Counterclaim. having produced part of funds declared to be dividend, unless contract of transfer had so provided.-Smith v. Cotting, 120 N. E. 177.

COUNTIES.

See Highways, 194; Judgment, 584.
II. GOVERNMENT AND OFFICERS.
(D) Officers and Agents.
752 [New, vol. 3A Key-No. Series]
(Ill.) Officers' and Employés' Pension
Fund Act June 29, 1915, allowing reduction
from salaries from certain public employés,
is not unconstitutional, as contravening Const.
art. 10, § 10, fixing the compensation of coun-
ty officers, as applied to a junior typist in the
office of the probation officer of the juvenile
court of Cook county; such employé not being
an employé of a county officer within the act.-
Shea v. Sweitzer, 120 N. E. 760.

III. PROPERTY, CONTRACTS, AND

LIABILITIES.

(D) Torts.

VI. OFFICERS AND AGENTS. (C) Rights, Duties, and Liabilities as to Corporation and Its Members. 320(11) (N.Y.) In action under Stock Corporation Law, § 29, to recover from a corporate officer for money advanced by the corpo-148 (Ohio) Gen. Code, § 6278 et seq., giving ration to another corporate officer, evidence held insufficient to show that defendant consented to the loan.-Murray v. Smith, 120 N. E. 60, 224 N. Y. 40.

I. NATURE, GROUNDS, AND EXTENT
OF RIGHT IN GENERAL.

a right of action for injuries sustained by the violence of mobs, being remedial, should be liberally construed in favor of those who were given the remedy.-Phillips Sheet & Tin Plate Co. v. Griffith, 120 N. E. 207.

COURTS.

See Action, 8; Appeal and Error, 643,
1185, 1192, 1194; Certiorari, 69; Chari-
ties, 47; Commerce, 8; Constitutional
Law, 43, 213, 254; Counties, 752;
Criminal Law, 260, 302, 1092; Execution,
10; Injunction, 135; Judgment,
1, 292, 341, 823, 933; Justices of the Peace;
Mortgages, 594; Prohibition; Statutes,
74; Trusts, 160; Wills, 270.
NATURE, EXTENT, AND EXERCISE

I.

OF JURISDICTION IN GENERAL.

8 (N.Y.) A tort committed in one state creates a right of action which may be sued upon in another, unless public policy forbids.-Loucks v. Standard Oil Co. of New York, 120 N. E. 198, 224 N. Y. 99.

Notwithstanding one state may have no law concerning a similar right or remedy to that conferred by the law of another, where the tort occurs, the courts of the first state may enforce a right under the law of the foreign state, unless the public policy of their own state forbids.-Id. II. ESTABLISHMENT, ORGANIZATION, AND PROCEDURE IN

GENERAL.

(D) Rules of Decision, Adjudications, Opinions, and Records.

93 (1) (Ind.) Principle of stare decisis as relating to rules of property has no application to police power of state.--Schmitt v. F. W. Cook Brewing Co., 120 N. E. 19.

2 (N.Y.) Costs in equity action are not a part of, or in any way connected with subject-97(5) (Ind.) The courts of the several states matter thereof, but are merely incidents of litigation.-Evans v. Supreme Council of Royal Arcanum, 120 N. E. 93, 223 N. Y. 497.

3 (111) The right to costs is entirely statutory, and they can never be recovered, unless authorized by statute.-People v. Lawson, 120 N. E. 814.

are bound by the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States upon the meaning and application of the federal Constitution.Harmon v. Bolley, 120 N. E. 33.

107 (Mass.) Statements in opinion of Supreme Judicial Court in illustration of questions actually decided are seldom considered in

For cases in Dec.Dig. & Am.Dig. Key-No.Series & Indexes see same topic and KEY-NUMBER

all their bearings, and must be restricted to
propositions decided.-Attorney General v.
Armstrong, 120 N. E. 678.

