For cases in Dec.Dig. & Am.Dig. Key-No.Series & Indexes see same topic and KEY-NUMBER
430 (Ind.App.) Under Burns' Ann. St. 1914, § 8710 et seq., plan to carry portion of primary assessment of cost of paving back from tract abutting on street and distributing it on successive tracts in rear constitutes sole method whereby adjacent lands may be assessed, whether there be diverse ownership or not. --Buckingham v. Kerr, 120 N. E. 422.
Under Burns' Ann. St. 1914, § 8710 et seq., in carrying back to adjacent tracts portions of primary assessment on abutting land of cost of street paving, the several tracts must be assessed consecutively, and portions of primary assessment may be carried back 150 feet, though no assessment can extend across another street, though owned by same person and within 150 feet.-Id.
were beneficial to certain property not freeing
it from liability for its proportion of cost of
other parts of improvement not beneficial to
it.-Id.
466 (Ill.) If benefit to property from street
improvement is less or greater because derived
from some particular element of improvement,
the fact must be considered in determining pro-
portional amount of cost the particular prop-
erty should bear.-City of Chicago v. Farwell,
120 N. E. 520.
469(1) (Ill.) The entire cost of the whole sidewalk in a municipality cannot be apportioned to the lots according to their frontage, unless the sidewalk is completed past all of the lots so assessed.-People v. Lawson, 120 N. E. 814.
Under Burns' Ann. St. 1914, § 8710 et seq.,488, 489(1) (Ind.App.) If, under Burns' where plaintiffs' north tract did not abut on Ann. St. 1914, § 8710 et seq., land or any part street paved, was not adjacent in sense it was is not liable to be assessed by common council liable for portion of any primary assessment for cost of paving, owner need not appear be carried back from abutting land, and was sep- fore council at any stage, but may rely on arated from improved street by another, com- statute.-Buckingham v. Kerr, 120 N. E. 422. mon council had no authority to assess it.-Id. 502(3) (Ill.) Judgment confirming special 437 (Ill.) In establishing new highways, ex- assessment against property of dock and canal tent of use of old and new, and probable effect company for improvement of thoroughfare held upon routes of travel of new highways, should sustained by evidence as to benefit of improvebe considered in determining effect upon propment and its effect on company's property.erty. City of Chicago v. Farwell, 120 N. E. City of Chicago v. Farwell, 120 N. E. 520. 520. 511(1) (Ind.App.) On landowner's appeal to circuit court from assessment for cost of paving by common council, the only question that may be reviewed is amount of assessment, and landowner must admit liability for some amount, for, as to lands not liable to be assessed, right of appeal is denied by Burns' Ann. St. 1914, § 8716.-Buckingham v. Kerr, 120 N. E. 422. the ordinance under 515(2) (Ill.) Where which a sidewalk is constructed is void, because beyond the power of the city, or because unreasonable, unjust, or oppressive, it cannot be validated by a subsequent ordinance, although under Sidewalk Act, § 8, a new ordinance may validate an assessment under an old ordinance under which the work was done in good faith.
438 (Ill.) In proceeding to assess upon dock and canal company part of cost of street improvement, company's proposed finding that others using streets and bridge for like purposes would share advantages with occupants of objecting property was immaterial.-City of Chicago v. Farwell, 120 N. E. 520.
439 (Ill.) Where street giving access to warehouses, etc., and inadequate to carry both commercial and pleasure automobile traffic, was improved to be adequate for both classes of traffic, a company whose industrial property was benefited could not be relieved of participation in cost of improvement because without pleasure automobile traffic there would have been no congestion.-City of Chicago v. Far--People v. Lawson, 120 N. E. 814.
(F) Enforcement of Assessments and Special Taxes.
In 'city's proceedings to assess cost of street improvement, though its power to regulate use of roadways by different classes of vehicles had 535 (Ind.App.) Action of common council not been exercised in improvement ordinance, it could not be said that relief to transportation was confined to voluntary acts of those using improved roadways.-Id.
