States, as they have, by law or usage in the conrts of the state, from whence the said records are or shall be taken. By the statute of 1795, debt may be brought upon any judgment for debt, damages or costs, rendered in any court of record of the United States, or of any other state in the union, in any court of record in this commonwealth holden for the county in which either party may dwell, or in which the debtor may have any valuable estate. This statute is now in force here. But it is not material, whether this cause is to be governed by our statute, or by the laws of the United States, as my opinion will rest upon the same principles. And I am satisfied that it was the intention of our own legislature, and also of the federal government,to place the judgments recovered in any of the courts of the United States, on better ground than judgments rendered in other state or country; and that judments of this last description only can now be considered as foreign judgments. By the express words of the constitution all the effect is given to judgments rendered in any of the United States, which they can have, by securing to them full faith and credit, so that they cannot be contradicted, or the truth of them denied. And the future effect which congress was to give, relates to the authentication, the mode of which is to be prescribed. The jurisdiction remains as it was before. Whenever, therefore, a record of a judgment of any court of any state is produced as conclusive evidence, the jurisdiction of the court rendering it is open to inquiry; and if it should appear that the court had not jurisdiction of the cause, no faith or credit whatever will be given to the judgment. If a court of any state should render judgment against a man not within the state, nor bound by its laws, nor amenable to the jurisdiction of its courts; if that judgment should be produced in any other state against the defendant, the jurisdiction of the court might be inquired into; and if a want of jurisdiction appeared, no credit would be given to the judgment. And the court must not only have jurisdiction of the cause, but of the parties. As a debtor living in Massachusetts may have goods, effects or credits in New-Hampshire, where the creditor lives. The creditor there may lawfully attach these, pursuant to the laws of that state, in the hands of the bailiff, factor, trustee, or garnishee of his debtor; and on recovering judgment those goods, &c. may lawfully be applied to satisfy the judgment; and the bailiff, &c., if sucd here for those good, &c., shall, in our courts, be protected by that judgment, the court of New Hampshire, having jurisdiction of the cause for the purpose of rendering the judgment; and the bailiff, &c., producing it, not to obtain execution of it here, but for his own jurtification. If, however, those goods, &c. are insufficient to satisfy the judgment, and the creditor should sue an action on that judgment in this state to obtain satisfaction, he must fail; because the defendant was not personally amenable to the jurisdiction of the court rendering the judgment. And if the defendant had gone into New-Hampshire, after the service of the process of foreign attachment, or should have constituted an attorney, to defend the suit, so as to protect his goods, &c. from the effect of the attachment, he would not thereby have given the court jurisdiction of his person; since this jurisdiction must result from the service of the foreign attachment. From this reasoning the conclusion is manifest, that judgments rendered in any other of the United States, are not, when produ ced here as the foundations of actions, to be considered as foreign judgments, the merits of which are to be inquired into, as well as the jurisdiction of the courts rendering them. Neither are they domestic judgments, rendered in our own courts of record, because the jurisdiction of the courts rendering them is put in issue, but not the merits of the judgments. In the case before us the judgment was rendered in a court of record in New-Hampshire, against defendants named in the writ, as of Boston in this state; and it is agreed that when the writ was served they were in New-Hampshire, and the original process was served on them personally. It appears from the record, and it is agreed, that they appeared to the writ and defended the action, and were thus parties to the judgment. Now, an inhabitant of one state may, without changing his domicil, go into another; he may there contract a debt or commit a tort; and, while there, he owes a temporary allegiance to that state, is bound by its laws. and is amenable to its courts. Defendant, therefore, cannot be admitted to impeach that judgment by evidsnce, or to deny it. Judgment for plaintiff. 5. KILBURNE V. WOODWORTH, 5 Johns. N. Y. Rep. 37; ROBINSON If a court of a state should render a judgment against a man Same sub not within the state, nor bound by its laws, nor amenable to the ject. jurisdiction of its courts; if that judgment should be produced And must have juris of the per son and in any other state, against the defendant, the jurisdiction might be enquired into; and if a want of jurisdiction appeared, no credit would be given to to the judgment. Per Parsons, Bissell v. Briggs. And the court must, not only have jurisdiction of the cause, but of the person." 6. TAYLOR V. PHELPS, 1 Gill & Johns. Md. Rep. 492; SHUMMAY V. STILLMAN, 6 Wend. N. Y. Rep. 447; 9 Mass. before cited: JACOBS v. HULL, 12 ib. 25. Jurisdiction of the person as well as the cause, seems essential when judgment recovered in one state is to be enforced in diction both another. As where the court of another state has jurisdiction of the cause as above stated; but the goods there are insufficient to satisfy it; and the creditor sues an action on that judgment in another state, to obtain satisfaction, he must fail because the defendant was not personally amenable to the jurisdiction of the court, which rendered the judgment.