"The defendants confidently contend that plaintiff has no personal claim against them for the taxes paid and has no redress whatever, since he failed to obtain it under the provisions of said section 8172. The decisions cited by them do not foreclose the question. In Spencer v. Levering, 8 Minn. 461, where the statement is made that there is no personal liability against the mortgagor for failure to pay taxes, it does not appear that any agreement existed in regard thereto. Nor did Martin v. Lennon, 19 Minn. 67 (65 Am. St. Rep. 576), or Nopson v. Horton, 20 Minn. 268, involve any agreement between the litigants in regard to the taxes. Cases from other jurisdictions do not reach the point because of dissimilarity of mortgage stipulations, of statutes and of facts. Those tending to sustain defendants' position that no express or implied agreement can be spelled out which authorizes a recovery against them are: Johnson v. Payne, 11 Neb. 269 (9 N. W. 81); Kersenbrock v. Muff, 29 Neb. 530 (45 N. W. 778); Walton v. Hollywood, 47 Mich. 385 (11 N. W. 209); Vincent v. Moore, 51 Mich. 618 (17 N. W. 81); Swan v. Emerson, 129 Mass. 289; Semans v. Harvey, 52 Ind. 331; Horrigan v. Wellmuth, 77 Mo. 542; Stone v. Tilley, 100 Tex. 487 (101 S. W. 201, 10 L. R. A. [N. S.] 678, 123 Am. St. Rep. 819, 15 Ann. Cas. 524). However, in Hogg v. Longstreth, 97 Pa. 255, the supreme court of Pennsylvania held that a mortgagee may pay the taxes and sue the mortgagor, whose duty it was to pay them, in assumpsit. In the case at bar it must be observed that defendants stipulated that in case of default in payment of taxes plaintiff, the assignee of the mortgagee, might pay them and charge the amount to the defendants; that the payment was not made until after the foreclosure; that the statute (section 8172) permitted plaintiff to make the payment when it was made and gave a lien on the land therefor; and that the foreclosure never became complete so that the purchaser could be said to have taken the title as it stood at the time of the sale, charged with these taxes. The defendants at all times remained the owners of the mortgaged premises. It has been held that a mortgagee who has paid taxes to protect his interests prior to the foreclosure sale may reimburse himself from the proceeds of the sale, although no mention was made in the foreclosure

notice, or the proceedings were so irregular that no claim could be made that the lien given by the statute, or by the usual terms of the mortgage, was enforced in the foreclosure proceeding. Gorham v. Insurance Co., 62 Minn. 327 (64 N. W. 906); Hamel v. Corbin, 69 Minn. 223 (72 N. W. 106). Taxes paid by plaintiff during the year of redemption should, as to these defendants, stand in as good position since the enactment of section 8172, as did the taxes paid by the holder of the mortgage in the two cases last referred to.

"It would seem therefore to follow that at least plaintiff was not a volunteer or intermeddler when he redeemed from the tax certificates held by Hicks & Co. and when he, during the year of redemption, paid the subsequent taxes in order to avoid the imposition of the penalty. The statute gave him the right to make the payment and have a lien therefor. His mortgage executed by defendants permitted him to make the payment and charge the amount to them as owners of the land, and it further authorized him to purchase and hold tax titles upon the land in his own right. Under this situation it would be a gross injustice to permit defendants to profit several hundred dollars from plaintiff's mistake or inadvertence. Regardless of the right to a personal judgment we think plaintiff is entitled to be subrogated to the position of Hicks & Co. and the State as to these taxes. Taxes are a perpetual lien until paid. Hicks & Co. as holders of the tax certificates held this lien, by virtue of which they had also the right to pay subsequent taxes and acquire a lien therefor. Section 2125 G. S. 1913. We perceive no good reason why defendants should be heard to object to such subrogation. There is ample authority for the proposition that one who has paid taxes to protect his own rights and not as a volunteer or intermeddler, may be subrogated to the rights of the State or of the one who had acquired the State's rights. Pratt v. Pratt, 96 Ill. 184; Sharp v. Thompson, 100 Ill. 447 (39 Am. Rep. 61); Cockrum v. West, 122 Ind. 372 (23 N. E. 140); John v. Connell, 61 Neb. 267 (85 N. W. 82); Fiacre v. Chapman, 32 N. J. Eq. 463; Title Guarantee & Trust Co. v. Haven, 196 N. Y. 487 (89 N. E. 1082, 1085, 25 L. R. A. [N.