440 (Ohio) Where plaintiff's lands were adequately provided by street sewer with drainage, he is not liable to assessment for the construction of another sewer which renders no
service and is no benefit to the premises.-City of Cincinnati v. Doerger, 120 N. E. 304.
451 (Ind.App.) Under Burns' Ann. St. 1914, § 8710 et seq., in determining portion of primary assessment on abutting property of cost of paving improvement which should be carried back to each adjoining tract, common council acts quasi judicially, but in levying other assessments it acts ministerially.-Buckingham v. Kerr, 120 N. E. 422.
458 (Ill.) Assessment on property of its proportion of cost of street improvement cannot exceed amount of benefit or proportional amount of whole assessment which particular property should bear.-City of Chicago v. Farwell, 120 N. E. 520.
460 (Ill.) Cost of entire street improvement was properly assessed against all property benefited. in proportion to benefit, and proper mode to find amount of benefits was not to deduct from total cost of improvement cost of acquiring land which objecting property owner claimed was unnecessary for improvement that would benefit its property to maximum.-City of Chicago v. Farwell, 120 N. E. 520.
in levying street improvement assessments is quasi judicial, but the council is not even an inferior court, and so cannot exercise judicial power, and its decision may be collaterally attacked by a property owner in an action to enjoin collection.-Buckingham v. Kerr, 120 N.
572 (II.) Under the Sidewalk Act, which does not specifically provide for the allowance of costs of the proceeding to fix a judgment lowed in such a proceeding against the property against lots for a sidewalk, costs cannot be alof the objector.-People v. Lawson, 120 N. E.
592(2) (Ohio) Ordinance No. 36131aa of the city of Cleveland, purporting to define a suspicious person, is a valid ordinance, and does not conflict with Gen. Code. § 3664, providing for punishment of any suspicious person who cannot give a reasonable account of himself.-Welch v. City of Cleveland. 120 N. E. 206.
592(2) (Ohio) Ordinance of city of Cleveland, providing that any person who, otherwise than by force and violence or by putting in fear, attempts to steal from the person anything of value, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, does not conflict with general laws, and is a valid exercise of local police power conferred by Ohio Const. art. 18. § 3.-Greenburg v. City of Cleveland, 120 N. E. 829.
Object of city's proceeding to assess cost of street improvement is to assess whole cost of entire improvement upon all property, benefit-596 (Ohio) Ordinance No. 36131aa of the ed; the fact that parts of improvement only city of Cleveland, purporting to define a suspi
cious person, is not beyond the powers conferred
by Const. art. 18, § 3, providing that municipali-
ties shall have authority to exercise all powers
of local self-government.-Welch v. City of
Cleveland, 120 N. E. 206.
597 (Ohio) Under Page & A. Gen. Code, §
3650, conferring certain municipal powers, a
municipality may regulate and suppress all
places that in its judgment are likely to be in-
jurious to the health of its inhabitants.-State
v. Rendigs, 120 N. E. 836.
| 693 (N.Y.) Legislature can authorize
structures on streets for private use and bene-
fit which are reasonably incident to ordinary
uses of street, and which, without such author-
ity, would be encroachments and public nui-
sances.-Bradley v. Degnon Contracting Co.,
120 N. E. 89, 224 N. Y. 60.
Temporary steam tramway, laid down by sub-
way contractor in street, pursuant to legisla
tive authority, to haul dump cars from excava-
tion, cannot be adjudged legal encroachment or
obstruction on ground that it was temporary
and reasonably necessary, therefore a contem-
plated street use.-Id.
606 (Ohio) Under Page & A. Gen. Code, §
3650, conferring certain municipal powers, a
municipality may regulate and suppress all
places that in its judgment are likely to disturb 698 (Ill.) The right to travel the streets is
persons living in the immediate neighborhood one which the public has a right to enjoy, but
by offensive odors.-State v. Rendigs, 120 N. the right to use the street for ingress to and
E. 836.
egress from private property is private, and
the property owner may maintain an action for
an interference therewith.-Gibbons v. Padu-
cah & I. R. Co., 120 N. E. 500.
