Modes of affirmanco 4. KLINE V. BEEBE, July T. 1827, 6 Conn. Rep. 505. Per Cur. Hosmer, C. J. There are three modes of affirm of acontract ance of a contract by a infant. made in in fancy. And he may mani sent in the The first and most obvious is by express ratification; 4 Leon. 4. The second is, by the performance of an act or acts, from which an affirmance may reasonably be implied; 1 Pow. on Con. 55. The third, an omission to disaffirm a contract within a reasonable time, has been held sufficient evidence of a ratification. 5. JACKSON, EX DEM. BRAYTON V. BURCHIN, Jan. 1817, 14 Johns. The lessors of the plaintiff claimed under a deed from Feathfest his dis erly, who it appeared had previously given a deed of the same land to one Newkirk when he was an infant, being about 19 years of age. same way he assented. Verdict for plaintiff. Per Cur. Spencer, J. The deed was a bargain and sale. And admitting that the deed is not void but voidable, it would seem, not only on principle, but authority, that the infant can manifest his dissent in the same way and manner by which he first assented to convey. If he has given livery of seizin, he must do an act of equal notoriety to disaffirm the first act; he must enter on the land and make known his dissent. If he has conveyed by bargain and sale, then a second deed of bargain and sale will be equally solemn and notorious in disaffirmance of the first. Where an infant pur 6. HUBBARD V. CUMMINGS, Aug. T. 1820. 1 Greenl. Me. Rep. 11. Jackson the plaintiff's testator, conveyed land to Dudley, and chases land Dudley gave him a mortgage for the purchase money. Dudley was then an infant. Dudley on arriving at full age retained poshis maturi session of the land, and conveyed it to Cummings. possession of it after ty is a ratifi cation of the contract. Mellen, C. J. after referring to Zouch v. Parsons, 3 Burr. 1794, held, that the infant had confirmed his contract on arriving at full age by the possession and sale of the land. The same principle was decided in Dana v. Combs, 6 Greenl. Rep. 89. 7. BARNABY V. BARNABY, Oct. T. 1822, 1 Pickg. Mass. Rep. 221. BARD V. CUMMINGS, 1 Greenl. Me. Rep. 11; Dana v. a person ar The guardian of the infant submitted to arbitration the rights A letter by of the infant, and the arbitrators awarded that the infant should rived at full pay the widow an annuity in lieu of dower. age enclos ing money award, on a The infant after coming of full age, wrote to the widow en- in part pay ment of,and closing money and saying, "You will find enclosed the sum of a promise to in part towards your right of dower. The remainder I fulfill the shall forward to you in a few days. It was entirely unexpected submission to me it was not paid before, as I had lodged property in my him when brother's hands to meet an annual payment. made by an infant, is a ratifica Per Cur. Parker, C. J. There can be no doubt that this tion. amounts to a complete recognition of the award and a ratification of it. Judgment for plaintiff. 8. Where re- there is no She disaffirm of period of ance for a KLINE V. BEBEE, July T. 1827, 6 Conn. Rep. 494. Patty Bolles executed a deed of conveyance of her land in mainder in 1791, when she was eighteen years of age. held a note given for the consideration money for the period four years, and married. It remained in the possession of the years it will husband until her death in 1815, who retained it in his posses- an affirm sion eleven years afterwards. The grantee remained in the possession of the land. During all the time there was no disaffirmance of the contract. Held by the court, Hosmer, C. J. Brainard, Lanan, Daggett, Js. that there was both an implied and tacit affirmance. V. LIABILITY OF INFANTS FOR CRIMINAL ACTS.* 1. COMMONWEALTH V. GREEN, Sept. T. 1824, 2 Pick. Mass. Rep. 380. PENNSYLVANIA V. SULLIVAN, Addis. Rep. 143. amount to ance. The prisoner, an infant under fourteen years of age, was con- An infant victed of an assault with an intent to commit a rape. Motion in arrest of judgment. * The infant above 14 years is liable for a breach of the peace, a riot, an assault and battery; 1 Hale, 402. But if the offence is a mere non feasance he will be privi under four teen years of age may be convict ed of an as Per Cur. Parker, C. J, The court are of opinion the verdict an intent to must stand, and judgment be rendered on it. sault with commit a гаре. Any debtor or member of a firm Ensoldent Debtors. I. OF VOLUNTARY ASSIGNMENTS, p. 50. (A) OF THE PETITION, p. 60. (B) OF THE ASSIGNMENT, p. Gl. (D) PAYMENT OF DIVIDENDS, p. 63. (E) DISCHARGE, p. 64. III. STATE INSOLVENT LAWS, EFFECT OF DISCHAR- IV. OF FOREIGN INSOLVENT OR BANKRUPT LAWS, I. VOLUNTARY ASSIGNMENT. 