Sunderland Bros. Co. v. Missouri P. R. Co. one of the plaintiff's yards, and the plaintiff would be remediless. The intent and purport of the statute was to give the plaintiff some remedy when the defendant neglected, delayed or refused to place the cars at their destination. If the railroad's construction of this statute is, as they contend, correct, then the whole statute fails in its purpose, for a train of sand is no more available to Sunderland Brothers on the 'hold tracks' of the defendant company than it would be at Louisville. The statute goes to the question of the prompt delivery of the cars at the point where the shipper wants them." We think the district court properly held that cars "held waiting orders" should be considered placed only while they were being so held, and that after orders were received from the consignee specifying the yard in which the cars should be placed the statutory time should again run. To hold otherwise would defeat the very object of the statute, to wit: the prompt delivery of cars after arrival at destination. Plaintiff has filed a cross-appeal from the findings of the district court. In order to determine exactly the correctness of these findings, it would be necessary to examine the evidence as to the time of loading and of arrival in Omaha of each and every one of over 2,000 cars, and also to examine and determine how long a time each car was "held waiting orders" before delivery at the yards of the consignee. If the record and documentary evidence produced had been examined by disinterested and expert accountants and such experts had testified to the result of their examination, both the district court and this court would have been better able to determine the issues. The argument and briefs have not convinced us that the district court erred in its findings. The finding of the district court in such a case is of the same weight as the verdict of a jury and will not be set aside unless clearly wrong. AFFIRMED. ROSE, J., not sitting. Henke v. Deemer. JOHN HENKE ET AL., APPELLANTS, V. GEORGE W. DEEMER, APPELLEE. FILED APRIL 14, 1917. No. 19455. 1. Justice of the Peace: JURISDICTION. "In computing the 'amount in controversy' to ascertain whether a case is within the jurisdiction of a justice of the peace, interest accrued at the time of suit on an interest-bearing debt should be considered." Adams v. Nebraska Savings & Exchange Bank, 56 Neb. 121. 2. 3. -: "It is not the amount which the bill of particulars shows the plaintiff might claim, but the actual amount of his demand, which ascertains the jurisdictional amount." Adams v. Nebraska Savings & Exchange Bank, 56 Neb. 121. : The bill of particulars and summons both disclosing that the amount of the debt with interest from the time it was claimed to the filing of the suit exceeded $200, a justice of the peace had no jurisdiction of the suit. APPEAL from the district court for Dawes county: WILLIAM H. WESTOVER, JUDGE. Reversed, with directions. Allen G. Fisher and William P. Rooney, for appellants. Lee Card, contra. LETTON, J. Plaintiff filed a bill of particulars, not verified, before the county judge exercising jurisdiction as a justice of the peace, and procured a summons, returnable in four days, to be issued and served. He sought to recover for medical services in the sum of $197, with interest from the 3d day of January, 1914. Defendants appeared especially and objected to the jurisdiction of the judge, because the amount sued for was in excess of $200, the limit of jurisdiction of a justice of the peace. The court had no power to issue a summons returnable in four days in such a case, and the summons was not returnable nor in form or substance such as required in term cases. This objection was overruled, and defendants made no further appearance. Judg Manning v. Pomerene. ment was rendered by default against them for $197. Error proceedings were prosecuted to the district court, which affirmed the judgment. Defendants appeal. In Adams v. Nebraska Savings & Exchange Bank, 56 Neb. 121, it is held that the "amount in controversy" which determines the jurisdiction includes interest accrued at the time of the suit, but that if the summons does not show on its face that the demand is in excess of jurisdiction upon default, the court could render judgment to the full jurisdictional amount. In this case both the bill of particulars and the summons disclosed that the plaintiff claimed $197, with interest from January 3, 1914. The debt exceeded the jurisdiction of the county judge sitting as a justice of the peace, and the summons returnable in four days should have been quashed. The judgment of the district court is reversed and the cause remanded, with instructions to reverse the judgment of the county court. REVERSED. CHAPIN E. MANNING, APPELLEE, V. LOUIS W. POMERENE, APPELLANT. FILED APRIL 14, 1917. No. 20008. 