Εικόνες σελίδας
PDF
Ηλεκτρ. έκδοση

Lionberger v. Rouse.

ing capital of the State, and that the shares of all other associations in the State (there being many), with all the privileges of banking except the power to emit bills, are taxed like the shares in National banks, but it is claimed the proviso in the forty-first section of the National Banking Act, imposing a limitation on the power of the States, has reference alone to banks of issue. To ascertain the sense in which the word" bank" is used in the proviso to this section, it is necessary to recur to the mischief which Congress desired to guard against. The National banks were established to provide a National currency, at a time when the State banks furnished the entire paper circulation of the country. In providing a system by which the States, where National banks were located and did business, could tax their shares, it was important, as their notes came in competition with State bank paper, that there should be no unfavorable discrimination against them. It was easy to see that an unfriendly State could legislate so as to drive them out of circulation, and this consideration induced Congress to limit the State power of taxation in two particulars. In declaring that National bank shares should be taxed like other moneyed capital, and that no burdens should be imposed on them from which State banks were exempt, all was done that the necessity of the case required. There was nothing to fear from banks of discount and deposit merely, for in no event could they work any displacement of National bank circulation. It seems, therefore, clear that the proviso to the forty-first section was meant by Congress to apply to banks of issue. It is proper in this connection to observe that the changed condition of the banking interests of the country has been the occasion of further legislation by Congress on this subject, and that now the power of State taxation over the shares of National banks is subject only to the restriction that the taxation shall not be at a greater rate than is assessed upon other moneyed capital in the hands of individual citizens. 15 Statutes at Large, p. 34.

Having determined that Congress, in imposing conditions on the power of the State to tax, had reference to banks of circulation, the question arises whether the tax in this case was invalid because of the status of the two banks left in Missouri. According to the words of the law the tax was not warranted, but did Congress intend that the law should have such an effect? Did it contemplate that the shares of National banks should escape taxation, if the

Lionberger v. Rouse.

State complied, so far as it had the ability to do so, with the requirements of the forty-first section of the National Banking Act? In our opinion the answers to these inquiries must be in the negative. It is a universal rule in the exposition of statutes that the intent of the law, if it can be clearly ascertained, shall prevail over the letter, and this is especially true where the precise words, if construed in their ordinary sense, would lead to manifest injustice. Dwarris on Statutes, chap. 12; Perry v. Skinner, 2 Mees. & Wels. 471; Stocker v. Warner, 1 C. B. 149.

It is very clear that Congress, in conceding to the States the right to tax, adopted a measure which it was supposed would operate to restrain them from legislating adversely to the interests of the National banks. The measure itself had reference to prospective legislation by the States, and its object was accomplished when the States conformed, so far as practicable, their revenue systems to it. Each conformity was required, if attainable, but the law-making power did not intend such an absurd thing, as that the power of the State to tax should depend on its doing an act, which it had obliged itself not to do. It was well known at the time, and Congress must be supposed to have legislated on this subject with reference to it, that States, by contract with individuals or corporations, could grant away the right of taxation, and that this power had been frequently exercised. It was equally within the knowledge of Congress that the policy on this subject varied in different States; while some of them retained in their own hands the power of taxation over all species of property, except such as were devoted to religious or charitable purposes, others had parted with it to interests of a purely business character, like banks and railroads. Can it be supposed that Congress, in this condition of things in the country, meant to confer a privilege by one section of a law which by another it made practically unavailable? If the construction contended for by the plaintiff in error be allowed, then a State so unfortunate as to have a single bank, whose shareholders are exempt by contract from taxation in the manner provided by Congress, can derive no benefit from the power given to tax the shares of National banks. And this further consequence would follow, that the shareholders of National banks located in one State would escape all taxation, while those whose property was invested in banks in a different locality would have to contribute their full share of the public burdens. This court will not impute to Con

Lionberger v. Rouse.

gress a purpose that would lead to such manifest injustice, in the absence of an express declaration to that effect. Without pursuing the subject further, it is enough to say, in our opinion, Congress meant no more by the second limitation in the proviso to the fortyfirst section of the National Banking Act, than to require of each State, as a condition to the exercise of the power to tax the shares in National banks, that it should, as far as it had the capacity, tax in like manner the shares of banks of issue of its own creation.

Testing the case in hand by this rule, it is apparent that the tax complained of was properly assessed and collected. Missouri has complied, so far as it had the ability to do it, with the demands of the law.

The legislature, as soon as the National banking system was created, passed a law enabling the ten banks of issue in the State to wind up their business, in order that their shareholders could, if they chose, transfer their interests to the new system. Eight of these banks availed themselves of the privilege, surrendered their char· ters as State corporations, and became National bank associations. Two of them declined the proposition tendered by the State, and are still doing business in St. Louis. There is no way the State could compel them to relinquish their charters, nor has it the power to tax their stockholders on their shares of stock. Having contracted with these banks to accept from them annually, in lieu of all taxes, one per cent, on their paid-in capital stock, it cannot turn around and assess a tax on the shareholders. As the State did all that it could to conform its legislation to the requirements of the law, it was therefore in a condition to impose the tax in question on the shares of stock held by the plaintiff in error.

