prior to the time of his injury, and they need not have been dependent upon him.-Humphrey v. Industrial Commission of Illinois, 120 N. E. 816.

388 (Mass.) Daughter of deceased servant's widow, though member of servant's family at time of his death, not being his child, is not entitled to compensation under Workmen's Compensation Act, pt. 2, § 7, as amended by St. 1914, c. 708, § 3, nor under last paragraph of section 7.-Holmberg's Case, 120 N. E. 353.

389 (Mass.) Where injured servant accepts compensation, insurer under Workmen's Compensation Act, pt. 3, § 15, as amended by St. 1913, c. 448, is subrogated to servant's cause of action against third person whose negligence caused injury.-Labuff v. Worcester Consol. St. Ry. Co., 120 N. E. 381.

(C) Proceedings,

397 (N.Y.) Where, although federal courts had exclusive jurisdiction over a claim for employe's death occurring in performance of a maritime contract, State Industrial Commission assumed to make award therefor under Workmen's Compensation Law, fact that both employer and insurance carrier acquiesced in award to extent that certain payments were made thereunder, and no appeal was taken therefrom, did not estop them thereafter from questioning commission's jurisdiction.-Doey v. Clarence P. Howland Co., 120 N. E. 53, 224

N. Y. 30.

the burden of proving that injury complained of resulted from an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment.-New Castle Foundry Co. v. Lysher, 120 N. E. 713.

403 (Mass.) By Workmen's Compensation Act, pt. 2, § 7, widow living with husband at time of his death is conclusively presumed to have been wholly dependent upon him for support.-Holmberg's Case, 120 N. E. 353.

Son of deceased servant, child by his former wife, and under age of 18, though not living with father at latter's death, under Workmen's Compensation Act, pt. 2, § 7, par. c, as amend ed by St. 1914, c. 708, § 3, is conclusively presumed to have been wholly dependent for support on deceased servant, having no surviving parent.-Id.

405 (1) (Ill.) Evidence held not to show that servant's arsenical poisoning was a disease incident to his occupation as furnace fireman in a zinc smelter.-Matthiessen & Hegeler Zinc Co. v. Industrial Board, 120 N. E. 249.

405(1) (Ind.App.) In coal miner's proceedings under Workmen's Compensation Act, evidence held to justify findings of Accident Board and that reasonable excuse for failure to give that employer's agents had knowledge of injury, notice was shown.-Vandalia Coal Co. v. Holtz, 120 N. E. 386.

Car

405(1) (N.Y.) An award of the Industrial Commission for the death of an employé under the Workmen's Compensation Law, based on 398 (I.) That the employer was repre- nothing but hearsay evidence as to the hapsented at the inquest over the body of a de-pening of the accident and the resulting inceased employé held within 30 days after the jury, cannot be sustained.-Belcher v. accident, sufficiently showed that the employer thage Mach. Co., 120 N. E. 735, 224 N. Y. 326. had notice within the time required by the 405(2) (Ill.) In a proceeding under the Compensation Act.-Sulzberger & Sons Co. v. Workmen's Compensation Act to recover for Industrial Commission of Illinois, 120 N. E. death, due to falling into an elevator shaft, 535. evidence held to sustain a finding that the employment of decedent as a chauffeur was not casual, although at the time of the accident he was on trial merely.-Marshall Field & Co. v. Industrial Commission of Illinois, 120 N. E. 773.

398 (Ind. App.) Where mining company's pit boss or foreman had knowledge of injury suffered by claimant for compensation under Workmen's Compensation Act at time disability was ascertained to have resulted, company had sufficient notice of injury under the act.-Van-405(4) (Ind.App.) In a proceeding under dalia Coal Co. v. Holtz, 120 N. E. 386. the Workmen's Compensation Act for injuries 398 (Mass.) Under Workmen's Compensa- sustained by an employé in lifting a bale of tion Act, a person's right to recover for inju- wire weighing about 150 pounds resulting in ries sustained through injury to another person strangulating a pre-existing hernia, evidence is not barred by such other's neglect or refusal held to sustain the award of the industrial to give notice conditional to his right of recov-board.-Puritan Bed Spring Co. v. Wolfe, 120 ery.-Erickson v. Buckley, 120 N. E. 126. N. E. 417.

