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going from place to place to sell the same." To the same purport, and on the same subject generally, see Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 209; License Cases, 5 How. 575, 592, 594, 600, 605; Passenger Cases, 7 How. 407, 414, 419, 415, 462–464; Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35, 41-49; Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168, 182–184; Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. 418, 430, 431; State Tax on Rail. way Receipts, 15 Wall. 293; The Lottawanna, 21 Wall. 581; Henderson v. Mayor of Ñ. Y. 92 U. S. 259; Sherlock v. Alling, 93 U. S. 99; Railroad Co. v. Husen, 95 U. S. 465; Cook v. Pennsylvania, 97 U. S. 566; Guy v. Ballimore, 100 U. S. 434; Tiernan v. Rinker, 102 U. S. 123; Packet Co. v. Cat. lettsburg, 105 U. S. 559; Transportation Co. v. Parkersburg, 107 U. S. 701; S. C. 2 SUP. Cr. REP. 732; and see Moran v. New Orleans, 112 U. S. 69; S. C., ante, 38.

In the case of Railroad Co. V. Husen, 95 U. S. 469, in which another law of the state of Missouri came up for consideration, which declared that no Texas, Mexican, or Indian cattle should be driven or otherwise conveyer into the state, between the first of May and first of November, unless carried through the state in cars, without being unloaded, this court, through Mr. Justice STRONG, said: “It seems hardly necessary to argue at length that, unless the statute can be justified as a legitimate exercise of the police power of the state, it is a usurpation of the power vested exclusively in congress. It is a plain regulation of interstate commerce, a regulation extending to prohibition. Whatever may be the power of a state over commerce that is completely internal, it can no more prohibit or regulate that which is interstate than it can that which is with foreign nations.” In short, it may be laid down as the settled doctrine of this court, at this day, that a state can no more regulate or impede commerce among the several states than it can regulate or impede commerce with foreign nations.

This being the recognized law, the question then arises whether the assessment of the tax in question amounted to any interference with, or restriction upon, the free introduction of the plaintiffs' coal from the state of Pennsyl. vania into the state of Louisiana, and the free disposal of the same in commerce in the latter state; in other words, whether the tax amounted to a regulation of, or restriction upon, commerce among the states, or only to an exercise of local administration under the general taxing power, which, though it may incidentally affect the subjects of commerce, is entirely within the power of the state until congress shall see fit to interfere and make express regulations on the subject.

As to the character and mode of the assessment, little need be added to what has already been said. It was not a tax imposed upon the coal as a foreign product, or as the product of another state than Louisiana, nor a tax imposed by reason of the coal being imported or brought into Louisiana, nor a tax imposed while it was in a state of transit through that state to some other

place of destination. It was imposed after the coal had arrived at its destisa nation and was put up for sale. The coal had come to its place of rest, for final disposal or use, and was a commodity in the market of New Orleans. It might continue in that condition for a year or two years, or only for a day. It had become a part of the general mass of property in the state, and as such it was taxed for the current year, (1880,) as all other property in the city of New Orleans was taxed. Under the law, it could not be taxed again until the following year. It was subjected to no discrimination in favor of goods which were the product of Louisiana, or goods which were the property of citizens of Louisiana. It was treated in exactly the same manner as such goods were treated.

It cannot be seriously contended, at least in the absence of any congressional legislation to the contrary, that all goods which are the product of other states are to be free from taxation in the state to which they may be carried for use or sale. Take the city of New York, for example. When the as.

sessor of taxes goes his round, must he omit from his list of taxables all goods which have come into the city from the factories of New England and New Jersey, or from the pastures and grain-fields of the West? If he must, what will be left for taxation? And how is he to distinguish between those goods which are taxable and those which are not? With the exception of goods imported from foreign countries, still in the original packages, and goods in transit to some other place, why may he not assess all property alike that may be found in the city, being there for the purpose of remaining there till used or sold, and constituting part of the great mass of its cominercial capital: provided always that the assessment will be a general one, and made without discrimination between goods the product of New York, and goods the product of other states? Of course the assessment should be a general one, and not discriminative between goods of different states. The taxing of goods coming from other states, as such, or by reason of their so coming, would be a discriminating tax against them as imports, and would be a regulation of interstate comnierce, inconsistent with that perfect freedom of trade which congress has seen fit should remain undisturbed. But if, after their arrival in the state,—that being their place of destination for use or trade,--if, after, this, they are subjected to a general tax laid alike on all property within the city, we fail to see how such a taxing can be deemed a regulation of commerce which would have the objectionable effect referred to.