S.] 1308, 17 Ann. Cas. 1131). In this State in two cases where subrogation was permitted, there was included in the lien allowed, amounts paid for taxes. Emmert v. Thompson, 49 Minn. 386 (52 N. W. 31, 32 Am. St. Rep. 566), and Elliott v. Tainter, 88 Minn. 377 (93 N. W. 124).

"In our opinion the facts pleaded show that plaintiff, in reference to the payment of taxes and redeeming from the tax certificates of Hicks & Company, did so lawfully, under both contract and statute, to protect his interest in the land; and justice requires that he be substituted to the liens held by Hicks & Co., and the State, notwithstanding these have been canceled.

""This doctrine (of subrogation) is applied when such lien has been discharged under a mistake of the real situation, to save the party * * from loss if such payment and discharge would otherwise give the owner of the land an unconscionable and inequitable advantage over the person who paid the same.' Elliott v. Tainter, supra.”

It would be a great injustice if in the instant case the defendant could take over the land without paying the taxes which it was the duty of the owner to pay. The decree should be affirmed, with costs.

KUHN, J., concurred with MOORE, J.

OSTRANDER, J. The mortgage was foreclosed by advertisement and the premises were bid in, not by the mortgagee, but by a third person, a stranger to the title. The bid was considerably in excess of the mortgage debt. Afterwards, during the period of redemption, the purchaser paid taxes theretofore and thereafter levied upon the mortgaged premises. The owner of the land-by inheritance-in proper time paid the amount bid and interest to redeem from the sale, and the record in the office of the register of deeds was made to show the fact. Later, he sold a part of the land, giving a warranty deed therefor, to defendant Overton. The purchaser at the foreclosure sale filed

the bill in this cause, setting up these and other facts -which other facts do not affect or change the issue. presented-asking, among other things, that it may be

decreed

"that the plaintiff is the holder of the said lands and the title thereto or a lien thereon in trust and that the said E. Porter Button be required to pay the amount of principal paid by this plaintiff to the sheriff of Van Buren county on the 11th day of December, 1916, the interest thereon to the date of the decree, the taxes advanced and paid by this plaintiff to free the lands from the liens created thereby and interest thereon as well as all costs and charges which this plaintiff is put to in this suit and that the same be paid at a short day to be fixed by the court in such decree and that in default thereof, that he be forever barred from asserting any claim to said lands or any portion thereof.

"(5) That the fund now in the hands of the register of deeds be impounded by this court to be used to reimburse the said Fred J. Overton, if in equity and justice it shall be found that he paid over any money to the said E. Porter Button for the land so deeded to him to aid the said E. Porter Button in attempting to redeem said land, and to be used for such other purpose to protect the rights and interests of innocent parties involved in this litigation and agreeable to the facts and circumstances as they develop on the hearing of said cause."

The decree entered reads, in part, as follows:

"That the said Alfred Wood be and he is hereby granted a lien, and a lien is hereby created on the land above described for said sums, together with the interest thereon and the costs of this proceeding and that in default of the payment thereof the said premises above described or so much thereof as may be sufficient to raise the amount so as aforesaid decreed to be due the said plaintiff with interest thereon as aforesaid and the costs in this case, and the costs and expenses of sale, may be sold at public auction."

The sums so referred to are $66.45 and $211.41,

and interest thereon from February 27, 1917, to the date of payment. It is further decreed:

"That after the payment aforesaid the redemption of said land by the said E. Porter Button, be in all things confirmed the same as though the said E. Porter Button had paid to the register of deeds the taxes aforesaid, with interest thereon up to the time of said redemption."

The bill was not demurred to, but was answered, affirmative relief for defendants being asked for.

In my opinion, the case presented is not one to be determined upon some notion of general equities. The parties have a right to stand upon the law. Carlisle v. Dunlap, 203 Mich. 602. The right to redeem from a foreclosure at law is a legal right, is created by the statute, and can neither be enlarged nor abridged by courts. A redemption is complete when one having the right to redeem pays in proper time, to a proper person,

"the sum which was bid * * with interest from the time of the sale at the rate per cent. borne by the mortgage, * * * and in case such payment is made to the register of deeds, the sum of one dollar as a fee." * 3 Comp. Laws 1915, § 14959.

Such a redemption was made in this case. The power of sale contained in the mortgage is exhausted, the mortgage debt is paid, the mortgage lien discharged, the sheriff's deed canceled, and the mortgagee and the bidder at the sale have no further interest in the property. In what right, then, and by what authority may a court declare a lien upon the land for taxes paid by the bidder after he purchased the land and before redemption? It seems to be considered that upon the authority of decided cases the question may be somehow answered favorably to plaintiff. Various cases are referred to and voluminously quoted from without pointing out the principle relied upon