625 (Ohio) An ordinance of city of Cincin-
nati forbidding erection or use of buildings upon
land abutting on a public street, etc., forming
any part to the boundary of a residential block
for storage, cleaning, or renovation of uncured
animal hair and its by-products, is not unrea-
sonable nor arbitrary, and is a valid exercise
of the police power.-State v. Rendigs, 120 N.
E. 836.
XI. USE AND REGULATION OF PUB-
LIC PLACES, PROPERTY,
AND WORKS.
(A) Streets and Other Public Ways.
661(1) (Ind.) Streets of city laid out under
legislative enactments are public highways be-
longing to state and, in absence of constitu-
tional limitations, may be directly controlled
by state.-City of Vincennes v. Vincennes Trac-
tion Co., 120 N. E. 27.
661(1) (N.Y.) The Legislature has con-
trol over streets, absolute and unrestricted, ex-
cept as qualified by the Constitution and the
rule that their free use for proper purposes will
not be unreasonably interfered with through
any private appropriation of use.-Bradley v.
Degnon Contracting Co., 120 N. E. 89, 224 N.
Y. 60.
661(3) (Ind.) Franchise given by city to
street railway company to use streets must be
regarded as coming from state.-City of Vin-
cennes v. Vincennes Traction Co., 120 N. E. 27.
671 (10) (N.Y.) Doctrine that corporations
or persons engaged in public work authorized
by law, as the construction of the subway was,
are not liable for consequential damages, un-
less caused by misconduct, negligence, or un-
skillfulness, is not applicable in suit of pro-
prietors abutting on street for injunction and
damages against subway contractor who laid
down temporary steam tramway.-Bradley v.
Degnon Contracting Co., 120 N. E. 89, 224
Where railroad embankment crossed two
north and south streets and four east and west
streets in immediate vicinity of plaintiff's prop-
erty without leaving means of ingress and
egress to and from his property to the princi-
pal part of the town across the embankment,
there was an interference with plaintiff's pri-
vate rights for which the railway was liable.
—Id.
In order to warrant recovery by private
owner for such obstruction of street as en-
tirely cut off ingress to and egress from his
property, it is not necessary that his property
abut upon the street obstructed.-Id.
Where railroad embankment was So con-
structed as to cut off plaintiff's access to his
property entirely from all city streets, the fact
that railroad left a 25-foot passageway to an-
other street would not preclude recovery for
the damage, where such passageway was not
permanent and the railroad had not so acted as
to be estopped to close it.-Id.
704 (Mass.) Sidewalk along street formed
part of highway in concurrent use of which
pedestrian and automobile owner each owed oth-
er duty of due care.-Murray v. Liebmann, 120
N. E. 79.
Person standing on sidewalk talking with
friend had right to assume drivers of vehicles
using part of way for carriage travel would
exercise ordinary precautions to avoid con-
tact with persons on sidewalk standing within
curbing.—Id.
705 (1) (Mass.) Neither pedestrian nor driv-
er of automobile has rights in street superior
to those of other, but each is bound to act with
reasonable regard to other's presence.-Emery
v. Miller, 120 N. E. 655.
705(12) (Mass.) Owner of automobile,
merely by virtue of his ownership, is not liable
for injuries inflicted by the car when driven by
Gookin, 120 N. E. 691.
another person, not his servant.-Phillips v.
As to proprietors abutting on street wherein
private steam tramway was laid down by sub-706(4) (Mass.) In actions for injuries to
way contractor, tramway was unlawful in con-
struction and operation, as it subjected street
to easement exclusively for private use, and
each owner could recover damages from injury
to his easements of light, air, view, and access,
and for annoyances suffered by him.-Id.
680, 681 (8) (N.Y.) Legislature was
stricted from authorizing appropriation of part
of city street to construction and operation of
steam tramway for convenience of subway
contractor, private property and exclusively
for private use.-Bradley v. Degnon Contract-
ing Co., 120 N. E. 89, 224 N. Y. 60.
To constitute a use public, it must be for the
benefit and advantage of all the public, and in
which all have right to share.-Id.
A temporary steam tramway, laid down in a
city street by a subway contractor for hauling
dump cars from the excavation, the action be-
ing taken under Rapid Transit Act. § 33. subd.
