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charged may be easily understood by the jury. Every objection to any indicto ment for any formal defect apparent on the face thereof shall be taken by des murrer or on motion to quash such indictment before the jury shall be sworn,“ and not afterwards; and every court before whom any such objection shall be taken for any formal defect may, if it be thought necessary, cause the indictment to be forth with amended in such particular by the clerk or other officer of the court, and thereupon the trial shall proceed as if no such defect appeared." 1 Brightly's Purd. Dig. 347, 348; Act March 31, 1860.

“If any person shall, by any false pretense, obtain the signature of any person to any written instrument, or shall obtain from any other person any other chattel, money, or valuable security, with intent to cheat and defraud any person of the same, every such offender shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on conviction, be sentenced to pay a fine not exceeding five hundred dollars, and undergo an imprisonment not exceeding three years: provided, always, that if upon the trial of any person indicted for such misdemeanor it shall be proved that he obtained the property in question in such manner as to amount in law to larceny, he shall not by reason thereof be entitled to be acquitted of such misdemeanor; and no person tried for such misdemeanor shall be liable to be afterwards prosecuted for larceny upon the same facts." Id. 347, 348; Act Märch 31, 1860. (4) An affidavit by Frederick Gentner, as follows:

"Commonwealth of Penna. v. Louis Reggel. "Frederick Gentner, being duly sworn according to law, deposes and says: The grand jury of the March sessions, of the city and county of Philadelphia, found a true bill of indictment against Louis Reggel, charging him with the crime of false pretenses, and that the said Louis Reggel is a fugitive from justice, and now in Salt Lake City, Utah territory.

"FREDERICK GENTNER. “Sworn to and subscribed to this tenth day of April, A. D. 1882. Seal of Court Quarter Ses

ALLISON HENNESEY,

“Per Clerk. “Indorsed: Commonwealth v. Louis Reggel."

* The foregoing constituted the evidence submitted to the governor of Utah, on which his warrant for the arrest of appellant was granted. From the order denying the application of the petitioner to be discharged and reinanding him to the custody of the marshal, an appeal was allowed and perfected, -the petitioner, pending the appeal, being placed under bond to surrender himself in execution of the judgment, if it should be affirmed, modified, or dismissed, and obey all orders made herein by this court.

Arthur Brown, for appellant.

Mr. Justice HARLAN, after stating the facts in the foregoing language, delivered the opinion of the court:

This case arises under sections 5278 and 5279 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, which provide:

“Sec. 5278. Whenever the executive authority of any ate or territory demands any person as a fugitive from justice of the executive authority of any state or territory to which such person has fled, and produces a copy of an indictment found, or affidavit made before a magistrate of any state or territory, charging the person demanded with having committed treason, felony, or other crime, certified as authentic by the governor or chief magistrate of the state or territory from whence the person has fled, it shall be the duty of the executive authority of the state or territory to which such person has fled to cause him to be arrested and secured, and to cause notice of the arrest to be given to the executive authority making such demand, or to the agent of such authority appointed to secure the fugitive, and to cause the fugitive to be

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delivered to such agent when he shall appear. If no such agent appears within six months from the time of the arrest, the prisoner may be discharged. All costs and expenses incurred in the apprehending, securing, and transporting such fugitive to the state or territory making such demand shall be paid by such state or territory.

“Sec. 5279. Any agent who receives the-fugitive into his custody shall be empowered to transport him to the state or territory from which he has fled. And every person who, by force, sets at liberty or rescues the fugitive from such agent while so transporting him, shall be fined not more than five hundred dollars, or imprisoned not more than one year. 1 St. c. 7. 88 1, 2.

It is not necessary to consider the question suggested by counsel as to the right of the governor of the territory to have withheld the papers upon which he based his warrant for the arrest of the accused; for the record shows that the requisition and the accompanying papers from the governor of Pennsylvania constituted the evidence upon which he acted, and were submitted to the court to which the writ of habeas corpus was returned. Under the act of congress, it became the duty of the governor of Utah to cause the arrest of Reggel, and his delivery to the agent appointed to receive him, when it appeared (1) that the demand by the executive authority of Pennsylvania was accompanied by a copy of an indictment, or affidavit made before a magistrate, charging Reggel with having committed treason, felony, or other crime within that state, and certified as authentic by her governor; (2) that the person demanded was a fugitive from justice.

The first of these conditions was met by the production to the governor of Utah of the indictment (duly certified as authentic) of the grand jury of the court of quarter sessions of the peace for the city and county of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, wherein the accused was charged with having committed the crime of obtaining, by false pretenses, certain goods, with the intent to cheat and defraud the persons therein named; which offense, as was made to appear from the statutes of that commonwealth, (a copy of which, duly certified as authentic, accompanied the indictment,) is a misdemeanor under the laws of Pennsylvania, punishable by a fine not exceeding $500, and imprisonment not exceeding three years.

