termine the jurisdiction of circuit courts of the United States, and to regulate the removal of causes from state courts, and for other purposes," (18 St. 470,) or both. Whether the corporations of the United States, organized under acts of congress, have or have not this right of removal is the principal question in these cases.

The suits were all brought in state courts against the said corporations severally. In the first case, Myers, a switchman at Armstrong, in Kansas, sued the company for an injury alleged to have been sustained by him through the carelessness of the company or its agents, in the construction of the coupling of its cars. The company filed an answer, and at the same time a petition

for the removal of the cause to the circuit court of the United States for the district of Kansas, and the proper bond required by the law. The petition for removal stated that the petitioner was a corporation other than a banking corporation, and organized under a law of the United States, namely, an act of congress entitled "An act to aid in the construction of a railroad and telegraph line from the Missouri river to the Pacific ocean, and to secure to the government the use of the same for postal, military, and other purposes," approved July 1, 1862; and that, in accordance with said act, and the acts amendatory and supplemental thereto, the petitioner had exercised and did exercise its corporate functions and powers. The petition then proceeded as follows:

"That February 1, 1880, pursuant to section 16 of the said act of July 1, 1862, and of the act of July 2, 1864, the Kansas Pacific Railway Company, a corporation created by the territorial legislature of Kansas, and organized under the laws of said territory, and the Denver Pacific Railway & Telegraph Company, a corporation created and organized under the laws of the territory of Colorado, both of which said companies are mentioned in said acts of congress, and their said railroads by said acts made a part of the Union Pacific Railroad system, were, by agreement, consolidated with the Union Pacific Railroad Company. Your petitioner and said consolidated company, by agreement, as by said acts authorized, assumed, and adopted the name of the Union Pacific Railway Company, which company consolidated, assumed, took, and from thenceforth had, and has, by virtue of said agreement of consolidation, possession and ownership of all the railroads and other property, real and personal, of said constituent companies, and has and does operate and manage the same under and by authority of said acts of congress, and is governed and controlled by said acts, and is to all intents and purposes, and in fact, a corporation under the laws of the United States. That the plaintiff, Abram Myers, has sued your petitioner, the Union Pacific Railway Company, process in this suit having been served on its agents, and your petitioner has appeared thereto and filed its answer; that the matter and amount in this suit above entitled exceeds, exclusive of costs, the sum or value of five hundred dollars; that your petitioner has a defense to said action arising under and by virtue of the aforesaid laws of the United States; that said suit has not been tried, nor has it been ready for or stood for trial, and the present is the first term of the court at which it could have been tried."

The petition concluded with the proffer of the proper bond, and a prayer for an order of removal, and that the court would proceed no further in the cause. The bond was approved and an order of removal was made. On filing the record in the circuit court of the United States, a motion was made to remand the cause to the state court, and it was remanded accordingly, the circuit judge holding that the suit was not one arising "under the constitution and laws of the United States," within the meaning of the act of congress of March 3, 1875, and that a suit cannot be removed from a state to a federal court upon the sole ground that it is a suit by or against a corporation organized under the laws of the United States. To the judgment remanding the cause, the writ of error was sued out in this court.

The next case, Union Pac. R. Co. v. City of Kansas, was a proceeding instituted by the common council of said city, by ordinance passed in April, 1880, for widening a street through the depot grounds of the company, and thereby taking a portion of its said grounds and the property of many other persons. A jury was summoned in November, 1880, before the mayor, to inquire and find the value of the property taken for the street, and to assess the amount upon surrounding property benefited thereby. On December 12, 1880, this jury found the value of the company's property taken equal to $7,305, and assessed, as benefits, upon the remaining property of the company the sum of $12,325 towards paying the damages for widening the street. The verdict was confirmed by the mayor and common council February 25, 1881. The laws of Missouri give to any party, dissatisfied with the award of the jury in such cases, an appeal to the circuit court of Jackson county, (in which Kansas City is situated,) and the Union Pacific Railway Company and some other dissatisfied parties filed separate appeals, and the proceedings were certified to the said court, where the said appeals were by the law directed to be tried "in all respects, and subject to the same rules and the same law as other trials had in the circuit court, and the same record thereof made and kept." After the case was certified to the circuit court of Jackson county, the company in due time, April, 1881, filed a petition for removal of the case to the circuit court of the United States for the Western district of Missouri. The petition, as in the case of Myers, set out the incorporation of the company, and the consolidation of the three companies before mentioned under the acts of congress, before referred to, by the name of the "Union Pacific Railway Company." The petition then proceeds to state as follows:

