more important service to the students of jurisprudence. Those who profited by his teaching will be able to accomplish that which he had not the time to undertake."

We hope and believe that the closing words of this writer may be verified in the future.

Many years ago, Mr. Chittenden, of the American bar, was sitting by the side of the writer of this sketch, at the close of Von Vangerow's course of lectures on the Pandects. All the class were in a state of exhaustion; but it was felt to be exhaustion after a mighty victory. Never will the plaudits with which those lectures were concluded be forgotten. Mr. Chittenden retired with the writer, to the building now known as the "Hotel de Russe," and while the present writer was penning an article on Lord Palmerston for the American Press, Mr. Chittenden wrote on a piece of paper, still preserved, the following account of that closing lecture: "Dr. Von Vangerow was deeply affected, for his students had faithfully clung to him till his last utterance. His face was flushed and his glorious voice trembled with feeling. When he closed, thunders of applause testified the admiration of his students, and many a tear was brushed away from manly cheeks. 'Gentlemen,' said Von Vangerow, 'we have attained our object, and I have now only a pleasant duty to perform. Though, during the long months that have fled, I have given your patience a severe trial, I still hope that the recollection of the labor my instructions have cost you will not cast too deep a shade upon the lectures themselves. You will, I know, remember that the labor has been mutual. I am confident that the investigations of the past session have demonstrated to you that the study of the pandects is, and will be, the only sure basis of a scientific knowledge of the law. I am quite sure that your further researches in jurisprudence will be facilitated by the attention you have paid to this subject. One who knew well has said, and said correctly, "bonus pandectista, bonus jurista," and the experience of every age confirms the assertion. I trust you will regard the notes of my lectures, which you will carry away with you, as a friendly souvenir of the past session. But my time fails; I thank you heartily for your kind and studious attention. It is a guarantee to me that you have acquired a correct idea of the full significance of the principles and doctrines advanced. I shall not, however, blame you,' he pleasantly observed, if you rejoice somewhat at the thought, that- instead of listening to the voice that has so long resounded in this lecture hall-you are about to enjoy a pleasant ferien in the homes of your friends. Farewell.'' Several have been the communications since that "Farewell," which have come from the kind-hearted and noble professor on the banks of the Neckar to the old student on the banks of the Thames. On the 18th of October last a letter came with the Baden impress. It told his former pupil and friend that the excellent professor, Dr. Von Vangerow, was dead, and that on the previous Friday he had been laid in his last resting-place-his "quiet bed," as the Germans call it not far from Umbreit, and Mittermaier, and Rothe, and that a distinguished professor from Munich had been already invited to occupy his chair.-Law Magazine and Review.

There are 347 rules already in force for regulating the practice under the English bankruptcy act.

NOTES AND QUERIES.

EVENING LAW SCHOOL.

BROOKLYN, August 1, 1871.

Dear Sir-In looking over the back numbers of your valuable journal I saw (under the head of Current Topics, in No. 13, Vol. 1) a paragraph relating to the formation of an "Evening Law School," with several prominent names connected as corporators. If such a corporation has been formed, you will greatly oblige a number of students, besides your correspondent, by informing us where to obtain a circular stating the particulars connected therewith.

PROVIDENCE, R. I. Editor Law Journal: Your correspondent, "Quidam" answers the question of "Lex" in regard to the effect of an execution against the husband on the wife's dower, "correctly," as Bishop would say, "according to the light of reason and principle." Mr. Parker's answer certainly shows two very conclusive cases in favor of the affirmative of the original question, so far, at least, as New York is concerned. But, before the matter passes as universally settled, as these correspondents seem to think it, please permit me to call attention to the following note, by Sharswood, to 2 Bl. Com. 137, n. 27: "In some States dower is barred by a sale on execution for the debts of the husband. Davidson v. Frew, 3 Deo. 3; Gardiner v. Miles, 5 Gill, 94; Reed v. Morrison, 12 S. & R. 18: Loudon v. Loudon, 1 Humph. 1." Also, "a sale of lands under a testamentary power for the payment of debts discharges the land from the dower of the testator's widow. Mitchell v. Mitchell, 8 Barr, 126." Perhaps this will induce some one who cares to investigate the matter to give further light on the subject. STUDENT.

LEGAL NEWS.

Of the twenty-three law schools in this country, Harvard, founded in 1817, is the oldest.

A bill has passed the Connecticut legislature creating the office of attorney-general.

Humphrey William Woolrych, sergeant at law and author of a number of legal works, died in England on the 2d of July.

An exchange says that General Phil. Sheridan was made a doctor of laws because of his knowledge of cannon law.