IV. COURTS OF LIMITED OR INFERI-

OR JURISDICTION.

does not involve constitutional questions, giv-
ing Supreme Court jurisdiction, because of al-
leged necessity for allegations as to property
in bill to empower trial court to hear evidence
jurisdiction to render decree for alimony by
on question of alimony, and alleged loss of
lapse of term at which original decree was ren-
dered; these being questions of practice.-
Edlund v. Edlund, 120 N. E. 538.

189(1) (Ill.) A suit brought by a lessor in
the municipal court of Chicago against his les-
see to recover rent and possession of the prem-219 (10) (Ill.) Supreme Court has no juris-
ises as a fourth-class action may, by agreement
of the parties and abandonment of the forcible
entry and detainer element of the suit, be
prosecuted as a first-class action for rent mere-
ly.-Selz v. Stafford, 120 N. E. 462.

189(7) (Ill.) A statement of claim in ac-
tions of the fourth class in the municipal court,
which does not state a cause of action, does
not require an answer, and, if a judgment by
default is rendered upon such statement, it may
be reversed, and such statement will not of
itself sustain a judgment.-Lyons v. Kanter,
120 N. E. 764.

diction of appeal from order of circuit court
dismissing a bill to restrain performance of a
paving contract, on the ground that the specifi-
cations fostered monopoly, in the absence of
contention that the ordinance under which the
contract was let is invalid.-Schoellkopf v. City
of Chicago, 120 N. E. 778.

219(12) (Ill.) A freehold is involved, giv-
ing Supreme Court jurisdiction of appeal,
when one party gains and another loses a free-
hold by the decision, or when title to free-
hold is so put in issue by pleadings that deci-
sion of case involves decision of question.-
189(15) (Ill.) A statement of claim in ac-
Kuhne v. Sanitary District of Chicago, 120 N.
tions of the fourth class in the municipal court, E. 471.
which does not state a cause of action, does not 219(40) (Ill.) Where pleadings raised no is-
require an answer; and, if a judgment by de-sue of ownership of freehold, and no question
fault is rendered upon such statement, it may
of freehold was involved in trial court, and is
be reversed, and such statement will not of it- therefore not involved in appeal to Supreme
self sustain a judgment.-Lyons v. Kanter, 120 Court, appeal should have been taken to Ap-
N. E. 764.
pellate Court.-Kuhne v. Sanitary District of
Chicago, 120 N. E. 471.

190(2) (Mass.) Order of appellate division
of municipal court of city of Boston, on report
after verdict for defendant, giving plaintiff
leave to amend declaration, and granting new
trial conditionally on such amendments being
made, otherwise dismissing report, is not "final
decision" within St. 1912. c. 649, from which
alone appeal lies.-Hall Pub. Co. v. MacLaugh-
lin, 120 N. E. 69.

190(2) (Mass.) In St. 1912, c. 649, § 9, cre-
ating right to appeal to Supreme Judicial Court
from appellate division of municipal court of
Boston, general court used words "final deci-
sion" in their natural import of determination
putting end to litigation, and leaving nothing
more open to dispute, but putting controversy
at rest. Real Property Co. v. Pitt, 120 N. E.

141.

Decision of appellate division of municipal
court of city of Boston ordering new trial on
report of case to it after finding for plaintiff
was not "final decision" within St. 1912, c.
649, 89, creating right to appeal to Supreme
Judicial Court from final decision of appellate
division.-Id.

190(3) (Mass.) Though St. 1912, c. 649, 8
9, does not expressly confine right to appeal to
Supreme Judicial Court from appellate divi-
sion of municipal court of city of Boston to
parties aggrieved by decision of appellate di-
vision, limitation is necessary implication, and
defendant cannot appeal from decision in his
favor.-Hall Pub. Co. v. MacLaughlin, 120 N.
E. 69.