"And your petitioner, by agreement of said constituent companies, succeeded to, had, and possessed all the rights and privileges and property, real and personal, which was of said constituent companies, or either of them, and that at the time of commencement of this proceeding your petitioner had owned, and possessed, exclusive of all other rights and claims, the tract of land described in said proceeding, as follows," (it then describes the land of the company taken for the street, and then states as follows:) "and that the same had been acquired by the Kansas Pacific Railway Company for depot and other railway purposes by authority of law, and that your petitioner held said land for said purposes, and was occupying the same in part for such purposes at the time of the commencement of the proceedings, and was about to appropriate the residue thereof to such use, the increase of business of your petitioner making it imperatively necessary that it should be so occupied. Your petitioner distinctly avers that it is a corporation, not banking, organized under the laws of the United States; that it holds and possesses said property pursuant to such laws; that it has a defense in this action arising under and by virtue of the laws of the United States herein before referred to; and your petitioner desires that said cause may be removed into said circuit court of the United States for trial, pursuant to section 640 of the Revised Statutes of the United States. Your petitioner further states that the matter in dispute in this cause, in which your petitioner is interested, exceeds the sum of five hundred dollars, exclusive of costs; and further, that this suit has not been tried, but is now pending for trial on appeal in the circuit court of Jackson county, Missouri."

The petition concluded with the ordinary proffer of a bond and prayer for removal of the case, etc., and an order of removal was made by the state court. Motion was then made to the circuit court of the United States to remand the cause, and that court, after holding the motion under consideration for some time, gave judgment to remand, which judgment is brought here by writ of error. Before rendering judgment the circuit court of the United States allowed the company to file an additional statement of facts for the pur

pose of showing that the cause was removable, averring its acceptance of the acts of congress, and the passage of an act by the legislature of Missouri, authorizing the company to extend its track within the limits of Missouri, and to acquire depot grounds there, which it did; and the fact that said grounds are essential to the operations of the company in carrying out the objects declared in the acts of congress relating thereto; that the United States loaned its bonds on said portion of the road, and has a lien thereon for their payment.

The third suit, Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Knuth, was an action brought by the defendant in error against the company in the district court of Dodge county Nebraska, in July, 1883, to recover damages for injuries sustained by her at the company's depot at North Bend, between Omaha and Ogden. A petition for removal of the cause to the circuit court of the United States for the district of Nebraska was filed in due time, alleging the incorporation and organization of the company under and by virtue of the acts of congress of 1862 and 1864, before referred to; that the matter in dispute exceeds $500 exclusive of costs; that the defendant had a defense to the action arising under and by virtue of the laws of the United States, to-wit, the act and amendatory act of congress above referred to, concluding with the usual proffer of bond and prayer for removal. The order of removal was granted, the circuit court remanded the cause to the state court, and a writ of error brings the case here. In this case the place of injury was on the main line of the Union Pacific Railway Company.

