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by the interior department with reference to one of the state selections referred to. It was objected that the selection was invalid because not inade in accordance with the provisions of the act of the legislature of the state, of April 27, 1863. But the secretary answered that it was not necessary to enter into a consideration of the alleged defects in the application of the purchaser; that was a question between him and the state; that by the seventh section of the act of March 3, 1853, the state was granted indemnity if sections 16 and 36 lay within private grants; that the manner of selecting such indemnity was not specified; that the act of the legislature had provided for the sale of certain lands belonging to the state, and if purchasers failed to comply with the requirements of the statute, their claims may fail; that the questions to be considered by the general government were, the right of the state to claim the land under her grant, and was the land subject to selection, observing that these were the only questions to determine, as the general government only recognized the state in the proceedings; that “it was no part of its duty to inquire into the transactions between the state and her purchasers, neither would it go back of the record to ascertain whether, as between the state and her agent, he complied with the provisions of the statute relating to the sale of granted lands.” The secretary added that there was no complaint on the part of the state of any irregularity in the selection in question, but, on the contrary, she had recognized and approved of it, and issued a patent to the purchaser. And, further, that the legislature of the state had passed an act for the relief of purchasers of state lands, approved March 27, 1872, declaring that when application had been made to purchase such lands, and full payment had been made to the treasurer of the proper county for the same, and a certificate of purchase or patent had been issued to the applicant, the title of the state was vested in him or his assignees, if no other application had been made for the purchase of the land prior to the issue of the certificate. Thus, said the secretary, has the state in the most emphatic manner asserted her claim to the land, notwithstanding the alleged irregularities on the part of her agent in selecting the same.

To this action of the state it may be added that the general government has, by the act of congress of March 1, 1877,*relinquished every possible objection on its part to a recognition of the claim of the state, by confirming her title to lands certified to her as indemnity school selections in lieu of the sixteenth and thirty-sixth sections lying within Mexican grants, the final survey of which had not been made; and also confirming indemnity school selections certified to the state, which were defective or invalid from any other cause.

The sole question, therefore, remaining for our determination, is whether the premises in controversy were open to selection at the time the selection was made. And of this we think there can be no reasonable doubt. The Mexican grant, under which the land was claimed, had been confirmed in December, 1856, and although, as stated above, a survey had been made by a deputy surveyor in 1858, it had not been approved by the surveyor general, and was, therefore, of no effect. No other attempt was made to obtain a survey of the land until February, 1868, over 11 years after the confirmation of the grant, and over 3 years after the passage of the act of July 1, 1864, and over 18 months after the passage of the act of July 23, 1866. Had a survey been called for by the grantee, or made under the act of 1864, it would have required the approval of the commissioner of the general land-office before it could have been the basis of action by the state or by individuals. But the grantee having neglected to take any action, and 10 months having elapsed after the passage of the act of 1866, it was competent for the surveyor general of California, and indeed it was made his duty, to extend the lines of the public surveys over the land confirmed; and the act declares that "he shali set off, in full satisfaction of such grant, and according to the lines of the public surveys, the quantity of land confirmed in such final decree, and, as nearly as can be done, in accordance with such decree, and all the land not included in such grant as so set off shall be subject to the general land laws of the United States."

