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holding the court assumed, for the purposes of the case, without, however, admitting the fact, that the act ceding jurisdiction to the United States over the reservation was valid, and that the United States had legally accepted the cession. To review this judgment the case is brought here.

Two questions are presented for our determination: one, whether the act of Kansas purporting to cede to the United States exclusive jurisdiction over the reservation is a valid cession within the requirements of the constitution; the other, if such cession of jurisdiction is valid, did the act of Kansas relating to the killing or wounding of stock by railroads continue in force afterwards within the limits of the reservation? It can hardly be the design of counsel for the railroad company to contend that the act of cession to the United States is wholly invalid, for, in that event, the jurisdiction of the state would remain unimpaired, and her statute would be enforceable within the limits of the reservation equally as in any other part of the state. What we suppose counsel desires to maintain is that the act of cession confers exclusive jurisdiction over the territory, and that any limitations upon it in the act must therefore be rejected as repugnant to the grant. This point was involved in the case of Fort Leavenworth R. Co. v. Lowe, ante, 995. We there held that a building on a tract of land owned by the United States, used as a fort, or for other public purposes of the federal government, is exempted. as an instruinentality of the government, from any such control or interference by the state as will defeat or embarrass its effective use for those purposes. But, in order that the United States may possess exclusive legislative power over the tract, except as may be necessary to the use of the building thereon as such instrumentality, they must have acquired the tract by purchase, with the consent of the state. This is the only mode prescribed by the federal constitution for their acquisition of exclusive legislative power over it. When such legislative power is acquired in any other way, as by an express act ceding it, its cession may be accompanied•with any conditions not inconsistent with the effective use of the property for the public purposes intended. We also held that it is competent for the legislature of a state to cede exclusive jurisdiction over places needed by the general government in the execution of its powers, the use of the places being, in fact, as much for the people of the state as for the people of the United States generally, and such jurisdiction necessarily ending when the places cease to be used for those purposes.

Upon the second question the contention of the railroad company is that the act of Kansas became inoperative within the reservation upon the cession to the United States of exclusive jurisdiction over it. We are clear that this contention cannot be maintained. It is a general rule of public law, recog. nized and acted upon by the United States, that whenever political jurisdiction and legislative power over any territory are transferred from one nation or sovereign to another, the municipal laws of the country—that is, laws which are intended for the protection of private rights-continue in force until abrogated or changed by the new government or sovereign. By the cession public property passes from one government to the other, but private property remains as before, and with it those municipal laws which are designed to secure its peaceful use and enjoyment. As a matter of course, all laws, ordinances, and regulations in conflict with the political character, institutions, and constitution of the new government are at once displaced. Thus, upon i cession of political jurisdiction and legislative power--and the latter is involved in the former-to the United States, the laws of the country in support of an established religion, or abridging the freedom of the press, or au. thorizing cruel and unusual punishments, and the like, would at once cease to be of obligatory force without any declaration to that effect; and the laws of the country on other subjects would necessarily be superseded by existing laws of the new government upon the same matters. But with respect to other laws affecting the possession, use, and transfer of property, and designed to secure good order and peace in the community, and promote its health and prosperity, which are strictly of a municipal character, the rule is general, that a change of government leaves them in force until, by direct action of the new government, they are altered or repealed. American Ins. Co. y. Canter, 1 Pet. 542; Halleck, Int. Law, c. 34, § 14.

The counsel for the railroad company does not controvert this general rule in cases of cession of political jurisdiction by one nation to another, but contends that it has no application to a mere cession of jurisdiction over a small piece of territory having no organized government or municipality within its limits; and argues upon the assumption that there was no organized government within the limits of Fort Leavenworth. In this assumption he is mistaken. The government of the state of Kansas extended over the reservation, and its legislation was operative therein, except so far as the use of the land as an instrumentality of the general government may have excepted it from such legislation. In other respects, the law of the state prevailed. There was a railroad running through it when the state ceded jurisdiction to the United States. The law of the state, making the railroad liable for killing or wounding cattle by its cars and engines where it had no fence to keep such cattle off the road, was as necessary to the safety of cattle after the cession as before, and was no more abrogated by the mere fact of cession than regulations as to the crossing of highways by the railroad cars, and the ringing of bells as a warning to others of their approach.

