State v. Tuller. of Loyal Wilcox, of said Hartford, and which had been by him deposited with said bank for safe-keeping. The evidence supported the declaration, and the defendant was convicted. The defendant moved for a new trial. N. Shipman and Robinson, for the motion. C. Chapman and McFarland, contra. BUTLER, J. [After deciding several points of practice.] Several important practical questions are raised upon the motion for a new trial, and upon the eight requests to charge made by the defendant to the court. The import of the first, second, fifth, sixth and eighth requests is, that the prisoner could not be convicted under the second count of the information. The claims involved in those requests are, first, that the information would not lie under the statute of this State, because that statute does not embrace tellers of National banking associations; second, because the package was not the property of, or a deposit in the bank, within the meaning of that act; and third, that the court had no jurisdiction of such an offense, because the Legislature had no constitutional right to apply it to a National bank. These claims we will consider in their order. The first claim is not founded. The statute is made to apply to all banks incorporated by authority in the State. The language of the statute was originally of the State, and was changed by the revisers and General Assembly in 1866. These alterations and the general language of the first clause of the act, taken in connection with the particular language subsequently used, sufficiently show the intention of the Legislature to embrace tellers in the National banks. Although termed banking associations in the act by which they are incorporated, they are created to do a banking business, and are universally known as "banks," and that is the name generally assumed by them in cases where they had previously existed under a State law, and re-organized under the National law. Such is the name assumed by the institution in question, and such was the name applied to it by the counsel for the prisoner in their requests to the court. It is very clear, then, that the revisers and the Legislature intended the statute to apply to tellers of the National banks doing business in the State. State v. Tuller. The second claim is also without foundation. The property is not laid in the second count as the property of the bank; but as a special deposit by a third person, differing from money deposited on general account, intended by both parties to be mingled with the assets of the bank, and to become its property. These special deposits are very common, and that fact, and the language used, taken in connection with the provisions in respect to the persons who may be defrauded, makes it very clear that the Legislature intended to provide for just such a case. It seems equally clear that the third claim is untenable. It is undoubtedly true that the laws of Congress, if operative at all, are supreme and exclusive, and that offenses against them are not cognizable by the State courts. And it seems to be settled in this State by the case of Davison v. Champlin, 7 Conn. 244, and by high authority elsewhere, that Congress has no power to give the courts of the States criminal jurisdiction in respect to offenses against Federal laws. It follows therefore that the Legislature have no power to constitute such offenses cognizable by our courts. So far as they have attempted to do any such thing by the statute in question, the statute is inoperative. But a statute may be good and operative in part and in part inoperative. Congress, by the National Currency Act, incorporated the bank in question as a bank located within this State. They enacted all the provisions which were necessary to constitute it a corporation and give it being, and all of power or restraint that they deemed essential to regulate that being. They authorized it in general terms to do a banking business, but they did not undertake, by any regulation or restraint, to regulate that business; and they left that to be regulated by the laws of the State and land. They did enact in the 55th section of the Currency Act, that if any teller or other officer of the bank should embezzle the property of the bank they should be punishable by fine and imprisonment. That provision goes to the being and internal working of the bank, and is intended to protect its property from its agents. It was not intended to regulate and has not the effect of regulating the business of the bank with its customers. Now the business of the bank is conducted within the jurisdiction of this State, with our citizens, and in conformity to our laws, and it is competent for the Legislature to pass any laws affecting that business, or protect the bank or its customers in the conduct of that business by State v. Tuller. any penalty, and such law and penalty will not be predicated on any law or offense created by Congress, or have any relation or be repugnant to the Currency Act, or in any manner infringe the jurisdiction of Congress or the Federal courts. It is theft by our law to steal from a National bank; it is burglary to break into one for the purpose of stealing; and it is cheating to obtain money from one by false pretenses. As a corporate being, located in the State, its property and interests and business are protected by State laws and subject to State legislation, and so it is competent for the legislature to protect its customers, the citizens of the State, in their business dealings with it, whatever they may be, whether constituting the relation of borrower and lender or of special or general depositor and bailee; and they may be controlled and protected by penal enactments, without interference with the laws of Congress. Such is the character of the statute in question. It is in part repugnant to the law of Congress, but it also protects