1. Master and Servant: WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT: ACCIDENT. Plaintiff, who was employed to attend to and fire a steam-heating boiler, was compelled to use a narrow passageway when inspecting the steam gauges. Two iron beams lay on the boiler, and the ends projected over the passage. Plaintiff attempted to move them out of the way by pushing with his body, when he felt pain in his stomach, became faint and weak, was compelled to cease work and be assisted home. On the third day afterward he vomited blood, and afterwards had a slight paralytic stroke. Held, that his condition was the result of an accident as defined in section 3693, Rev. St. 1913, and that the injury arose out of and in the course of his employment. 2. : Manning v. Pomerene. - APPEAL: CONFLICTING EVIDENCE. The evidence as to whether the present disability of the plaintiff was caused by the accident being conflicting, and there being sufficient testimony to that effect to support the finding of the district court, its judgment will not be disturbed. APPEAL from the district court for Lancaster county: WILLARD E. STEWART, JUDGE. Affirmed. Strode & Beghtol, for appellant. Charles S. Roe and G. P. Putnam, Jr., contra. LETTON, J. Action under the workmen's compensation act. The plaintiff was a steam-fitter's helper employed by the defendant, who was engaged in the heating and plumbing business. While engaged in attending to a boiler for the defendant, the plaintiff attempted to move two steel "I" beams resting about three feet from the floor by pushing against the beams with his body. He did this once or twice, when he felt faint and sick, and was compelled to sit down. He was unable to work during the remainder of the day. He worked the next day at overseeing some other men. The next day was Sunday. He felt sick and faint during this time, but was able to take a walk that day. On Monday he felt worse, and that night he vomited blood, and has since been unable to work. He was paid compensation for part of the time, but afterwards defendant refused to make further payments, on the ground that the disability from which plaintiff now suffers is not due to the injury to which he ascribes it. The district court awarded him $678 as arrears, and $9.60 a week for 300 weeks, and $7.60 a week for the remainder of his life as compensation. From this award the defendant appeals, insisting (1) that the removal of the beams was not within the scope of plaintiff's employment; (2) that plaintiff did not suffer an "accident" as defined in the statute, and that his indisposition or disability was caused by senile arterio sclerosis; (3) that he has fully recovered from the effect of the injury, even if it had been caused by accident. Manning v. Pomerene. As to the first point we are satisfied that the injury or accident, if any there was, occurred in the course of plaintiff's employment. It seems there was a narrow passageway in which he was required to walk in order to reach the gauges showing the steam pressure in the boiler. The end of these beams projected over and obstructed the passageway, and, while there were steam-fitters near whom he might have called from their work to move the beams far enough to allow him to pass, it was perfectly natural and to be expected that in order to perform his duties he should move or attempt to move them himself. They were lying upon a projecting part of the boiler, and the testimony is that beams resting upon iron, as these were, usually slide easily when pushed. In our view he was acting within the scope of his employment. As to the second point, defendant's argument is that under the definition of the word "accident” in section 3693 Rev. St. 1913, no accident happened. The statute provides: "The word 'accident' as used in this article shall, unless a different meaning is clearly indicated by the context, be construed to mean an unexpected or unforeseen event, happening suddenly and violently, with or without human fault and producing at the time objective symptoms of an injury." It is insisted that no "unexpected or unforeseen event, happening suddenly and violently," occurred; that sickness arising from the placing of his body by plaintiff against the beams and surging back and forwards could not reasonably be said to be "an unforeseen event;" and that it did not happen suddenly and violently except as it was produced by the plaintiff himself. It is said that this language is "clearly meant to limit recoveries to accident such as the breaking of machinery, or the unexpected cutting or wounding of employee's person by some breaking or falling or exploding of apparatus, machinery, or tools." To hold this would unduly limit the meaning of this clause. The unforeseen event was the straining, 'weakening or lesion of the blood vessels of the brain or stomach, and this was an unforseen event happening suddenly. It 101 Neb.-9 |