It is true there is a wide difference between a cession of political jurisdiction from one nation to another, and a cession to the United States by a state of legislative power over a particular tract, for a special purpose of the general government, but the principle which controls as to laws in existence at the time is the same in both. The liability of the railroad company for the killing of the cow did not depend upon the place where the animal was killed, but upon the neglect of the company to inclose the road with a fence, which would have prevented the cow from straying upon it. The law of Kansas on the subject, in our opinion, remained in force after the cession, it being in no respect inconsistent with any law of the United States, and never having been changed or abrogated. The judgment is accordingly atfirmed.

(114 U, S. 523)
BEECHER MANUFG Co. 0. ATWATER MANUFG Co. and others."

(May 4, 1885.) PATENTS FOR INVENTIONS-DIES FOR FORMING CLIP-ARMS OF KING-BOLTS FOB WAGONS

-INVENTION.

The use in succession of two distinct pairs of dies, of well-known kinds, not combined in one machine, nor co-operating to one result, but each pair doing by itself its own work, is not a patentable invention. Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Connecticut.

H. T. Fenton and 0. H. Platt, for appellant. Geo. 8. Prindle and J. M. ll'ilson, for appellee.

GRAY, J. This is an appeal from a decree for an injunction and damages for the infringement of a patent issued to Robert R. Miller, on February 22, 1870, and reissued to his assigns on May 6, 1879, for an improvement in dies for forming the clip-arms of king-bolts for wagons. 8 Fed. Rep. 608. According to the description in the specification, such bolts are made by taking an iron rod of suitable length, splitting it for about two inches at one end, and turning the forks or arms outwards; then heating the rod, placing the body in a hole in a block or die grooved to receive the arms, and striking it

a

IS. C. 8 Fed. Rep. 608.

139.

66

with a plane-faced upper die, so as to force the arms into and make-them take the shape of the grooves; and afterwards placing it between two other dies, which give the arms the proper bend to fit them to the axle-tree of a wagon. With the subsequent shaping of the collar and stem of the bolt, this patent has nothing to do.

In the original patent the patentee stated that he did not claim either of the dies separately, and claimed only “the series of dies” (designating them by letters) "for forming the clip-arms and wings of the lower ends of kingbolts for wagons, said dies being constructed and operating substantially as herein shown and described.” In the reissue he claimed (1) the first pair of dies, “constructed and combined substantially as and for the purpose shown;" (2) “the series of dies” (designated by letters) "for forming clip king-bolts, substantially as shown and described.”

The first claim of the reissue is bad, not only because it was for some thing the patentee had expressly disclaimed in the original patent, but be cause, as the evidence clearly shows, there was nothing new in the dies themselves. The second claim of the reissue, like the single claim of the original patent, for the use in succession, or, in the patentee's phrase, “the series,” of the two pairs of old dies, the one pair to shape the arms of the bolt, and the other to give those arms the requisite curve, does not show any patentable invention. The two pairs of dies were not combined in one machine, and did not co-operate to one result. Each pair was used by itself, and might be so used at any distance of time or place from the other; and if the two were used at the same place and in immediate succession of time, the sult of tho action of each was separate and distinct, and was in no way influenced or affected by the action of the other. This was no combination that would sustain a patent. Hailes v. Van Wormer, 20 Wall. 353; Pickering v. McCullough, 104 U. S. 310; Stephenson v. Brooklyn Railroad, 114 U. 8. 149; S. C., ante, 777.

Decree reversed, and case remanded, with directions to dismiss the bill.

(114 U. S. 648)

parte HUGHES, Petitioner.

