either were in actual, peaceable occupation of the premises for the period of six years, or upward, before the commencement of the action, or that they occupied it for a less period under color of title and in good faith. The declaration in the first suit between these parties was filed on September 8, 1913, and the record discloses that the first improvement was made upon the premises either in 1907 or 1908, the date not being fixed positively, and it is impossible to tell whether it was before September 8, 1907, or not. This improvement consisted of a small part of a barn extending into the disputed strip. We are satisfied from a reading of this record that there was not sufficient evidence to have warranted the submission to the jury of the question whether or not the property was occupied for six years before the commencement of the suit, nor are we of the opinion that the defendants had any color of title to the disputed strip. Moreover, we think it conclusively shown that the alleged improvements were a damage and a detriment to the property rather than a benefit, because of their location and the inability to use them, and that therefore the improvements added nothing to the value of the land. We are therefore of the opinion that no prejudicial error was committed by the court in failing to give the requests as presented with reference to this phase of the case. The judgment is affirmed. BIRD, C. J., and OSTRANDER, MOORE, STEERE, BROOKE, FELLOWS, and STONE, JJ., concurred. GILLETT v. MICHIGAN UNITED TRACTION CO. 1. NEGLIGENCE-STREET RAILWAYS-PERSONAL INJURIES-CONTRIB UTORY NEGLIGENCE-PRESUMPTIONS-EYEWITNESSES. In an action against a street railway company for personal injuries caused by a collision between plaintiff's automobile and an interurban car, where plaintiff started from the curb and drove his automobile in front of the car, and no witness was able to say whether or not plaintiff looked to see if a car was coming, and he testified that his mind was a blank as to what happened, the presumption that, in the absence of eyewitnesses, plaintiff was free from contributory negligence, held, not applicable. 2. EVIDENCE-PRESUMPTIONS-WEIGHT AGAINST EVIDENCE. A rebuttable or prima facie presumption has no weight as evidence; it may establish a prima facie case, but, if challenged by rebutting evidence, the presumption cannot be weighed against the evidence. 3. NEGLIGENCE-CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE- PRESUMPTIONS - EVI DENCE-QUESTION FOR JURY. When direct, positive, and credible rebutting evidence is introduced, the presumption of due care ceases to operate; but when circumstantial evidence of doubtful value is the only rebutting evidence offered, the question should be submitted to the jury. 4. SAME. It is only in cases where direct testimony of credible eyewitnesses as to the negligence of deceased is uncontradicted that the court is warranted in directing a verdict for the defendant on the ground of decedent's contributory negligence; if the testimony is contradicted or rendered improbable by the circumstances, or if the credibility of the witnesses is attacked, the question must be submitted to the jury; the evidence to be weighed unaided by the presumption. 5. SAME-EVIDENCE-DUE CARE-PRESUMPTIONS. If the jury decide that the testimony tending to show negli gence on the part of the deceased has been overcome, the presumption of due care will still operate. 6. SAME CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE-PRESUMPTIONS-OVERCOMING PRESUMPTIONS. The real test as to whether the presumption of due care has been overcome is whether or not evidence tending to show contributory negligence, be it direct or circumstantial, is so conclusive that reasonable and unprejudiced minds could not fail to be convinced that decedent was careless. 7. SAME-EVIDENCE-CONCLUSIVENESS-DIRECTED VERDICT. Where there was evidence that if plaintiff had looked he would have seen the car coming and realized his danger, from which an inference might properly be drawn that he did not see the car, and that either he did not look, or that he did look but carelessly drove upon the track, and the inevitable conclusion to which all unprejudiced minds must come is that plaintiff was clearly guilty of contributory negligence under the peculiar facts in the case, the trial judge was justified in directing a verdict for defendant. Error to Calhoun; North, J. Submitted January 15, 1919. (Docket No. 36.) Decided April 3, 1919. Case by Melvin J. Gillett against the Michigan United Traction Company for personal injuries. Judgment for defendant on a directed verdict. Plaintiff brings error. Affirmed. Price & Whiting, for appellant. Sanford W. Ladd (Warren, Cady, Ladd & Hill, of counsel), for appellee. KUHN, J. Plaintiff has brought this action to recover damages for injuries received in a collision between his automobile and an interurban car of the defendant company, which occurred on State street in the city of Marshall, under the following circumstances: Plaintiff had left his automobile standing, facing west, close to the curb on the north side of State street in the block between Madison and Jefferson streets, while he went into Bently's grocery store on an errand. It was a two-seated Ford car, the top was up, and some, if not all, the side curtains were on. Upon leaving the store, he got into the car and attempted to start, but had some difficulty with his engine, and two young men who happened to be passing stopped and cranked it for him several times before he succeeded in getting under headway. He then immediately turned his car from the curb, making about as short a turn as was possible, and drove directly onto the street car track, where his machine was struck by a west-bound interurban car and carried nearly to Jefferson street. Plaintiff was severely injured by the impact. State street from curb to curb at this point is 66 feet wide, and the distance from the curb to the nearest rail of the street car track is 30.5 feet. Plaintiff testified that he had no recollection whatever of the accident, but that his mind was a complete blank as to what happened from the time he stepped out of the grocery store onto the sidewalk to the time he found himself at home in bed, suffering from his injuries. The testimony varied somewhat concerning the speed of the interurban car, ranging from that given by the motorman of 12 to 15 miles an hour to that of two or three persons who witnessed the accident from the sidewalk or store windows, who estimated it at from 20 to 30 miles an hour. There was a city ordinance limiting the speed at this particular point to 10 miles an hour. All the witnesses agreed that it was a wet, slippery morning. There was a conflict in the testimony as to how far the car traveled after the collision before coming to a stop. The accident happened directly in front of Hewlett's jewelry store, the first store west of Bently's grocery. The motorman insisted that he stopped with the front of his car in the middle of Jefferson street. This, according to the measurements given on the blue-print, Exhibit A, would make the distance about 150 feet. Other witnesses stated that the rear of the car was either in the middle, or even with the farther curb, of Jefferson street. If this is true, the distance must have been from 210 to 230 feet, as the interurban car was shown to have been 61 feet in length. The testimony is conflicting as to whether the motorman sounded the gong before crossing Madison street, but nearly all the witnesses testified that he sounded a warning whistle while his car was crossing Madison street or a few feet beyond and as soon as it became apparent that plaintiff was going to try to cross the street. The automobile was going at a speed of 4 or 5 miles an hour, and apparently made no effort to turn aside, or to stop, or to increase its speed. None of the witnesses were able to testify whether or not the plaintiff, either at the time he started from the curb or at any subsequent moment before the collision, looked back to see if a car was coming. The trial judge first submitted the case to the jury, but, when it became apparent that the jurors could not agree, called them back and directed a verdict for the defendant on the ground that plaintiff had failed to meet the burden resting upon him to prove that he was in the exercise of due care. It is the claim of the plaintiff that the presumption of due care, which we have held may sometimes be applied in cases where the plaintiff was killed by the accident and there were no eyewitnesses, should be held also to apply to a case such as the present one where the plaintiff survives, but has no recollection whatever of the accident, and where there are no witnesses who can testify as to whether or not he fulfilled the duty of looking and listening which the law imposed upon him. This would present an interesting question if this were a case where the presumption relied upon would have operated, had the plaintiff been killed by the collision. But, in our view of the law, |