398 (N.Y.) An unauthorized agent, acting for an employer and the insurance carrier, cannot waive Workmen's Compensation Act, 8 28, requiring claim for compensation to be filed with the commission within one year, so as to make the waiver binding on the parties to a proceeding to obtain compensation for personal injuries. Twonko v. Rome Brass & Copper Co., 120 N. E. 638, 224 N. Y. 263.

An employer and an insurance carrier under the Workmen's Compensation Act were not estopped to set up that Workmen's Compensation Act. § 28, requiring claim for compensation to be filed with the commission within one year, was not complied with, because the insurance carrier had paid medical bills for the injured employé.-Id.

An injured employé who fails to present a claim for compensation to the commission within one year as required by Workmen's Compensation Act, § 28. is thereafter barred from obtaining compensation for his injuries.--Id.

399 (Ind.App.) A demand for autopsy should be made at a reasonable time and place. -Vonnegut Hardware Co. v. Rose, 120 N. E. 608.

405(4) (Ind.App.) In proceeding for workmen's compensation, evidence, together with the proper inferences therefrom, held to sustain finding that the injury resulted from an accident arising out of and in the course of the employment.-New Castle Foundry Co. v. Lysher, 120 N. E. 713.

405(4) (Mass.) In proceedings for compensation for death of stock cutter, evidence held to sustain finding that injury, cut in big toe from dropping of plank, arose out of and in course of employment.-Mallory's Case, 120 N. E. 591.

405(4) (Mass.) In widow's proceedings for compensation for death of her husband, evidence there was no causal connection between injury and tuberculosis from which decedent died held to support decision of Accident Board in favor of insurer.-McCarthy's Case, 120 N. E. 852.

405(4) (N.Y.) Evidence held insufficient to show that a servant's death from blood clot and pressure on the brain was the result of any injury received while in the course of his employment.-Hansen v. Turner Const. Co., 120 N. E. 693, 224 N. Y. 331.

403 (Ill.) In workmen's compensation pro- 416 (I) The record of a claimant under ceedings, the burden of proving the employment, and the injury, is, upon claimant.-Chicago Great Western R. Co. v. Industrial Commission of Illinois, 120 N. E. 508.

403 (Ind.App.) One claiming compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act has

the Workmen's Compensation Act, on appeal from the decision of a committee of arbitration to the Industrial Board, held to be filed within time required by the statute as existing December 4, 1914, where extensions of time had been granted.-Sulzberger & Sons Co. v.

For cases in Dec.Dig. & Am.Dig. Key-No.Series & Indexes see same topic and KEY-NUMBER
Industrial Commission of Illinois, 120 N. E.
535.

416 (Ind.App.) Under Workmen's Compen-
sation Act, § 22, findings of Industrial Board
held to sustain award to coal miner who lost
sight of eye through injury, but gave no notice
to employer, on the ground that employer's
agents had actual knowledge, and reasonable
excuse for failure to give notice existed.-Van-
dalia Coal Co. v. Holtz, 120 N. E. 386.

416 (Ind.App.) An agreement for compen-
sation between an injured employé and the
employer, approved by the Industrial Board,
under Workmen's Compensation Act, § 57, has
the effect of an award.-Pedlow v. Swartz Elec-
tric Co., 120 N. E. 603.

An award of compensation under the Work-
men's Compensation Act, not reviewed or set
aside, is conclusive on both parties, except as
provided in section 45, allowing a modification
on change of conditions.-Id.

417(1) (Ill.) On application to circuit court
for judgment for award and attorney's fees in
accordance with statute, court has no jurisdic-
tion to review decision of Industrial Board,
construe the statute, or determine whether de-
cision is correct.-Friedman Mfg. Co. v. In-
dustrial Commission of Illinois, 120 N. E. 460.

