numbers, which compelled them to relinquish their advantage and abandon the village of Gross Gorschen. They returned, however, once more to the charge, regained possession of the place, and, by the steadiness of their fire in platoons, forced the dismayed battalions of France to desert the field of battle in disordered crowds. When it was observed by the Prussians that an opportunity was presented to carry Kaja, but that the troops on the spot were too weak to maintain that village even should they succeed in the expulsion of the enemy, the reserve brigades were called into action, and these gallant troops arrived on the ground at a most critical juncture. Napoleon incessantly pushed on from all points fresh battalious. The reserve brigades were already so thinned in their ranks, that they could only keep up a partial and irregular fire like the open lines of a rifle corps. The guards, however, pressed forward with exemplary bravery and order; they took Klein Gorschen, and the village of Hahalati to its right, driving the French before them to the other side of Kaja. In vain did the enemy endeavor to stop their progress with the bayonet. Their resolution was not to be daunted; the ground over which they marched was strewed with the dead and wounded, and blood and carnage paved the way to glory. Kaja was in flames, but remained unoccupied by either of the contending armies.

This was the most brilliant period of the battle. It was six o'clock in the evening, and the allies had gained a mile and a half in advance upon the foe, amidst a continual and murderous fire, of which the violence and fury baffle all attempts at description. But the unexpected and obstinate resistance of the enemy in the line of villages, soon convinced the allies that their first suspicions were correct, and that the greater number of Napoleon's forces were engaged. It was too late, however, to retire, and no other alternative was left to the allies but to carry their point at all hazards. General Von Blucher's army, forming the whole of the first line, had been warmly engaged with the enemy; and though he had defeated their superior num

bers, no prospect appeared of directing, as was first intended, the principal weight of the attack against his right wing. It was therefore resolved to order up the second line, consisting of general Yorck's corps of 8000 men, and general Von Berg's of 5000, to support general Von Blucher. With the view of attracting the attention of the enemy's right wing, and by this feint to profit from the first opening that might be presented to the cavalry on the right of Staarsiedel, the Prussian cavalry in reserve, and a great part of the Russian heavy cavalry, were so drawn up on the plain as to support general Blucher's left with their right wing, and to stand with their left opposite the village. A brisk cannonade now ensued along the whole of this line. The reserves of Russian and Prussian infantry were posted on the high commanding grounds in the neighbourhood beyond the range of the enemy's artillery.

At the same time that the Russian guards penetrated to Kaja, the enemy's first line being threatened on their left wing, and much annoyed by the artillery of the allies, drew back from five to six hundred yards, and evacuated the village of Staarsiedel, which the want of infantry prevented the confederates from occupying,

It was evident that Napoleon considered the occupation and possession of the five villages as decisive of the fate of the battle. For he did not hesitate to bring into action one third of his infantry, in order to retake and maintain them: and thus for many hours continued an obstinate engagement, in which the allies and the French were by turns victorious.

The corps of Blucher amounted to 20,000 men, without the cavalry in reserve; the enemy once more became his superior in numbers, and it required the most heroic exertions to preserve those points from which he had dislodged the foe, until the corps of general Von Yorck, and a great part of the corps of general Von Berg could advance to support him. Napoleon, in bringing up his forces, spread them far to the left of the villages, thus obliging the allied troops of the second line to deploy more to the right, and consequently

mont was to be found wherever he judged his presence most necessary; he neglected nothing to deserve the praises of Buonaparte, who was delighted in such difficult circumstances, to see himself so well seconded by his aide-de-camp. Not to retard the movements of the ariny, which could not advance with success without its artillery, Marmont, instead of having recourse to his former manœuvres at St. Bernard, to get over mount Albaredo, determined to defile his artillery under the fire of Fort de Bard; the road was strewed with dung, and the wheels covered with hay: they experienced losses, but the passage succeeded.