Jules Favre, the great French leader, has resumed the active practice of the law. He re-appeared in his barrister's robes at the palace of justice on the third instant.

The number of assistant assessors of the internal revenue service in Massachusetts, Rhode Island and Connecticut, July 1, 1870, was 154. The number now employed is 93.

The commissioner of internal revenue has decided that officers of a Territorial government are not entitled to the exemptions from income tax, as are officers of State governments under the decision of the supreme court, in the case of Buffington v. Day.

SUICIDE AND LIFE INSURANCE. Considering the limited knowledge which the courts have on the subject of insanity, it is not wonderful that they have been unable to agree as to the effect of suicide on life insurance.

Most policies contain provisions rendering them void in case the assured shall die by his own hand, or shall commit suicide, or shall die by suicide. That these are synonymous terms is not disputed, but whether they include self-destruction under the influence of insanity, as ordinarily understood, is not agreed.

That suicide is not necessarily the effect of mental derangement, but may be the act of a sound, rational mind, is admitted by the most eminent writers on insanity; but that it frequently is the result of insanity, in one form or another, is settled beyond dispute. Ray divides suicides into two classes, founded upon the different causes or circumstances by which they are actuated. The first includes those who have deliberately committed the act from the force of moral motives alone; the second, those who have been affected with some pathological condition of the brain, excited or not by moral motives. Ray on Insanity, 487. Under the first division may be classed those cases where the suicide has been committed to escape infamy, or on account of a sudden and serious reverse of fortune, etc. Under the second head he classes suicides resulting from a melancholy disposition, or from an impulse or propensity to self-destruction, etc.

The authorities concur with considerable unanimity that suicide resulting from some forms of insanity is not covered by the terms of the policy above quoted; but what shall be the criterion is far from settled. The one sustained by some of the authorities, and by the dictates of common sense, is the same as if the act were that of homicide-did the person know right from wrong, etc.? And, to sustain this view, the maxim of nosciter a sociis has been brought to bear. The terms suicide, or death by his own hand, are generally placed in the policy in connection with the other exceptions - "death in consequence of a duel, or by the hands of justice, or in the known violation of any law." And it is contended that this coupling of the words together shows that they are to be understood in the same sense, and that, inasmuch as the last three exceptions designate criminal acts, the first must be taken to designate a similar act- - that is, felonious self-killing. There is another well-known rule of construction that has been applied by the courts, holding that "suicide," as used, means felo de se, viz.: that the words of the proviso being the words of the insurers and not the assured, are to be taken, if doubtful, most strongly against the former.

more liberal to the insurer. In Borradaile v. Hunter, 5 Man. & Gran. (1843), the policy contained a proviso that, in case the assured should die by his own hands, or by the hands of justice, or in consequence of a duel, the policy should be void. The assured threw himself into the Thames, and was drowned. The court instructed the jury that "if the assured by his own act intentionally destroyed his own life, and that he was not only conscious of the probable consequences of the act, but did it for the express purpose of destroying himself voluntarily, having at the time sufficient mind to will to destroy his life, the case would be brought within the condition of the policy; but if he was not in a state of mind to know the consequences of the act, then it would not come within the condition." The jury found that the assured "voluntarily threw himself into the water, knowing at the time that he should thereby destroy his life, and intending thereby to do so, but at the time of committing the act, he was not capable of judging between right and wrong." By the first part of the verdict it was made a case of felo de se, and by the last part a case of insanity. Judgment was entered for the office, and was subsequently affirmed by three of the judges of the common pleas, Tindal, C. J., dissenting. Much stress was laid by the majority, upon the fact that the jury found the act of self-destruction to have been voluntary. Erskine, J., said: 'Looking simply at that branch of the proviso upon which the issue was raised, it seems to me that the only qualification that a liberal interpretation of the words with reference to the nature of the contract requires is, that the act of self-destruction should be the voluntary and willful act of a man having at the time sufficient powers of mind and reason to understand the physical nature and consequences of such act, and having at the time a purpose and intention to cause his own death by that act; and that the question whether at the time he was capable of understanding and appreciating the moral nature and quality of his purpose is not relevant to the inquiry, further than as it might help to illustrate the extent of his capacity to understand the physical character of the act itself. It appears indeed to me that, excluding for the present the consideration of the immediate context of the words in question, the fair inference to be drawn from the nature of the contract would be, that the parties intended to include all willful acts of self-destruction, whatever might be the moral responsibility of the assured at the time."

bring the case within the exception, it must be made to appear that the deceased died by his own voluntary act; that at the time he committed that act he could distinguish between right and wrong, so as to be able to understand and appreciate the nature and quality of the act he was doing, and that, therefore, he was at that time a responsible being. The jury found for the plaintiff. 2 Car. & Kirwan, 134. The cause was afterward brought into the court of exchequer chamber, and will be found in 3 Man. & Gr. 437, by the title of Clift v. Schwabe. That court, by a vote of four to two, ordered a new trial, holding that the direction was erroneous; for that the terms of the condition included all acts of voluntary self-destruction irrespective of the question of moral responsibility. This case seemed to turn, like the former one, on the assumed fact that the suicide was voluntary.