3, as amended by Laws 1909. c. 498, § 8, was
not a "public use" of the street.-Id.
husband and wife and their motorcycle in col-
lision with automobile, defendant's question to
he had ever had license to run motorcycle was
husband, on cross-examination, as to whether
properly excluded.-Polmatier v. Newbury, 120
N. E. $50.
706 (5) (Mass.) In action for damages to
automobile run into on street by runaway team
belonging to city, which had carried city's boil-
er for repairs to defendant company's place of
business, evidence that any negligence of de-
fendant contributed to injury, falling of boiler
having frightened horses, held insufficient to
sustain verdict for plaintiff.-Sabin v. Cam-
bridge Iron Works, 120 N. E. 664.
706 (6) (Mass.) Evidence of negligence of
driver of automobile, who, coming up behind
and passing street car on right, struck girls
walking ahead, who, warned by lights, started
to run across road to right of track, he having
violated St. 1909, c. 534, §§ 14, 16, held to raise
For cases in Dec.Dig. & Am,Dig. Key-No.Series & Indexes see same topic and KEY-NUMBER
question for jury Emery v. Miller, 120 N. E. |
655.
706 (7) (Mass.) Where car tracks ran to
left of roadway, and girls walking to left, star-
tled by lights of car and automobile in rear,
started to right, across road, and were struck
by automobile, which turned slightly further to
right, though girls would have been safe in
narrow space between car and automobile, the
question of their due care was for jury.-Emery
v. Miller, 120 N. E. 655.
706(7) (Mass.) Under St. 1914, c. 553, es-
tablishing presumption of due care on part of
person injured or killed, whether death of boy
who, while watching concrete mixer in street,
stepped back to avoid hopper and was struck by
automobile, was due to contributory negligence
on his part, held question for jury.-Sarmento
v. Vance, 120 N. E. 848.
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733 (4) (Ohio) In the construction of a hy-
draulic, a municipality is required to use ordi-
nary skill and foresight to prevent injury in
times of flood to be reasonably anticipated;
and if injury is caused by the negligence of the
municipality it is liable, if its negligence is one
of the proximate causes, although it concurred
with the act of God.-City of Piqua v. Morris,
120 N. E. 300.
741(1) (Ill.) Hurd's Rev. St. 1917, c. 70, 87,
requiring one about to sue city for injuries to
give notice within six months of injury, etc.,
applies only to persons mentally and physically
capable of comprehending it, and obeying, and
not to a child of seven years.-McDonald v.
City of Spring Valley, 120 N. E. 476.
(C) Defects or Obstructions
and Other Public Ways.
762(1) (Mass.) City, having dug hole in
street by tracks of street railway, was primarily
responsible for death of wife of driver of horse-
drawn runabout caused thereby; its liability
under statute being limited to $1.000.-Charles
v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co., 120 N. E. 69.
817(3) (Mass.) It was not necessary to show
positive acts of care on part of wife riding with
husband beyond relying in silence on his skill,
but her due care might be gathered from ab-
sence of fault under circumstances which fairly
exclude inference of negligence.-Charles v.
Boston Elevated Ry. Co., 120 N. E. 69.
(E) Condition or Use of Public Buildings
and Other Property.
cities of other classes.-Brayton v. City of
Rushville, 120 N. E. 48.
Burns' Ann. St. 1914, § 8687, providing that
all contracts and agreements beyond existing
appropriations are absolutely null and void,
applies to cities of the fifth class, such limita-
tion not being restricted to the contracting pow-
er of executive departments, but to officers of
all cities, in view of sections 8658 and 8688,
prescribing the manner of drawing warrants, as
well as other provisions relating to the govern-
ment of cities.-Id.
in General, Appro-
priation, Warrants and Payment.
890 (Mass.) Under St. 1913, c. 719, the
municipal indebtedness act, council of city, aft-
er adoption of annual budget submitted by
mayor, cannot increase compensation of firemen
and policemen, making necessary appropria-
tions larger than contained in the budget, de-
spite provision that, on mayor's failure to
transmit recommendation for appropriation
cil, it may make an appropriation; "any pur-
"for any purpose" deemed necessary by coun-
pose" meaning object other than those already
included in budgets submitted.-Flood v. Hodg-
es, 120 N. E. 689.
