ed liquidat an account has been liquidated, it carries interest; and that an be consider account is to be considered liquidated after it has been render-ed after is ed, if objections are not made to it. 5. has been rendered, if no objec tions have been made ELLIOTT ads. MINOTT, May T. 1822, 2 M'Cords S. Ca. Rep. to it. p. 127, 128. acknowl memoran dum in writ precision, time of pay be such a li Per Cur. Johnson, J. The general rule is, that an open run- knowl ning account does not carry interest; I H. Black. 305; New- edgment or ell v. Griswold, 6 Johns. Rep. 45. And if the converse of this position is good, it follows that those that are liquidated will; ing with but what will constitute such a liquidation, is perhaps a question the amount of some nicety, and one about which it would be impossible to due and the lay down any rule which would not be subject to exceptions, as ment, will numerous almost, as the cases which would arise under it. As quidation a good general rule, it may be safely laid down, that any note, as will car acknowledgment, or memorandum in writing, fixing with precision the amount due at the time of payment, will be such a liquidation. Thus a letter of credit, which stipulated for the time of payment, was held to entitle the plaintiff to interest on the amount of his account; 3 Wilson, 205: So in the case of Walden, et al. v. Sherburn, et al. 15 Johns. N. Y. Rep. 407; an account rendered, to which no objection was made, was held to be a liquidation, and to carry interest. See also 3 Caine, 234. 6. ry interest. Interest is e.able on book ac CATLIN V. AIKIN, Dec. T. 1832, 5 Vt. Rep. 180. Hutchinson, C. J. Interest is never to be cast on book ac- never recov counts, unless by reason of some contract upon the subject, otherwise than upon the balance, and that only from the time counts, un when the balance ought to have been paid. 7. GRAHAM V. WILLIAMS, July T. 1827, 16 Sergt. & Rawl. Penn. Rep. 357. This was an appeal from the orphan's court, for refusing to allow interest, on a store-keepers running account, until three months after the last item on the debit side. less upon the balance, if there be no contract to pay it. ed book ac count, from three months af Per Cur. Rogers, J. It is more easy to determine, what in- mon terest shall not, than what shall be allowed, in the case of a run- ter the last item, on the ning account. It is usually to the jury, under all the circum- debit side stances. The orphans's court have thought proper, that inter- of the at est only should be allowed, from three months after the last item, on the debit side of the account; in which there is no erron douns A practice by a store keeper to balance his books at the year, and balance of a count. upon 8. GRAHAM, ADM'R OF WILLIAMS v. WILLIAMS, July T. 1827, 16 Appeal from the orphan's court. Rogers, J. Three exceptions have been filed to the decree of the orphan's court: 1. In not allowing interest on the account end of each of John Patterson as charged by him. The intestate, John charge inter Williams, opened a running account with John Patterson, a est on the storekeeper. There was no final settlement, in the life-time of running ac the intestate, but Williams paid Patterson, from time to time, which there several sums of money; Patterson balanced his books at the has been no end of each year, which appears to be his practice, and charged settlement, is illegal. interest on the balance. Whether he allows interest, is not so manifest. It is to this the first exception applies; and there can be but little question, that such a practice, if sanctioned by the court, would lead to great injustice. If there had been an express agreement between them, that would be relieved against, as inconsiderate and oppressive. Thus, when a mortgagee inserts a covenant in the mortgage deed, that if the interest be not punctually paid at the day, it shall from that time, and so from time to time, be turned into principal, and bear interest, equity relieves the mortgagor against such a covenant, as unjust and oppressive. Sir Thomas Mear's case, cited in Cases Temp. Tall. 40, 42; Salk. 449, and Thornhill v. Evans, Atk. 330. Here, to make the most of it, it amounts to an implied agreement, from the practice of Patterson, and the knowledge, and therefore, implied consent of Williams. Sanction this, and it is made the direct interest of this class of people, to encourage their dilatory customers to run up their accounts with them, knowing that until the time comes for pressing a settlement, their accounts will be drawing compound interest. When the day of settlement comes, the debtor finds himself unacquainted, as he generally is, with the operation of this principle, in debt to, perhaps, double the amount he supposed. A judgment and mortgage are the consequence; and finally it ends in his property being sold for half its value. To protect the ignorant and unwary, public policy requires, that courts of justice should put the seal of reprobation on such implied, unjust, and oppressive agreements. When there is a settlement between them, and a promise to pay interest, the attention of the debtor is called to the state of the acconnt. If he is wronged, it is his own fault; he then goes on with his eyes open. V. WHEN RECOVERABLE ON SPECIATIES. (A) ON ACCOUNT FOR RENT, &c. 1. CLARK V. BARLOW, Feb. T. 1809, 4 Johns N. Y. Rep. 183. S. allowable This was an action of covenant, for the non-payment of rent, Interest is and the only question was, whether the plaintiff was entitled to in un action recover interest on rent, being a specific sum, payable in money. for a cer of covenant Per Cur. We are of opinion, that in an action of covenant, tain sum brought to recover a sum certain, due for rent and payable in money, the plaintiff is entitled to recover the interest. See contra, Downing v. Palmateer, 1 Monroe's Rep. 68; Breckenridge v. Brooks, 2 Marsh. 