The fourth case is that of Frank Harwood, who brought a suit against the Union Pacific Railway Company in the district court of Davis county, Kansas, in July, 1882, to recover damages for an injury received by him at the company's depot at Junction City, Kansas, while loading hogs in a car. A petition for removal of the cause was filed in due time, alleging the organization of the company under the act of congress of July 1, 1862, and the amendments thereto, and other acts of congress; and that the petitioner had a defense arising under the laws of the United States, and concluding with tendering the proper bond, and a prayer for removal. The state court approved the bond offered, but denied the petition and proceeded with the cause. A verdict being found for plaintiff, the case was taken to the supreme court of Kansas by appeal. One of the reasons assigned on the appeal was the denial of the petition to remove the cause. The supreme court affirmed the judgment, and a writ of error to the judgment of that court brings the case here. The three cases of the Texas & Pacific Railway Company were as follows: The first was a suit brought by A. F. McAlister against the company in the district court of Harrison county, Texas, in April, 1879, to recover damages for an injury to the plaintiff while a passenger in one of the company's trains. A petition for removal was filed in due time, alleging that the suit arose under the laws of the United States, and that the defendant was a corporation organized under and by virtue of certain acts of congress of the United States, to-wit, "An act entitled an act to incorporate the Texas & Pacific Railroad Company, and to aid in the construction of its road, and for other purposes, approved March 3, 1871, and an act supplementary thereto, approved May 2, 1872; that the petitioner had a defense to the action arising under and by virtue of a law of the United States, to-wit, said act of incorporation; that it was not a banking, but a railroad, corporation authorized to construct, own, and maintain a railroad to and from certain places designated in said acts of congress; concluding with a proffer of a bond and a prayer for removal. The court approved the bond, but refused to remove the cause. The special exceptions to the petition for removal were two-First, that it did not show what the defense was, arising under and by virtue of a law of the United States; secondly, denying the allegation that the defendant was a corporation created and existing under and by virtue of acts of congress of the United

States. Afterwards the defendant filed a plea in abatement, stating that it had filed in the United States circuit court at Jefferson, Eastern district of Texas, a certified copy of the record of the pleadings and other papers in the cause, and had the same entered on the docket of said court in the fall term, 1879, and that plaintiff appeared, and moved to remand the cause to the state court, which motion was overruled, and the circuit court of the United States entertained jurisdiction of the cause; and the plaintiff agreed to a continuance of the cause in that court to the spring term of 1880; and at the spring term, 1880, procured the same to be continued, and at the fall term, 1880, appeared before said court and consented to a continuance, and at the spring term, 1881, again prosecuted his cause in said court, and continued the same. This plea was excepted to, and overruled by the state court. Judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff, and an appeal was taken to the supreme court of Texas. That court overruled the error assigned on the refusal of the district court to remove the cause, on the ground that the defendant's petition for removal did not set forth the defense so as to show that it was a defense arising under the laws of the United States. The court took notice also that the petition was not sworn to, but as that point was not raised by the plaintiff's counsel, they did not consider it. The judgment of the district court was affirmed; and the case is brought here by writ of error to the judgment of the supreme court.

The second case of the Texas & Pacific Railway Company was a suit brought by Laura Kirk against the company in the district court of the Second judicial district of Texas, in March, 1881, to recover damages for the death of her husband, caused by the company's cars running off the track. The petition for removal was filed in this case similar in all respects to that in the preceding case. A second petition was filed a few days later, adding an averment that the defendant had fixed its domicile and principal business office at Philadelphia, in the state of Pennsylvania, and was in contemplation of law a citizen of that state. The prayer of the petition was denied, the cause went to trial, judgment was rendered for the plaintiff, an appeal was taken, and the judgment was affirmed by the supreme court of Texas, upon the reasons and authority of the previous case of McAlister v. Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. The case is now here by writ of error.

