cannot but be as deeply fenfible of all that mifery and hardship which arifes from the want of them! The common intellect and apprehenfion of man would be but ill placed in an ox or afs; nor would the genius and temper of fome philofophic mind be any better fuited to him that driveth them, and is occupied in all their labours.

But this must neceffarily be the state of things, if all men were by nature furnished with all those rational or intellectual accomplishments, which adorn fome few of them at prefent. Three parts in four of the world must be unfit for their particular circumstances, and at odds with their condition."

How inconfiftent also would it be in nature to implant those various fenfes, appetites, and tastes in all men, which not one in a thousand would have power to gratify! that fublime degree of reafon and reflection, which could only prove its own tormentor!

Not to mention what ill influence fuch a scheme would have on government itself; how difficult it must be to rule, where every one has the fame strength and skill; how hard to obey, when all have equal abilities, and therefore (as they might imagine) an equal right to be their own direct

ors.

*In fhort, how much more wife and be

neficial

* Si omnes ingenio pares effent, omnefque in eofdem affectus proclives, aut iifdem virtutibus ornati; non effet qui alius imperiis parere vellet, aut ei quidpiam concedere, aut qui varietati ministeriorum et artium omnium generum aptus effet. Cum omnes omnia curare nequeant, fingulos in Societate fuo munere, in gratiam aliorum, fungi oportet; nec viliffima munera minus funt neceffaria interdum quam fublimiora. Itaque effe oportuit omnibus fuum ingenium, ut quifque quod fuum eft ad Societatis felicitatem conferret, et quod cæteris deeft fuâ industriâ fuppleret. Cleric. Silv. Philol. ad Efchin. Socr. p. 170, 171.

neficial is the present constitution of things! where all is left to mankind themselves, who have both the forming and difpofing of each other; nay, where men are at liberty in a great measure to frame their own natures, and difpofitions: where they have no inconvenient or pernicious principle to lay to nature's charge*; no properly innate notions, or implanted inftincts; no truly natural appetite or affection, to fway or byass them; except that universal sense, and strong defire of happiness, which was fo abfolutely neceffary to their preservation (a).

By

See Ibbot's Boyle's Lect. 2d fett, Serm. 5. p. 143, &c. or King's Origin of Evil, Note 38, p. 189. 4th Edit.

+ See Prelim. Diff. to King and Rem. i. p. 75. 4th Edit. (a) To fuch as are defirous of forming more exact, philofophical notions on the prefent Subject, let it be observed, that when the first foundation of a diverfity of fenfe and intellect is once laid in a greater or less fufceptibility of pleasure or pain, by a perception of ideas more acute or dull, more quick or flow, and a proportioned reflection on them, (which proportion, by the bye, between these two powers [of perceiving and reflecting] is, I believe, in each Perfon pretty exactly kept up, as to the pitch of their vivacity in both the abovenamed respects) - from hence the whole tribe of affections, &c. and the feveral degrees in each, are very apparently deducible: fuppofing only this, I fay, which feems to lie in the original ftamina of the body, and is fo far not to be accounted for, at leaft by me; which therefore, and which only I should term innate or strictly natural; fince every thing befides, that is comprehended under the name of natural appetite, &c. is properly fo far from being such, that it is evidently pofterior in the order of nature, and entirely grounded on the ideas which themselves arife from hence, and whose innatenefs in all fenfes of that word is now generally given up: fuppofing then this one foundation laid by nature, a difference herein will be enough to conftitute the being more or lefs fenfible, or rational in general; and tend to make it more or lefs paffionate or mild, eager or indolent, &c. in whatsoever it applies itself to: But can this ever actually determine it to any one peculiar fett of objects, or have any tendency towards giving what we mean by a particular genius, taste, or temper? That, and the whole conftitution of the human mind, or its predominant qualities, feem to arife afterwards from the particular associations which we form ourselves, or learn of

others,

By these means we have at first only fuch thoughts and inclinations instilled into our minds as are agreeable to, and for the most part do in fact arise from our particular place and circumstances in the world; and afterwards find room enough

others, as these grow gradually, and even mechanically from the circumstances we are in, or from those objects that more immediately furround and strike us ; provided that a suitable attention and regard be paid to each as it prefents itself.

For that amidst all this mechanic apparatus we have fuch a distinct faculty of attending, and determining the fubordinate powers in confequence thereof, as is ftated at large by ABp. King, I must beg leave to fuppofe, till all the various appearances, which feem fo much to require it (of which in the following Note) are solved on other principles; and then indeed this, which, it must be owned, contains fomething inexplicable, will be of courfe excluded. I may add here, that neither are thofe affociations themselves, from whence fome very ingenious perfons would deduce a total mechanism, altogether neceffary; nor we fo far paffive under them, as to be left without a power of curbing and correcting, breaking and eradicating; as well as of contracting them at firft, and afterwards confirming them: to affert this would be advancing a new doctrine of habits contrary to the general fenfe and language of mankind.