417(34) (Ill.) Whether wife of deceased
employé was entitled to award for injuries re-
sulting in death which occurred outside of the
state involved a construction of Workmen's
Compensation Act, and if construction given by
Industrial Board was erroneous, section 19 per-
mitted a review.-Friedman Mfg. Co. v. Indus-
trial Commission of Illinois, 120 N. E. 460.

in reviewing award of Industrial Board, al-
though member of such board who heard the
evidence found for appellant, and award from
which appeal is prosecuted was made by the
other two members of the board.--Vonnegut
Hardware Co. v. Rose, 120 N. E. 608.

Where evidence as to whether refusal to per-
mit operation was such misconduct as to de-
prive decedent's dependents of the benefit of
the Workmen's Compensation Act was clearly
open to more than one inference by reason-
able men, determination of Industrial Board
with reference thereto cannot be disturbed on
appeal.-Id.

Finding of Industrial Board, as to whether
an autopsy was necessary to determine the
cause of death, and whether the demand there-
for was made within a reasonable time, based
on conflicting evidence, will not be disturbed on
appeal.-Id.

In proceeding under Workmen's Compensa-
tion Act, held, there was some evidence to sup-
port finding of Industrial Board that the
strangulation of the intestines which caused
decedent's death resulted from hernia, and that
the hernia was caused by a strain resulting
from master's work, so that award would be
affirmed.-Id.

417(7) (Mass.) Whether claimant had estab-
lished causal connection between accident to
deceased servant in course of employment and
his death, more than three months later, was
issue of fact to be determined by Industrial Ac-
cident Board, under Workmen's Compensation
Act, pt. 3, § 16, as amended by St. 1912, c. 571,
§ 15.-Knight's Case, 120 N. E. 395.

Decision of Industrial Accident Board in
workman's compensation case on issue of fact,
is not open to revision by Supreme Judicial
Court, finding being conclusive if with substan-
tial support in evidence.-Id.

417(34) (Ill.) Where notice and copy of
decision of Industrial Board, allowing compen-
sation for death of employé, were sent and re-
ceived by employer on a certain day, and no
writ of certiorari was sued out or suit in chan-
cery commenced within 20 days thereafter, de-417(7) (Mass.) Findings of Industrial Acci-
cision of board became, in view of Workmen's
Compensation Act, § 19, conclusive except for
fraud, although 20 days had not expired since
denial of employer's petition for modification of
findings of fact.-Friedman Mfg. Co. v. Indus-
trial Commission of Illinois, 120 N. E. 460.

417(6) (Mass.) In workman's compensation
case, evidence held insufficient to justify Su-
preme Judicial Court in holding as matter of
law that finding of Accident Board, that claim-
ant had failed to sustain burden to prove de-
ceased servant's death had any causal connec-
tion with previous injury in employment, was
unwarranted.-Knight's Case, 120 N. E. 395.

417(7) (Ill.) Finding of industrial board as
to extent of disability from injury, being a legit-
imate conclusion from facts proved by compe-
tent evidence, is conclusive on the Supreme
Court. Scully v. Industrial Commission of Illi-
nois, 120 N. E. 492.

417(7) (Ill.) If the evidence in favor of the
applicant sustains the award of the Industrial
Commission, the weight of the evidence to the
contrary will not be considered by the reviewing
court.-Pekin Cooperage Co. v. Industrial Com-
mission, 120 N. E. 530.

Determination of the facts upon contradictory
evidence by the Industrial Commission is final.
-Id.

417(7) (Ind.App.) Industrial Board having
found facts showing actual knowledge of injury
by employer's agents, also reasonable excuse for
failure to give statutory notice, findings are
binding on Appellate Court, if there is any evi-
dence to sustain either.-Vandalia Coal Co. v.
'Holtz, 120 N. E. 386.

dent Board on all questions of fact, under
Workmen's Compensation Act, pt. 3, § 11, as
amended by St. 1912, c. 571, § 14, are final,
and cannot be set aside, if there is any evi-
dence to support them.-Weatherbee's Case,
120 N. E. 845.

which caused his death, and whether injury
Whether deceased servant received injury
arose out of and in course of employment, were
questions of fact for Industrial Accident Board.

-Id.