Unequivocal limitation of St. 1913, c. 719, the
municipal indebtedness act, on power of initia-
tive by city council in making appropriations,
cannot be circumvented by vote requesting ac-
tion by mayor, by amendment to ordinances es-
tablishing expenditures, or by enactment of
ordinance depriving mayor of right to approve
drafts or warrants.-Id.
(C) Bonds and Other Securities, and Sink-
915 (Ill.) Where a municipal corporation
has made an invalid issue of bonds, a subse-
quent issue to replace such bonds, enjoined by
be included in estimating the bonded indebted-
the courts and thereafter destroyed, will not
ness of the municipality.-Worley v. Idleman,
120 N. E. 472.
916 (Ohio) Subject to statutes limiting the
total issue of bonds for all purposes, Gen. Code,
§ 3939, as amended May 15. 1911 (102 Ohio
Laws, p. 262), authorizes the council of a
municipal corporation to issue bonds for the
purposes named, within the limitations of Gen.
Code, 88 3940, 3941.-Heffner v. Krinn, 120 N.
E. 221.
917(1) (Ohio) Where a municipal corpora-
tion proposes to issue bonds, under Gen. Code,
§ 3939, within the limitation of sections 3940
and 3941, the council need pass but one ordi-
nance authorizing such issue.-Heffner v. Krinn,
120 N. E. 221.
847 (N.Y.) Kut two feet long, one foot
wide and three inches deep in surface of ap-918 (1) (Ohio) Where a municipal corpora-
proach to dump, whereby teamster was jolted tion proposes to issue bonds in excess of the
from wagon, is within rule that usual and ordi- limitation named in Gen. Code, §§ 3940, 3941,
nary defects in highway create no liability for the question must be submitted to the electors..
accidents. (Per Pound, Cuddeback, and Mc--Heffner v. Krinn, 120 N. E. 221.
Laughlin, JJ.).-Horan v. Hastorf, 120 N. E. 918(2) (Ohio) Where a municipal corpora-
58, 223 N. Y. 490.
856 (N.Y.) One agreeing with city to as-
sume its duty of keeping in repair approach to
dump is required only to use ordinary care, as
regards liability to person injured in using it,
through defect therein. (Per Pound, Cudde-
back, and McLaughlin, JJ.).-Horan v. Hastorf,
120 N. E. 58, 223 N. Y. 490.
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tion proposes to issue bonds, under Gen. Code,
§ 3939, in excess of the limitations of sections
3940 and 3941, the council must pass a pre-
liminary resolution by an affirmative vote of
two-thirds of the members, declaring it neces-
sary to issue and sell bonds, stating the pur-
pose, and fixing a date for submission to the
electors.-Heffner v. Krinn, 120 N. E. 221.
A preliminary resolution by the council of a
municipal corporation, proposing to pass a bond
issue in excess of limitations in Gen. Code, §§
3940, 3941, is the first measure required to be
passed within Gen. Code, § 4227-3, as amend-
ed April 17, 1913 (103 Ohio Laws, p. 212).-Id.
918(5) (Ohio) Under Gen. Code, § 4227-1,
as amended April 17, 1913 (103 Ohio Laws, p.
211), an ordinance authorizing a bond issue may
be proposed by initiative petition, and, if ap-
proved by the majority of the electors, no fur-
ther ordinance or resolution is necessary.-Heff-
ner v. Krinn, 120 N. E. 221.
(D) Taxes and Other Revenue, and Ap- | across South branch of Chicago river, would
plication Thereof.
be estopped from requiring defendant to re-
model its bridge, so as not to obstruct naviga-
tion.-Id.
972(3) (N.Y.) In view of Second Class Cit-
ies Law, 161, providing that no assessment in
such a city shall be invalid for ignorance or
mistake as to the name of the owner of prop-
erty, and Tax Law, § 9, as amended by Laws
1911, c. 315, an assessment of railroad prop-
erty against several railroads when in fact it
was owned by a terminal railroad corporation,
when the land was sufficiently described, was
sufficient.-People ex rel. New York Cent. & H.
