neck. It was about 11 or 12 feet from the cross-timber to the far end of the rock that fell. It appears that, after Guess set up the cross-timber, he tested the top, and had a talk with Wallace. The latter continued to work under this overhanging rock, which was partially exposed at the time Guess examined the neck and placed the supports in position. It was what was denominated in mining parlance a "horseback," and weighed 80,000 pounds. Wallace was bound to have known of the existence of this threatening horseback, since he had himself erected props to support the top, and also saw Guess sound and test the top. Moreover, this immense overhanging rock was clearly exposed to view for at least 24 hours, or about 10 to 14 working hours, prior to the accident. Notwithstanding the imminent peril attending such work, especially obvious to a miner of Wallace's long experience, he continued to work, and augmented the danger by taking out the coal that supported this overhanging rock, and drove the room for 21⁄2 to 3 feet or 5 or 6 feet further. It further appears that on the evening after Guess did the timbering, and the day preceding the accident, the deceased fired a mining shot in that room, knocking down a block of coal, and that, on the morning of the accident, deceased and his son put in another mining; that is to say, they took out the seam of rash that lay just under the room for a distance of 2% to 3 feet. The effect of this was to uncover and remove several feet of the mining that supported this imminently dangerous rock, and in that proportion increased the peril. It further appears that, at the time of the accident, deceased was working directly beneath this rock, engaged in digging up with his pick the layer of slate covering the bottom seam of coal for a distance of 3 feet. He was at work in the very place from which he had removed the layer of rash and upper seam of coal. The result was that this exposed rock, having been steadily undermined by the deceased himself, became at last dislodged, and fell, crushing Wallace beneath its superincumbent weight. John Wallace, the son, who was present, working with his father, was asked this question: "Now, as a matter of fact, that which turned the rock loose and caused it to fall was on account of your father having taken the last support from under it? Ans. I don't know, sir. Question. He had taken that support from under it? Ans. Yes, sir."

Now, upon these facts, it is insisted that the proximate cause of the accident was the gross contributory negligence of the deceased, and that the circuit judge should have sustained the demurrer to the evidence and dismissed the suit. One of the printed rules of the company, posted in plain view at the mines, at the place where the miners get their coal checks every morning and evening, was as follows: "All employés must, at the commencement of their daily work, note careful

ly and examine the face, sides, roof, and all parts of their working place, and satisfy themselves that the same is safe in every respect. But if, upon such examination, any employé shall find said working place dangerous or in want of repairs, which makes it unsafe, it shall be his duty to at once cease all operations there until such danger is removed, or proper repairs are made; and it shall be the duty of every employé, immediately upon the discovery of danger or defect, to proceed to make them safe, when it is in his ordinary duty to do so, provided he considers it safe to take the personal responsibility and risk as to injury, but the company will not be responsible for any injury he may receive while making such repairs. When it is not his ordinary duty to make such repairs, he shall immediately report to the mining boss, for him to proceed to make such repairs. [which] shall be obligatory upon him, unless he considers that he can make the repairs with safety to himself." Charles James, a miner working in the same mine at the time of the accident, testifies, on cross-examination, that, "when a man was driving an entry or room neck, it was his duty, from time to time, to sound the top"; that the company had specific rules to the effect that every man was to sound his top; that the printed rules were posted up at the mines in plain view, where the men got their checks every morning and evening; that rule 5 had been a rule of the company as long as he had been working for the company; that the rules were that "it was every man's duty to examine from time to time his own working place, and see that it was in safe condition"; and that "when he was working in a room outside of the roadway, and found the top was in bad condition, he had to set a single timber, but when he was in an entry or roadway or room neck, under the rules, it was his duty to inform the mining boss or John Guess, and stay from under it until the timber had been set by them." Ed. Peaverly, a miner working in the same mine at the time of the accident, states that if a man was working in an entry or roadway or room neck, and found that his place was in bad condition, he would send for John Guess, the timberman, to repair it; that it was customary, or the rule, for a man to first examine his top, and see whether it was in good condition, and, when he found it was not in good condition, he would send for Guess, who would come and set a cross-timber; that it was the duty of all miners, when digging in a room, to sound the top and see if it was in good condition, just the same as if in a room, and that they generally did this always; that if a miner was in a room neck or entry, and found his top was not in a safe condition, it was his duty to notify the boss or timberman to come and set the timbers, and "to stay from under it until the man does come and set the cross-timbers." William Slover, a miner of 12 years' experience,