Where, on question whether deceased serv-
ant's death was caused by strain of swinging
heavy sledgehammer, thereby injuring and
weakening an already diseased heart, or was
matter of speculation and conjecture, evidence
was conflicting, finding of Industrial Accident
Board must stand.-Id.

417(7) (Mass.) Decisions of Industrial Ac-
cident Board on questions of fact stand on
same footing as verdict of jury or finding of.
judge, and are not subject to review, except
to determine whether there is any evidence to
support them.-McCarthy's Case, 120 N. E.
852.

Weight and credibility of testimony as to any
causal connection between injury to decedent
and tuberculosis which resulted fatally to him
is for the Industrial Accident Board.-Id.

417(7) (Mass.) Where both single member
of Industrial Accident Board in his report,
and full board on appeal, state that one ques-
tion to be decided is whether claimants were
dependent on earnings of deceased child, the
employé, thus showing point was considered
and passed on at hearings, such point is open
on appeal, though no request was made re-
417(7) (Ind.App.) Where there is some evi- specting it.-Dembinski's Case, 120 N. E. 856.
dence to sustain finding of Industrial Board in 418(2) (Mass.) Workmen's Compensation
proceeding under the Workmen's Compensa-
tion Act, it will not be disturbed on appeal.-
Pedlow v. Swartz Electric Co., 120 N. E. 603.
417(7) (Ind.App.) Workmen's Compensation
Act, as amended by Acts 1917, c. 63, does not
give Appellate Court power to weigh evidence

Act, pt. 3, § 11, expressly provides there shall
be no appeal from decree of superior court bas-
ed on memorandum of agreement approved by
Industrial Accident Board, and on such at-
tempted appeal merits of decree cannot be ex-
amined.-Dempsey's Case, 120 N. E. 75.

418(3) (Mass.) Where counsel for the com-
pensation insurer stated before the Industrial
Accident Board that he did not wish to raise
any question as to the giving of notice of in-
jury, the insurer cannot contend for the first

time in the Supreme Judicial Court on appeal
that the notice was insufficient.-Mallory's
Case, 120 N. E. 591.

MINES AND MINERALS.

See Master and Servant, 398, 405, 416.
MINIMUM WAGE COMMISSION.
See Constitutional Law, 62, 80, 89, 238, 275;
Eminent Domain,
69; Statutes,

See Infants.

2;

Master and Servant,
64; Witnesses, 293.

MINORS.

418(31⁄2) (Ill.) A writ of error to review
action of circuit court in confirming award of
industrial board by judgment rendered Decem-
ber 11, 1917, was sued out in time, although
the record was not filed until April term, 1918,
the complaining party, in absence of provision
in Workmen's Compensation Act, having three
years after rendition of judgment, under Prac- See Counties, 148; Judgment, 584.
tice Act, § 117.-Western Electric Co. v. In-
dustrial Commission of Illinois, 120 N. E. 774.

MOBS.

MONOMANIA.

418(3%) (Mass.) Whether single justice of See Contracts, 92.

Supreme Judicial Court, pursuant to St. 1915,
c. 132, should enter order for suspension pend-

ing appeal of decree of superior court ordering

MONOPOLIES.

219; Trusts, 272.

entry of decree for dependent under Workmen's See Constitutional Law, 249, 305; Courts,
Compensation Act, and issuance of execution
thereon, rested in discretion of single justice.-
Dempsey's Case, 120 N. E. 75.

II.

418(6) (Ill.) In a proceeding under the
Workmen's Compensation Act to recover for
the death of plaintiff's husband, evidence held
sufficient to preclude reversal on appeal from
decision of circuit court sustaining award.-ny
Sulzberger & Sons Co. v. Industrial Commis-
sion of Illinois, 120 N. E. 535.

418(6) (Ill.) Where industrial board found
that employé's death was accidental, and there
was competent evidence in the record to sup-
port such finding, the Supreme Court, on error
to review judgment of circuit court confirming
the industrial board's award, will not weigh the
evidence and will affirm the judgment.-Western
Electric Co. v. Industrial Commission of Illi-
nois, 120 N. E. 774.

