expressly directing the last-named to watch for an opportunity to assist the garrison of Fort Washington.

As General Howe approached King's bridge, three British ships of war, undeterred by the guns of Forts Washington and Lee, passed up the river; and Washington, hearing of the fact, sent word to Greene that, while he should not attempt to dictate to one on the ground, he did not consider it prudent to risk a defense of Fort Washington, when the enemy occupied the surrounding country, and commanded the river as well. He then hastened arrangements for conveying the western troops across the Hudson, determining to command the expedition in person, leaving Lee in command in Westchester county, with directions to follow him, so soon as the British had crossed the river. On the 13th day of November, after inspecting the posts about Peekskill and making arrangements for their defense, Washington followed the troops designed for service in New Jersey, across the river, and found Greene near Fort Lee. Greene had miscalculated the strength of the garrison at Fort Washington, and had not complied with Washington's suggestion that it be evacuated. Its condition was now most critical. Howe had, in fact, made its reduction the principal object of his expedition, and had occupied Fordham heights, not far from King's bridge, to await the proper time for an offensive movement. On the night of November 14th, thirty boats were taken undiscovered past the American forts and into the Harlem river, thus providing means for crossing that stream, and attacking the works at such points as should be deemed most vulnerable. Howe, on the 15th, sent a demand for the surrender of the garrison. To this summons Magraw returned a spirited answer that he would defend the fort to the last extremity, and sent word to that effect to General Greene at Fort Lee, who communicated with Washington at Hackensack. Washington hastened to Fort Lee, and, Greene reporting to him that the garrison was in high spirits and confident of success, he had nothing to do but await results. At 10 o'clock on the following morning the British force prepared to storm the fort at four points; five thousand Hessians and Waldeckers, under Knyphausen, were to approach on the north; British infantry and guards, under General Matthew, supported by Lord Cornwallis, with the grenadiers and a regiment of infantry, on the east. The third movement was to be led by Lieutenantcolonel Sterling, who was to drop down the Harlem in boats, and make an attack from the side facing New York; and Lord Percy, accompanied by Howe in person, was to approach the fort from the south. The assault began about noon, and the heavy firing of both parties told a sufficient story of its severity, to those across the river. The defense of the garrison was, at every point, most determined. The attacks upon the north and south were made by Knyphausen and Percy at almost the same time. Colonel Cadwallader, who occupied the first lines at the south, was compelled to give way and retire to the works, by the success of the second and third

divisions of the British, which had crossed the Harlem, dispersed the troops on that side of the fort, and were threatening his rear. As it was, some portion of his force was cut off and captured by Sterling. Rawlings, on the north, held his position stubbornly. His riflemen and a battery of three guns were very effective, and only when the Hessians, so greatly his superiors in number, had gained a footing on the summit, did he also retire to the fort. Howe now held all the lines and the positions of vantage about the fort and sent in another summons for its surrender. The defending force was not large enough to make a resistance on open ground, yet too large to be sheltered by the works; ammunition, too, had run very low, and, considering that a further defense would be but a useless sacrifice of life, Magraw surrendered, the entire garrison becoming prisoners of war. A message, sent by Washington, urging Magraw to hold the fort until night, when an effort would be made to take off the troops, came too late to arrest the negotiation, and it seems very doubtful whether the works could have been so long defended, and, had they been so held, whether the garrison could have been taken off.

The loss of Fort Washington was not a vital matter; the loss at Fort Washington was well nigh irreparable--probably falling little, if any, below four thousand killed, wounded, and captured, and these the most valuable troops of the army. Preparations were at once made for the abandonment of Fort Lee, but the arrival of Lord Cornwallis in the neighborhood, with a strong detachment of British, compelled a precipitate retirement of the garrison, leaving behind tents, blankets, tools, cooking utensils, provisions, and stores, and all the heavy artillery save two twelve-pounders. Washington, finding himself in danger of being entrapped between two rivers, retreated across the Hackensack and posted his men temporarily upon its western bank.

CHAPTER XIV.

THE NEW JERSEY CAMPAIGN.-BATTLES OF TRENTON AND PRINCETON.

THE

HERE can be no doubt that with the loss of Fort Washington opened the darkest era in the war of independence. Beyond the middle of November, the cold of a severe Northern winter before him, Washington had under his immediate command but three thousand men who could, by any stretch of imagination, be classed as effective. These were ragged, many of them barefooted, without shelter, lacking provisions, dispirited, defeated. The militia had very largely anticipated the expiration of their service, which was to come upon the 1st of December, and had gone home. in bodies; none could be counted upon to remain longer than they were bound to do. To add to all, very many of the regulars in all branches of the army would be entitled to a discharge upon the 1st day of January. The worst feature of the situation was that, with his army thus melting away before his eyes, Washington saw no definite prospect of replacing it; the weak policy of Congress, coupled with the unfortunate result of the year's campaign, had left the recruiting experiment an undeniable failure. The colonies were all depressed by disaster-the middle ones, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and New York, of more than doubtful loyalty to the cause; on the ground which he occupied and where his operations in the immediate future bade fair to be carried on, such subsistence and support as he could not command by force, he stood little chance of obtaining. Nevertheless, with this almost hopeless prospect before him, he never for a moment lost heart or meditated submission. His question to himself was never, "Can I do this thing?" but always, "How shall I do it?" This is the key to Washington's character. Brave in the field; a natural soldier and tactician; fertile in originating and bold in executing the most daring plans, yet to this century and still more to those beyond us, he must ever stand as greatest in the hours of discouragement, trial, and inaction. Such steadfastness, patience, devotion, modesty, and faith, find no parallel in history.