working in the same mine at the time of the accident, states that, when a man was digging in a room neck or entry, it was his duty, certainly, to examine his top from time to time; that "it is any man's duty to examine the top, that digs coal; that it was the miner's business to see whether or not his top was in a safe condition, and when he found it was loose he would send after Guess or the mine foreman, and call their attention to it, and they would have it timbered; that this was the way to do; that the miner working in there all the time is familiar with the situation, while the mine boss is only in there a few minutes each day, and, of course, as he drives forward, uncovers new top from time to time, and the result is it is his business to examine the top from time to time, and see that it doesn't get loose; but when he is working in a place such as a hallway, room neck, or entry, that required double timbers, he sends for the mine boss or timberman to do that." The foregoing testimony introduced by the plaintiffs demonstrates that, under the rules and custom of the company, it was the duty of the miner to make the necessary tests of his room neck, and, if he discovered it was not safe, he was charged with the duty of sending for the timberman, and especially was he enjoined and required to stand from under until the dangerous top was repaired. According to the testimony of plaintiffs' witnesses, the duty of inspecting the changing top of a room neck is the same as in any other part of the room. We are constrained to believe from the record that deceased not only steadily undermined the rock and brought it down upon himself, but that he was conscious of the danger, and yet, inured for so many years to such perils, he deliberately assumed the risk.

It is argued, however, on behalf of the plaintiffs below, that it was the duty of the company to furnish its employés a safe place to work, and that the breach of this duty was the proximate cause of the accident, for which the defendant company is liable. We do not think this rule of the common law applicable in such a case. The principle invoked is usually applied to a permanent place, and not to such places as are constantly shifting and being transformed as the direct result of the employés' labor. This distinction is aptly illustrated in the following cases: In Finalyson v. Mining Co., 14 C. C. A. 492, 67 Fed. 510, the plaintiff, a laborer engaged in mining ore, was injured by the falling of an exposed mass of substance, called "gouge," which he was endeavoring to pick down under the direction of the foreman. It was held by the United States circuit court of appeals that the rule of a safe place to work had no application, and that a verdict was properly directed for the defendant. Sanborn, Circuit Judge, delivering the opinion of the court, said: "It is the general rule that it is the duty of the master to exercise ordinary care to provide a reasonably safe place in which

Rail

the servant may perform his service. way Co. v. Jarvi, 3 C. C. A. 433, 53 Fed. 65. But this rule cannot be justly applied to cases in which the very work the servants are employed to do consists in making a dangerous place safe, or in constantly changing the character of the place for safety as the work progresses. The duty of the master does not extend to keeping such a place safe at every moment of time as the work progresses. The servant assumes the ordinary risk and dangers of his employment that are known to him, and those that might be known to him by the exercise of the ordinary care and foresight. When he engages in the work of making a place that is known to be dangerous safe, or in a work that in its progress necessarily changes the character for safety of the place in which it is performed as the work progresses, the hazard of the dangerous place, and the increased hazard of the place made dangerous by the work, are the ordinary and known dangers. In Mining Co. v. Clay's Adm'r (Ohio) 38 N. E. 610, 25 L. R. A. 848, above cited, in which Clay, a miner engaged in operating a cutting machine, was killed by slate falling from the top, that had been negligently propped by Dalton, the 'filler.' upon whom the duty of propping the roof had devolved by custom of the mine, the trial judge charged the jury upon the theory that 'the duty of defendant company in respect to furnishing a safe working place was such that it was liable for the negligence of Dalton, the filler, irrespective of the question of his incompetency, and of the company's knowledge thereof.' It was held on appeal that this was error, that the doctrine of a safe place to work had no application, and that Clay and Dalton were fellow servants. The court said in reference to this question: "The claim is sought to be sustained by a class of cases which hold that the duty of the master to provide a safe working place and machinery for his employés cannot be delegated so as to absolve the master from liability in case of failure of the vice principal to perform that duty. It does not seem necessary to review these cases. They are, as a rule, based upon the proposition that, where the appliance or place is one which has been furnished for the work in which the servants are to be engaged, then the duty above stated attaches to the master. We need not discuss this proposition, for we have not that case. Here the place was not furnished as in any sense a permanent place of work, but was a place in which the surrounding conditions were continually changing, and instead of being a place furnished by the master for the employés, within the spirit of the decisions referred to, was a place the furnishing preparations of which was in itself a part of the work they were employed to perform. The distinction may be found in a number of cases, among which may be cited Fraser v. Lumber Co., 45 Minn. 235, 47 N. W. 785; McGinty v. Reservoir Co., 155 Mass.