418(6) (Mass.) On appeal from decree of
superior court affirming award under Work-
men's Compensation Act, Supreme Judicial
Court is not concerned with weight of evidence
or credibility of witnesses, and findings of fact
in report of single member of Accident Board,
which were affirmed on review, must stand, un-
less plainly unwarranted.-Mallory's Case, 120
N. E. 591.

Widow, claiming under Compensation Act,
not being bound by insurer's evidence, and
having presented evidence warranting finding
that blow was sufficient to cause conditions
found to exist on autopsy, and which caused
death, Supreme Judicial Court cannot say as
matter of law that the conclusion that the in-
jury was cause of death was error.-Id.

419 (Ind.App.) In a hearing under Work-
men's Compensation Act, § 45, to review an
award, because of change of conditions, the
parties are bound by the proof made at the
former trial, and proof is limited to evidence
to prove or disprove the contention that the
conditions existing at the time of the award
have changed.-Pedlow v. Swartz Electric Co.,
120 N. E. 603.

420 (II.) Where employer failed to pay
compensation according to award, and did not
institute proceedings for review within 20 days,
as provided by Workmen's Compensation Act,
§ 19, circuit court, on claimant's application for
judgment for award, properly allowed attor-
ney's fees.-Friedman Mfg. Co. v. Industrial
Commission of Illinois, 120 N. E. 460.

TRUSTS AND OTHER COMBINA-
TIONS IN RESTRAINT OF

TRADE.

21 (Mass.) Plaintiff, stockholder in compa-
operating in violation of St. 1908, c. 454,
prohibiting monopolistic practices, cannot be
under liability for doing his duty in repudiating
illegal contracts and asking that the business
be managed according to law.-Duane v. Mer-
chants' Legal Stamp Co., 120 N. E. 370.

Plaintiff, stockholder in company whose meth-
ods of operation are violative of St., 1908, c.
454, prohibiting monopolistic practices, cannot
hold his fellow wrongdoers liable to himself for
failure or refusal to abjure illegal contracts and
business methods, as he himself does, and can-
not invoke the law to compel them to give up
partially executed illegal project, and restore
his property rights to him.-Id.

Plaintiff, stockholder in company operating
in violation of St. 1908, c. 454, prohibiting
monopolistic practices, cannot have relief as
stockholder against company, directors, etc.;
a first step being the avoidance of their acts
in pretending to forfeit and cancel his stock,
though such acts were illegal, pursuant to un-
lawful contracts, and a conspiracy.-Id.

Where plaintiff voluntarily became stockhold-
er in company operated in violation of St. 1908.
c. 454, prohibiting monopolistic practices, and
voluntarily became party to illegal aspects of
the business, with full knowledge of all facts,
he cannot have relief against company, direc-
tors, etc., to recover property rights and prof-
its; illegal contracts having been executed in
part.-Id.

Penitence and offer to return dividends already
received for participation in execution of il-
legal monopolistic corporate enterprise affords
no ground for relief to plaintiff stockholder,
seeking restoration of his property rights against
the company.-Id.

24(1) (Mass.) If plaintiff were innocent
shareholder in company operated in violation of
St. 1908, c. 454, prohibiting monopolistic prac-
tices, and seasonably sought to restrain illegal
business by the company, injunctive and other
adequate relief would be afforded as of course.-
Duane v. Merchants' Legal Stamp Co., 120 N.
E. 370.

MORTGAGES.

See Equity, 150; Judgment, 721; Life
Estates, 10; Receivers, 154; Vendor
and Purchaser, 231; Wills, 840.
VII. PAYMENT OR PERFORMANCE
OF CONDITION, RELEASE,

AND SATISFACTION.

298(3) (Mass.) Where $832.76, fully dis-
charging mortgagor's indebtedness, was not only

For cases in Dec.Dig. & Am,Dig. Key-No.Series & Indexes see same topic and KEY-NUMBER
paid to authorized agent of mortgagee, but mort-
gagee received benefit of payment, in that note
of hers to bank to which agent indorsed check
was paid thereby, mortgagor was entitled to
discharge of mortgage.-Clark v. Young, 120 N.
E. 397.

be conferred on the municipalities of the state
by its laws.-State v. Otis, 120 N. E. 313.