We do not mean to say that if a tax collector should be stationed at every ferry and railroad depot in the city of New York, charged with the duty of collecting a tax on every wagon-load or car-load of produce and merchandise brought into the city, that it would not be a regulation of, and restraint upon, interstate commerce, so far as the tax should be imposed on articles brought. from other states. We think it would be, and that it would be an encroachment upon the exclusive powers of congress. It would be very different from the tax laid on auction sales of all property indiscriminately, as in the case of Woodruff v. Parham, which had no relation to the movement of goods from one state to another. It would be very different from a tax laid, as in the present case, on property which had reached its destination, and had become part of the general mass of property of the city, and which was only taxed as a part of that general mass in common with all other property in the city, and in precisely the same manner.

When congress shall see fit to make a regulation on the subject of property transported from one state to another, which may have the effect to give it a temporary exemption from taxation in the state to which it is transported, it will be time enough to consider any conflict that may arise between such regulation and the general taxing laws of the state. In the present case we see no such conflict, either in the law itself or in the proceedings which have been had under it and sustained by the state tribunals, nor any contlict with the general rule that a state cannot pass a law which shall interfere with the unrestricted freedom of commerce between the states. In our opinion, therefore, the second assignment of error is untenable.

The only remaining assignment of error to be considered is that the tax in question violated that clause of the fourth article of the constitution which declares that “the citizens of each state shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states.” As the applicability of this objection did not occur to us upon reading the record of the case, we have carefully examined the brief of the plaintiffs' counsel for light on the subject, but so far as we can understand the point is not urged. We are certainly unable to see how, or in what respect, any equality of privileges as citizens has been denied to the plaintiffs by the imposition of the tax. Their property was only taxed like that of all other persons, whether citizens of Louisiana or of any other state or country. Not the slightest discrimination was made.

The judgment of the supreme court of Louisiana is affirmed.

902.

(114 U. S. 663)

THE TENNESSEE BOND CASES.
STEVENS 0. THE RAILROAD COMPANIES. (17 Cases.)

(May 4, 1885.) For majority opinion, see ante, 974.

HARLAN, J., dissenting. I am of opinion that, while the object of the statutes in question was to protect the state against liability, they were, also, designed to create a lien for the payment of the bonds themselves, by whomsoever held. That lien, so far as the holders of bonds were concerned, could not be discharged, except by payment of the interest and principal, according to the terms of the bonds, and in the mode prescribed by the statute under whiclı they were issued. For these reasons, I am compelled to withhold my assent to the opinion and judgment.

(114 U. S. 453)
EDMONDS and another, Com’rs, etc., 0. BALTIMORE & P. R. Co.

(April 20, 1885.) 1. RAILROAD-RIGHT OF WAY-TRACKS IN CITY or WASHINGTON-POWER OF CONGRESS

-EFFECT OF 14 Sr. 389—Act FEBRUARY 5, 1867.

The provision of the original act, under which the Baltimore & Potomac Railroad enters the city of Washington, D. C., (14 St. 389,) has never been repealed, and it fully asserts the purpose of congress to retain in its own hands the right to the use of the streets of the city in regard to that company and its road, as it has in re

gard to all others. 2. SAME-ERECTION OF DEPOT INCIDENTAL Right-TRACK LAYING.

The right of a railroad company to erect a depot or warehouse in a certain locality does not have as an incident the right to lay tracks communicating therewith

on the streets of Washington without the express permission of congress. 3. SAME-EFFECT OF CHAPTER 18, Rev. Sr. D. C.-CORPORATIONS CREATED BY LAWS OF

THE SEVERAL STATES.

The power conferred by the Revised Statutes of the District of Columbia, chapter 18, concerning corporations, was designed only for corporations organized under it. and are not conferred upon corporations created by states of the Union, governed by the laws of those states. SAME-POWER OF CONGRESS, HOW AFFECTED BY CHAPTER 18, Rev. St. D. C.