183, 29 N. E. 510; and Coal Co. v. Scheller, 42 Ill. App. 619." See, also, Armour v. Hahn, 111 U. S. 313, 4 Sup. Ct. 433, 28 L. Ed. 440; Fraser v. Lumber Co., supra; Blazenic v. Coal Co. (Iowa) 72 N. W. 292; City of Minneapolis v. Lundin, 6 C. C. A. 344, 58 Fed. 525; Railroad Co. v. Jackson, 12 C. C. A, 507, 65 Fed. 48. In Railroad Co. v. Brown, 20 C. C. A. 147, 73 Fed. 970, it was said: "There is a duty on the part of the master to provide his servant a safe place in which to work; but manifestly the principle is not applicable to a case like this, where the place became dangerous in the progress of the work, or from the manner in which the work is done." It is true, in Iron Co. v. Pace, 101 Tenn. 484, 48 S. W. 232, we held the charge of the circuit judge was in accord with the general rule "that it is the duty of the master to keep the premises in the prosecution of his business in a reasonably safe condition, and, if he fails to do so, he is liable to the servant for all the injuries resulting to him from such defects." That was a case where a miner engaged in driving an entry was injured in consequence of an explosion caused by the negligence of the company in permitting explosive dust and gas to accumulate in the mine. The injuries were sustained as a result of a mine-dust explosion, and the recovery was sought for breach of the statute which required the company to keep its mine, with all its entries, airways, and workings, properly ventilated and free from all dangerous and explosive gases and substances, and to have said entries, airways, and workings examined and tested by one skilled in such business every morning before said employés entered said portion of the mine, and, if poisonous gases or other explosive gases or substances were found, to remove the same immediately, etc. It was also a ground of recovery in that case that the company had breached the statute in employing an unskilled and incompetent inside overseer or mine boss. The duties for a breach of which a recovery was sought in that case were especially enjoined by chapter 170, Acts 1881, entitled "An act to provide for the ventilation of coal mines and collieries, and for the protection of human life." We held in that case that the charge of the court was not so strong as the positive mandates of the statute, and hence it was not error to charge the general rule that it was the duty of the master to keep his premises in a reasonably safe condition.

But it is claimed that defendant company is liable under section 8, c. 170, of the Acts of 1881, making it the duty of the mine boss to keep a careful watch over the timbering, etc. That section is as follows: "That to better secure the ventilation of every coal mine and colliery, and provide for the health and safety of the men employed therein, otherwise and in every respect the owner or agent, as the case may be, in charge of every coal Inine and colliery, shall employ a competent

and practical inside overseer, to be called 'mining boss,' who shall keep a careful watch over the ventilating apparatus, over the airways, the traveling ways, the pump, the sumps, and the timbering; to see, as the miners advance in their excavations, that all loose coal, slate, or rock overhead is carefully secured against falling; and all things connected with and appertaining to the safety of the men at work in the mine." By section 19 of this act it is provided "that any miner having charge of a working place in any coal mine or colliery who shall neg lect or refuse to keep the roof thereof properly propped and timbered, to prevent the falling of coal, slate, or rocks, every such person or persons shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction shall be punished by imprisonment and fine at the discretion of the court trying the case." Any analysis of this statute will show the following tripartite obligation: (1) The mine owner is charged with the duty of employing a competent and practical inside overseer or mine boss; (2) the mine boss so employed is charged with the duty of maintaining a careful watch over the ventilation and the timbering, and to see, as the miners advance in their excavation, that all loose coal, slate, or rock overhead is carefully secured against falling, etc., and all things connected with or pertaining to the safety of the men at work in the mines; (3) the miner having charge of the working place in any mine is charged with the duty of keeping the roof thereof properly propped and timbered, to prevent the falling of coal, slate, or rock. It will thus be observed that reciprocal duties and obligations are imposed by the statute upon the company and its employés, which are equally imperative and binding. It should have been stated that the criminal penalty for a violation of the duties imposed by the statute was denounced against all of the parties named.