X. FORECLOSURE BY ACTION.

(J) Sale.

In determining the meaning of a provision in a municipal charter, the action of the people of the city in enacting an initiated ordinance based on such provision is to be considered.-Id.

III. LEGISLATIVE CONTROL OF MU-
NICIPAL ACTS, RIGHTS, AND
LIABILITIES.

527 (Ill.) A certificate of sale confers no title, but is only evidence of a right to obtain 71 (Ind.) The Legislature has the power to title, and, as against every right except that consent to the surrender of a franchise granted right, and until it is exercised and a master's by a city to a street railway without the apdeed made, the owner of the equity of redemp-proval of the city.-State v. Lewis, 120 N. E. tion continues owner of the land.-Allison v. 129.

White. 120 N. E. 809.

(A) Meetings, Rules, and Proceedings in

539 (Ohio) Where record on foreclosure IV. PROCEEDINGS OF COUNCIL OR shows regular procedure, service on defendant OTHER GOVERNING BODY. by publication, default, and that the premises were sold to a purchaser in good faith, the title will not be vacated by application of defendant under Gen. Code, § 11632, to have the judgment opened and be let in to defend. Moor v. Parsons, 120 N. E. 305.

542 (Ill.) After foreclosure sale, and until execution of the master's deed, the owner of the equity of redemption is entitled to possession and control of the property.-Allison v. White, 120 N. E. 809.

554 (Ill.) By failing to redeem from the master's sale the owner of the equity of redemption does not lose title, and, if the master's deed be not executed within the time limited by statute. such owner is then the absolute owner.-Allison v. White, 120 N. E. 809.

XI. REDEMPTION.

594(2) (Ill.) Though a judgment of the fourth class rendered by the Chicago municipal court does not constitute a lien on land, under Municipal Court Act, § 63, and hence did not become a lien on land in another county on the filing of a transcript under section 1 of the act relating to judgments and decrees, the judgment creditor had a right to redeem from a mortgage foreclosure after expiration of time for redemption by mortgagor, in view of section 20 of the act concerning judgments and decrees.Level v. Goosman, 120 N. E. 758.

General.

92 (Ill.) Rule 29 of Chicago City Council, providing that motion to take any motion from the table may be proposed at same meeting at which motion was laid on table, provided twothirds of aldermen vote therefor, does not limit right to take motion from table to same meeting at which it was laid on table and prevent the motion from being taken up at a later meeting, but merely requires two-thirds vote to take from table at same meeting.-People v. Davis, 120 N. E. 326.

102 (Ill.) Under Cities and Villages Act, art. 3, §§ 7, 14, as to rules of proceeding, a municipal council, like other legislative bodies, may reconsider, under parliamentary rules, its votes and action upon questions rightfully pending before it and rescind its previous action.-People v. Davis, 120 N. E. 326.

Under Laws 1917, p. 724, a city council has power, after confirming mayor's appointments to board of education, to reconsider its action and disapprove such appointments.-Id.

(B) Ordinances and By-Laws in General.

108 (N.Y.) Provision for five-cent fare in so-called Milburn agreement between city of Buffalo and its street railroad systems is a "right of the city," that which is directed by law for one's advantage, within its charter, section 31, as amended by Laws 1916, c. 260, so that resolutions of the city council, consenting See Appeal and Error, 235, 716; Dismiss- to increase to six cents are subject to refal and Nonsuit, 61; Equity, 412; Mu- erendum provisions of charter.-International nicipal Corporations, 92; Pleading, Ry. Co. v. Rann, 120 N. E. 153, 224 N. Y. 83. 192, 354.

MOTIONS.

MOTORCYCLE.

See Municipal Corporations, 706.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.

111(1) (Ohio) Initiated Ordinance No. 45222 of the city of Cleveland, entitled "An ordinance to provide for the appointment of a rapid transit commission," is valid, though it does not specify in terms the powers and duties of the commission; it being sufficient to refer to the statute defining the functions of such commissions.-State v. Otis, 120 N. E. 313.