a special depositor of the bank against the felonious or fraudulent appropriation of the deposit by the agents of the bank, who have access to it, and so far forth it is not open to the objection urged. The import of the third and fourth requests, if I correctly understand them, is that there could be no conviction under the first count for larceny, if the prisoner took the package entire and unbroken from the bank; but it is not a case for the application of the principle claimed. It is not alleged, nor was it attempted to be proved, that the prisoner received the package, or that he was intrusted with it, or that he ever had any care or possession of it. All that is alleged or could be proved is, that he had access to the place of deposit. There being no trust, or possibility of the breach of trust, no possession nor custody, the technical rule in relation to the breaking of a package is entirely inapplicable Moreover, it appears, without denial upon the motion, that he did dispose of the contents in parcels, and must, therefore, have broken the package at some time. [The remainder of the opinion was devoted to a consideration of a question of practice.] In this opinion all the other judges concurred, except MCCURDY, J., who dissented. The Chattahoochee National Bank v. Schley. THE CHATTAHOOCHEE NATIONAL BANK V. SCHLEY. (58 Georgia, 369.), Liability of National banks as to deposits for safe-keeping-Power to withdraw deposits. A National bank which habitually receives special deposits for safe-keeping as matter of accommodation, is bound by the act of its cashier in receiving on special deposit, a package of stocks and bonds. The bank, though act. ing without reward, becomes a bailee and is responsible for gross. negli. gence.* If a person withdraws from a bank a special deposit, in pursuance of authority conferred upon him by the depositor, the bank is discharged, though at the time its officers were not aware of his authority. Written authority indorsed on a certificate of deposit of stocks and bonds to pay to a certain person dividends or coupons is no authority for surrendering the stocks and bonds themselves. TH ПROVER by Eliza Schley as guardian against the Chattahoochee National Bank, to recover the value of certain bonds left with the bank for safe-keeping, and which the bank failed to return on demand. At the time the bonds were left the assistant cashier of the bank gave a receipt, specifying the bonds and stating that they were received" on special deposit." On the back of this receipt Mrs. Schley indorsed the following: "Will pay above dividends and coupons to" a person specified. The person so specified afterward called at the bank, received the bonds and never returned them again. The bank had occasionally accommodated its friends by allowing them to place valuables in its vaults for safe-keeping. It, however, made no charge therefor, and there was no charge made to nor compensation expected from Mrs. Schley. On the part of the bank it was also proved that when they *The first proposition of the head note, and which is but a repetition of the first proposition of the opiuion, is obiter that question not arising in the case. It is also contrary to the decision of the Supreme Court of Vermout in Wiley v. The First National Bank, post, and to the decision of the Court of Appeals of New York, in First National Bank v. Ocean National Bank, post. It is, however, supported by the decisions of the Supreme Court of Pennsylva nia in First National Bank v. Graham, post; Scott v. National Bank, post. See The Third National Bank v. Boyde, post, and Turner v. First National Bank, post, and notes to above cases.-REP. The Chattahoochee National Bank v. Schley. received the bonds in question, their assistant cashier, who was the only officer of the bank that knew of the transaction, or ever knew that the bonds were on deposit, refused at first to give a receipt, saying that the bank would not be responsible for them, but upon its being represented that all that was wanted was a memorandum to show the numbers and amount in case of accident, such memorandum was given, stating simply that the bonds specified were received on special deposit. The evidence tended to show that Mrs. Schley had orally authorized the person who received the bonds from the bank to use them, though such authority was not known to the bank at the time the bonds were delivered to him. The officers of the bank testified that there was no rule, law, or by-law of the bank authorizing the deposit of valuables for safekeeping; but that they had allowed friends to place in their bankvault valuable packages, but without any idea that the corporation would thereby be made liable. The jury rendered a verdict for the plaintiff for the value of the bonds, and defendant moved for a new trial, which was denied. Johnson & Ingram, and R. J. Moses, for plaintiff in error. Thornton & Grimes, for defendant. BLECKLEY, J. 1. A National bank that habitually receives special deposits for safe-keeping, as matter of accommodation, is bound by the act of its cashier in receiving, on special deposit, a package of stocks and bonds. The bank, though acting without reward, becomes a bailee, and is responsible for gross negligence. Lancaster Bank v. Smith, 62 Penn. St. 47; Code, §§ 2104, 2105. Compare Wiley v. First National Bank, 47 Vt. 546; First National Bank v. Ocean National Bank, 60 N. Y. 278; Weckler v. First National Bank, 42 Md. 581; Foster v. Essex Bank, 17 Mass. 479. 2. If a person withdraws from a bank a special deposit, in pursuance of authority conferred upon him by the depositor, the bank is discharged, though the authority be unknown at the time to the corporation, or to the officer representing it in the transaction. 3. Written authority, signed by the depositor, on the certificate of deposit, in these terms: "Will pay above dividends or coupons |