(May 4, 1885.) Costs -PRINTING OF Brierg--COURSE OF THE SUPREME COURT.

Petition for a writ of mandamus. Motion to tax as costs (1) a docket fee; and (2) the disbursements of the respondent for printing briefs of counsel and objections to filing a reply to the relator to the return of the respondent.

J. N. Dolphe, for the motion.

WAITE, C. J. It has never been the practice of this court, in cases brought before it under its appellate jurisdiction, to tax as costs disbursements by counsel or parties for printing briefs. We see no reason for adopting a different rule in cases within our original jurisdiction. A proceeding in this court, under its original jurisdiction, against a judge of an inferior court of the United States to obtain a writ of mandamus requiring him to proceed in a cause pending in court before him, is a civil cause, and a docket fee is, therefore, taxable in favor of the attorney of the prevailing party as part of the costs. The objections to the filing of the reply were in the nature of pleadings in the cause. The disbursements for printing such objections are, therefore, taxable as costs of printing the record.

The motion, so far as it relates to the printing of briefs, is denied, but ia Jl other respects granted.

(114 U. S. 501)
NEW ORLEANS, S. F. & L. R. Co. 0. DELAMORE and others.

(May 4, 1885.) 1. SUPREME COURT-JURISDICTION-SUPREME Court of LOUISIANA - MORTGAGE--Fore

CLOSURE

The United States supreme court has jurisdiction in error over the judgment of the supreme court of Louisiana in a suit between citizens of that state for the foreclosure of a mortgage, in which the only controversy related to the effect to be given a sale of property under an order of the bankruptcy court directing the mort

gaged property of the bankrupt to be sold free of incumbrances. 2. SALE-RIGHT OF WAY-FRANCHISES—DecREE OF BANKRUPTCY COURT.

The right of way and the franchises granted by the city of New Orleans to the first Canal Street, City Park & Lake Railroad Company passed by the sale thereof made in pursuance of the decree of the bankruptcy court. In Error to the Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana.

This is a writ of error to bring under review a decree of the supreme cour of Louisiana reversing a decree of the Fifth district court for the parish of Orleans. The facts, as they appeared from the pleadings and evidence, were as follows:

The Canal Street, City Park & Lake Shore*Railroad Company was a corporation organized under the general law of the state of Louisiana. By an ordinance of the city of New Orleans, numbered 2,264, culministration series, dated August 6, 1873, the city granted to the corporation named the right of way from the neutral ground in Basin street, by certain other designated streets, and along the embankment on the western side of the Orleans canal, to the lake shore, the termini and the entire route being within the city limits. The route upon which the road was to be buil. was subsequently modified by ordinance numbered 2,518, administration series, dated March 25, 1874. The company constructed and used a railroad upon the right of way so granted. In the year 1876, upon a petition in bankruptcy filed by Edward B. Hampson and another, the railroad company was adjudicateii bankrupt by the district court of the United States for the district of Louisiana. Besides other property and assets surrendered by the bankrupt, were "the railroad track, all and singular, built in pursuance of the charter of the said company, and the various grants and privileges conferred upon said company by the city of New Orleans,

including the road-bed of main tracks and branches, and all rights and appartenances of said railroad tracks, as well as rights of way thereto attached,

and all the franchises and appurtenances” of said company:

On November 29, 1876, the assignee in bankruptcy applied to the bankruptcy court for an order to sell the property above described, and other assets of the company, free and clear of all incumbrances, and on May 19, 1877, the court made the order prayed for, and directed the sale to be made on the following terms: “One-third cash, and the balance on one and two years' credit, to be secured by mortgage on the property sold.” On July 14, 1877, the property was sold by the special master appointed by the court to Thomas H. Handy. The sale was afterwards confirmed by the court, and a deed made by the master to the purchaser for the railroad and “all the right of way, powers, privileges, immunities, and franchises conferred and granted by the city of New Orleans to the Canal Street, City Park & Lake Railroad Coinpany,” by*the ordinances above mentioned. At the same time, and by the same act, Handy gave a mortgage on the property conveyed to him, to secure his notes given for two-thirds of the purchase money. The mortgage contained the pact de non alienando.