It was objected in the court of original jurisdiction that there could be no valid requisition based upon an indictment for an offense less than a fel*ony. This view is erroneous. It was declared, in Kentucky v. Dennison, 24

How. 99, that the words "treason, felony, or other crime,” in section 2 of article 1 of the constitution, include every offense, from the highest to the lowest, known to the law of the state from which the accused had fled, including misdemeanors. It was there said by Chief Justice TANEY, speaking for the whole court, that, looking to the words of the constitution, “to the obvious policy and necessity of this provision to preserve harmony between the states and order and law within their respective borders, and to its early adoption by the colonies, and then by the confederated states whose mutual interest it was to give each other aid and support whenever it was needed, the conclusion is irresistible that this compact ingrafted in the constitution included, and was intended to include, every offense made punishable by the law of the state in which it was committed." It is within the power of each state, except as her authority may be limited by the constitution of the United States, to declare what shall be offenses against her laws; and citizens of other states, when within her jurisdiction, are subject to those laws. In recognition of this right, so reserved to the states, the words of the clause in reference to fugitives from justice were made sufficiently comprehensive to include every offense against the laws of the demanding state, without exception as to the nature of the crime.

Although the constitutional provision in question does not, in terms, refer to fugitives from the justice of any state who may be found in one of the territories of the United States, the act of congress has equal application in that class of cases; and the words “treason, felony, or other crime" must receive the same interpretation when the demand for the fugitive is made, under that act, upon the governor of a territory, as when made upon the executive authority of one of the states of the Union.

Another proposition advanced in behalf of the appellant is that the indictment which accompanied the requisition does not sutficiently charge the commission of any crime; of which fact it was the duty of the governor of Utab to take notice, and which the court may not ignore in determining whetherg *the appellant is lawfully in custody. In connection with this proposition, counsel discusses, in the light of the adjudged cases, the general question as to the authority of a court of the state or territory in which the fugitive is found to discharge him from arrest whenever, in its judgment, the indictment, according to the technical rules of criminal pleading, is defective in its statement of the crime charged. It is sufficient for the purposes of the present case to say that, by the laws of Pennsylvania, every indictment is to be deemed and adjudged sufficient and good in law which charges the crime substantially in the language of the act of assembly prohibiting its commission, and prescribing the punishment therefor; or, if at common law, so plainly that the nature of the offense charged may be easily understood by the jury; and that the indictment which accompanied the requisition of the governor of Pennsylvania does charge the crime substantially in the language of her statute. That commonwealth has the right to establish the forms of pleadings and process to be observed in her own courts, in both civil and criminal cases, subject only to those provisions of the constitution of the United States involving the protection of life, liberty, and property in all the states of the Union.

The only question remaining to be considered, relates to the alleged want of competent evidence before the governor of Utah, at the time he issued the warrant of arrest, to prove that the appellant was a fugitive from the justice of Pennsylvania. Undoubtedly the act of congress did not impose upon the executive authority of the territory the duty of surrendering the appellant, unless it was made to appear, in some proper way, that he was a fugitive from justice. In other words, the appellant was entitled, under the act of congress, to insist upon proof that he was within the demanding state at the time he is alleged to have committed the crime charged, and subsequently withdrew from her jurisdiction, so that he could not be reached by her crimi. nal process. The statute, it is to be observed, does not prescribe the character of such proof; but that the executive authority of the territory was not required by the act of congress to cause the arrest of appellant and his delivery to the agent appointed by the governor of Pennsylvania, without proof of the fact that he was a fugitive from justice, is, in our judgment, clear from the language of that act. Any other interpretation would lead to the conclusion that the mere requisition by the executive of the demanding state, accompanied by the copy of an indictment, or an affidavit before a magistrate, certified by him to be authentic, charging the accused with crime committed within her limits, imposes upon the executive of the state or territory where the accused is found the duty of surrendering him, although he may be satisfied from incontestable proof that the accused had, in fact, never been in the demanding state, and therefore could not be said to have fled from its justice. Upon the executive of the state in which the accused is found, rests the responsibility of determining, in some legal mode, whether he is a fugitive froin the justice of the demanding state. He does not fail in duty if he makes it a condition precedent to the surrender of the accused that it be shown to him, by competent proof, that the accused is in fact a fugitive from the justice of the demanding state. Did it sufficiently appear that the appellant was, as represented by the exec

v.58–73

853

utive authority of Pennsylvania, a fugitive from the justice of that common. wealth? We are not justified by the record before us in saying that the gove ernor of Utah should have held the evidence inadequate to establish that fact. The warrant of arrest refers to an affidavit taken before a notary public of Pennsylvania, showing Reggel's flight from that commonwealth. There was no such affidavit; but the reference, manifestly, was to the affidavit made by Frederick Gentner, which recited the finding by the grand jury of the city and county of Philadelphia, of a true bill of indictment charging Reggel with "the crime of false pretenses,” and stating that he “is a fugitive from justice," and was then in Salt Lake City, Utah territory. This is sworn to, and is attested by the seal of the court of quarter sessions,—the court in which the prosecution is pending. It is not entirely clear from the record, as presented to us, what is the official character of the person before whom the affidavit was made. The reasonable inference is that the affidavit was made in the court where the prosecution is pending, and that it is one of the papers accompanying the requisition of the governor of Pennsylvania, and which he certified to be authentic.