190(6) (I.) Municipal Court Act, § 23, par.
6, was not intended by Legislature to authorize
original stenographic report to be made part
of transcript of record by order of court, with-
out a stipulation of the parties in case of ap-
peal.-Marshall Field & Co. v. Nyman, 120 N.
E. 756.

VI. COURTS OF APPELLATE JURIS-

DICTION.

(B) Courts of Particular States.
219(7) (l.) Where public revenue was not
directly involved in suits attacking elections in
high school district on choice of site for school
and issuance of bonds, there was no right to
appeal to Supreme Court on such ground.-
O'Connor v. Evanston High School Dist., 120
N. E. 518.

219(8) (Ill.) Appeal from decree for ali-
mony, rendered after partial reversal of di-
vorce decree, with remand, by Appellate Court,

220(9) (Ind.) In action against railroad for
negligence in selling unauthorized return tick-
et from Indiana to Oklahoma, the interstate
character of trips did not give Supreme Court
jurisdiction of an appeal under Burns' Ann.
St. 1914, § 1391, on theory that construction
of Interstate Commerce Act was involved,
where there was no showing that act was am-
biguous.-Ross v. Gallogly, 120 N. E. 599.

VII. UNITED STATES COURTS.
(F) State Laws as Rules of Decision.

366(1) (Ind.) The construction of a state
Constitution by the state Supreme Court will
be followed by the federal courts.-Harmon v.
Bolley, 120 N. E. 33.

jurisdiction, as two county or circuit courts of
481 (Ill.) As between courts of co-ordinate
the state, neither has power to vacate or set
aside a judgment by the other, not void on its
face.-Marshall Field & Co. v. Nyman, 120 N.
E. 756.

Though it is not good practice, after order
is entered by one branch of Appellate Court,
for another branch to set it aside, first branch
of Appellate Court, to which main branch had
assigned appeal after overruling motion that
original stenographic report be stricken, had
power to set aside order and strike report.-Id.

COVENANTS.

See Landlord and Tenant, 48, 148, 152.

CRIMINAL LAW.

See Burglary; Commerce, 8; Conspiracy,
37-48; Constitutional Law, 58; Dis-
trict and Prosecuting Attorneys, 8; Drug-
gists, 2; Evidence, 596; Explosives,

5; Homicide; Indictment and Informa-
tion; Injunction, 105; Innkeepers,
15; Insurance, 115; Jury, 25, 31,
131, 136; Larceny; Mandamus, 151; Mu-
nicipal Corporations, 592, 596; Physicians
and Surgeons, 10; Rape, 40; Receiv-
ing Stolen Goods; Statutes, 64, 74; Street

Railroads, 122; Usury, 149; Witness-301 (Mass.) Whether plea of not guilty, en-
es, 193, 269, 311, 349, 393, 406.

VII. FORMER JEOPARDY.
165 (Ind.) When a defendant, who has
tered a plea of not guilty, is tried on a valid
indictment before a jury lawfully impaneled
and sworn, and a verdict of acquittal is re-
turned, he cannot legally be tried again for
the same offense.-Barker v. State, 120 N. E.
593.

tered either in absence of or by advice of coun-
sel, may be retracted, and other pleas filed, is a
matter wholly in discretion of court.-Common-
wealth v. Wakelin, 120 N. E. 209.
en-302(1) (Ill.) Refusal of municipal court of
Chicago to enter a nolle prosequi filed by
state's attorney to an information charging a
violation of Cr. Code, div. 1, § 259, was not
an arbitrary abuse of discretion where there
was a clear violation of law and state's attor-
ney refused to prosecute because of attitude
of people.-People v. Newcomer, 120 N. E. 244.
302(1) (Mass.) There is no such instrument
as disclaimer known to Massachusetts system
of criminal pleading and practice.-Common-
wealth v. Wakelin, 120 N. E. 209.

196 (Ind.) Where the facts necessary to a
conviction upon a second prosecution would not
necessarily have convicted upon the first pros
ecution, an acquittal in the first would not be
a bar to a second prosecution.-Barker v. State,
120 N. E. 593.