† cause. * In Douglas v. Forrest, 4 Bing. 686, where a judgment had been rendered against non-residents without notice of the suit; and who did not appear and answer to the same, in the court in Scotland; but there was an attachment of his heritable property there, and proclamations were made by what is there called norning. The question was, whether such judgment was void? Best, C. J. said, “A natural born subject of any country, quitting that country, but leaving property under the protection of its law, even during his absence, owes obedience to those laws, particularly when those laws enforce a moral obligation. But, he added, "We confine our judgment to a case, where the party owed allegiance to the country, in which the judgment was so given against him, from being born in it; and by the laws of which country, his property was, at the time those judgments were given, protect ed. The debts were contracted in the country, in which the judgments were given whilst the debtor resided in it." So Ld. Kenyon, in Ogden v. Folliott, 3 T. R. 733 observed, "I have always understood it to be clear, that all judicial acts, done in one country, over the property of the subjects within their jurisdiction, are conclusive on the property of those parties in any other country." But chief justico Parsons, in the case before cited, gives an instance of what will give jurisdiction of the cause thus: "A debtor living in Massachusetts may have goods, effects, or credits in New Hampshire, where the creditor lives. The creditor there, may attach these, pursuant to the laws of that state; and on recovering judgment, those goods, &c. may be applied to satisfy the judgment; and the bailiff, &c., if sued in our courts, will be protected by that judgment, the court in New Hampshire having jurisdiction of the cause for the purpose of rendering the judgment." The existence of the property within the territory, gives jurisdiction of the cause to the extent of subjecting the property to execution upon the judgment It is a proceeding in rem.; and is of no force or effect, in respect to the person, or without the territory, except to protect those who have lawfully acted under it. The doctrine of this case is generally recognized in this country. + So in Buchanan v. Rucker, 9 East. 192, where a judgment had been recovered in Tobago against a defendant who was styled, “formerly of the city of Dunkirk, 7. BISSELL V. BRIGGS, 9 Mass. 445, 2d. ed. But an inhabitant of one state may, without changing his domicil, go into another; he may there contract a debt, or commit a tort; and while there he owes a temporary allegiance to that state, is bound by its laws, and is amenable to its courts. He cannot, therefore, be admitted to impeach that judgment rendered against him; because the court had jurisdiction of the cause, and of the parties to it. 8. ANDREWS V. MONTGOMERY, May T. 1821, 19 Johns. N. Y. Rep. 162; MILLS V. DURYEE, 7 Cranch U. S. Rep. 481; THOMAS V. ROBINSON, 3 Wend. N. Y. Rep. 267. not assump In this case, which was assumpsit on a judgment recovered in Debt and the C. P. in New Jersey, the court held, that the judgment be- sit is the pro ing unimpeached and admitted by the pleadings, was absolute per action and decisive evidence of a debt; but they also decided that as- ment of an sumpsit would not lie upon it Spencer, C. J. observed, "with the qualifications that the party may show that the judgment was obtained by fraud, or that the state court had not jurisdiction of the person of the defendant, we are bound by the authority of the case, in the U. S. C. to consider a judgment fairly obtained in another state, as conclusive evidence of the matter adjudicated. In this case the debt was a debt of record. The rule is different in relation to inferior jurisdictions. Thus in Thomas v. Robinson, where debt was brought upon a justice's judgment, rendered in Pennsylvania, held, that it was incumbent and now of the city of London, merchant;" and who had been summoned to appear by a summons, served "by nailing up a copy of the declaration at the court house' door." The judgment was sought to be maintained on the ground of being authorised by the local law, in cases where defendants are absent from the island. But the court said, "Can the island of Tobago pass a law to bind the whole world? would the world submit to such an assumed jurisdiction? The law itself, however, (which says," absent from the island,") must be taken only to apply to persons, who had been present there, and were subject to the jurisdiction of the court, out of which the process issued; and, as nothing of that sort was in proof here, to show that the defendant was subject to the jurisdiction at the time of commencing the suit, there is no foundation for raising an assumpsitin law upon the judgment so obtained." Chief justice Best said, 4 Bing. 670, “ To be sure if attachments issued against persons, who were never within the jurisdic. tion of the court issuing them, could be supported in the country, in which the per son attached resided, the legislature of any country might authorise their courts to decide on the rights of parties, who owed no allegiance to the government of such country, and were under no obligation to attend its courts, or obey its laws." on judg other state. But the U. S. Court, it has been tled the bet is not a an action other state. on the plaintiff to show that the magistrate had jurisdiction of the subject matter of the suit, as well as of the person. They are not courts of record. It appeared affirmatively in this case, that justice's courts in Pennsylvania were created and organized by statute. The superior courts in that state, take judicial notice of the authority and jurisdiction conferred by statute upon these courts; but the courts of another state have no judicial knowledge of another state. If the the proceedings were shown to have been in conformity with the statute; the statute being proved, then the judgment would be entitled to full faith and credit. The evidence being defective, new trial was granted. 9. MILLS V. DURYEE, 7 Cranch U. S. Rep. 481; HAMPTON V. M'- The United States' court, in these cases, decided, that nil debet is not a good plea to an action upon a judgment of another said, has set state; and indeed that no plea would be good except such as question, would be allowed in the courts of the state, in which the judgment that nil de of the state was rendered; thus establishing an identity, in opegood plea to ration and effect, between judgments rendered in the court of upon a judg the same state, and those of other states. Over a question of ment of an this nature, the construction of the constitution and laws of the United States, that court has the final and conclusive authority; so that their decision must be taken to be the law of the land. There can be, therefore, while these decisions stand, no further doubt as to the effect of the judgments of the courts of one state in those of another: Per Parker, C. J. 17 Mass. Rep. 546. By the decisions in the United States court, the judgment of a court of any of the United States, is by the constitution and law of congress, put upon the footing of domestic judgments, for being authenticated as provided by law, they are to have the same faith and credit given to them in every other state; so that the court upon inspection of the record are to decide as upon a record of any court of their own state. Conflicting decisions. 10. HITCHCOCK V. AIKINS, 1 Caine's N. Y. Rep. 466; ARMSTRONG Some diversity of decision formerly existed upon this subject: |