Chapter 18 of the Revised Statutes of the District of Columbia shows on its face that congress never intended to part with the right to designate the route of a rail. road through the city, and on what streets its track should be located, and which streets it should use. Appeal from the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia. A. G. Riddle, for appellants. Enoch Totten, for appellee.

MILLER, J. This is an appeal from the supreme court of the District of Columbia.' The railroad company has constructed its road from Baltimore, through the District of Columbia and through the city of Washington, to the Potomac river at Long Bridge, on which it crosses that river to the Virginia side. It has done this by virtue of several acts of congress granting the necessary authority to do so. At the Washington end of the bridge it has purchased and now owns one of the squares of the city and part of another, numbered, in the division of the city into streets, squares, and lots, squares 233, and 267. These squares are divided by Fourteenth street, running north and south, and square 267, on its south side, abuts on Maryland avenue, one of the streets of the city. At the junction of Maryland avenue, whose course is nearly east and west, and Fourteenth street, there is a considerable space of ground made by Water street, which follows the bank of the river, and the other two streets, which is a public highway made by the union of all three streets at that point. A map or diagram found in the record, and which the reporter will copy, is necessary to a clear understanding of the controversy.

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The railroad company alleges that its increased traffic requires, in the city of Washington, additional accommodations for receiving, storing, and transferring freight, and that it has purchased the two squares mentioned for

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that reason, and that it intends to build a freight depot on square 233, as be ing at once convenient for the company and more out of the way of the travel, current business, and residences of the citizens than any point within reason. able distance of the line of the road. As their road is at present located lawfully on Maryland avenue, along which it touches the city end of the bridge, this allegation is probably true.

In order, however, to reach square 233 with its trains, they must depart from Maryland avenue and cross square 267 and Fourteenth street, which lies between the two squares, or they must make a curve from the avenue around the south end of square 267, and reach square 233 by the use of the public highway made by the junction of Maryland avenue, Water street, and Fourteenth street, and, in so doing, depart from Maryland avenue. The company gave notice, as required by law, to appellants, who, as commis. sioners of the District of Columbia, are charged with the care and protection of the streets and other highways of the city, that it intended to construct a lateral track, which, leaving its main track on Maryland avenue at a point near its intersection with Thirteenth street, should cross square 267 from its east to its west side, and then crossing Fourteenth street, would reach its projected 'depot on square 233. The commissioners refused consent to this, and, fearing it would be attempted without such consent, they guarded the way across the street by police force for some time. * In this condition of affairs, the railroad company filed its bill in chancery in the supreme court of the District of Columbia, praying an injunction against the commissioners, to prevent them from interfering with the exercise of the right which the company claimed of laying its track across Fourteenth street, and that court granted the injunction as prayed.

The appeal of the commissioners from this decree brings the matter in issue before us for review. Neither the pleadings in the case, nor the relief sought by the bill, nor the decree of the court, bring into question the right of the company to purchase squares 233 and 267, nor the right to erect on either of these a warehouse for the storage of freight. Nor does the question arise of their right to locate at that place such a depot as their business requires, nor to use it as such, if they have the right of access to it by using the streets and highways of the city for that purpose. This court does not, therefore, consider those questions, because the only point raised by the record is the right of the company to lay in or across the streets of the city their railroad track, and use it as a means of transit for its locomotives and cars, without any express authorization by act of congress, or the consent of any authority representing the city of Washington or the District of Columbia.

The assertion of the existence of such a right is, to say the least, somewhat novel. It is not known to any member of this court that any railroad company, whether its cars are propelled by steam or horse power, has ever claimed to use the streets of an incorporated city or any part of them, without express authority from some legislative body, or the authorities of the city government. It would be a strange grant of power which, authorizing a railroad company to enter or even pass through a city, should leave to the company the selection, not only of its route into or through the city, but even the streets and highways over which its tracks should be laid, subject only to its sense of its own convenience and that of the people of the city. Nor does the decision of a court of justice, that the necessities of the company demand the use of these streets, and that the locality of the depot to which the track leads is selected with a due regard to the interests of the whole city, make this claim of power any the less remarkable. No judicial decision is cited in favor of such propositions.

The streets of Washington are largely used by street railroad companies whose tracks occupy their surface. There are some four or five of these companies, and their cars are propelled by horse-power and not by steam. They

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