Nothing can be plainer than this language. It leaves no doubt as to its ineaning All the land not included in the grant as thus set off “shall be. subject to the general land laws of the United States.” The survey of the land confirmed is withdrawn, therefore, from that special supervision and control* which are vested in the commissioner of the general land-office over surveys of private land claims made under the act of 1864. The laws and practice of the land department, with respect to surveys of the public lands generally, only apply, and must govern the case. Had it been the intention of congress to retain the special supervision of the commissioner, it is reasonable to suppose that the intention would, in some way, have been expressed. But there is nothing of the kind, and the survey is therefore to be treated as an ordinary official survey of the public lands, and, as such, is operative until changed or set aside by the land department. It is not necessary, as in the case of surveys of private land claims under other laws, to obtain the previous approval of such department before it becomes operative; and proceedings to acquire the title to lands outside of it may at once be taken either by the state or preemptors upon its assumed validity. Such was the view of the interior department with reference to the survey of the land confirmed here, after a most elaborate consideration. In illustration of the manner in which public lands, when once surveyed, can be disposed of, the secretary refers to the act of congress approved May 1, 1796, providing for the sale of lands of the United States in the territory north-west of the river Ohio and above the mouth of the Kentucky river. The surveyor general was authorized to prepare plats of township surveys, to keep one copy in his office for public information, and to send other copies to the places of sale and to the secretary of the interior. The present local land-offices, said the secretary, are equivalent to the places of sale mentioned in the act of 1796, and, as a matter of practice, from that day to the present time, the township plats prepared by the surveyor general have been filed by him with the local land-officers, who thereupon have proceeded to dispose of the public lands according to the laws of the United States. There was nothing in the act of 1796, or any subsequent acts, which required the approval of the commissioner of the general land-office before, the survey became final and the plats authoritative. Such a theory, said the secretary, is not only contrary to the letter and spirit of the various acts providing for the survey of the public lands, but it is contrary to the uniform practice of the department. Applying this uniform practice to the case at bar, all doubt that the lands in controversy were open to selection by the state disappears. The grant was surveyed in February, 1868, and sufficient land set apart to satisfy it. In March following, a survey of the townships in which the land lay was made and approved by the United States surveyor general of the district, and in April the survey and township plats were filed in the land-office of the district. The stato selections of lands lying outside of the survey of the grant were made before any action of the surveyor general was had recalling the plats and ordering a new survey. Had his action been sustained by the land department, and the new survey made upon his order, which included the land in controversy as part of the grant, been approved, a question would have arisen as to the validity of the selections in the face of such subsequent proceedings. It is not necessary to hold that they would have been unaffected. It may, perhaps, be that they would have had to abide the judgment of the department as to the status of the land. All that is necessary to decide here is that, after the grant had been surveyed and the township plats filed, the state was at liberty to make selections from land lying outside of the survey, and pre-emptors were at liberty to settle

116

apon it, and if the survey were not ultimately set aside, their rights thus initiated would be protected.

As already said, the interior department held the original survey valid, directed the township plats to be returned to the land-office, and accepted the selections of the state outside of the survey, and listed the land to her. Tho inchoate rights acquired to the lands selected were not lost by the subsequent action of the surveyor general in setting aside the first survey of the grant, and, after that action was vacated, could be perfected. The original survey, outside of which the selections were made, was approved by the secretary of the interior on the thirty-first of October, 1871, and the lands selected were listed to the state by the commissioner of the general land-office on the twenty-ninth of May, 1872, and by the secretary of the interior on the thirtyfirst of the same month. The title of the state to the lands thus became as complete as though transferred by a patent of the United States. The statute declares that lists of lands granted to the state by a law of congress, which does not convey the fee-simple title or require patents to be issued, “shall be regarded as conveying the fee-simple of all the lands embraced in such lists that are of the character contemplated by such act of congress, and intended to be granted thereby." It does not appear why the lands should have been listed by the secretary of the interior, as well as by the commissioner of the general land-office, but it may have been because, by the act of July 23, 1866, selections of indemnity school lands for the sixteenth and thirty-sixth sections, when lost in private grants, were to be approved by that officer. Hay. ing the title, there was nothing to prevent the issue by the state of her patent to the purchaser under whom the plaintiff claims. The land was not thereafter open to settlement and pre-emption, and the judgment must there. fore be affirmed.

(115 U. S. 116)

Good and others v. O'CONNOR.
HAZARD and others v. O'CONNOR.

(May 4, 1885.) In Error to the Supreme Court of the State of California. Each of these cases presents similar questions to those considered and determined in Frasher v. O'Connor, ante, 1141, and on authority of that case the judgment in each is affirmed.

