John xv. 22,24. kind of discourse did de facto, and of right it ought to produce faith in those, who came under the influence of it: the being convinced by it was the virtue of faith, shewing the ingenuity and discretion of those so wrought upon; and the not being convinced so, was the fault for which unbelievers were liable to just condemnation; If I had not come and spake to them, they had not had sin : and, If I had not done the works among them, which never any other man did, they had not had sin: that is, If my doctrine had not been very good, and my discourse very reasonable; if my works had not discovered abundance of divine grace and power attending them; had not both my words and works been very open and manifest to them; they had been excusable, as having no reasons cogent enough to persuade them; but now they deserve to be condemned for their unreasonable and perverse incredulity. And give me leave, by the way, to observe, that by the like syllogism it is, that faith may (and perhaps in duty should) be produced even in us now: the major proposition is altogether the same: A person so qualified is credible; (this is a proposition of perpetual truth, evident to common sense, such as by all men of reason and ingenuity should be admitted: otherwise no message from heaven or testimony upon earth could be received.) The minor, Jesus was a person so qualified, was indeed evident to the senses of those with whom he conversed, (to such as were not blinded with evil prejudice, and wilfully disposed to mistake;) and will now appear as true to those, who shall with due care consider the reasons by which it may be persuaded: that it is attested by so many, and in all respects so credible histories, yet extant and legible by us; confirmed by so clear, so general, so constant a tradition; maintained by so wonderful circumstances of Providence; in a word, that it is evidenced by so many and so illustrious proofs, that no matter of fact had ever the like, none ever could have greater, to assure it. Upon these and such like premises I embrace the more plain and simple notion of the word belief; meaning, when I say I believe, that I am in my mind fully convinced and persuaded of the truth of the propositions hereafter expressed, (or implied ;) not excluding any objects there contained under any formality, (either of being apparent to sense, or demonstrable by reason, or credible by any sort of testimony,) nor abstracting from any kind of reasons persuasive of their truth. I believe there is a God, the Creator of the world; that he is infallibly wise, and perfectly veracious; that he hath revealed his mind and will to mankind; as well for that good reason dictates these things unto me, as that the best authorities avow them. I believe that Jesus is the Christ, and our Lord, and the Son of God, because the holy scriptures do plainly so teach, and apostolical tradition thereto consents: and in like manner of the rest. [I believe in God, the Father Almighty, Maker of Heaven and Earth.] WHAT the phrase I believe in doth most perly here import, I did endeavour (the last somewhat to explain: I would have deduced Deorum pro-Primus est time) cultus Deos some credere. Sen. Ep 95. qui novit. Ibid. “Εορα καὶ βάσις ὑφια Deum colit corollaries, and added some considerations preventive of mistake, and further explicative of that matter, if my intention hereafter to endeavour greater brevity did permit but for that cause I proceed to the objects of our belief: whereof in the first place, as is meet, and in the front, God is placed; the belief of whose existence is the foundation of all religion, the To support of all virtue, the principal article in all the Guay. Plut. Creeds of all the world. He that comes to God (whoever applies himself to any religious performance) must first of all be persuaded, that God is; as the object of his devotion, and the rewarder of his obedience. For the explication of which, we will consider, 1. What it is that we are to believe; 2. Why and upon what grounds we should believe it. πρὸς εὐσέ For the first: That in the world there are beings imperceptible to our senses, much superior to us in knowledge and power, that can perform works above, and contrary to, the course of nature, and concerning themselves sometime to do so for the interests of mankind; for these qualifications and performances deserving extraordinary respect from us, hath been a constant opinion in all places and times to which sort of beings some one general name hath been in all languages assigned, answerΦαμὶν δὲ τὸν ing to that of God among us. Of such beings, that there is one, supreme and most excellent, incomparArist. Me- ably surpassing in all those attributes of wisdom and Deus sum- power and goodness; from whom the rest, and all mum mag- things beside, have derived their beings, do depend upon, are sustained and governed by; the author, I vi, et potes- say, of all being, and dispenser of all good; to whom Tertull.ad-consequently supreme love, reverence, and obedience vers. Marc. is due; hath been also the general sense of the most Θεὸν εἶναι ἄριστον. taph. xii. 7. num, et forma et ratione, et tate, &c. i. 3. ancient, most wise, and most noble nations among men; to whom therefore in a peculiar and eminent manner the title of God (and those which answer thereto) is appropriated: so that when the word is absolutely put, without any adjunct of limitation or diminution, he only is meant and understood: to which sometimes, for fuller declaration, are added the epithets of Optimus, Maximus, Summus, Æternus, Omnipotens, Dominus, and the like; the Best, the Greatest, the Most High, the Eternal, the Almighty, the Sovereign God. Thus, according to the common sense of mankind, is the word God understood; the notion thereof including especially these attributes and perfections of nature; supreme and incomprehensible wisdom, power, goodness, being the fountain and author, the upholder and governor of all things: and what is contracted with, or is consequent upon these; namely, the most excellent manner of being and of activity, eternity and immortality, independency and immutability, immensity and omnipresence, spirituality and indivisibility, incessant energy of the most excellent life, intuitive understanding, absolute freedom of will, perfect holiness and purity, justice, sincerity, veracity; as also complete happiness, (self-enjoyment and self-sufficiency;) glorious majesty, sovereign right of dominion; to which highest veneration and entire obedience is due. In short, whatever our mind can conceive of good, excellent, and honourable, that in the most transcendent degree is, by the consent of mankind, comprehended in the notion of God, absolutely taken, or in the last sense forementioned. Neither doth divine revelation commend any other notion thereof to us; but explains, amplifies, and confirms this; expressing more clearly and distinctly these attributes and perfections; with the manner of their being exerted, especially to our benefit; and determining our duty in relation to them. Now that really such a being doth exist (that this main principle of religion is not a mere postulatum, or precarious supposition, which we must be beholden to any reasonable man for to grant us) I shall endeavour to prove briefly by three or four arguments, which are indeed of all most obvious and suitable to every capacity, (for they be not grounded upon metaphysical subtlety, nor need any depth of speculation to apprehend them; common sense and experience will suffice to discover their force,) and yet of all that have been produced, they seem to me most forcible. The first is drawn from natural effects observable by every man; a second, from the common opinions and practices of mankind from all antiquity; a third, from particular discoveries of such a divine power attested by history; a fourth, from every man's particular experience concerning a divine Providence. And, 1. I say, that natural effects do declare such a Being incomprehensibly wise, powerful, and good, from whence this visible world did proceed, and by which it subsists and is conserved. That it is true, which the prophet Jeremiah saith, That he hath made the earth by his power, hath established the world by his wisdom, and stretched out the heavens by his discretion, Jer. x. 12. It may be assumed for a principle, which common experience suggests to us, that matter of itself doth not run into any order, &c. if not now, then not yesterday, nor from |