extirpate the wretched natives of Mexico; we, more ruthless, loose these dogs of war against our countrymen in America, endeared to us by every tie that can sanctify humanity. I solemnly call upon your Lordships, and upon every order of men in the state, to stamp upon this infamous procedure, the indelible stigma of the Public Abhorrence. More particularly, I call upon the holy prelates of our religion, to do away this iniquity; let them perform a lustration, to purify the country from this deep and deadly sin. My Lords, I am old and weak, and at present unable to say more; but my feelings and indignation were too strong, to have said less. I could not have slept this night in my bed, nor even reposed my head upon my pillow, without giving vent to my eternal abhorrence, of such enormous and preposterous principles.

10-Speech of the Earl of Chesterfield, in the House of Lords, February 22, 1740, on the Pension Bill.

MY LORDS,-It is now so late, and so much has been said in favour of the motion for the second reading of the pension bill, by Lords much abler than I am, that I shall detain you but a very short while with what I have to say upon the subject. It has been said by a noble duke, that this bill can be looked on only as a bill for preventing a grievance that is foreseen, and not as a bill for remedying a grievance that is already felt; because it is not asserted, nor so much as insinuated, in the preamble of the bill, that any corrupt practices are now made use of, for gaining an undue influence over the other House. My Lords, this was the very reason for bringing in the bill. They could not assert, that any such practices are now made use of, without a proof; and the means for coming at this proof, is what they want, and what they propose to get by this bill. They suspect there are such practices, but they cannot prove it. The crime is of such a secret nature, that it can very seldom be proved by witnesses; and, therefore, they want to put it to the trial, at least, of being proved by the oath of one of the parties; which is a method

often taken in cases that can admit of no other proof. This is, therefore, no argument of the grievance not being felt; for a man may very sensibly feel a grievance, and yet may not be able to prove it. That there is a suspicion of some such practices being now made use of, or that they will be made use of, the many remonstrances from all parts of the united kingdoms are a sufficient proof. That this suspicion has crept into the other House, their having so frequently sent up this bill is a manifest demonstration, and a strong argument for its being necessary to have some such bill passed into a law. The other House must be allowed to be better judges of what passes, or must pass, within their own walls, than we can pretend to be. It is evident, they suspect that corrupt practices have been, or soon may be, made use of, for gaining an undue influence over some of their measures; and they have calculated this bill for curing the evil if it is felt, for preventing it if it is only foreseen. That any such practices have actually been made use of, or are now made use of, is what I shall not pretend to affirm; but I am sure I shall not affirm the contrary. any such are made use of, I will, with confidence, vindicate his Majesty. I am sure he knows nothing of them. I am sure he will disdain to suffer them, but I cannot pass such a compliment upon his ministers, nor upon any set of ministers that ever was, or ever will be, in this nation; and, therefore, I think I cannot more faithfully, more effectually, serve his present Majesty, as well as his successors, than by putting it out of the power of ministers to gain any corrupt influence over either House of Parliament. Such an attempt may be necessary the security of the minister; but never can be necessary for, must always be inconsistent with, the security of his master; and the more necessary it is for the minister's security, the more inconsistent it will always be with the king's, and the more dangerous to the liberties of the

If

nation.

for

To pretend, my Lords, that this bill diminishes, or any way encroaches upon the prerogative, is something very strange. What prerogative, my Lords? Has the crown a prerogative to bribe; to infringe the law, by

sending its pensioners into the other House? To say so is destroying the credit, the authority of the crown, under the pretence of supporting its prerogative. If his Majesty knew that any man received a pension from him, or any thing like a pension, and yet kept his seat in the other House, he would himself declare it, or withdraw his pension, because he knows it is against law. This bill, therefore, no way diminishes or encroaches upon the prerogatives of the crown, which can never be exercised but for the public good. It diminishes only the prerogatives usurped by ministers, which are never exercised but for its destruction. The crown may still reward merit in the proper way, that is, openly. The bill is intended, and can operate only against clandestine rewards or gratuities given by ministers. These are scandalous, and never were, nor will be, given, but for scandalous

services.