The question first arose in this country in the case of Breasted v. The Farmers' Loan and Trust Co., 4 Hill, 73 (1843). The policy contained a provision that it should be void if the assured "die upon the seas, or by his own hand, or in consequence of a duel, or by the hands of justice." The defendants pleaded that the assured committed suicide by drowning himself in the Hudson river. Replication that he was insane at the time, to which the defendants demurred. The court overruled the demurrer, holding that suicide, as used in policies, involves the deliberate termination of one's existence while in the possession and enjoyment of his mental faculties, and the drowning of the assured was no more his act, in the sense of the law, than if he had been impelled by irresistible physical force.

The cause was subsequently tried by referees, who reported in favor of the plaintiff, and who found specially, "that the assured, on the 25th day of June, 1839, threw himself into the Hudson river from the steamboat Erie, while insane, for the purpose of drowning himself, not being mentally capable at the time of distinguishing between right and wrong." The judgment entered upon this report was affirmed in the court of appeals, 8 N. Y. 299. The principles and authorities were very elaborately examined by Mr. Justice Willard, who delivered the prevailing opinion, and the conclusion reached, that the terms suicide, or die by his own hand, as used in the policies of insurance, mean a felonious self-killing, and not a self-killing by a person incapable of distinguishing between right and wrong. This decision was dissented from by three of the eight judges.

In Hartman v. Keystone Insurance Company, 21 Penn. St. 466 (1853), it was held, that suicide, by taking arsenic, avoided a policy conditioned to be void if the assured shall "die by his own hand," and that even if no such condition had been in the policy, suicide was such a fraud on the insurers as would prevent a recovery. It does not appear that there was any allegation or proof of insanity, and the remarks of the court as to suicide were no wise

necessary to the decision; besides, the last proposition is in direct conflict with the English cases. See Dormay v. Borradaile, 10 Beav. 335.

The question next arose in the case of Dean v. The American Mutual Life Insurance Company, 4 Allen, 96 (1862). The conditions in the policy were the same as in the case of Breasted. The assured came to his death by cutting his throat with a razor. The plaintiff offered to prove that the death was caused during a state of insanity. The court held that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover; that "the facts agreed upon by the parties, concerning the mode in which the plaintiff's intestate took his own life, leave no room for doubt that self-destruction was intended by him, he having sufficient capacity at the time to understand the nature of the act which he was about to commit, and the consequences which would result from it."

The opinion in this case is singularly self-contradictory and inconclusive, but it is certainly not an authority against the proposition that suicide resulting from some forms of insanity are not covered by the usual provisos in life policies. At the very opening a distinction is drawn between the terms suicide, and die by his own hand. The court remarked: "In considering this question, we are relieved of one difficulty which has embarrassed the discussion of the same subject in other cases. If the proviso had excepted from the policy death by 'suicide,' it would have been open to the plaintiffs to contend that this word was to have a strict technical definition, as meaning, in a legal sense, an act of criminal selfdestruction, to which is necessarily attached the moral responsibility of taking one's life voluntarily and in the full exercise of sound reason and discretion." This statement is wrong, both in fact and in law. Only one case theretofore decided had been "embarrassed" by the term "suicide"-that of Clift v. Schwabe, supra; all the others had contained the same proviso as this case, viz.: die by his own hand. That it is wrong as to the law has been since held by the same court, in the case of Cooper v. Massachusetts Insurance Co., 102 Mass. 227, wherein it was said there is no substantial difference in signification between the phrases "shall die by his own hand," "shall commit suicide," and "shall die by suicide." The court -further said: "It is against risks of this nature-the destruction of life by the voluntary and intentional act of the party assured that the exception in the proviso is intended to protect the insurers." "If the suicide was an act of volition, however excited or impelled, it may in a just sense be said that he died by his own hand. But, beyond this, it would not be reasonable to extend the meaning of the proviso. If the death was caused by accident, by superior and overwhelming force, in the madness of delirium, or under any combination of circumstances from which it may be fairly inferred that the act of self-destruction was not the result of the will or intention of the

party adopting means to the end, and contemplating the physical nature and effects of the act, then it may be justly held to be a loss not excepted, within the meaning of the proviso. A party cannot be said to die by his own hand in the sense in which those words are used in the policies, whose self-destruction does not proceed from the exercise of an act of volition, but is the result of a blind impulse of mistake, or accident, or of other circumstances over which the will can exercise no control."