It is said, however, that by custom of the company the miner was not charged with the duty of timbering a room neck. It will be observed the statute makes no exception in requiring the miner to prop and timber his working place. It is a question, then, whether the miner could be relieved of this statutory duty by any rule or custom of the company. In Mining Co. v. Clay's Adm'r (Ohio) 38 N. E. 610, 25 L. R. A. 848, the plaintiff's intestate, Clay, a coal miner, engaged in operating a machine that cut the coal, was killed by slate falling from the top of room while so engaged. It appeared that in each room three sets of hands were employed in turn: First, the miners, of whom Clay was one, who operated the machine that cut the coal; next, the drillers, who drilled holes in the face of the coal to prepare it for blasting; and, lastly, the filler, who blasted down and loaded the coal, and who also, by a custom of the mine, was required to post or prop the roof. Clay, while engaged in operating the coal-cutting machine, was killed by

slate falling from the top of the room on account of the negligent manner in which it had been previously propped by Dalton, the "filler." The Ohio statute provided that, “If any miner or other person employed in any mine governed by the provisions of this act shall neglect or refuse to securely prop or support the roof and entries under his control, he shall be guilty of an offense." The trial judge refused to charge the jury, as requested by the defendant, that, "If they find from the evidence that Clay, when he got killed, was in control of the room, that then, under the criminal statute (section 6871, Rev. St. Ohio), it was his duty to properly post the room, and no custom existing at the time at the mine could relieve him of that duty," and, on the contrary, stated to the jury, in his general charge, that if they found that Clay "violated a criminal statute, for which violation he could have been prosecuted, had he lived, such violation will not preclude a recovery in this action." It was held on appeal that this action of the trial judge was error, and a new trial was granted. In discussing this question, the court said: "So extensive is this industry in the state, that legislation affecting those engaged in it as a daily vocation may be regarded as of public interest; and where a statute, as does the one cited, undertakes to outline and prescribe a particular duty owing by persons so engaged, not only to themselves but to others, it may be properly regarded as indicating a public policy on the subject, and, where the same provision has remained in force for so long a time,-about twenty years at the time of this occurrence,-the policy may be treated as a settled one. This provision clearly points out a duty devolving upon all who come within its terms; a grave duty; one so nearly related to the protection of life and limb that it ought not to be lightly esteemed, nor easily avoided. The object of the statute is to encourage carefulness,-regard not only for the life of the miner, but for the lives of all who may be subject to like risks. It imposes an obligation to perform a duty to others. Anything, therefore, which tends to operate in opposition to that obligation, would violate the policy of this statute; and hence whatever right the custom at this mine, imposing upon Dalton the work of propping and posting the roof of the room, may have given Clay to call upon Dalton to do the manual work of posting, and delay his own work until that had been properly done, such custom ought not to have the effect to exonerate Clay from the duty enjoined by the statute, nor shift the risk undertaken by himself over upon the company. We think the trial judge erred in refusing to give the instruction requested, and in the charge as given on the subject."

But without deciding this question, and conceding that under the rules of the company, as well as by custom, no obligation rested upon Wallace, the deceased miner, to

prop and timber a room neck, as contradistinguished from a room, which it is admitted he was obliged to prop, was Wallace guilty of such contributory negligence as defeats this action? It is difficult to see wherein the mining boss, Card, was negligent. He had examined the top a day or two prior to the accident, and shortly thereafter sent Guess. the timberman, to timber this rock. It is said, however, that Card, the mining boss, did not return to inspect the room after Guess had timbered it; but, as is argued, this fact was fully known to Wallace, who did not send for Card or make any complaint. There is no proof tending to show that Guess had improperly or negligently timbered this rock, but the proof is that he carefully tested, after timbering, in order to ascertain whether it was safe. It is further shown that, under the rules of the company, Guess was subject to Wallace's orders, and that, upon the development of a dangerous condition in the rock, it was the duty of Wallace to send for Guess and have the rock retimbered. So far as this record discloses. Guess had no notice from Wallace of the necessity for further timbering. We are of opinion that, after a careful examination of this record, Wallace was guilty of gross contributory negligence, and that his negligence, moreover, was the proximate cause of this accident. The record clearly shows that Wallace worked for 10 to 14 hours under the overhanging rock after Guess had set up the cross-timbers; that he steadily undermined the support beneath the end of the rock, and thus caused its dislodgment and precipitation upon himself. The rules of the company imperatively require the miner, when he discovers the top to be dangerous, to have it repaired, and in the meanwhile to stay from unler it. But in violation of the rules, deceased assumed the obvious risk, by working under the impending rock, and in failing to have it timbered as required by the rules of the company.