The third and last case of the Texas & Pacific Railway Company was a suit brought by James Murphy against the company, (or, rather, against one of its constituent companies, and afterwards, by amendment, against the company itself,) in the district court of Harrison county, Texas, in 1873, to recover damages for an injury received by the plaintiff in getting upon the cars of the company at Jonesville, Texas. The pleadings were amended from time to time on both sides, and the cause was continued, until finally an amended original petition was filed in October, 1878, followed by a petition for removal filed November 1, 1878. The prayer of the petition was denied. The case was afterwards tried, and a verdict and judgment rendered for the plaintiff; and in May, 1883, this judgment was affirmed by the supreme court of Texas on appeal. On the question of removal, the court followed the decision in the McAlister Case, above stated. No question was raised in this case on account of the time at which the petition for removal was filed. The application for removal was treated by the court as made under section 640 of the Revised Statutes. With some diversification of details, it will be perceived that all of these cases depend principally on two questions: First, whether the fact that the plaintiffs in error are corporations of the United States created by act of congress. makes the suits against them "suits arising under the laws of the United States," within the meaning of the second section of the act of March 3, 1875, before referred to, so as to be removable from the state into the federal courts for that cause; and, secondly, whether, if not removable on that ground, they are removable under section 640 of the Revised Statutes, upon the allegation contained in the several petitions of removal, that the defendant has

a defense to the action arising under and by virtue of a law of the United States, naming, in some cases, the act of incorporation as the law referred to. We are of opinion that corporations of the United States, created by and organized under acts of congress, like the plaintiffs in error in these cases, are entitled as such to remove into the circuit courts of the United States suits brought against them in the state courts, under and by virtue of the act of March 3, 1875, on the ground that such suits are suits "arising under the laws of the United States." We do not propose to go into a lengthy argument on the subject; we think that the question has been substantially decided long ago by this court. The exhaustive argument of Chief Justice MARSHALL in the case of Osborn v. Bank of U. S. 9 Wheat. 817-828, delivered more than 60 years ago, and always acquiesced in, renders any further discussion unnecessary to show that a suit by or against a corporation of the United States is a suit arising under the laws of the United States. That argument was the basis of the decision on the jurisdictional question in that case. The precise question, it is true, was as to the power of congress to authorize the bank to sue and be sued in the United States courts. The words of its charter were that the bank should be made able and capable in law to "sue and be sued, plead and be impleaded, answer and be answered, defend and be defended, in all state courts having competent jurisdiction, and in any circuit court of the United States." The power to create such a jurisdiction in the federal courts rested solely on the truth of the proposition that a suit by or against the bank would be a suit arising under the laws of the United States; for the constitution confined the judicial power of the United States to these four classes of cases, namely: First, to cases in law and equity, arising under the constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made under their authority; secondly, to cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls; thirdly, to cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; fourthly, to certain controversies depending on the character of the parties, such as controversies to which the United States are a party, those between two or more states, or a state and citizens of another state, or citizens of different states, or citizens of the same state claiming lands under grants of different states, or a state or its citizens and foreign states, citizens, or subjects. Now, suits by or against the United States Bank could not possibly, as such, belong to any of these classes except the first, namely, cases in law and equity arising under the constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States; and the supreme court, as well as the distinguished counsel who argued the Osborn Case, so understood it. Unless, therefore, a case in which the bank was a party was for that reason a case arising under the laws of the United States, congress would not have had the power to authorize it to sue and be sued in the circuit court of the United States. And to this question, to-wit, whether such a case was a suit arising under the laws of the United States, the court directed its principal attention. But as it was objected that several questions of general law might arise in a case, besides that which depended upon an act of congress, the court first disposed of that objection, holding that, as scarcely any case occurs every part of which depends on the constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States, it is sufficient for the purposes of federal jurisdiction if the case necessarily involves a question depending on such constitution, laws, or treaties. The chief justice then proceeds as follows:

"We think, then, that when a question to which the judicial power of the Union is extended by the constitution, forms an ingredient of the original cause, it is in the power of congress to give the circuit courts jurisdiction of that cause, although other questions of fact or law may be involved in it. The case of the bank is, we think, a very strong case of this description. The charter of incorporation not only creates it, but gives it every faculty which it possesses. The power to acquire rights of any description, to transact business of any description, to make contracts of any description, to sue on those