When general Desaix overthrew the Austrians on the day of the battle of Marengo, Marmont contributed much to the success of that attack, by the fire of the artillery, which he caused to advance nearly within musket-shot of the enemy's line. At the crossing of the Mincio, the 26th of December, 1800, effected by general Brune against the Austrian general Bellegarde, the artillery commanded by Marmont rendered great services. The passage of the Adige, which was presumed as presenting great obstacles, was not disputed. Prince Charles had just been appointed generalissimo of the imperial troops; he resolved upon proposing an armistice, which was signed at Steyer, the 25th of December, 1800, and became general to the army of Italy by a convention, which general Marmont, authorised by general Brune, concluded with the count of Hohenhollern, who represented general Bellegarde, at Treviso, January 16th, 1801.

It is from this period that we may date the extraordinary change which took place in the character of Marmont. He had been made inspector-general of artillery, and general-in-chief of the army of Holland. His marriage had rendered him one of the richest individuals of France, and his devotedness one of the greatest favorites of the first consul. Those same officers with whom he had lived in much familiarity in Italy and in Egypt, he easily accustomed himself not to recognise, and he has been heard to reply to similar remembrances

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sometimes, by saying, "It may I do not recollect it:" and very often by turning his back upon those importunate visitors. During his stay in Holland, he employed himself in erecting pyramids by his soldiers, in honor of Napoleon: he was detested both by his army and the inhabitants, whom he treated on every occasion with haughtiness and contempt: the latter made him feel he was not the same man who, in 1800, was so polite when soliciting a loan of some millions on the part of Buonaparte; he increased his bad treatment to that degree, that the good Dutch people rendered sincere thanks to Providence, when in 1805, he was called to the grand army: his troops were in the organization, comprised under the name of the 2nd corps. They consisted of the divisions of infantry, commanded by generals Boudet, Grouchy, and Dumonceau, and in the division of light horse commanded by general Lacoste.

After having passed the Rhine at Cassel, Marmont directed his march upon Wurtzburg, where he effected his junction with the Bavarians and the corps of the army of marshal Bernadotte, on the 2nd of October 1805. He received orders to proceed towards the Danube, to cross that river, and to take position between Aicha and Augsburg. General Mack having shut himself up in Ulm, Buonaparte ordered the 2ud corps to proceed by forced marches to Illersheim, to favor the movement of general Soult upon Memingen, and afterwards to come and co-operate in the blockade of Ulm, on the right bank of the Danube. That place having capitulated, Marmont served at first as a reserve to the grand army, and was afterwards detached towards Styria, to threaten the left of the Austro-Russian army, and harass the rear of the army of Italy, commanded by the archduke Charles. This destination, where he had but to fight against a few partisans in the envirous of Leoben, prevented him from being at the battle of Austerlitz. After the peace of Presburgh, Marmont repaired with the French troops under his orders, into the Friuli, to guard the frontier of the kingdom of Italy. Buonaparte, always suspicious, had carried his

mistrust so far, as not to distribute cartridges to the Dutch who made a part of Marmont's corps. General Dumonceau having complained of this disposition, as humiliating and dangerous, Marmont alleged the great want the other corps of the grand army were in for them. Some sycophants have flattered Marmont, by exaggerating into engagements some few musket-shots fired on the 8th of November, at Weyer, on the 13th of the same month at Leoben, between Marmont's sharp-shooters and some Austrian partisans. The truth is, that the campaign of 1805 against Austria, was to Marmont and his troops, but a continuation of marches, fatiguing throughout, on account of the difficulty of the roads, and the rigor of the season. He had to regret his not being in the different battles, as he lost the opportunity of instructing himself, by not being present in the fine military movements which took place towards the end of the campaign, notwithstanding which, he was created duke of Ragusa.

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During his stay at Udina, Marmont had a very warm dispute with general Grouchy he had ordered that general to occupy with his division, cantonments very unwholesome, and too poor to provide for his troops. Grouchy obeyed, but remonstrated after he had executed the movement prescribed. He made Marmont sensible of the impropriety of his dispositions, giving him to understand, that as he was his senior in rank, as general of division, he consequently ought to pay attention to the observations of a man, his superior in experience. Marmont, stung to the quick, answered him haughtily; "Know, general Grouchy, that I am one of those generalsin-chief, who are never to be dictated to." Grouchy gave him a smile of pity, and measuring Marmont from head to toe, placed his hand upon the hilt of his sword, telling him they were both generals of division. Marmont had him put under arrest, and requested his change from Buonaparte, which was immediately granted. Grouchy was put at the head of a division of dragoons, in which he distinguished himself at the battle of Friedland.