The judgment of the circuit court is therefore reversed, and the demurrer to the evidence sustained, and the suit dismissed.

SHEAFER et al. v. MITCHELL et al. (Supreme Court of Tennessee. Nov. 15, 1902.) LAND GRANTS-ENTRY-INTERVENING HIATUS -TAX DEEDS VALIDITY - DESCRIPTION WHAT LAW GOVERNS-PRESUMPTION-APPEAL.

1. R. & J. made a special entry, but did not obtain their grant until after two hiatuses intervened. E. & F. made two younger entries on same land, and obtained two grants before said hiatuses. Held, that E. & F., claiming under junior entries and senior grants issued before, have superior title to R. & J., claiming under senior entry and junior grant issued after, the hiatuses. Cases cited and approved: William son v. Throop, 11 Humph. 265; Blevins v. Crew, 3 Sneed, 152: Gass v. Waterhouse (Tenn. Ch. App.) 61 S. W. 452; Cowan v. Hatcher (Tenn. Ch. App.) 48 S. W. 328. Cited and dis

tinguished: Tipton v. Sanders, 2 Head, 690; Sampson v. Taylor, 1 Sneed, 600; Henegar v. Matthews, 14 S. W. 554, 88 Tenn. 132.

2. A tax deed, to be valid under Acts 1835, c. 15, should recite: (a) The consideration paid; (b) a sufficient description of the lands; (c) the judgment upon which the sale was made; (d) the date of judgment and court where rendered; (e) the fact of legal notice having been given; and (f) sale of property, and date thereof. Where such recitals appear, they constitute prima facie evidence of such facts, and the deed is valid evidence of title in any court of law or equity; and it is immaterial whether the sheriff who made the sale or his successor (13 years thereafter) executed the deed. Acts cited and construed: Acts 1801, c. 8; 1809, c. 84: 1835, c. 15; 1843-44, c. 92; 1847-48, c. 147; 1849-50, c. 102. Cases cited and approv ed: Bates v. Sullivan, 3 Head, 633; Tharp v. Hart, 2 Sneed, 572; Polk v. Mitchell, 4 S. W. 221, 85 Tenn. 634. Cited and distinguished: Allen v. Moss, 2 Tenn. Cas. 317.

3. Where a deed describes land as the "Shady Tract" merely, but refers for particular description to other deeds of record containing accurate description of same, it is not void for insufficient description, but is a valid conveyance. Authorities cited and approved: 2 Pingrey, Real Prop. § 1375; 4 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2d Ed.) 759.

4. It is not necessary to show in the face of the deed that the several tracts of land described therein were separately sold. The fact that the sale was made in bulk, and not separately, might be set up in defense on the trial, where the deed is not clear as to how the sale was made, but the fact that it does not so recite would not avoid it if the statutory prerequisites are recited. Cases cited and approved: Brien v. Creighton, 2 Tenn. Cas. 211.

5. The validity of a tax deed must be determined by the law in force at time of sale; and, if executed by virtue of such sale, and valid under that law, it cannot be effected by subsequent legislation. Cases cited and approved: Tracy v. Reed (C. C.) 38 Fed. 69, 2 L. R. A. 778, 779; Richardson v. Marshall Co., 45 S. W. 440, 100 Tenn. 352; Douglass v. Pike Co., 101 U. S. 677, 25 L. Ed. 968; Taylor v. Ypsilanti, 105 U. S. 60, 26 L. Ed. 1008.

6. After long lapse of time (35 years in the present case) every reasonable presumption should be indulged to uphold a tax deed; and especially is this so where the original proprie tors, or their privies, have asserted no title, although numerous subsequent conveyances have been made. Cases cited: Childress v. Harrison, 1 Baxt. 411; Gonzales v. Ross, 7 Sup. Ct. 705, 120 U. S. 605, 30 L. Ed. 801; Dodge v. Briggs (C. C.) 27 Fed. 160; Orton v. Noonan, 25 Wis. 672; Thomas v. Stickle, 32 Iowa, 71; Howard v. Stevenson, 11 Mo. App. 410; Gage v. Bailey, 102 Ill. 11. Code cited: Shannon's Code, 3762.

