negotiation by means of private agents. Mr. Richard Oswald, sent as representative of Lord Shelburne, was soon deep in consultation with Franklin, while Mr. Thomas Grenville, an emissary of Fox, was sounding the Count de Vergennes.

It is neither necessary nor possible to follow the various phases of the preliminary steps to the negotiation. Fox favored admitting American independence in the first instance; Shelburne desired that question to remain as an element in the negotiation. The misunderstandings and mysterious reservations of agents, impressed Vergennes and Franklin with distrust of the good faith of Great Britain. Then Jay returned from Spain. He knew that Spain would claim such a boundary as should cut off the United States from the Mississippi river. All knew that England would make every possible encroachment at the north, and that she would protest against the demands of the United States regarding the fisheries. Jay suspected that Vergennes could not be relied upon for any active opposition. He did not, however, know-what was the fact that Vergennes had sent a secret emissary to Lord Shelburne, intimating that France would not uphold America in any unjust demands, from which language a readiness to make liberal concessions, in the name of America, was intended to be inferred.

The defeat of Fox, his retirement from the cabinet, the death of Rockingham, and the elevation of Shelburne to the premiership, all these led up to the commissioning of Mr. Oswald to treat regarding peace, with "the thirteen colonies of North America, or any persons whatever." Franklin and Vergennes expressed themselves willing to accept this peculiar commission and to treat with Mr. Oswald. Mr. Jay refused so to do, or to be content with aught but an antecedent recognition of American independence. It was by reason of this disagreement that Mr. Adams was summoned, not much to the satisfaction of Vergennes, and decidedly to the chagrin of Oswald, who had hoped to conclude his treaty without the intervention of a person so difficult either to intimidate or cajole. Adams' first suggestion, made in a letter to Jay during September, was that a compromise be effected by the amendment of Oswald's commission which should give him power to treat with the United States of America. He considered that this, while not a formal recognition, would be a sufficient admission to form the basis of a negotiation. The combined influence of Mr. Jay's pressing representations and of the anxiety of England to close a treaty without the intervention of Adams, was to secure this amendment of Oswald's instructions, and he at last stood recognized and apparently unhampered as the agent of Great Britain, and opened his business with Jay and Franklin. The first step was the submission by Mr. Oswald to his government of a threefold proposition, suggested by Mr. Franklin as a basis of negotiation. This embraced, first: the recognition of American independence and liberal definition of bounda ries; second such joint use of fisheries, as had existed since the French

war until the Revolution; third: free navigation of the Mississippi. This proposal certainly was broad enough, covering every possibly controverted point; it was, in fact, too broad to suit king, cabinet, or people of Great Britain. It began to be suspected that Mr. Oswald was not quite as wise as a serpent, hence he was reinforced in his mission, by the appointment of Mr. Henry Strachey, who was instructed to insist upon the indemnification of refugees, the curtailment of boundaries, and the modification of American demands regarding trade and the fisheries. From the moment of the ⚫ arrival of this gentleman, the harmony of the negotiation was at an end. France, too, began to manifest in an unequivocal manner her design to support the British commissioners in their demands for the modification of the American ultimata as to trade and the fisheries. It was at this point that Mr. Adams, having at last settled his important matters at the Hague, arrived at Paris to assume his place in the commission. This was indeed a most delicate one, calling for his action with and judgment between two colleagues radically disagreed upon a vital matter, he himself being fully of the mind of neither.

The attitude of France brought before the commissioners for the first time, a full practical appreciation of the disadvantage and the blind folly of the action of Congress, which had made them ultimately dependent upon the decision of the French minister. They had before felt this as a humiliation; they now saw before them only the choice between ignoring this direction and proceeding with a separate negotiation, and, on the other hand, standing idly by, while France should barter away the most valuable rights of America, to assist in oiling the wheels of European diplomacy for her own purposes. Jay was the first to declare his intention of proceeding independ ently of France; Franklin still professed confidence in the ultimate justice of that power, but, upon Adams' joining with Jay, he assented. Vergennes did not seem seriously offended at the action of the commissioners; it was, in fact, a delicate and vexatious duty taken from his hands, and if he might be clear of it, he was willing to waive every real and imaginary right, except that secured in the treaty of alliance, that the peace of France and America with Great Britain should be simultaneous.

When the negotiation was re-begun, under this new determination, Franklin and Jay were reinforced by Adams; Oswald by Strachey. The independence was conceded, as was the matter of navigation of the Mississippi. The points principally at issue were questions of boundary and the fisheries, claimed by America; the securing of debts due British subjects, and the payment of indemnity to refugees, insisted upon by the British. Adams came just in time to save the interests of New England as to the northeastern boundary and the fisheries, for, while his colleagues had pressed for them, they had not insisted upon them as essential. The result of the early consultations of the enlarged commission, was the drawing of

new proposals by Mr. Adams, which granted to British subjects the right of collecting their debts by agency of the American courts, refused all indemnity to refugees, demanded liberal boundaries, and equal rights with Great Britain as to the fisheries. These Strachey conveyed to London, leaving behind him a note in which he predicted a failure of the negotiation, should they not be modified. The ministry was, however, in such a strait that peace was a necessity, and the ultimate granting of the demands made by the American commissioners, a light matter when compared with it. Hence Strachey returned to France with instructions to offer concessions regarding boundaries, to maintain the former position regarding the fisheries and refugees, until the determination of the American commissioners became evident, then to recede and accept their terms.

The fisheries question coming up, after some discussion, Strachey offered to concede the fishing at a distance of more than three leagues from the coast, as a privilege, but declined to yield it nearer the shore. Adams claimed the fisheries of the high seas as a right, that of the waters within the jurisdiction of Great Britain as a concession. The British commissioners made one more stand, avowing their readiness to yield the liberty but not the right of fishing. Adams answered in a bold, determined, vehement speech, saying that he had come to the conference to protect the rights of America to the fishery, and that he would accept no other expression in lieu thereof. This was a bold stand, for the commercial mission under which he originally went to France, had been revoked, and the matter of the fisheries was then not even held as an ultimatum by the United States. He turned to Laurens, who had joined the commission, for corroboration and support, which he received in liberal measure. Jay, though perhaps less warm in his approval, also acquiesced. The British commissioners, deeming that they had carried resistance as far as their instructions demanded, announced their willingness to accept the terms proposed, and, on the same day, the 29th of November, 1782, was signed the provisional treaty of peace. The victory was indeed a grand one. The negotiation of so favorable a peace by the inexperienced diplomatists of an infant nation, hampered by the weakness of their Congress, furtively opposed by the wily minister of France, dealing with a nation so arrogant and unbending as England-it was indeed an accomplishment excusing a measure of pride. No other man upon the commission did so much to literally and inflexibly support the demands of America as did Adams, and the maintenance of her boundaries and fisheries may justly be ascribed to him.

The preliminary treaty could, of course, only become effective when a peace should be concluded between the other belligerent powers and England. There had never been a thought, on the part of any one of the American commission, of overlooking the obligation which bound them to make a common peace as they had made a common war with France. Yet Ver