Well then, allowing fuch a degree of liberty, or active power to be joined with the other paffive ingredients in our compofition, as fuch, it must in some measure act independently on each of them, and be capable of forming new associations from its own proper acts, which will extend to all the rest, and influence them: and yet as it will also have fome fuch fort of connection with them all, as to be itself

See Hartley's Obfervations on Man, part 1. A book well worth the pains required to understand it, and which I must beg leave to recommend, as exhibiting a very curious hiftory of man's frame, and well founded in the main; though the ingenious author carries fome points, particularly that of mechanifm, farther perhaps, than either experience feems to justify, or we are at prefent willing to allow. Perhaps it exceeds the power of human understanding to decide where mechanifm ends, and where the liberty of indifference (the only notion of liberty that comes up to the purpose) may be fuppofed to commence. However, it feems clear that fome share of each is to be admitted into the human compofition, as well towards folving feveral phænomena, as giving due fatisfaction in the great articles of religion and morals; and that after all the attempts of the moft able writers on this fubject, neither principle can be wholly excluded. This appears fufficiently from a late hu morous treatife, where the fagacious Mr. Search, in order to reconcile his scheme to common fenfe, either plays continually on a falfe and foreign notion of freedom, or is forced to adopt a main part of the real system, even while he is endeavouring to exclude it.

enough to refine, improve, and enlarge our faculties; to qualify ourselves for, as well as, by a right application of them, to merit fome fuperior station, whenever that fhall become void. How regular and beautiful a fubordination must this

foon

itself in fome respect or other influenced by them reciprocally; or (which comes to the fame thing) the mind will be fo far affected in,' and through them as to influence it; which we all daily feel: [elfe how come thefe parts of our conflitution to be conftantly applied to with fuccefs for the determination of it? Why is pain prefent or in profpect used to move a man, or arguments and motives urged, if they are really matters of indifference to his choice, and have no natural effect upon it?] As this grows and gathers ftrength, like all our other faculties; and is equally capable of being impaired, and rectified again: (King. Note X. p. 360. 4th Ed.) — As it is limited and fubject to its laws, not perhaps wholly different, though of a kind diftinct from thofe of the other appetites: (however, fuch as make it no lefs governable, lbid. c. v. 5. fub. 4. p. 372, &c. with § Notes 69, p. 366, and 70, p. 371.) and cannot go against these appetites without manifeft pain and mifery to the perfon: (lb. note N. p. 241, &c.) As it may be inclined, both by them and its own courfe of operation, and will become daily more and more conformed to them, by due regular exercife; which we likewife experience; -its operations will become as much the objects of foreknowledge; nor will it be much less easy to account for either the formation, or increase of any particular turn of mind, in any given fituation, than if all were performed in us neceffarily, and at once.

This plan of human nature, which derives every thing from a few principles, and yet makes room for that endless variety confpicuous in it, might, I am fenfible, be fet in a good light, and fhewn to be free from fome of the greateft difficulties that muft clog all others. In this view, a juft uniformity is, by the Deity, so far as his immediate acts reach, always, and might be by us, generally, preferved among all its conftituent parts; our talents fuited to our capacity of ufing them; our fphere enlarged, as that increases; and regularly keeping pace with our improvements; each difpenfation put upon a reasonable foot; and all difcoveries made in due proportion to our qualifications for judging of them, and our difpofitions to apply them. Whereas the contrary fcheme, of bringing all things to an original, equal, and immediate intuition; or of fixing every man to certain impulfes, or instincts, independent on his ftation and endeavours, and intirely unimprovable by them; this must be quite arbitrary, and in a great measure ufelefs; and attended with all the inconfiftences and inconveniences already mentioned.

Such would the confequences be of that pretended univerfal equability, in natural religion; nor is the levelling fcheme, fo much contended for in revelation, lefs abfurd as will appear below.

foon produce! How fitly might the whole body, thus knit together and compacted by that which every joint Supplieth, increafe with the increase of God, would man but enter into the fame great plan of exciting industry and labour, and do what lies in his power to promote it, viz. entail benefits and fucceffes as the natural confequence of thefe; endeavour to fuit every one's station to his respective merit and abilities; i. e. deal with each perfon according to what he is, and obferve thofe rules which the great God of nature has established!

What emulation must this raise, joined with the utmost care and caution, when each finds it in his power fo much to improve and advance, as well as to impair and debase his nature; and thereby also change his ftate! what eagerness to excel fome! what dread of falling below others! what encouragement for all, to make the best use of their faculties and opportunities! This amicable conteft, and perpetual struggle, must certainly make more for the good of the whole, than if all had been paffive, and abfolutely fixed in any degree of knowledge and perfection; or limited unalterably to any state. (b) Upon this plan

only

(b) See King's Origin of Evil, Note 19. p. 108, &c. and Note Y. p. 398, &c. We may add, that the fuppofition of any fuch fixed, unimprovable state of natural good implies, ftrictly speaking, no lefs than the fubverfion of all virtue or moral good; which is nothing but the chufing to communicate the former: [See King. R. i. p. 75, 76. 4th Ed.] for which communication there could be no place in fuch a ftate, nor confequently any room for any of those ideas which are founded on it.

Nor does this scheme any better confult the interest of our intellectual accomplishments; which, while it feems to be exalting them, is at the bottom taking away their ufe and exercife: while it pretends to confitute an equality among rational agents, is really de-. ftructive of both rationality, and agency.