1. SAVINGS BANK V. BATES, 8 Conn. Rep. 505; EGBERTS V. It is settled that a debtor may make an assignment in trust to may assign pay his creditors; and one partner may assign without the knowlpay credit edge of the other-even of goods at sea. And corporations also may assign their property, and give a preference to creditors. property to ors and so may corpo rations. The right to assign property to 2. RUSSELL V. WOODWARD, 10 Pick. Mass. Rep. 408. C. J. Shaw. A trust assignment, made by a failing debtor, pay credit for the purpose of providing for the distribution of his property among his creditors, upon general principles of law, equity and ors is not now an open ques Lion. leged by his non age, because it is said no laches can be imputed to an infant; ib. 3 Bacon's Abr. 591. In capital crimes the following rules have been laid down. Within the period of seven years the infant cannot be punished for any crime; 3 Bac. Abr. Between the ages of seven and fourteen the infant shall be presumed to be incapable of com mitting a crime; and this presumption diminishes in proportion to the advance to that period. At 14 years of age the law presumes them doli capax, and able to discarn between good and evil. expediency, now for the first time drawn in question, this court is not now at liberty to regard as an open question. Since the repeal of the U. S. bankrupt law, a series of decisions upon the subject of assignments in trust for creditors has taken place, founded upon the principles of law and equity, by which a system of rules of conduct and action among the trading community in the older states has been established; and which are not now to be disturbed. ཉ. Assign state. INGRAHAM V. GEYER, 13 Mass. Rep. 147; BLAKE V. WILLIAMS, 6 Pick. Rep. 286; BOXLEN V. CLEAVELAND, 5 Mason's U. S. Rep. 174. Assignments made out of the state: The rule, that foreign ments made bankrupt laws cannot effect a transfer of property in the United out of the States, is now quite settled. And it is equally well settled that a voluntary assignment made abroad, although valid by the laws of the country or state where it was made; yet, it will not be received as valid here, to the prejudice of our own citizens. The case of Ingraham v. Geyer, 13 Mass. R. 147, decided, that an assignment of all his effects, by a debtor in another state, in trust for such of his creditors as should within a given time release their demands against him; the surplus to be distributed among his other creditors, with a reservation of the remainder to the assignor, was void in respect to creditors here, who had acquired a lien by attachment of the property, before suit commenced by the assignees. In a later case in the same court, the chief justice observed, "The assignment set up (in I. v. G.) was clearly void, according to the law of this state. It was said that it was valid in Pennsylvania where it was made; the court said, admit it to be so, nevertheless it would not be received here against our citizens, because it was unjust and unequal in its effects upon them. The meaning was, that though comity, the laws of other states, and contracts made under them, are to be received and followed here; yet this case would come within the acknowledged exception to that general rule, viz. that out citizens should not be prejudiced thereby. It was certainly not intended to decide that a bona fide transfer by a debtor abroad to his creditors, or to trustees for their use, in such form as would be valid to pass the property if made within this state, would be set aside for the benefit of creditors who had acquired no lien until after the making of such assignment;" Blake v. Williams, 6 Pick. 286. So, in Boxlen v. Cleaveland, 5 Mason, 174, where goods were A condition al assign on consignment in Boston; and the owners in Pennsylvania having failed, made an assignment for the benefit of their creditors; but before notice of the assignment reached the consignees, a creditor of the debtors who also was a citizen of Pennsylvania attached the goods in Boston; held that the assignment held the property. Preferred creditors: As a debtor may pay all, he may pay any, or he may pay some in preference to others. So he may assign his property in trust for the use and benefit of his creditors generally; or he may assign in trust to particular debts. In the execution of this power, the debtor is clothed with legislative authority; and may prescribe the terms of preference in his deed of assignment; 1 Hop. Ch. R. 373; 7 Pet. R. 608; 11 Pick. 829; 5 N. H. R. 113; 7 Greenl. 241; 2 Conn. 683. The case last cited held the assignment valid, where the property consisted of a manufacturing establishment and stock; and where the creditor, who claimed to hold the property by attachment was not named in the schedule; and although the assignees were directed to work up the stock. 4. LOCKE V. WINNING, 3 Mass. Rep. 315. In Lock, assignee v. Winning, which was a case under the bankrupt law, C. J. Parsons observed, "until an act of bankruptcy committed, the bankrupt has the exclusive right to dispose of his effects at his pleasure, so that the disposition be bona fide, and not fraudulent. He may continue to pay his debts, and transact his business in the ordinary course of his trade, or may pay the debts of any creditor using due diligence to recover payment, either by demanding it, or by threatening a legal prosecution to recover it; and in one case it is holden that he may, on demand, secure a debt not yet payable. But in all these cases he must act fairly, without an intention of preferring one creditor to others. Such intent is a fraud upon the other creditors; because the bankrupt laws do not allow of favored creditors. But as the law now is, sureties equally with creditors may be preferred; 15 Mass. 69; 5 ib. 42. 144; 6 Greenl. 395; 1 Rawle, 258. 5. WIGERY V. HASCALL, March T. 1809, 5 Mass. Rep. 144; BOR- |