Shaftesbury's Ethical Principle of Adaptation to Universal Harmony ...New York University, 1909 - 48 σελίδες |
Συχνά εμφανιζόμενοι όροι και φράσεις
according to Shaftesbury Accordingly actions anticipated appeal of virtue Aristotle beauty bury's teaching Char character conduct contrast to Hobbes conviction covenant creature Cumberland deistic deists Deity determined detraction Divine doctrine emphasized English Thought ethical theory ETHICS AND RELIGION evolutionary ethics exemplification existence expression fundamental furnished further Gizycki happiness harmonious relation hedonism hedonistic herent human nature implied individual intellectual interest intuitional intuitionalism knowledge Leslie Stephen Leviathan ligion maintains man's native mankind mind moral sense moral value motive natural affection ness objective opinion organism particular Phaedo philosophy Plato Pope position presentation recognized reference regarded Regimen religious says Ibid selfish Shaftes Shaftesbury holds Shaftesbury says SHAFTESBURY'S ETHICAL TEACHING Shaftesbury's merit Shaftesbury's most characteristic Shaftesbury's originality Shaftesbury's system Shaftesbury's teaching significance social speculation Spencer spirit standard standpoint Stephen Stoicism Stoics Street Madison taste teacher teaching of Hobbes terms of pleasure Theocles things tion true universal harmony virtuous whole world-order
Δημοφιλή αποσπάσματα
Σελίδα 24 - When the proud steed shall know why man restrains His fiery course, or drives him o'er the plains; When the dull ox, why now he breaks the clod, Is now a victim, and now Egypt's god: Then shall man's pride and dulness comprehend His actions', passions', being's use and end; Why doing, sufFring, check'd, impell'd; and why This hour a slave, the next a deity.
Σελίδα 29 - For whoever thinks there is a God, and pretends formally to believe that he is just and good, must suppose that there is independently such a thing as justice and injustice, truth and falsehood, right and wrong, according to which he pronounces that God is just, righteous, and true.
Σελίδα 15 - FLOWER in the crannied wall, I pluck you out of the crannies, I hold you here, root and all, in my hand, Little flower — but if I could understand What you are, root and all, and all in all, I should know what God and man is.
Σελίδα 17 - The juice nectareous, and the balmy dew ; For me, the mine a thousand treasures brings ; For me, health gushes from a thousand springs ; Seas roll to waft me, suns to light me rise ; My foot-stool earth, my canopy the skies.
Σελίδα 31 - this is right, or that wrong " : they may believe " this a crime, or that a sin ; this punishable by man, or that by God " : yet if the savour of things lies cross to honesty ; if the fancy be florid and the appetite high towards the subaltern beauties and lower order of worldly symmetries and proportions, the conduct will infallibly turn this latter way.
Σελίδα 23 - All Nature is but art, unknown to thee All chance, direction, which thou canst not see; All discord, harmony not understood; All partial evil, universal good: And, spite of pride, in erring reason's spite, One truth is clear, Whatever is, is right.
Σελίδα 23 - Yet serves to second too, some other use. So man, who here seems principal alone, Perhaps acts second to some sphere unknown. Touches some wheel, or verges to...
Σελίδα 15 - However this may prove, there can be no kind of writing ' which relates to men and manners where it is not necessary for the author to understand poetical and moral truth, the beauty of sentiments, the sublime of characters, and carry in his eye the model or exemplar of that natural grace which gives to every action its attractive charm.
Σελίδα 24 - Obvious her goods, in no extreme they dwell : There needs but thinking right and meaning well; And mourn our various portions as we please, Equal is common sense and common ease. Remember, man, ' the Universal Cause Acts not by partial but by general laws,' And makes what happiness we justly call Subsist not in the good of one, but all.
Σελίδα 28 - So that if a creature be generous, kind, constant, compassionate, yet if he cannot reflect on what he himself does, or sees others do, so as to take notice of what is worthy or honest, and make that notice or conception of worth and honesty to be an object of his affection, he has not the character of being virtuous; for thus, and no otherwise, he is capable of having a sense of right or wrong, a sentiment or judgment of what is done through just, equal, and good affection, or the contrary.