After making the camp upon the Hackensack, his first care was to draw upon his slender resources for an army which might at least make a show of opposition to the British and check the growing disaffection, which was as much the result, of lack of faith in the result as of any predilection in favor of Great Britain, on the part of any of the colonies. With this view he dispatched to General Schuyler, at Ticonderoga, directions to send to him at once all New Jersey and Pennsylvania troops under his command. His knowledge of human nature told him that men would fight best in the defense of their own soil, and that the detention of troops from menaced colonies at distant points, could not fail of causing dissatisfaction. He also sent orders to General Lee to cross the Hudson and be in readiness to join him should occasion demand it. Lee's tardiness, which subsequent history has almost justified us in ascribing to disloyalty, was one of the greatest drawbacks to the success of a campaign, which might otherwise have been decisive in favor of the colonies. The limits of this work will not permit of rehearsing the arguments used by Washington to influence Congress in favor of organizing a permanent and efficient army. They were the same already given in these pages, only elaborated and emphasized, and they had no greater effect during the terrible winter campaign which followed, than to secure to the army a slender and at no time reliable reinforcement. He made an appeal to New England, and six thousand Massachusetts troops, with a considerable number from Connecticut, were massed to join him, when Sir Henry Clinton, moving by water from New York, seized Newport, and the home exigency proved too strong for the Governors.

Washington first deserted his position upon the Hackensack, passed the Passaic, and established himself at Newark, pursuit being temporarily cut off by the destruction of the Hackensack bridge. Then the British army crossed the Passaic and the American commander, leaving them to take possession of Newark, moved on to Brunswick, only a few hours before their coming.

The incidents of this remarkable game of war cannot be followed here. Cornwallis, constantly expecting to checkmate his adversary, was as constantly baffled. Washington retreated from town to town, until, on the 2d day of December, he reached Trenton, on the Delaware, the river having been scoured for seventy miles, and all boats collected at that point, to secure the double purpose of a means of crossing for the Americans, if such should be necessary, and, in their absence, a check to the British. It being considered probable that no successful stand could be made on the nearer bank of the river, the crossing of the scanty stores and impedimenta was made in safety, the sick were sent to Philadelphia, and only the effective army remained. At no time during the wonderful march from Fort Lee to the bank of the Delaware, had Washington's force-it can scarcely be called

an army-numbered more than four thousand men; when the partial crossing was made it was a thousand less. With this he had annoyed, foiled, and escaped from an army vastly superior in numbers, flushed with victory, and perfectly equipped, and had led the enemy a chase, through an almost hostile country, still keeping his men together and maintaining their discipline and spirit, though many of them were without shoes, some died from cold by the way, and all suffered as few are called upon to suffer. This retreat and the offensive movements that followed it are justly considered among the greatest military achievements in history.

At this time, General Sir William and Admiral Lord Howe, as royal commissioners for the restoration of peace, issued a proclamation, calling upon all persons in arms against the king to disband and disperse to their homes, and all persons holding civil authority to relinquish the same, promising to such as should conform to these requirements, and within thirty days sign a prescribed declaration of submission to the authority of his majesty, full and free pardon. Copies of this declaration were scattered broadcast throughout the colonies, and in many cases were readily taken by persons only too eager to secure themselves against the consequences of so doubtful a conflict.

On the 7th of December, Washington, having received a reinforcement of fifteen hundred men from Philadelphia, and the promise of another regiment, and feeling that some active operations were necessary to counteract the effect of the manifesto referred to, set out for Princeton, hoping that his appearance might check the British advance and procure the re-establishment of patriotic feeling in New Jersey. On the march he learned that Cornwallis, having been largely reinforced, was making a forced advance from Brunswick, in the endeavor to gain his rear. Hence he retreated, crossed the Delaware, and so bestowed his men as best to guard the fords of the river. The last boat-load had not reached the further bank when Cornwallis appeared. Finding that his quarry had escaped him, he established his army with the main body at Trenton and detachments posted up and down the river to a considerable distance.

The days immediately following the crossing of the Americans, which occurred on the 8th, were spent by Cornwallis in a vain effort to secure means of following the colonial force; this failing, he placed his men in winter quarters, and the main body of General Howe's army, having followed him into New Jersey, was also quartered at various points so as to hold possession of the colony. It is probable that Howe would gladly have held the Americans in safe inaction until the expiration of the sixty days named in his proclamation, at the same time extending his posts and influence so as to seriously as possible undermine the patriot cause.

It is now necessary to give a little attention to the proceedings of Gen eral Lee. It was on the 21st of November that Washington ordered him