in habeas corpus proceedings brought in the same court;
a writ of error being the appropriate remedy. In re
Joseph, 659.
HARMLESS ERROR-See TRIAL (1).
HEARING UPON MERITS-See APPEAL AND ERROR (14).
HEIFER-See EXEMPTIONS (2).
HERNIA-See MASTER AND SERVANT (3, 9, 10).
HIGHWAYS AND STREETS- See MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
(1-3).
1. A wife living separate and apart from her husband in
another State has no homestead rights in her husband's
lands in Michigan. Affirming Stanton v. Hitchcock, 64
Mich. 316. Standard v. Jewell, 61.
2. The decree of the court below setting aside a deed of a
homestead of 40 acres from a father to his son as in
fraud of creditors of the father, will be modified, on, ap-
peal, to exclude from the operation of the decree the
homestead rights up to $1,500. Van Allen v. Sprague, 116.
See DEEDS (2).
HOMICIDE-See CRIMINAL LAW (15, 17, 25).
HUSBAND AND WIFE-See HOMESTEAD (1); REPLEVIN.
IDENTITY OF GRANTOR-See DEEDS (1).
IMPEACHMENT OF RECORD-See COURTS (2).
IMPLIED POWERS-See CORPORATIONS (3).
INCAPACITATED FOR MAKING CLAIM-See MASTER AND SER-
VANT (43, 44).
INCUMBRANCES-See LICENSES (1).
INDECENT LIBERTIES-See CRIMINAL LAW (1-4),
INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR-See MASTER and SERVANT (13).
INDIVIDUAL ACTION-See PARTNERSHIP (2).
INDORSEMENT OF WITNESS ON INFORMATION AT TRIAL
-See CRIMINAL LAW (26).
INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT BOARD-See MASTER AND SERVANT
(22-45).
INFANTS-See NEGLIGENCE (2).
INFERENCES-See MASTER AND SERVANT (34, 37, 38); NEGLI-
GENCE (7).
INFORMATION-See CRIMINAL LAW (2, 3, 31, 35, 37).
INJUNCTION-See WATERS AND WATERCOURSES.
INSPECTION—See CONTRACTS (2); NEGLIGENCE (9).
INSTRUCTIONS-See APPEAL AND ERROR (10); CRIMINAL LAW
(4, 7, 19, 27, 29, 41); MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (3); PERJURY
(4); RAILROADS (1); STREET RAILWAYS (3); TRIAL (3, 4).
1. Where a wife's will gave and bequeathed. to the husband
all of her estate of which she might die seized, or which
she might be entitled to at the time of her death, held,
since the husband was the sole heir of the wife and the
making of the will was otherwise purposeless, to be the
exercise of her right to appoint him beneficiary in a
benefit policy in the cigarmakers' union. Beland v. Cigar-
makers' International Union of America, 127. ·
2. In an action on a fire insurance policy, where defendant
failed to sustain the burden of proof that it had been
prejudiced by the failure of plaintiff to pay assessments
or to notify it that he had taken out additional insurance,
under Act No. 128, Pub. Acts 1911 (2 Comp. Laws 1915,
§ 9481), plaintiff was entitled to a directed verdict. Lag-
den v. Concordia Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 341.
3. Where assured gave insurer an order on the paymaster
of the railroad company by which he was employed for
four payments, payable in four successive months, in
payment of the premium, but left its employment before
the first payment became due, leaving no funds in its
hands to pay the same, payment to the solicitor who
secured assured's application was not payment to the in-
surer, in the absence of evidence that said solicitor had
authority, either real or apparent, to waive the terms of
the policy and collect the premium, or of waiver or rati-
fication by insurer. Randall v. Travelers Ins. Co., 418.
4. In an action on a life insurance policy by the beneficiary,
where there was no question as to the agent's authority
to solicit the insurance, but the scope of his agency and
whether he had authority to collect the premium, under
the circumstances, was in controversy, 2 Comp. Laws 1915,
§ 9305, defining the status of persons soliciting life in-
surance and providing that in any controversy between
assured or beneficiary and insurer they should be regarded
as agents of insurer and not of assured, held, not appli-
cable. Id. 419.
See CRIMINAL LAW (32, 33).
INTENT-See CRIMINAL LAW (38-40); MASTER AND SERVANT
(44); SALES (1).
INTENTIONAL MISCONDUCT-See MASTER AND SERVANT (45).
JAIL-LIMITS BOND, FORFEITURE-See SHERIFFS.
JOINT ACTION-See PARTNERSHIP (2).
A "joint adventure" may be defined as an association of
two or more persons to carry out a single business enter-
prise for profit. Fletcher v. Fletcher, 153.
JOINT OWNERSHIP-See REPLEVIN.
Since the law governing corporations is applicable to limited
partnerships, a deed to a limited partnership was to a
distinct entity. First National Bank of Bay City v. Van-
den Brooks, 177.
JOINT TORTFEASORS-See NEGLIGENCE (11, 12).
JUDGMENT-See APPEAL AND ERROR (6, 8, 12, 17).
JUDGMENT NON OBSTANTE VEREDICTO-See APPEAL AND
ERROR (9).
JUDICIAL NOTICE-See CRIMINAL LAW (24).
JURISDICTION-See CORPORATIONS (8); COURTS (4, 5); CRIMI-
NAL LAW (22, 23); DIVORCE (2); EQUITY (1, 2, 4, 6); GAR-
NISHMENT; WILLS (1).