It is very remarkable, my Lords, it is even diverting, to see such a squeamishness about perjury upon this occasion, amongst those, who, upon other occasions, have invented and enacted multitudes of oaths, to be taken by men who are under great temptations, from their private interest, to be guilty of perjury. Is not this the case of almost every oath that relates to the collection of the public revenue, or to the exercise of any office? Is not this perjury one of the chief objections made by the dissenters against the test and corporation Act? And shall we shew a less concern for the preservation of our constitution, than for the preservation of our church? The Reverend Bench should be cautious of making use of this argument; for if they will not allow us an oath for the preservation of the former, it may induce many people to think they ought not to be allowed an oath for the preservation of the latter.

By this time, I hope, my Lords, all the inconveniences pretended to arise from this bill have vanished; and, therefore, I shall consider some of the arguments brought to shew that it is not necessary. Here I must observe, that most of the arguments made use of for this purpose, are equally strong for a repeal of the laws we have already in being against admitting pensioners to sit and

vote in the other House. If it be impossible to suppose, that a gentleman of great estate and ancient family can, by a pension, be influenced to do what he ought not to do; and if we must suppose, that none but such gentlemen can ever get into the other House, I am sure the laws for preventing pensioners from having seats in that House are quite unnecessary, and ought to be repealed. Therefore, if these arguments prevail with your Lordships to put a negative upon the present question, I shall expect to see that negative followed by a motion for the repeal of those laws; nay, in a few Sessions, I shall expect to see a bill brought in for preventing any man's being a member of the other House but such as have some place or pension under the crown. As an argument for such a bill, it might be said, that his Majesty's most faithful subjects ought to be chosen Members of Parliament, and that those gentlemen will always be most faithful to the king that receive the king's money. I shall grant, my Lords, that such gentlemen will be always the most faithful, and the most obedient to the ministers; but for this very reason, I should be for excluding them from Parliament. The king's real interest, however much he may be made by his ministers to mistake it, must always be the same with his people's; but the minister's interest is generally distinct from, and often contrary to both; therefore, I shall always be for excluding, as much as possible, from Parliament, every man who is under the least inducement to prefer the interest of the minister to that of both king and people: and this I take to be the case of every gentleman, let his estate and family be what they will, that holds a pension at the will of the minister.

Those who say, they depend so much upon the honour, integrity, and impartiality of men of family and fortune, seem to think our constitution can never be dissolved as long as we have the shadow of a Parliament. My opinion, my Lords, is so very different, that if ever our constitution be dissolved, if ever an absolute monarchy be established in this kingdom, I am convinced, it will be under that shadow. Our constitution consists in the two Houses of Parliament being a check upon the

Crown, as well as upon one another. If that check should ever be removed, if the Crown should, by corrupt means, by places, by pensions, and bribes, get the absolute direction of our two Houses of Parliament, our constitution will, from that moment, be destroyed. There would be no occasion for the crown to proceed any further. It would be ridiculous to lay aside the forms of Parliament; for under the shadow our king would be more absolute, and might govern more arbitrarily, than he could do without it. A gentleman of family and fortune, would not, perhaps, for the sake of a pension, agree to lay aside the forms of government; because, by his venal service there, he earns his infamous pension, and could not expect the continuance of it if these forms were laid aside; but a gentleman of family and fortune may, for the sake of a pension, whilst he is in Parliament, approve of the most blundering measure, consent to the most excessive and useless grants, enact the most oppressive laws, pass the most villanous accounts, acquit the most heinous criminals, and condemn the most innocent persons, at the desire of that minister who pays him his pension. And if a majority of such House of Parliament consisted of such men, would it not be ridiculous in us to talk of our constitution, or to say we had any liberty left? This misfortune, this terrible condition, we may be reduced to by corruption: as brave, as free a people as we, the Romans, were reduced to it by the same means; and to prevent such a horrid catastrophe, is the design of this bill.

If people would at all think, if they would consider the consequences of corruption, there would be no occasion, my Lords, for making laws against it. It would appear so horrible, that no man would allow it to approach him. The corrupted ought to consider, that they do not sell their vote, or their country only: these, perhaps, they may diregard; but they sell likewise themselves: they become the bond slaves of the corrupter, who corrupts them, not for their sakes, but for his No man ever corrupted another for the sake of doing him a service. And, therefore, if people would but consider, they would always reject the offer with dis

own.