See Abatement and Revival, 7; Appeal and 11(3) (Ohio) Const. art. 2, § 26, providing Error, 994; Bailment, 21, 35; Car- for the uniform operation of laws, has no appliriers, 12, 15; Commerce, 8; Consti- cation to municipal ordinances.-Welch v. City tutional Law, 43, 52, 63, 117, 121, 137, of Cleveland, 120 N. E. 206. 308, 321; Counties; Courts, 189; Crim-116 (Ohio) An initiated ordinance repeals a inal Law. 260, 302: Dedication, 19, prior ordinance in so far as the two ordinances 23, 39; Drains, 39, 70, 74; Eminent Do- are in conflict.-State v. Otis, 120 N. E. 313. main, 167, 242, 246; Estoppel, 39, 62; 121 (Ohio) Where question whether an orEvidence, 501; Gas, 14; Health, ;dinance was reasonably necessary for protecInfants. 71; Injunction, 105; Judg- tion of health and comfort of those living in ment, 562; Jury. 25, 31: Mandamus, residential districts was committed, in first 97; Master and Servant. 361, 375; Nay-instance, to judgment of municipal authority, igable Waters, 20; Railroads, 76, 99; and where, in exercising such discretion, it actSchools and School Districts; Statutes,

64, 74, 93, 120; Street Railroads; Taxation,
47, 338; Telegraphs and Telephones,
10; Waters and Water Courses,

203.

II. GOVERNMENTAL POWERS AND
FUNCTIONS IN GENERAL.

58 (Ohio) Under Cleveland City Charter, §§ 1, 2, authority is reserved to the city to exercise any power now or that may hereafter

will not be disturbed.-State v. Rendigs, 120 N. ed reasonably and not arbitrarily, its action E. 836.

122 (2) (Ohio) The presumption is in favor of the validity of an ordinance, and one asserting its invalidity has the burden of showing that council's enactment of ordinance in exercise of the police power was clearly unreasonable and arbitrary.-State v. Rendigs, 120 N. E. 836.

V. OFFICERS, AGENTS, AND EM-

PLOYÉS.

(B) Municipal Departments and Officers
Thereof.

tion of addition to waterworks system at a cost
in excess of $500 without advertising for bids,
as then required by Rev. St. 1900, § 2419.-
Frisbie Co. v. City of East Cleveland, 120 N. E.
309.

21 (I.) Appointees to board of education, 373(1) (Ill.) One who furnished material for
subject to approval and confirmation of city municipal sewer construction had a lien upon
council, having no legal title to the office, have bonds issued to pay the contractor, regardless
no power to terminate appointments of offices of whether they were purchased by an indi-
of board and make new appointments in their vidual with knowledge of the claim or by a
stead. People v. Coffin, 120 N. E. 807.
corporation of which he was the president and
sole owner.-N. A. Williams Co. v. McCarthy,
120 N. E. 485.

213 (Ohio) Cleveland City Charter, § 77,
creating a city plan commission, with power to
control "the plan, design, and location of pub-373(7) (Ill.) In action to enforce lien of
lic buildings, harbors, bridges, viaducts, street materialman on municipal bonds issued in pay-
fixtures, and other structures and appurtenane- ment of sewer construction, evidence held to
es." etc., does not preclude the creation by ordi- show that defendant personally, and not as a
nance of a rapid transit commission with the corporation officer, purchased the bonds.-N.
powers conferred by Gen. Code. § 4000-16 et A. Williams Co. v. McCarthy, 120 N. E. 485.
seq.-State v. Otis, 120 N. E. 313.

(C) Agents and Employés.

214(3) (Ohio) Under Act May 17, 1915
(105-106 Ohio Laws, p. 287) § 5, relating to
expenditure of appropriations, and section 3,
authorizing rapid transit commission to employ
such employés as may be necessary and refer-
ring to attorneys, the commission was authoriz-
ed to appoint counsel, notwithstanding Gen.
Code, § 4214, relating to steps necessary to
authorize payment of compensation to city em-
ployés.-City of Cincinnati v. Rogers, 120 N.