It is objected that the mode of assessment provided by the general revenue law of the State is inconsistent with the provisions of the act of Congress of June 3d, 1864, as it requires the tax assessed on the shares of stock, to be paid by the corporations respectively, instead of the individual shareholders. This was one of the questions in the case of the National Bank v. Commonwealth, decided at this term, supra, 34, and it was there held that this mode of assessment was not inconsistent with the terms of the law, but in all respects unobjectionable. It is unnecessary to repeat the argument presented in that case, or to consider the point further, as we see no reason to question the soundness of that decision.

Judgment affirmed.

Merchants' National Bank v. State National Bank.

MERCHANTS' NATIONAL BANK V. STATE NATIONAL BANK.

[blocks in formation]

(10 Wallace, 604.)

·Power of cashier to certify — Place of business of banks.

A certificate of a bank that a check is good is equivalent to an acceptance; it implies that the check is drawn upon sufficient funds in the hands of the drawee, that they have been set apart for its satisfaction, and that they shall be so applied whenever the check is presented for payment. (See note, p. 61.) National banks have the power to certify checks, and this power may be exercised by the cashier without special authorization. The directors may limit his exercise of this power as they deem proper, but such limitation will not affect a person ignorant thereof who deals with the cashier in relation to matters apparently within the scope of his power.* (See note, p. 6.)

The provision of the National Bank Act requiring "the usual business" of the banks to be transacted "at an office or banking-house in the place specified in its organization certificate," does not prevent the purchase of coin by one bank at the banking-house of another.

M. and S., who was cashfer of defendants' bank, went to plaintiffs' bank and bought gold, paying for it by M.'s checks on defendants' bank, which S., as such cashier, certified to be "good." The defendants' bank refused to pay the checks, alleging that the cashier had no authority to certify them. It was not shown what became of the gold. Both banks had power to buy and sell coin; and defendants' by-laws conferred upon their cashier large general powers, although the power to certify checks or to buy gold was not specifically mentioned. Cashiers of other banks in the same locality testified that they exercised the same powers, and were authorized to borrow and lend the moneys of their bank of and to each other, and to pledge the credit of their banks; and that these transactions were uniformly conducted on the faith of the cashier's implied powers. There was no proof that either S. or any of them had ever certified checks or purchased gold. Held, 1. That if the gold actually went into defendant's bank, the bank was liable for money had and received, irrespective of the cashier's authority.

The present Revised Statutes of the United States enact as follows: "Sec 5208. It shall be unlawful for any officer, clerk, or agent of any National banking association to certify any check drawn upon the association unless the person or company drawing the check has on deposit with the association, at the time such check is certified, an amount of money equal to the amount specified in such check.

Any check so certified by duly authorized officers shall be a good and valid obligation against the association; but the act of any officer, clerk, or agent of any association, in violation of this section, shall subject such bank to the liability and proceedings on the part of the Comptroller as provided for in section fifty-two hundred and thirtyfour."

Merchants' National Bank v. State National Bank.

2. If it did not, it was a question for the jury under the evidence of the powers exercised by the cashier and the usages of banks, whether his power to bind the bank by his contract might not fairly be inferred, applying the rule that where an innocent party deals with a corporation unaware of any defect in its agent's authority, and there is nothing to excite suspicion, if the contract can, in fact, be valid under any circumstances, the party has a right to presume their existence, and the corporation is estopped to deny it.

ER

RROR to the Circuit Court for the District of Massachusetts, in an action by the Merchants' National Bank against the State National Bank, upon three checks of Mellen, Ward & Co., amounting to $600,000, drawn on the latter bank and marked "good" by its cashier. The opinion of the court states the facts.

Messrs. S. Bartlett, J. G. Abbott and William M. Evarts, for the plaintiff in error, the Merchants' National Bank.

Messrs. B. R. Curtis, C. B. Goodrich and B. F. Thomas, contra.

Mr. Justice SWAYNE delivered the opinion of the court.

This is a writ of error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Massachusetts. The plaintiff in error was the plaintiff in the court below. It appears, by the bill of exceptions, that upon the evidence in behalf of the plaintiff being closed, the defendants' counsel moved the court to instruct the jury that it was not sufficient to warrant them to find a verdict for the plaintiff upon either of the counts in the declaration. This instruction was given. The jury found for the defendant. The plaintiff excepted, and has brought that instruction here for review. This renders it necessary to examine the entire case as presented in the rocord. According to the settled practice in the courts of the United States, it was proper to give the instruction of it here clear that the plaintiff could not recover. It would have been idle to proceed further when such must be the inevitable result. The practice is a wise one. It saves time and costs; it gives the certainty of applied science to the results of judicial investigation; it draws clearly the line which separates the provinces of the judge and the jury, and fixes where it belongs the responsibility which should be assumed by the court. The facts disclosed in the bill of exceptions are neither numerous nor complicated. The defendant called no witnesses. There is no conflict in the testimony. The questions which it is our duty to examine are questions of law. None are made upon the pleadings, and it is unnecessary to consider

« ΠροηγούμενηΣυνέχεια »