Social Ontology: Collective Intentionality and Group AgentsOxford University Press, 23 Αυγ 2013 - 320 σελίδες Social ontology, in its broadest sense, is the study of the nature of social reality, including collective intentions and agency. The starting point of Tuomela's account of collective intentionality is the distinction between thinking and acting as a private person ("I-mode") versus as a "we-thinking" group member ("we-mode"). The we-mode approach is based on social groups consisting of persons, which may range from simple task groups consisting of a few persons to corporations and even to political states. Tuomela extends the we-mode notion to cover groups controlled by external authority. Thus, for instance, cooperation and attitude formation are studied in cases where the participants are governed "from above" as in many corporations. The volume goes on to present a systematic philosophical theory related to the collectivism-versus-individualism debate in the social sciences. A weak version of collectivism (the "we-mode" approach) depends on group-based collective intentionality. We-mode collective intentionality is not individualistically reducible and is needed to complement individualistic accounts in social scientific theorizing. The we-mode approach is used in the book to account for collective intention and action, cooperation, group attitudes, and social practices and institutions, as well as group solidarity. Tuomela establishes the first complete theory of group reasons (in the sense of members' reasons for participation in group activities). The book argues in terms of game-theoretical group-reasoning that the kind of weak collectivism that the we-mode approach involves is both conceptually and rational-functionally different from what an individualistic approach ("pro-group I-mode" approach) entails. |
Περιεχόμενα
1 | |
2 Groups and WeTh inking | 21 |
3 Collective Intentions | 62 |
4 Acting for Social Reasons | 97 |
5 Collective Acceptance and the Formation of Group Attitudes | 123 |
6 Cooperation and Authority | 147 |
7 WeReasoning in GameTh eoretic Contexts | 179 |
8 Institutional Facts and Institutions | 214 |
All for One and One for All | 242 |
Notes | 265 |
301 | |
307 | |
Άλλες εκδόσεις - Προβολή όλων
Social Ontology: Collective Intentionality and Group Agents Raimo Tuomela Περιορισμένη προεπισκόπηση - 2013 |
Social Ontology: Collective Intentionality and Group Agents Raimo Tuomela Περιορισμένη προεπισκόπηση - 2016 |
Συχνά εμφανιζόμενοι όροι και φράσεις
accordingly activities agreement argument assumed authorized leaders Bacharach’s basic Bayesian games beliefs causal central chapter collective acceptance collective commitment collective intention collective intentionality collectively constructed conceptual concerning condition corporation direction of fit discussion entails equilibria example externally authorized function game theory game-theoretic group action group agent group agent’s reason group attitudes group preference group reason group solidarity group-based group’s intention individualistic institutional facts involves irreducible joint action joint intention jointly kind least List and Pettit member-level members of g methodological individualism mode mutually believed normative notion one’s ontological organization outcome paint participants perform position-holders present pro-group I-mode qua group members qua members rational relevant requires satisfy Searle Searle’s shared situation social institutions squirrel pelt supervenience theory thinking and acting tion tive Tuomela typically we-attitude we-intention we-mode approach we-mode collective we-mode cooperation we-mode reasoning we-perspective we-reasoning we-thinking