JURY-See CRIMINAL LAW (12, 14).
Where the affidavit for a transcript of a justice's judgment
was properly signed and filed by affiant, the neglect of
the justice to fill in the date was not a fatal defect. Van
Allen v. Sprague, 116.
1. Under section 21, art. 8, of the Constitution, the legisla-
ture has authority by general law to delegate to cities
the power to determine the time and manner of nominat-
ing and electing justices of the peace. Attorney General
v. Bolton, 403.
2. Under 1 Comp. Laws 1915, § 3331, as amended by Act No.
275, Pub. Acts 1917, the city of Detroit had authority to
determine, by its charter, the time and manner of nomi-
nating and electing justices of the peace, they being local
officers and their selection a matter purely of local con-
cern. Id.
3. Section 27, Act No. 475, Local Acts 1903, authorizing the
common council of the city of Detroit to fill a vacancy in
the office of justice of the peace "until the next general
election," does not limit said term to the general election
held in November of the even years, but, the office in
question being a Judicial one, the spring election at which
Justices of the Supreme Court, regents of the university,
JUSTICES OF THE PEACE-Continued.
and other State officers are elected, is a “general election"
for the election of judicial officers. - Id.
4. Where defendant in quo warranto proceedings was, on
January 7, 1919, appointed to the office of justice of the
peace in the city of Detroit to fill a vacancy until the
next general election, his term of office was terminated
by the election of his successor at the general spring
election held on April 7, 1919. Id. 404.
LACHES-See APPEAL AND ERROR (18).
LAND CONTRACTS-See APPEAL AND ERROR (13); FRAUDS,
STATUTE OF (4); SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE (1-5).
1. A lease providing that "party of the first part is to furnish
feed for stock until feed can be grown on premises except
for horses. All grain and bran purchased shall be paid
for one-half each after feed is grown on the premises,"
construed and held, that, after the crops for the summer
began to come in, the horses as well as the other stock
should be fed from the products of the farm, and that
all grain and bran purchased thereafter should be paid
for one-half each. Herp v. Murphy, 354.
2. Damage to a building by fire will not relieve the lessee of
part thereof from liability under his contract to pay rent,
in the absence of a stipulation for release or covenant for
the landlord to repair, where the rooms may be restored
to their former condition by the lessee without committing
any trespass. Standard Drug Store v. A. E. Wood & Co.,
564.
See ADVERSE POSSESSION (1).
LANGUAGE OF STATUTE-See CRIMINAL LAW (14).
LEASE OF FARM-See LANDLORD AND TENANT (1).
LIABILITY OF EMPLOYER-See MASTER AND SERVANT (1).
LIABILITY OF INDORSING BANK-See BANKS AND BANKING
(2).
LICENSEE-See ADVERSE POSSESSION (1).
1. Where a deed conveyed property "subject to present in-
cumbrances," a parol license and permissive use of said
premises, held, not to amount to an incumbrance within
the meaning of the deed. First National Bank of Bay
City v. Vanden Brooks, 177.
2. The rule that a deed revokes a parol license, held, to
apply to a deed to a limited partnership, although the
grantor was an officer of the grantee. Id.
LIFE INSURANCE-See INSURANCE (3, 4).
LIMITATION OF ACTIONS-See MASTER AND SERVANT (43, 44).
LOOKOUT-See RAILROADS (1)
LOSS OF HAND-See MASTER AND SERVANT (26).
MAINTENANCE-See DIVORCE (1, 2).
MANDAMUS-See DISMISSAL AND NONSUIT.
MANDATORY PROVISION-See COURTS (1).
MASTER AND SERVANT.
1. Under section 3, part 2, of the workmen's compensation
act (2 Comp. Laws 1915, § 5434), where an injured em-
ployee was taken by his family physician to a hospital
and operated upon, his case requiring immediate action,
and the next day notice was given to the employer and
aid requested, but no response was made thereto, the
latter is liable for plaintiff's reasonable medical and hos-
pital expenses during the remainder of the three weeks
after the injury. Gage v. Board of Control of Pontiac
State Hospital, 25.
2. While a logical construction of said statute requires no-
tice and opportunity to the employer to select the phy-
sician and furnish the needed service during the pre-
scribed three weeks before the injured employee can se-
cure the same at the employer's expense, yet it is not an
unreasonable or strained construction, in view of its pur-
pose, to recognize as inferable exceptions in extraordinary
cases where the surrounding circumstances and critical
condition of the injured employee present emergencies
or exigencies demanding prompt action which reasonably
warrant him in securing the needed service at the em-
ployer's expense without first giving notice and oppor-
tunity to furnish or offer the same. Id.
3. Evidence that the employee was injured in the morning,
but did not at first realize the nature of his injury, that
the same day his wife called the family physician, who
pronounced the case strangulated hernia, and advised an
immediate operation, which was performed that evening,
the physician stating that the following day would be
too late, held, to support the conclusion of the industrial,
accident board that the employer was liable for the ex-
penses of said operation, although no notice or oppor
tunity to furnish the same had been given. Id. 26.
4. Where a mother, as administratrix of her son's estate,
Imade a settlement with the wrongdoer in an accident,
whereby her son was killed, she did not thereby release
the son's employer from liability to dependents under the
workmen's compensation act. Naert v. Western Union
Telegraph Co., 68.
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