R. R. Co. v. Mealy, 120 N. E. 155, 224 N. Y.
187.
MUTUAL BENEFIT INSURANCE.
See Insurance, 711-765.
See Explosives, 5; Indictment and Infor-
mation, 101; Physicians and Surgeons,
10; Religious Societies, 34.
NAVIGABLE WATERS.
See Attorney General, 7; Canals; Com-
merce, 8; Eminent Domain, 84; Tax-
ation, 6.
I. RIGHTS OF PUBLIC.
8 (Ill.) An elevated railway company's
right to an injunction, restraining Sanitary Dis-
trict of Chicago and another from dredging cer-
tain parts of Chicago river, so as to interfere
with piers and abutments of defendant's bridge
across the river, would depend upon the exist-
ence of complainant's right to maintain the
bridge with its piers and abutments.-Metropol-
itan West Side Elevated Ry. Co. v. Sanitary
Dist. of Chicago, 120 N. E. 756.
20 (2) (Ill.) Although an elevated railway
company's bridge across South branch of Chi-
cago river was built by authority of law, state
and federal, it did not remain a lawful struc-
ture, where, by reason of changed conditions
and increased demands of commerce and navi-
gation, it became an unreasonable interference
with traffic on the river.-People v. Metropoli-
tan West Side Elevated Ry. Co., 120 N. E.
748.
That sanitary district of Chicago, created un-
der Act Legislature 1889 (Laws 1889, p. 125),
will be benefited by reconstruction of defendant
railway's bridge across South branch of Chica-
go river, and is interested in proceedings
brought by state's attorney on behalf of people
to require defendant to reconstruct said bridge
so as not to interfere with navigation, will not
defeat the action.-Id.
II. LANDS UNDER WATER.
36(1) (Ind.App.) The right of a state in
and to lands under the waters of Lake Michi-
gan within the state boundaries is a holding in
trust for all the people of the state, and citi-
zens of the state may use such lands so long
as they do not interfere with use by other citi-
zens, but the privilege does not extend to the
citizens of another state.-Lake Sand Co. v.
State, 120 N. E. 714.
36(5) (Ind.App.) State, suing to enjoin re-
moval of sand from submerged lands under
Lake Michigan, is not aided by doctrine of pur-
presture, since a "purpresture" is a permanent
obstruction, whereas the trespass complained
of was a temporary use by anchoring vessels
for dredging.-Lake Sand Co. v. State, 120 N.
E. 714.
Complaint in state's suit to enjoin removal of
sand from land under the waters of Lake Michi-
gan, which alleged the value of the sand as it
lay on the bed of the lake, held to state a cause
capacity is without power to convey or curtail
37(2) (Ind.App.) The state in its sovereign
the right of its people in lands under the wa-
ters of Lake Michigan within the boundaries of
the state.-Lake Sand Co. v. State, 120 N. E.
714.
See Carriers; Death, 35; Food, 25,
26; Husband and Wife, 209; Innkeep-
ers, 10; Insurance, 428; Landlord
and Tenant, 169; Master and Servant.
88-332; Municipal Corporations,
704, 705, 706, 733-856; Railroads, 113,
134, 330-398; Receivers, 154: Street
Railroads, 86-118; Trial, 296; Wa-
ters and Water Courses, 171.
Hurd's St. 1917, c. 114, § 20, under which an
elevated railway company and its predecessors I. ACTS OR OMISSIONS CONSTITUT-
were organized, and Chicago ordinance April 7,
1892, giving right to construct bridge across
South branch of Chicago river, did not give de-
fendant the irrevocable right to maintain bridge23(1) (Ohio) Where the owner of an au-
as originally constructed, where, by reason of
changed conditions, it became an unreasonable
interference with traffic on the river.-Id.
20(4) (Ill.) In suit to compel an elevated
railway company to remove and reconstruct
abutments and pier projections of its bridge
across and over South branch of Chicago river,
so as to provide a clear navigable channel of at
least 150 feet, held, under the evidence, that
bridge was a serious obstruction to navigation.