E. 839.

VII. CONTRACTS IN GENERAL.

230 (Ohio) Under Gen. Code, § 4000-18,
as amended by Act March 31, 1917 (107 Ohio
Laws, p. 406), the board of rapid transit com-
missioners of Cincinnati is authorized to em-
ploy an attorney and to fix his compensation
and term of service.-State v. Leimann, 120 N.
E. 174.

247 (Ohio) A contract made by a city, in
disregard of the express requirements of the
statute prescribing the powers conferred on the
city, is not binding on it.-Frisbie Co. v. City of
East Cleveland, 120 N. E. 309.

249 (Ohio) No implied liability arises
against a city from use of water pipes made by
authority of the waterworks trustees of a city
to supply water to residents in certain allot-
ments.-Frisbie Co. v. City of East Cleveland,

120 N. E. 309.

Where landowner, damaged by repairs on
public way, did not file petition for compensa-
tion with mayor and aldermen, or selectmen,
or road commissioner, within year after com-
pletion of work, as required by Rev. Laws, c.
51, § 15, no application for jury at bar of su-
perior court for assessment of damages could
be maintained under section 16.-Id.

Filing of petition for compensation with
mayor and aldermen, and grievance respecting
the same, either by inadequate estimate of dam-
ages or neglect and refusal for 30 days to make
any estimate, were conditions precedent to right
in petitioner for assessment of damages from
repairs on public way to file application, under
Rev. Laws, c. 51, § 16, for jury to assess dam-
ages in superior court.-ld.

(E) Assessments for Benefits, and Special

Taxes.

405 (Ind.App.) Statutory process of levy-
ing upon abutting property cost of improving
streets by paving, prescribed by Burns' Ann.
St. 1914, 8710 et seq., is essentially one of
taxation.-Buckingham v. Kerr, 120 N. E. 422.

408(1) (Ind.App.) While endeavoring to as-
certain legislative intent in enacting Burns'
Ann. St. 1914, § 8710 et seq., empowering cities
to levy special assessments for paving, court
must remember such statutes are to be strict-
ly construed.-Buckingham v. Kerr, 120 N. E.
422.

283 (N.Y.) The term "tramway" has not a
fixed and strict meaning, and rails laid by con-
tractors three feet apart on ties in a street to
carry dump cars from a subway excavation
were a "tramway," within Rapid Transit Act,
§ 33, subd. 3, as amended by Laws 1909, c. 498,425(2) (Ill.) Lots owned by a railway com-
$8.-Bradley v. Degnon Contracting Co., 120
N. E. 89, 224 N. Y. 60.

(B) Preliminary Proceedings and Ordi-
nances or Resolutions.

pany and used for railway purposes are subject
to assessment for benefits when the streets on
which they abut are paved.-Village of Oak
Park v. Chicago & W. T. Ry. Co., 120 N. E.
761.

304 (13) (Ill.) Where a village resolution 425(4) (Ill.) The duty of a railroad company
provided for combined curb and gutter through-imposed by ordinance to pave streets between
out the whole line of improvement, but the or-
the tracks and for two feet beyond the rails
ceased when the road was elevated, and a pay-
ing ordinance failing to exclude the space be
neath the elevated track included work for
which the railroad company was not liable.-
Village of Oak Park v. Chicago & W. T. Ry.
Co., 120 N. E. 761.

dinance excepted a street already furnished
with a gutter, the variance being willful and
substantial was fatal and invalidated assess-
ments to pay therefor.-Village of Oak Park v.
Chicago & W. T. Ry. Co., 120 N. E. 761.

325 (I.) The question of the necessity for
a roadway of a certain width passing through
streets of varying width is one of fact in a
proceeding to pave such streets.-Village of
Oak Park v. Chicago & W. T. Ry. Co., 120
N. E. 761.

(C) Contracts.

330 (1) (Ohio) No valid obligation is impos-
ed on a city by a contract in 1902 for construc-

430 (Ill.) That industrial property sought
to be assessed for part of cost of street im-
provement is not contiguous to particular
street or bridge, and will not be to proposed
improvement, is not material, except as to
amount of benefit, and it is properly assessed
if it does receive some benefit increasing mar-
ket value.-City of Chicago v. Farwell, 120 N.
E. 520.