.613

(114 U. S. 642)

Ex parte REGGEL.

(May 4, 1885.) 1. FUGITIVES FROM JUSTICE-OFFENSE.

The statute requiring the surrender of a fugitive from justice, found in one of the territories, to the state in which he stands charged with treason, felony, or other crime, embraces every offense known to the laws of the demanding state, including

misdemeanors. 2. SAME-POWER OF State As To PROCEDURE.

* Each state has the right to prescribe the forms of pleading and process to be observed in her courts, in both civil and criminal cases, subject only to those provis, ions of the national constitution designed for the protection of life, liberty, and property in all the states of the Union; consequently, in a case involving the surrender, under the act of congress, of a fugitive from justice, it may not be objected that the indictment is not framed according to the technical rules of criminal plead

ing, if it confornis substantially to the laws of the demanding state. 3. SAME-DUTY OF EXECUTIVE OF STATE OR TERRITORY.

Upon the executive of the state or territory in which the accused is found rests the responsibility of determining whether he is a fugitive froin the justice of the demanding state. But the act of congress does not direct or authorize his surrender, unless it is made to appear that he is, in fact, a fugitive from justice.

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4. SAME-DISCILARGE OF FUGITIVE ON HABEAS CORPUS.

If the determination of that fact, upon proof before the executive of the state where the alleged fugitive is found, is subject to judicial review upon habeas corpus, the accused, being in custody under his warrant,—which recites the requisition of the demanding state, accompanied by an authentic indictment, charging him substantially as required by her laws, with a specific crime committed within her jurisdiction,-shonld not be discharged, because, in the judgment of the court, the proof showing that he was a fugitive from justice may not be as full as might properly have been required. Appeal from the Third Judicial District of the Territory of Utah.

This is an appeal from the judgment upon habeas corpus, of the Third judicial district court of Utah, remanding the appellant to the custody of the marshal of the United States, by whom he had been arrested. The arrest was made under the authority of a warrant of the governor of Utah, which recited that it had been represented by the governor of Pennsylvania that Louis Reggel stood charged in that commonwealth with the crime of obtaining goods by false pretenses from Daniel Myers and Charles Goodman; that he had fled from the justice of that commonwealth, and had taken refuge in the territory of Utah. It then proceeded: “And whereas, said representation and demand are accompanied by an indictment found against said Reggel by the grand inquest of the said state of Pennsylvania inquiring for the city and county of Philadelphia, in and before the court of quarter sessions of the peace for the said city and county of Philadelphia, March sessions, 1882, whereby said Louis Reggel is charged with the said crime, and an affi-, davit taken before a notary public of said state showing said Reggel's flight from*said state to and refuge in said territory, and also the statute laws of said state defining and making said acts of said Reggel a crime, and which said indictment, affidavit, and laws are certified by said governor of Pennsylvania to be duly authenticated: you are therefore required to arrest the said Louis Reggel,” etc.

The evidence laid before the governor of Utah was entirely documentary, and embraced the following papers:

(1) The requisition, in the customary form, of the governor of Pennsylvania, requesting the apprehension of Reggel, and his delivery to the agent of Pennsylvania, and to which was annexed a copy of the indictment and other papers, certified by him to be authentic.

(2) A duly-certified copy of the indictment referred to in the foregoing requisition, as follows: "IN THE COURT OF QUARTER SESSIONS OF THE PEACE FOR THE CITY AND

COUNTY OF PHILADELPHIA. MARCH SESSIONS, 1882. "City and County of Philadelphia, ss.: The grand inquest of the com