335; Cooke v. W.se, 3 Hen. & Mum. 463; Newton v. Wilson, ib. 470. 2. And in an action of co LAWRENCE V. PARKER, ET. AL. Nov. T. 1804, 1 Mass. R. 198. This was an action on a covenant for the conveyance of land, in which the court computed the interest from the service of the venant for writ. (B) ON VERDICTS AND JUDGMENTS, &C. 1. GWINN, ET UX. v. WHITAKER'S ADM'R, Oct. T. 1805, 1 Har. & Johns. Md. Rep. 755. the convey ance of land interest will be comput ed from the service of the writ. money car from its Chase, C. J. I consider the following principles as establish. Every judg ed by the judgments of the court of Maryland, and in harmony ment for with the decisions of the courts of England: That every judg. ries interest ment for money, will carry interest from the detention of it, un- dare, unless less by the terms consented to by the parties, or the nature of the othe wise judgment, interest is not demandable, or only so in a particular on by the way.* * Interest is recoverable on a judgment debt; Thomas v. Edwards, 3 Anstr. 804; Butler v. Stoneld, 8 Moore, 412. But interest is not in general recoverable on a foreign judgment; Atkinson v. Braybrook, 4 Campb. 380; Doron v. Orielly, 3 Price, 350. Nor is it recoverable on a verdict; Sarrold v. Reeve, & Price, 582. agreed up parties. Contra. Where the defendant 2. WILLIAMSON V. BROUGHTON, April T. 1827, 4 M'Cord's S. Ca. Per Cur. Judgments at common law do not carry interest. 3. THE PEOPLE V. GAINE, May T. 1806, 1 Johns. N. Y. Rep. 343. Per Cur. In all cases where the defendant applies to set applies to aside a verdict, and thereby delays the plaintiff, interest is awarded. In this case, there has been no delay created by the thereby de defendant, and interest ought not, therefore, to be allowed. lays the verdict, and plaintiff, in terest is awarded. But if the plaintiff has himself te layed the cause, he 4. WILLIAMS V. SMITH, PRESIDENT OF THE COLUMBIA INS. Co. The plaintiff in this cause recovered pro rata freight. Thinking himselt entitled to a verdict for the whole, he, in May term last, moved for a new trial, which the the court refused. One cannot have of the questions now was, whether, in taxing general costs, inthe amount terest should be allowed beyond the day on which the verdict of the ver was given. interest on dict further than down to the time when it was rendered. Per Cur. As to the interest, the plaintiff has himself been the means of delaying payment. The calculation, therefore, must be carried no further down, than to the day on which the verdict was rendered. If delayed by the de fendant, the plaintiff is entitled to interest on his verdict until the time of tax ing costs. Interest can not be reco vered upon a scire faci as. 5. VREDENBURGH V. HALLET & BowNE, Jan. T. 1799, 1 Johns. Per Cur. In all actions founded on contract carrying interest, where judgment is delayed by the making of a case, plaintiff is entitled to interest on his verdict, until the time of taxing costs, and the same must be taxed together with the costs. 6. Ex'RS OF MANN V. ADM'RS OF TAYLOR, May T. 1821, 1 M'- Scire facias upon a judgment. Per Cur. Johnson, J. That interest cannot be recovered in. proceedings by scire facias must be apparent to every one who will turn their attention to its form and character: and the authorities on this point are very satisfactory; Vide 3 Burr. 1789, Knox v. Costello, 2 Ld. Raymond, 1532; Henriques v. The Dutch West India Company, Strange, 809. VI. MODE OF CALCULATING. 1. In an action of debt up on a judg ment, upon which pay ments have HODGDON V. HODGDON, Feb. T. 1820, 2 N. H. Rep. 169. Debt upon a judgment rendered for $230, and $66 89, costs of suit. The defendant had paid to the plaintiff, at several times since the said judgment was rendered, several sums, amounting in the whole to $345 75, which had been accepted in part satis- been made faction of the judgment, and the question was, in what manner in interest was to be computed upon the judgment. interest is upon the judgment in Per Cur. Richardson, C. J. Interest upon the judgment is the same to be computed in the same manner that interest is computed on a note of hand, upon which payments have been made. 2. manner as upon a note of hand, which has been paid in part. ments have The Judges of the supreme court of N. Y. in answer to the ques- Rule for casting in tion put to them, as to the mode of calculating interest, when sun- terest where dry payments have been made, state, that they do not know that partial pay the question has been judicially settled; but, according to their been made. understanding, the rule of practice is, to calculate interest on the principal, up to the time when the payment has been made, add this interest to the principal, and the deduct the payment without regard to the time when made, whether before or after the expiration of the year. This rule, however, is to be adopted only in cases where the payment exceeds the interest due; otherwise it will be taking interest upon interest. When the payment falls short of the interest due, interest must be calculated on the principal up to the time when the payments will overrun the interest due on the principal debt; and the deduction then be made; 3 Cow. 87, note. 3. DEAN V. WILLIAMS, Oct. T. 1821, 17 Mass. Rep. 417. The only question in this case was, on the mode of computing the interest due on a note, to secure the payment of which a mortgage was given. Per Cur. One of the methods of casting interest, where partial payments have been made and endorsed on bonds, notes or other securities for money, is to calculate the interest from the date of the security, or the time when the interest is to commence, to the time of the first payment endorsed, to add this to In casting interest up on bonds, notes, &c. upon which ments have partial pay been made every pay ment is to be first ap plied to keep down the interest |