-People v. Metropolitan West Side Elevated
Ry. Co., 120 N. E. 748.
20(6) (Ill.) The duty of a railroad company
to restore a stream or highway crossed by its
road is continuing, and, if crossing becomes in-
adequate to meet the new and altered conditions
of the country, it is the duty of the railroad
to make such alterations as will meet the pres-
ent needs of the public.-People v. Metropolitan
West Side Elevated Ry. Co., 120 N. E. 748.
Since police power of state or federal gov-
ernment cannot be contracted away, neither the
state of Illinois, under Hurd's Rev. St. 1917. c.
114, § 20, under which defendant elevated rail-
way company and its predecessors were organ-
ized, nor the city of Chicago, under ordinance
April 7, 1892, giving right to construct bridge
(B) Dangerous Substances, Machinery,
and Other Instrumentalities.
drives the infant twice from the car, when the
tomobile finds an infant 41⁄2 years therein and
child still remains in close proximity to it, the
driver is required to exercise reasonable care
to avoid injury to the child.-Ziehm v. Vale,
120 N. E. 702.
Where, in such case, the infant thereafter,
without the notice of the owner, when he
started the car, got upon the running board,
the rule of care as to a bare licensee commit-
ting a trespass did not apply.-Id.
(C) Condition and Use of Land, Buildings,
and Other Structures.
32(2) (Mass.) A housemaid, using employ-
er's driveway for her own convenience, was
rightfully on premises, and stood in right of
employer toward oil company which had con-
tracted to excavate and repair gasoline tank
by driveway.-O'Neil v. National Oil Co., 120
N. E. 107.
44 (Mass.) Right to recover for injuries
from defective condition of premises caused by
snow and ice is common-law right, and embraces
all injuries to persons or property, direct or
consequential, resulting from negligent observ-
For cases in Dec.Dig. & Am.Dig. Key-No.Series & Indexes see same topic and KEY-NUMBER
ance of duty imposed on owner through express, child is incapable of contributory negligence.-
or implied obligation.-Erickson v. Buckley, 120 McDonald v. City of Spring Valley, 120 N. E.
N. E. 126.
50 (Mass.) If independent contractor, tak-
ing up gasoline tank to repair it, left hole in
owner's driveway used for travel, it was bound
to anticipate hole was dangerous to persons
walking on driveway, and to provide against
what was likely to happen.-O'Neil v. National
Oil Co., 120 N. E. 107.
50 (N.Y.) Owner of an estate is liable for
damages caused by a dangerous condition, where
superintendent having had notice of such con-
dition failed to correct it.-Killilea v. Morgan,
120 N. E. 691.
(A) Right of Action, Parties, Preliminary
Proceedings, and Pleading.
104 (Mass.) Provision of St. 1908, c. 305,
it shall be given in all kinds of actions founded
that notice shall be given in "actions" imports
on defective condition of premises caused by
snow and ice, and notice must appear to have
been given on behalf of person bringing suit,
and for purpose of fixing right of action.-Erick-
son v. Buckley, 120 N. E. 126.
52 (Mass.) Where plaintiff's decedent, de-
livering coal at defendant company's place of
business, was caught and fatally injured by
revolving shafting in full view from where he
was working, despite failure to warn of shaft-
ing, defendant was not liable.-Hunt v. Econom-121(2) (Mass.) Mere fact of injury to plain-
ic Machinery Co.. 120 N. E. 416.
55 (Mass.) Oil company, which, through
driver of its truck, undertook to take up and
repair gasoline tank set in earth, in doing ex-
cavating was independent contractor, under
duty to use reasonable care to protect employés
of owner of tank lawfully using driveway by
which tank was buried.-O'Neil v. National Oil
Co.. 120 N. E. 107.
tiff does not show negligence by defendant,
which must be shown by evidence either direct
or inferential.-Ash v. Childs Dining Hall Co.,
120 N. E. 396.
121(5) (Mass.) In action of tort for negli-
gence, burden to prove that proximate cause of
plaintiff's injury was negligence of defendant,
or its agents, rested on plaintiff.-Ash v. Childs
Dining Hall Co., 120 N. E. 396.