VIII. PRELIMINARY COMPLAINT, AF-
FIDAVIT, WARRANT, EXAMI-
NATION, COMMITMENT, AND
SUMMARY TRIAL.

260(2) (Ill.) Municipal Court Act, § 22,
specifying cases reviewable upon error or ap-
peal by Supreme Court, and providing that
other cases are to be reviewed by Appellate
Court, does not grant an appeal in any case,
but refers only to the jurisdiction in the Su-
preme Court and the Appellate Court, respec-
tively, of such writs of error and appeals as
may be authorized by law.-People v. Johnson,
120 N. E. 453.

IX. ARRAIGNMENT AND PLEAS AND
NOLLE PROSEQUI OR DISCON-
TINUANCE.

261(2) (Mass.) Where defendant pleaded not
guilty to indictment for murder, after district
attorney filed nolle prosequi as to murder, elect-
ing to prosecute only for manslaughter, it was
not necessary that defendant should be called
again to plead.-Commonwealth v. Wakelin, 120
N. E. 209.

Right and brief form of statement of district
attorney's nolle prosequi as to crime of murder
was that he would not further prosecute so
much of indictment as charged any higher crime
than manslaughter, or as charged murder in ei-
ther degree.-Id.

ty did not have absolute and unqualified power
302(2) (Ill.) State's attorney of Cook coun-
pending in municipal court of Chicago charg-
to enter a nolle prosequi to an information
ing a violation of Cr. Code, div. 1, § 259, im-
posing a fine only, but in view of Municipal
Court Act, § 27, court had discretion to re-
fuse to enter it.-People v. Newcomer, 120 N.
E. 244.

302(2) (Mass.) District attorney may at his
own pleasure enter a nolle prosequi.-Common-
wealth v. Wakelin, 120 N. E. 209.

302(4) (Mass.) So-called "disclaimer," filed
by district attorney, declaring he would not ask
defendant's conviction for murder in first or sec-
ond degree, but would only contend for convic-
tion of manslaughter, was "nolle prosequi,”
within his power to enter.-Commonwealth v.
Wakelin, 120 N. E. 209.

X. EVIDENCE.

(B) Facts in Issue and Relevant to Issues,
and Res Gestæ.

268 (Mass.) In prosecution for manslaugh-
ter, where defendant pleaded not guilty, at-338(4, 5) (Ill.) Evidence of the stealing of
tempting to reserve right to file special pleas
later, and thereafter moved for permission to
file preliminary plea and to dismiss, whether
such motions should be allowed rested in discre-
tion of judge.-Commonwealth v. Wakelin, 120
N. E. 209.

In prosecution for manslaughter, where de-
fendant pleaded not guilty, attempting to reserve
right to file special pleas later, hearing of mo-
tions that he be permitted to file preliminary
plea and to dismiss, after jury were impaneled,
rather than before, was not error.-Id.

Character of pleading is commonly to be de-
termined by nature of its averments, and not
by name attached to it.-Id.

270 (Mass.) There is no rule of practice or
procedure whereby defendant in prosecution for
crime may plead to general issue and as of right
reserve privilege of filing thereafter, by way of
substitution or otherwise, motions, pleas, or oth-
er matters in their nature preliminary, such as
plea in abatement or motion to dismiss.-Com-
monwealth v. Wakelin, 120 N. E. 209.

an auto by defendant's son is inadmissible on
prosecution for the stealing of an auto pursu-
ant to a conspiracy between defendant and
others, not including the son, to steal autos
and return them for reward.-People v. Hedge,
120 N. E. 494.

343 (Ill.) Threats to commit the crime for
which the accused is on trial are competent
against him on the question of intent, but the
language used or the circumstances under
which used must be broad enough to include the
injured person within its terms.-People v.
Scott, 120 N. E. 553.

(C) Other Offenses, and Character of Ac-
cused.