On January 31, 1878, a new railroad company was organized, under authority of the general corporation law of Louisiana, bearing the same name, towit, the “Canal Street, City Park & Lake Railroad Company," and having

v.58–64

*

the same objects and purposes as the company which had been adjudicated bankrupt. To this new company, Handy, on August 16, 1878, conveyed by public act the property heretofore described, purchased by him at the bankruptcy sale of the original Canal Street, City Park & Lake Shore Railroad Company, and the purchaser assumed the mortgage of Handy and his agreement to pay the balance due from him on his purchase of the property. Before this conveyance the city of New Orleans, by an ordinance numbered 4,523, administration series, dated May 22, 1878, had granted to the second Canal Street, City Park & Lake Railroad Company the right of way upon which to lay a railroad through and on the same streets and along the same route as had been previously granted by ordinance to the first Canal Street, City Park & Lake Railroad Company.

Both Handy and the railroad company, to which he sold the property, made default in the payment of the mortgage debt, and at the suit of Elizabeth Strathman and another, holders of one of the mortgage notes made by Handy, a writ of seizure and sale was issued, and the property described in and covered by the mortgage was seized and sold to Moses Schwartz & Brother, and afterwards conveyed to them by the sheriff, by deed dated April 4, 1879. In the mean time, on March 31, 1879, the present plaintiff, the New Orleans, Spanish Fort & Lake Railroad Company, had been organized under the general law of the state for the organization of corporations, and on April 9, 1879, Schwartz & Brother sold and conveyed to the last-named railroad company the railroad, “with all and singular the right of way, powers,“privileges, and immunities and franchises conferred and gra ted by the city of New Orleans to the Canal Street, City Park & Lake Railroad Company” by the ordinance of August 5, 1873, as amended by the ordinance of March 24, 1874, being the same property bought by Schwartz & Brother at the mortgage sale.

On November 15, 1879, George Delamore, one of the defendants, recovered a judgment in the Fifth district court for the parish of Orleans for $5,720 against the Canal Street, City Park & Lake Railroad Company, being the second company above mentioned organized under that name. Delamore, on the eleventh day of November, 1879, caused execution to issue on this judgment, which, on the eighteenth of November, the sheriff for the parish of Orleans levied on a certain frame building or structure, known as “The Pavilion,” being on the Bayou St. John, at or near the entrance thereto into the Lake Pontchartrain, and also on “all and singular the right of way, the powers, privileges, immunities, and franchises conferred and granted by the city of New Orleans to the Canal Street, City Park & Lake Railroad Company, under and by virtue of an ordinance of the city of New Orleans, being No. 4,523 of the administration series, adopted by the common council of the city of New Orleans on the twenty-first of May, 1878.” Thereupon the plaintiff, the New Orleans, Spanish Fort & Lake Railroad Company, filed the bill in this case in the Fifth district court for the parish of Orleans against Delamore and the sheriff, the prayer of which was for a writ of injunction against the defendants to restrain them from advertising or selling, or offering for sale, the property so levied on, as above stated. The Fifth district court allowed the injunction as prayed for, but on final hearing so modified it as only to restrain the seizure and sale of the rights and franchises enjoyed by the plaintiff, which it acquired from Moses Schwartz, and decreed that the plaintiff be quieted in the enjoyment and possession of the said road, right of way, powers, privileges, immunities, and franchises enjoyed by it and conferred upon it by ordinance of the city of New Orleans, and dissolved the injunction so far as it restrained the sale of property known as the pavilion. From this decree both parties appealed to the supreme court of Louisiana, which by its decree restored the injunction which enjoined the sale of the pavilion, and dissolved the injunction which enjoined the sale of rights and franchises of the New Orleans, Spanish Fort & Lake Railroad

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