, monwealth of Pennsylvania, inquiring for the city and county of Philadelphia, upon their respective oaths and affirmations, do present Louis Reggel, late of said county, on the thirteenth day of August, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and eighty-one, at the county aforesaid, and within the jurisdiction of this court, unlawfully and willfully devising and intending to cheat and defraud Daniel Myers and Charles Goodman of their goods, moneys, chattels, and property, unlawfully, did falsely and designedly pretend to the said Daniel Myers and Charles Goodman that he, the said Louis Reggel, was then and there the owner in his own right of a large stock of goods in his business as a merchant of Salt Lake City, in the territory of Utah, of the value of thirty-five thousand dollars, and that he did not then and there owe to any person a single dollar on account of said goods and merchandise, or for money borrowed; and also then and there unlawfully did falsely, and designedly pretend to the said Daniel Myers and Charles Goodman that he was then and there the owner in his own right of a certain*lot of ground, containing thereon a store building, wherein be carried on his business, at

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Salt Lake City, in the territory of Utah; and that he was also then and there the owner in his own right of a certain other lot of ground, containing thereon a certain dwelling-house, wherein he then and there resided, at Salt Lake City, in the territory of Utah; and he, the said Louis Reggel, then and there unlawfully and falsely pretended to said Daniel Myers and Charles Goodman that said two houses and two lots were then and there together of the value of forty thousand dollars; and that said two lots and their improvements were then and there free from all incumbrance; whereas, in truth and in fact, the said Louis Reggel was not then and there the owner in his own right of goods and merchandise in his business of the value of thirty-five thousand dollars, at Salt Lake City, in the territory of Utah, all paid for, and free of debt for money borrowed,—the said Louis Reggel being then and there in the possession of and owner of a stock of goods and inerchandise in his business at Salt Lake City, in the territory of Utah, of the value of only about six thousand dollars, instead of the value of thirty-five thousand dollars, as then and there unlawfully, falsely, and designedly pretended by him, the said Louis Reggel; and the said Louis Reggel was then and there indebted in the sum of $3,500 to the banking-house of McCormick & Co., at Salt Lake City, in the territory of Utah, for money drawn from said banking-house; and whereas, in truth and in fact, the said Louis Reggel was not then and there the owner in his own right of a certain lot of ground, containing thereon a store building, wherein he then and there carried on his business, at Salt Lake City, in the territory of Utah, and a certain other lot of ground, containing thereon a dwelling-house, wherein he then and there resided, at Salt Lake City aforesaid, together of the value of forty thousand dollars, clear of all incumbrances; that the said two lots of ground and the improvements and appurtenances thereunto belonging, were, by the said Louis Reggel, on the fourteenth day of January, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and eighty, by deed, duly recorded in the office for the recording of deeds for Salt Lake county, in the territory of*Utah, granted, sold, conveyed, and confirmed unto Robert Harkness and L. R. Jones, of said Salt Lake City, in the territory of Utah, and the title to the said two lots of ground and improvements and appurtenances thereunto belonging, was, at the time of the making of said unlawful, false, and fraudulent pretenses by the said Louis Reggel, at the county aforesaid, in the said Robert Harkness and the said L. R. Jones, and not in the said Louis Reggel; and the said Louis Reggel then and there well knew the said pretenses to be unlawful, fraudulent, and false. Whereupon the said Daniel Myers and Charles Goodman, believing the said false representations and pretenses then and there made by the said Louis Reggel, sold and delivered to the said Louis Reggel, on a credit of four months, shere follows a description and statement of the value of said goods, chattels, and property alleged to have been obtained under false pretenses;] which said goods and chattels and property the said Louis Reggel did then and there unlawfully obtain from the said Daniel Myers and Charles Goodman, with intent to cheat and defraud the said Daniel Myers and Charles Goodman, to the great damage of the said Daniel Myers and Charles Goodman, contrary to the form of the act of the general assembly in such case made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

“GEORGE S. GRAHAM,

“District Attorney."

*646

(3) Duly-certified copies of certain provisions of the penal laws of Pennsylvania, as follows:

“Every indictment shall be deemed and adjudged sufficient and good in law which charges the crime substantially in the language of the act of the assembly prohibiting the crime and prescribing the punishment, if any such there be; or, if at common law, so plainly that the nature of the offense

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