In 1809, Marmont commanded the army

of Dalmatia. Prince John summoned him to surrender, by his letter of the 17th of April. Although this prince's letter was very polite and conformable to the duties prescribed by honor and the laws of war, Marmont had the insolence not to make any reply to it. After having fought the engagements of Montkitta and Gradschatz, he arrived with his army on the 28th of May, at Fiume, where he made his junction with the army of Italy, which had obtained some successes over the archduke John. Marmont had under his orders about 10,000 effective men. In his reports he gave very great praise to general Clauxel, who ought to have been considered for his ability and experience, as the real generalin-chief of that army; but he complained bitterly of general Montrichard. In speaking of the affair of Ottochatz, which was only a skirmish, Marmont says, in his report of the 30th of May, 1809, "If general Montrichard had not been three hours behind hand, the rear of the enemy would have been evidently destroyed, the artillery and baggage taken, &c." He concludes by saying, "All our wishes will be fully gratified, sire, if what we have done should obtain the approbation of your majesty."

When Buonaparte resolved to attack the Austrian army at Wagram, he united all his forces. The duke of Ragusa's corps crossed the Danube, on the night between the 4th and 5th of July, and formed a part of the reserve. On the 6th, it was placed in the centre, with the corps of general Oudinot, and on the 7th it pursued the Austrians in the direction of Żuaim. After the armistice, Marmont quartered his troops in the circle of Kornneuburg, and, as will be perceived from the narrative of that memorable battle, displayed the skill and intrepidity of the practised soldier. From that period to the present, my nar ratives of the successive campaigns have minutely recorded his military operations. Upon the present occasion, he, to bear the brunt of the first shock, and to prevent, if possible, the consequences to be apprehended from the advantageous movements of the enemy, Napoleon immediately caused his army to halt, and the columns

General Von Kleist having been left left in and near Leipsic with 5000 men, and general Miloradovitch at Zeitz with 12,000, the allied army, 70,000 strong, after passing the Elster, crossed the Flosgraben in small compact columas, in close succession, wheeling as they deployed rather to the right, so that the right wing leaned on the Flosgraben, and halted behind the heights about a mile and a half from Gross Gorschen. It was now noon, and the troops were absolutely in want of some repose, the Prussians having marched without intermission during the last six and thirty hours. From these heights the gleams of hostile bayonets were seen at a great distance, and the enemy's cavalry was observed in full march by the way of Lutzen to Leipsic. The enemy occupied the villages of Gross Gorschen, Klein Gorschen, Rahno, Kaja, and Starsiedel, which, lying near each other, form of themselves a kind of irregular square. The plan of attack was to occupy these villages with an advanced-guard; to proceed with the front against the enemy, whose position seemed to parallel with the high road to Weissenfels, in such a manner as to bring the principal weight of the attack against his right wing, but to undertake nothing against his left. With this concentration of force, it was intended, if possible, to throw back his right wing, to drive Napoleon from the direct road to the Saale; and then with the mass of the numerous cavalry belong ing to the allied army, to turn the enemy's right, and, by a furious charge on its flank and rear, to bear down all obstacles, and thus decide the fortune of the day.

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The order of battle was as follows: the army of Blucher formed the first line; that formerly belonging to count Vitgenstein, the second; and the corps of general Vinzingerode, together with the Russian guards and grenadiers, the reserve. The

