CONTRIBUTION -See NEGLIGENCE (11).
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE-See MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
(2); NEGLIGENCE (1); RAILROADS (2); STREET RAILWAYS (1, 4).
CONVEYANCE OF FUTURE IMPROVEMENTS-See SPECIFIC
PERFORMANCE (6).
1. It is not a violation of the "Blue-Sky law" (3 Comp. Laws
1915, 11954) for each owner of stock in a corporation
to sell his stock when not made in the course of con-
tinued and successive transactions of a similar nature.
Dows v. Schuh, 133.
2. Where money represented by demand notes was lent to a
corporation in good faith, the lender or his personal rep-
resentatives had a right to demand and take security
from the corporation for its repayment, even if the di-
rectors had some ulterior or sinister purpose in borrowing
the money and in giving the mortgage. Freeman v. Mitch-
ell, 380.
3. Where the mortgage given to secure the demand notes
recited that it was authorized by the directors, and the
minutes also recite and admit the debt secured, any im-
plied power of the secretary of the corporation to execute
the notes in question was immaterial. Id.
4. A mortgage given by the directors of a corporation to
secure demand notes given from time to time for money
borrowed, held, not an assignment within the meaning
of the articles of association providing that no assign-
ment of the property of the company for the benefit of
creditors should be made by the directors unless author-
ized by a majority vote of all the stock issued. Id.
5. Said mortgage was not invalid simply because it secured
the payment of notes indorsed by the directors. Id.
6. The contention that the price bid at the foreclosure sale
was inadequate, held, not supported by the evidence. Id.
381.
7. In a stockholder's suit to set aside the foreclosure of a
mortgage given by the directors of a corporation on the
ground that the mortgage indebtedness was in whole or
in part fictitious, his right to relief depends upon some
proof that the debt was not created at all or was created
for some evil purpose shared by the mortgagee and the
directors. Id.
8. Where defendant, a stockholder and promoter of plaintiff
corporation, stood in a fiduciary relation to said corpo-
ration and its other stockholders, and received stock to
be used for the benefit of plaintiff, for which he refuses
to account, a court of equity has jurisdiction to compel
restitution. American Forging & Socket Co. v. Wiley, 664.
9. Where defendant received stock of plaintiff corporation
to be used for its benefit, he is in no position to deny the
legality of the organization of plaintiff, or the validity
of the contract whereby he received said stock. Id.
10. Since whatever would be an injury to the shareholders
would be an injury to their collective or corporate in-
terests, the company is the proper plaintiff to enforce
such rights. Id.
11. Where defendant received 100 shares, and the evidence
supports the conclusion that his services exceeded the
value of 20 shares, the decree of the court below requiring
him to surrender for cancellation 80 shares will be modi-
fled to 60 shares and affirmed. Id.
See FRAUD (1, 2); FRAUDS, STATUTE OF (2, 3).
CORPUS DELICTI-See CRIMINAL LAW (16, 17).
CORRECTING CLERK'S ERROR-See DISMISSAL AND NONSUIT.
CORRECTION OF MISTAKE-See MASTER AND SERVANT (32).
CORROBORATION-See PERJURY (2).
COSTS IN CIRCUIT COURT-See COURTS (5).
COUNSEL'S BRIEF-See APPEAL AND ERROR (1).
COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT-See MASTER AND SERVANT (17).
COURT RULES-See TRIAL (7).
1. Where notice of appeal to the circuit court from the
probate court was not served on the adverse party within
15 days from the date of the order directing the manner
of such service, as required by section 9, chap. 65, of the
judicature act (3 Comp. Laws 1915, § 14153), the circuit
court was without jurisdiction to hear the case or render
a judgment; said section of the statute being mandatory,
and there being no claim that service of notice was
waived. Sokup v. Davis' Estate, 144.
2. On such appeal, no certificate of the probate judge or
affidavit of any person may be considered as impeaching
the record of the probate court; the proper practice re-
quiring an amendment of the return if the facts are not
therein stated truly. Id.
3. Where the appeal bond was not approved by the probate
judge within 20 days after the return of the commis-
sioners on claims, as required by section 3, chap. 65, of
the judicature act (3 Comp. Laws 1915, § 14147), and
the time was not extended by the probate judge, the
circuit court was without jurisdiction to hear the case.
Id.
4. Jurisdiction of the circuit court was not waived by de-
fendant by taking part in the trial, where repeated mo-
tions were made to dismiss the appeal, and at the trial
objection was made to the introduction of any evidence by
plaintiff. Id.
5. In actions arising out of contract, jurisdiction of the court
is determined by the amount demanded in the plaintiff's
pleadings, and not by the sum actually recoverable or
that found by the judge or jury on the trial; the only
effect of failure to recover in the circuit beyond the
amount the party could have recovered in justice's court
being the award of costs against him. Zimmerman v.
Miller, 599.
CREDITOR'S BILL-See HOMESTEAD (2).
1. In a prosecution under an information charging the tak
ing of indecent liberties with a female child under the
age of 14 years, without committing or intending to com-
mit the crime of rape, the testimony of both the girl and
her father that she was 13 years of age, held, sufficient to
sustain a finding that she was under the age of 14 years.
People v. Smolkiewicz, 1.