124 (3) (Ill.) Where deceased seated him-
self on projecting boards two feet below top of
load of lumber, and without a footrest, and was
thrown to the street when the wheel of his
wagon entered a hole in the street left by de-
Though oil company which had contracted to
excavate and repair gasoline tank buried by
driveway had right to dig on premises, it was
liable to owner's housemaid for negligence in
opening hole into driveway, leaving it unpro-
tected, resulting in her injury, she being law-fendant street railroad, evidence that such
fully where she was.-Id.
Independent contractor to dig up and repair
buried gasoline tank was not relieved of re-
sponsibility to guard excavation by attempting
to delegate business to employé of owner of
tank who had no authority to relieve contrac-
tor of duty.-Id.
Contractor to dig up and repair buried gaso-
line tank was not relieved from liability to
housemaid of owner, injured in excavation, fere-
ly because its employé said to owner he thought
it a good idea to fill tank and leave it open to
discover any leak.-Id.
II. PROXIMATE CAUSE OF INJURY.
58 (Ohio) The proximate cause of a result
is that which in a natural and continued se-
method was customary practice among team-
sters was competent on issue of contributory
negligence.-Fowler v. Chicago Rys. Co., 120
N. E. 635.
125 (Mass.) Testimony as to acts of negli-
gence committed by a defendant on occasions
other than the one in question is inadmissible,
as misleading the jury from the issue, and
without logical relevancy.-Polmatier v. New-
bury, 120 N. E. 850.
132(3) (Ill.) Proof of a man's experience or
skill along a certain line does not tend to prove
his habits as to care.-Fowler v. Chicago Rys.
Co., 120 N. E. 635.
134(1) (Mass.) In action of tort for negli-
gence, disbelief of defendant's testimony as to
precautions used by it cannot take place of evi-
dence of negligence.-Ash v. Childs Dining
Hall Co., 120 N. E. 396.
quence contributes to produce the result with-134(3) (Mass.) In action for injuries to
out which it would not have happened.-City of
Piqua v. Morris, 120 N. E. 300.*
61(1) (Ohio) That some other cause con-
curred with a defendant's negligence in produc-
ing an injury does not relieve him from liabil-
ity, unless it is shown such other cause would
have produced an injury independently of his
negligence.-City of Piqua v. Morris, 120 N. E.
III. CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE.
housemaid in excavation made in digging up for
repairs her employer's buried gasoline tank, evi-
over lawn to get a pear, though not invited, she
dence held to justify inference that in passing
was there lawfully, so far as contractor to re-
pair tank was concerned.-O'Neil v. National
Oil Co., 120 N. E. 107.
134(5) (Mass.) In action for injuries from
slipping on defendant's steps, plaintiff's testi-
mony that, as she fell, she felt the slipperiness
of something, etc., held insufficient to warrant
inference of defendant's negligence.-Sheehan v.
Holland, 120 N. E. 591.
(C) Trial, Judgment, and Review.
(A) Persons Injured in General.
76 (Mass.) In actions of tort, though plain-
tiff cannot obtain aid of a court to relieve him
from direct consequences of his own illegal act,
that he was violating statute or ordinance when 136(26) (Ill.) While burden of proof is on
injured does not necessarily prevent recovery,
Todd v. Traders' & Mechanics' Ins. Co., 120
82 (Mass.) If plaintiff's violation of statute
or ordinance when injured was merely condition
or attendant circumstance, and not proximate
contributing cause of injury, he may recover.-
Todd v. Traders' & Mechanics' Ins. Co., 120 N.
(B) Children and Others Under Disability.
85(3) (Ill.) From time immemorial the law
has recognized that up to the age of seven a
plaintiff in a personal injury action to show
that he was in the exercise of ordinary care,
question is one of fact, and whether evidence
tends to prove such care is question of law to
be determined adversely to plaintiff only when
no other conclusion can reasonably be drawn
from the uncontradicted facts.-Pienta v. Chi-
cago City Ry. Co., 120 N. E. 1.
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS.
See Bills and Notes.
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