The question was again discussed by the supreme court of Maine, in the case of Eastabrook v. The Union Mutual Life Insurance Company, 54 Maine, 224 (1866). In that case the policy was to be void in case the assured "shall die by his own hands." The death was by suicide in a fit of insanity. The court held that the case was not within the exception of the policy. That "death, whether by disease, by accident or the result of insanity, is in each case within the general object of the policy." But the case cannot be said to be a direct authority against the decision of the Massachusetts court in Dean's case, as the court found that "the defendants had the benefit of instructions in entire conformity with the law, as stated by the supreme court of Massachusetts in Dean v. Am. Mutual Life Insurance Company, and the jury have in the evidence, found the facts such as in accordance with the law of that case would justify their verdict." The St. Louis Mutual Life Insurance Company v. Graves, reported in Bigelow's Life and Accident Insurance Reports, 736, was before the supreme court of Kentucky in 1869. The policy was conditioned to be void in case the assured "shall die by his own hands." The assured shot himself "in a momentary paroxysm," as was alleged, "of moral insanity, which subjected his will and impelled the homicide beyond the power of self-control or successful resistance." The verdict was for the plaintiff, and on appeal a new trial was ordered, but the court was equally divided on the grounds of the decision. Robertson, J., with whom Peters, J., concurred, held that the conditions of avoidance contemplated a rational mind and a presiding will, and that suicide in the absence of these would not defeat the policy. Williams, C. J., with whom Hardin, J., concurred, took substantially the same ground as was taken in Dean v. American Mutual Life Insurance Company, supra. If the force and accuracy of the opinions were taken as decisive of the case, we have little doubt Robertson, J., would have carried the court, for, to say nothing of the arguments of the chief justice, his "facts" are exceedingly erroneous, For instance, he includes Cresswell among the judges who decided Borradaile v. Hunter; and gives the vote in Clift v. Schwabe, as "five to two," whereas it was four to two, and speaks of Breasted v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Company, 4 Hill, 74, above cited, as decided by "the senate of New York sitting as a court of errors," and speaks of "the short, unphilosophical and weak argumentation of this

political body," when, in fact, that decision was made by the supreme court, and the opinion delivered by Chief Justice Nelson, now on the United States supreme court bench.

The charge of McKenna, J., in the case of Nimick v. Mutual Benefit Life Insurance Company (1870), Bigelow's Life and Accident Insurance Reports, 689, United States circuit court, western district, Penn., was substantially, and most of it literally, in the language of Dean v. The American Mutual Life Insurance Company. Its conclusion was as follows: “If, however, you believe from the evidence that he (the assured) committed self-destruction; that he intended to destroy his life, and comprehended the physical nature and consequence of his acts, the plaintiffs are not entitled to recover."

The last reported, though not the last decided, case is that of Cooper v. The Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co., 102 Mass. 227 (1869). The policy

there was to be void in case the assured should "die by suicide." The plaintiff's attorney offered to prove "that the assured, at the time of committing the act of self-destruction, was insane, and that he acted under the influence and impulse of insanity, and that his act of self-destruction was the direct result of his insanity." The judge ruled that the plaintiff could not recover, even if he proved these facts. On appeal the ruling of the judge was sustained, on the ground that there" was no offer to prove madness or delirium, or that the act of self-destruction was not the result of will and intention of the party, adopting the means to the end and contemplating the physical nature and effect of the act."

It is quite evident that the preponderance of the authorities is in favor of the proposition that voluntary suicide avoids a life policy containing the usual provisos. Precisely what is meant by "voluntary suicide" is not very apparent, but we infer from the language of the opinions, that the term is intended to include all suicides not perpetrated in the "madness of delirium." This is a construction severely strict, in favor of the companies. The proviso avoiding the policy in cases of suicide, etc., is the language of the company, and is also in the nature of a forfeiture, and should for both reasons be construed, if its meaning is doubtful, in favor of the assured. The term "suicide," which is agreed to be synonymous with "die by his own hand," has a technical legal meaning, and there is no inconsistency in holding that the parties use it in such a contract according to that meaning. "Self-slaughter by an insane man or a lunatic is not an act of suicide, within the meaning of the law," 4 Black. Com. 189; 1 Hale's P. C. 411. These ancient worthies were not familiar with our modern insurance law.

There is no injustice to insurers in holding them to a strict construction of their policies. If they do not choose to be responsible in case of suicide from any cause, they can easily avoid it by excepting self