2. In view of Act No. 89, Pub. Acts 1915 (3 Comp. Laws 1915,
14565), a conviction under said information will be sus-
tained, although the evidence was sufficient to show that
the greater offense of rape had been committed. Id.
3. In a prosecution under an information charging, in the
first count, the commission of the crime of rape, and in
the second the taking of indecent liberties with a female
child under the age of 14 years, without committing or
intending to commit the crime of rape, the testimony of
the prosecuting witness as to what occurred at the time
it is claimed the offense was committed, was admissible.
People v. Parmalee, 4.
4. It was reversible error for the court, in instructing the
jury as to the offense charged in the second count, to
omit to add the words of the statute, "without committing
or intending to commit the crime of rape." Id.
5. Although the testimony given by the people's witnesses is
difficult to harmonize, it cannot be said, as a matter of
law, that there was no testimony that would justify a
conviction under the second count. Id.
6. The testimony of a character witness, in a criminal prose-
cution, that the reputation of defendant was good was
admissible, although he admitted, on cross-examination,
that he had never heard anything said about defendant's
reputation, one way or another. People v. Woods, 11.
7. It was error for the court below to refuse defendant's
requested instruction that in a criminal prosecution the
accused is presumed to be of good character. Id.
8. Where defendant's character evidence was negative, it
was error for the court below to belittle it by stating to
the jury that it was not "much evidence of character or
reputation." Id.
9. It is the general rule that, where several persons are en-
gaged in one common unlawful enterprise, whatever is
said or done by any one of them in the prosecution of
the common enterprise, or while it is still in progress,
is evidence against all the parties to it. Id.
10. In a prosecution for arson, a conspiracy to burn the
building in question having been prima facie proven, a
conversation between witness and one of the conspirators
in connection with work being done to further the con-
spiracy, was admissible. Id. 12.
11. In such prosecution, testimony of one of the conspirators
implicating his co-conspirators, was admissible. Id.
12. Where, in a criminal proceeding, after the jury had been
out over two hours, they were brought into court at their
request, and the foreman informed the court that one
of the jurors had been approached, and the trial judge in-
quired of the foreman if they could render a fair and
impartial verdict regardless of the incident, but no in-
quiry was made of any other juror, and no further in-
vestigation had, and nothing was done to protect the
rights of defendant, and the jury, after retiring for a few
minutes, brought in a verdict of guilty, the motion of
defendant for a new trial should have been granted.
People v. Levey, 129.
13. In a prosecution under 3 Comp. Laws 1915, § 15292,
charging defendant with breaking and entering "the store,
not adjoining to or occupied with a dwelling," evidence
that the store broken into was not adjoining to or occu-
pied with a dwelling house was necessary. Id.
14. The jury in orally rendering their verdict is not required
to state all the language found in the act defining the
offense. Id.
15. In a prosecution for homicide, the denying a motion for
a continuance, held, not to amount to abuse of discretion.
People v. Jackzo, 183.
16. Testimony by the first witness as to a statement of the
defendant that an Indian had killed deceased, and also as
to witness' examination of the body and its condition,
showing acts of violence, held, to comply with the rule
requiring the showing of the corpus delicti in a homicide
case before the admission of other testimony; it not being
necessary to show the finding of the dead body and its
condition by medical testimony. Id.
17. Although, in a prosecution for homicide, the death and
its character should first be shown, there are exceptions
where the same set of facts, in cases of circumstantial
evidence, tend to connect the defendant with the com-
mission of the crime, and also at the same time to prove
the corpus delicti. Id.
18. A voluntary statement by defendant that "I took a stick
to hit Liberty (deceased) with, and he says, 'Don't hit
me,' and I threw the stick in the brush," held, admissible.
Id. 184.
19. An instruction by the court as to the weight to be given
to statements or admissions of accused, held, not erro-
neous, in the absence of request for fuller instructions
upon the subject. Id.
20. The question as to whether a maple stick 7 feet 1%
inches long, with a hook 1 foot and 10 inches long, and
being about 6 inches in circumference at the hook end,
was a dangerous weapon, or one that was likely to kill
or maim, was properly submitted to the jury as a ques
tion of fact. Id.
21. Where there was no testimony showing or intimating in
what township, county, or State, the crime was committed,
held, that the people utterly failed to prove the venue. Id.
22. Where the certificate of the trial judge to the bill of ex-
ceptions shows that it was accompanied by the assign-
ments of error, and the court certifies that all the testi-
mony introduced in the case that is necessary to present
the questions of law raised by the bill of exceptions and
assignments of error is there embraced, an assignment
that the people failed to prove the venue raised the ques-
tion of the jurisdiction of the court. Id.
23. The jurisdiction of the circuit court of a county is re-
stricted to the trial of persons charged with the commis-
sion of offenses in that county, except in case of change
of venue. Id.
24. The court will not take judicial notice of the existence of
an unincorporated hamlet or settlement. Id.
25. A conviction and sentence for homicide cannot be sus-
tained where the venue was not proved by competent
evidence beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
26. In a prosecution for larceny, the granting of a motion
indorsing upon the information the name of a witness
on the day the trial started, 12 days' notice of such motion
having been served upon defendant, and there being no
claim of surprise, or that more time was needed, and no
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