7. Tax deeds are void: (a) Where several tracts of land are sold as a whole, and not separately; (b) where the law authorizing such sales is not strictly followed, the proceeding being purely statutory; and (c) where the record offered to support the deed varies materially from its recitals. Authorities cited and approv ed: Cooley, Tax'n, 476; Downing v. Stephens, 1 Baxt. 456; Sampson v. Marr, 7 Baxt. 490; Blackw. Tax Titles, 380; Crishman v. Johnson (Colo. Sup.) 47 Pac. 296, 58 Am. St. Rep. 224; Barnes v. Boardman (Mass.) 21 N. Ê. 308, 3 L. R. A. 787; Polk v. Mitchell, 2 S. W. 221, 85 Tenn. 634; Ballard v. Scruggs, 18 S. W. 259, 90 Tenn. 585, 25 Am. St. Rep. 703.

8. Query: If void, can a defendant, who is a stranger to the title in an ejectment suit, rely upon this defense to defeat complainants' suit, as he could rely upon any other outstanding ti

¶ & See Deeds, vol. 16, Cent. Dig. § 84.

tle? Authorities cited: Freem. Ex'ns, 985; Lamm v. Railway Co. (Minn.) 47 N. W. 455, 10 L. R. A. 269; Harlan v. Harlan, 14 Lea, 115.

9. The presumption of law is in favor of the exercise of power; and, if there be both a legal and an illegal mode of exercising same, the legal method is presumed to have been adopted, in the absence of proof to the contrary. Cases cited and approved: Marshall v. Stephens, 8 Humph. 159. 47 Am. Dec. 601; Wilburn v. Spofford, 4 Sneed, 704; Murdock v. Leath, 10 Heisk. 188; Crisman v. Johnson (Colo. Sup.) 47 Pac. 296, 58 Am. St. Rep. 224.

10. Where the lower court decides a case correctly, but upon an erroneous theory of the law, the supreme court will affirm the holding, but base its decision upon the correct theory; and where questions of law, not fact, are involved, it is not necessary for all parties to appeal in order to invoke the application of the rule. If one side appeals, it brings up for consideration all questions of law governing the matters in controversy. Cases cited and approved: Butler v. Kinzie, 15 S. W. 1068, 90 Tenn. 31; Loftis v. Loftis, 28 S. W. 1091, 94 Tenn. 237.

11. The revisors of the Code of 1858 were authorized "to revise and digest" existing statutes, and the supreme court, construing the Code in doubtful cases, will presume that this was done, and that it was not intended to alter or change them. Case cited and approved: Bates v. Sullivan, 3 Head, 633.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Appeal from chancery court, Johnson county; John P. Smith, Chancellor.

Suit by Walter S. Sheafer and others against James S. Mitchell and others. From a judgment for defendants, plaintiffs appeal. Reversed.

C. J. St. John, Shields & Mountcastle, and Webb, McClung & Baker, for appellants. Jenkins, Wilson & Cole and Pickle & Turner, for appellees.

CURTIN, Special Judge. This is an ejectment bill, filed in the chancery court of Johnson county, to recover 200 acres of land, and for an injunction to stay waste. The complainants' title is founded upon two grants issued by the state of Tennessee for 5,000 acres each. Grant No. 21,601 was issued to Wm. Ewing May 13, 1838, founded on an entry made October 4, 1830; and grant No. 21,614, issued May 21, 1838, to John H. Fulton, based on an entry made October 4, 1830. The 200-acre tract in controversy lies partly upon each of these 5,000-acre tracts, and the complainants deraign title from the Ewing and Fulton grants. The defendant Mitchell claims the land by virtue of an entry made January 27, 1826, and a grant issued thereon to Asa Reece and B. W. Jenkins April 26, 1861, and deraignment of title thereunder. Mitchell purchased the land October 7, 1898, and his deed was duly acknowledged and registered October 12, 1898. The complainants also rely upon adverse possession under color of title for more than seven years. But the court of chancery appeals find as a fact that complainants' possession has not been for a longer period than six years; that they had made leases on the lands some fourteen years before the institution of this suit, though ac