Russian and Prussian reserves of cavalry were to be reunited. After an hour's rest, the army so formed marched onwards at about half past one o'clock. Colonel Klux's brigade was ordered to attack the first village Gross Gorchen. Three batteries were erected within 800 yards, and the village heavily cannonaded: the enemy's battalions drawn up before the village supported the fire with wonderful firmness for a considerable time; the brigade then advanced with steadiness and discipline to close action, and although more troops were encountered in the village than had been expected, yet the attack was made with an impetuosity so irresistible, that the French were in a few minutes driven out of it with great loss. They soon rallied, and, having been reinforced, returned to the attack with redoubled fury, and the action continued with violence without either party being compelled to relinquish a foot of ground. As the enemy continued to bring up fresh troops every moment, general Ziethen's brigade was ordered to advance to the right of the village, and the Prussians soon acquired a visible ascendancy. The enemy's infantry fought bravely; but the two brigades still pressed forward, and carried, after an obstinate resistance, the two villages of Rahno, and Gross Gorschen. For several hours the conflict was dubious; but the discharges of musketry were productive of such indescribable destruction, and the troops on both sides were so near to each other, that the number of killed and wounded on both sides was incredible. The artillery was then gradually brought forward, and small detachments of cavalry, which were attached to the second line of the Prussian brigades, endeavored to find favorable opportunities to charge. The enemy was not remiss in bringing up his artillery and squadrons of cavalry; and on a space of ground of about one thousand to one thousand five hundred yards square, intercepted by vil lages, hamlets, meadows, and ditches, a terrible carnage destroyed the ranks of both sides. both sides. The number of Prussians engaged amounted only to 14,000 men; and the enemy soon obtained a superiority of

numbers, which compelled them to relinquish their advantage and abandon the village of Gross Gorschen. They returned, however, once more to the charge, regained possession of the place, and, by the steadiness of their fire in platoons, forced the dismayed battalious of France to desert the field of battle in disordered crowds. When it was observed by the Prussians that an opportunity was presented to carry Kaja, but that the troops on the spot were too weak to maintain that village even should they succeed in the expulsion of the enemy, the reserve brigades were called into action, and these gallant troops arrived on the ground at a most critical juncture. Napoleon incessantly pushed on from all points fresh battalious. The reserve brigades were already so thinned in their ranks, that they could only keep up a partial and ir regular fire like the open lines of a rifle corps. The guards, however, pressed forward with exemplary bravery and order; they took Klein Gorschen, and the village of Hahalati to its right, driving the French before them to the other side of Kaja. In vain did the enemy endeavor to stop their progress with the bayonet. Their resolution was not to be daunted; the ground over which they marched was strewed with the dead and wounded, and blood and carnage paved the way to glory. Kaja was in flames, but remained unoccupied by either of the contending armies.

This was the most brilliant period of the battle. It was six o'clock in the evening, and the allies had gained a mile and a half in advance upon the foe, amidst a continual and murderous fire, of which the violence and fury bathe all attempts at description. But the unexpected and obstinate resistance of the enemy in the line of villages, soon convinced the allies that their first suspicions were correct, and that the greater number of Napoleon's forces were engaged. It was too late, however, to retire, and no other alternative was left to the allies but to carry their point at all hazards. General Vou Blucher's army, forming the whole of the first line, had been warmly engaged with the enemy; and though he had defeated their superior num

bers, no prospect appeared of directing, as was first intended, the principal weight of the attack against his right wing. It was therefore resolved to order up the ' second line, consisting of general York's corps of 8000 men, and general Von Berg's of 5000, to support general Von Blucher. With the view of attracting the attention of the enemy's right wing, and by this feint to profit from the first opening that might be presented to the cavalry on the right of Staarsiedel, the Prussian cavalry in reserve, and a great part of the Russian heavy cavalry, were so drawn up on the plain as to support general Blucher's left with their right wing, and to stand with their left opposite the village. A brisk cannonade now ensued along the whole of this line. The reserves of Russian and Prussian' infantry were posted on the high commanding grounds in the neighbourhood beyond the range of the enemy's artillery.

At the same time that the Russian guards penetrated to Kaja, the enemy's first line being threatened on their left wing, and much annoyed by the artillery of the allies, drew back from five to six hundred yards, and evacuated the village of Staarsiedel, which the want of infantry prevented the confederates from occupying,

It was evident that Napoleon considered the occupation and possession of the five villages as decisive of the fate of the battle. For he did not hesitate to bring into action. one third of his infantry, in order to retake and maintain them: and thus for many hours continued an obstinate engagement, in which the allies and the French were by turns victorious.

The corps of Blucher amounted to 20,000 men, without the cavalry in reserve ; the enemy once more became his superior in numbers, and it required the most heroic, exertions to preserve those points from which he had dislodged the foe, until the corps of general Von Yorck, and a great part of the corps of general Von Berg could advance to support him. Napoleon, in bringing up his forces, spread the far to the left of the villages, thus obliging the allied troops of the second line to deploy more to the right, and consequently