369(8) (Ind.) In prosecution under Acts
1907, c. 60, for having carnal knowledge of a
female under 16 years of age, there was no
error in permitting prosecutrix to answer ques
tions as to weekly intercourse had with de-
fendant prior to date specified in indictment,
and covering a period of about four years prior
274 (Mass.) Whether plea of guilty, enter- to such date.-Barker v. State, 120 N. E. 593.
ed either in absence of or by advice of counsel, 371(4) (Ill.) In prosecution for murder of
may be retracted, and other pleadings filed, is defendant's brother-in-law, evidence that two
matter wholly in discretion of court.-Common-years before, when deceased visited the home
wealth v. Wakelin, 120 N. E. 209.
of defendant's father, he was shot with buck-
shot, and that defendant was seen at the time
with a shotgun in his hands near the scene of
the shooting, was inadmissible as involving
another and distinct offense.-People v. Mc-
Dowell, 120 N. E. 482.

278(2) (Ind.) Objection to indictment,
found by grand jury in selection of which ir-
regularity occurred, was properly presented by
plea in abatement.-Duffey v. State, 120 N. E.
658.

279 (Mass.) Defendant's plea of not guilty
in effect was a waiver of matters in abatement.
-Commonwealth v. Wakelin, 120 N. E. 209.

295 (Ind.) A former acquittal is in the na-
ture of an affirmative defense, and the burden
of proving it is on defendant.-Barker v. State,
120 N. E. 593.

For cases in Dec.Dig. & Am,Dig. Key-No.Series & Indexes see same topic and KEY-NUMBER
defendant and wife, overheard by him, held ad-ed at his own trial.-People v. Reilly, 120 N. E.
missible, though he did not give scientific ex- 113, 224 N. Y. 90.
planation of apparatus.-Commonwealth v. 520(1) (N.Y.) Code Cr. Proc. § 395, prohibit-
Wakelin, 120 N. Ē. 209.
ing admission of confession, if made on a stipu-
lation of the district attorney that accused shall
not be prosecuted for the offense, does not pro-
hibit or affect the stipulation of the district at-
torney not to use against accused his statement,
made during investigation of charges against a
third person, which was exculpatory in nature,
and not a confession.-People v. Reilly, 120 N.
E. 113, 224 N. Y. 90.

390 (Ill.) In a prosecution for murder
claimed to have been committed in defense of
accused's father, it was error to sustain an
objection to a question asked of accused as
to whether his acts were done, as he believed,
in his father's or in his own defense.-People
v. Scott, 120 N. E. 553.

396(1) (Mass.) In prosecution for man-
slaughter, where inadmissible evidence as to
confession of third person out of court was ad-
mitted without objection from district attorney,
it was permissive for commonwealth to intro-
duce evidence to rebut its force by showing per-
son was in distant part of state on day of
crime.-Commonwealth v. Wakelin, 120 N. E.

209.

(F) Admissions, Declarations, and Hear-
say.

The assistant district attorney could not dis-
regard stipulation not to use statement against
accused on ground of failure of consideration in
that accused made false statements therein,
when the only statement alleged to be false was
one not material to the investigation then pro-
ceeding.-Id.

520(2) (N.Y.) In prosecution for assault,
where assistant district attorney, in order to
secure statement from accused concerning acts
of another person charged with a different of-
417(15) (Mass.) In prosecution for man- fense, promised that he would not use his state-
slaughter, preliminary finding of trial judgements against him, it was error to permit such at-
that statement of deceased convict, that he had torney at accused's trial to introduce any part
done killing sought to prove against defendant, of the statement so made.-People v. Reilly, 120
was not made in good faith, rendered its exclu- N. E. 113, 224 N. Y. 90.
sion necessary.-Commonwealth v. Wakelin, 120
N. E. 209.

Confessions by third persons out of court to
commission of crime with which defendant is
charged are inadmissible.-Id.

(G) Acts and Declarations of Conspirators
and Codefendants.

423(1) (Ill.) There being evidence of a con-
spiracy to steal autos and return them to their
owners for reward, and that the car charged
to have been stolen was taken pursuant there-
to, any step of any conspirator in furtherance
of the common design, though with reference
to another car, is admissible.-People v. Hedge,
120 N. E. 494.

423(4) (L.) Conversation between D. and
S., in the absence of defendant, whereby D..
who had conspired with defendant to steal
autos and return them to their owners for
reward, induced S. to join in prosecuting the
enterprise, is admissible as an act of D. in
furtherance of the purpose of the conspiracy.
-People v. Hedge, 120 N. E. 494.

423(7) (Ill.) When D., who had conspired
with defendant to steal autos and return them
to their owners for reward, arranged with S.
to join in the enterprise, S. became one of the
conspirators, whose acts in prosecution of the
common purpose became the acts of all, ad-
missible against all.-People v. Hedge, 120 N.

E. 494.

(H) Documentary Evidence and Exclusion
of Parol Evidence Thereby.

(M) Weight and Sufficiency.

566 (Ill.) It is not necessary to a legal con-
viction to prove the age of defendant unless put
in question during the trial.-People v. Bopp,
120 N. E. 790.

572 (Ill.) Evidence upon the defense of alibi
held insufficient to show that defendant was at
his room and not at the place of the murder at
the time it was committed.-People v. Bopp, 120
N. E. 790.

XI. TIME OF TRIAL AND CONTIN-
UANCE.

576(11) (Ind.) Accused's motion for a dis-
charge under Burns' Ann. St. 1914, § 2091, be-
cause of delay in trial, was insufficient where
it failed to show that trial had not been de-
layed because of his own act, since where one
claims the benefit of a statute he must bring
himself clearly within it.-Barker v. State,
120 N. E. 593..

656(9) (Ill.) In a prosecution for murder,
a question asked of deceased's sister whether
she had "any interest in this case other than
to see the person punished who murdered your
brother" should have been excluded as imply-
ing, by overruling objection thereto, that in
the opinion of the court defendant was guilty
of murder.-People v. Scott, 120 N. E. 553.

(C) Reception of Evidence.

444 (N.Y.) Under Code Civ. Proc. §§ 956,
957, Code Cr. Proc. § 392, and Penal Law, §
817, an Italian birth certificate held inadmis-683(4) (Ill.) In murder prosecution, grow-
sible for lack of proper authentication.-People ing out of demonstration of negro mob, where
v. Todoro, 120 N. E. 135, 224 N. Y. 129. police officers had testified that a sister of one

(J) Testimony of Accomplices and Code-

fendants.

508 (9) (Ill.) If accomplice gives testimony
which tends in any degree to exonerate himself
or to lay blame of transaction upon another
or it appears that he will be gainer in any way
by his testimony, such facts should have great
weight with jury and trial court.-People v.
Grove, 120 N. E. 277.

(K) Confessions.

of defendants, at time officers came to arrest
him hid a shotgun, such evidence was proper
in rebuttal of his testimony that he was not
present.-People v. Parker, 120 N. E. 14.

(D) Objections to Evidence, Motions to
Strike Out, and Exceptions.

692 (Mass.) District attorney's failure to
object to some incompetent evidence does not
estop him from making objection to other like
incompetent evidence.-Commonwealth v. Wake-
lin, 120 N. E. 209.

695(2) (Ill.) In a murder trial a general ob-
516 (N.Y.) Accused's statement to district jection to the introduction of a letter written
attorney concerning acts of third person charged by defendant without specifically pointing out
with another offense was no "confession" as to the objectionable portions is insufficient.-Peo-
accused, especially when it contained exculpa- ple v. Bopp, 120 N. E. 790.
tory matter, notwithstanding an isolated sen-698(1) (Mass.) In a prosecution for man-
tence contradicted the theory advanced by accus- slaughter, evidence as to confession out of court