It is contended that Gentner's affidavit that Reggel is a fugitive from jus. tice is the statement of a legal conclusion, and is materially defective in not setting out the facts upon which that conclusion rested. Although that statement presents, in some aspects of it, a question of law, we cannot say that the governor of Utah erred in regarding it as the statement of a fact, and as suficient evidence that appellant had fled from the state in which he stood charged with the commission of a particular crime, on a named day, at the city and county of Philadelphia; especially, as no opposing evidence was brought to his attention. If the determination of that fact by the governoi of Utah upon evidence introduced before him is subject to judicial review upon habeas corpus, the accused, in custody under his warrant,—which recites the demand of the governor of Pennsylvania, accompanied by an authentic indictment charging him, substantially in the language of her statutes, with a specific crime committed within her limits,-should not be discharged merely because, in the judgment of the court, the evidence as to his being a fugitivo from justice was not as full as might properly have been required, or because it was so meager as perhaps to admit of a conclusion different from that reached by him. In the present case, the proof before the governor of Utah may be deemed sufficient to make a prima facie case against the appellant as a fugitive from justice within the meaning of the act of congress.

Judgment affirmed.

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(115 U. S. 56)

CRUMP 0. THURBER.

(May 4, 1885.) REMOVAL OF Cause-CITIZENSHIP-ACTION BY STOCKHOLDERS AGAINST CORPORATION.

A suit in equity brought by C., a citizen of one state, against a corporation of the same state, and T., a citizen of another state, and W., to obtain a decree that C. owns shares of the stock of the corporation standing in the name of W., but sold by him to T., and that the corporation cancel on its books the shares standing in the name of W., and issues to c. certificates therefor, cannot be removed by T. into the circuit court of the United States, under section 2 of the act of March 3, 1875, (18 St. 470;) because the corporation is an indispensable party to the suit, and is a citizen

of the same state with c. Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Ken. tucky.

G. C.Wharton, for appellant. E. More, for appellee. * BLATCHFORD, J. This suit was commenced by the filing in the Louisville chancery court, in the city of Louisville, Kentucky, on the twenty-sixth of November, 1880, of a petition in equity, by W. H. Črump against James Wil

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son, and the Southern Dairy Company, a Kentucky corporation. The substance of the petition was that Crump had, under a contract with Wilson, assisted him in selling rights under a patent which he controlled; that, by th terms of the contract, Wilson was to receive $12,000 for the right for Kentucky, and $8,000 for the right for Indiana, and all received above those sums for either state was to be divided equally between Crump and Wilson; that the rights for Kentucky and Indiana were disposed of to the Southern Dairy Company, and 1,000 shares of its capital stock, of $100 each, out of 2,000 shares, were issued to Wilson, in payment for the rights, of which he had sold 100 shares for $5,000; that he had received more in value than the $20,000; that he refused to give to Crump any part of the stock or of the money; that a large amount of the stock issued to Wilson still stood on the books of the corporation in his name; and that Crump was entitled to 300 shares thereof. The petition pr ed that Crump be adjudged to own 300 shares of the stock; and that the corporation be ordered to cancel on its books the stock standing in the name of Wilson, to that extent, and to issue to Crump certificates for 300 shares.

The corporation was served with process. The petition was then amended by stating that no less than 250 shares of the stock still stood in the name of Wilson; and process on that was served on the corporation. It then filed an answer,"stating that 250 shares of his stock stood, when the petition was filed, in the name of Wilson, on its books, and had not since been transferred thereon; that before the suit was brought one H. K. Thurber bought the 250 shares from Wilson, and received from him the certificates thereof, by indorsement and delivery, and still held and owned them, and he had notified the president of the corporation of that fact, and claimed the right to have the stock transferred into his own name; and that it was willing to obey the judgment of the court, but ought not to be ordered to cancel or transfer the stock, unless Thurber should be brought before the court to litigate with Crump the true ownership of the stock. Crump replied to the answer of the corporation, and filed an amended petition, making Thurber a party to the suit, and praying the same relief as in his original petition. Wilson and Thurber were then each personally served with process in the city of New York. Thurber then came into the state court and filed a petition and a bond for the removal of the suit to the circuit court of the United States for the district of Kentucky, and the state court made an order removing the cause, under the objection and exception of the plaintiff. The petition proceeded on the ground that Crump was a citizen of Kentucky and Thurber a citizen of New York, and that there was a controversy in the suit between them, which was wholly between citizens of different states, and could be fully determined between them. Nothing was said in the petition for removal about Wilson or the corporation.

Thurber then filed an answer in the circuit court, setting forth that he had, on the twenty-sixth of October, 1880, purchased the 250 shares from Wilson for value, and received from him the certificates therefor, three in number, issued by the corporation to and in the name of Wilson, with blank forms of assignment and power of attorney on the back, which Wilson signed, and delivered to Thurber with the certificates; that he was entitled to fill the blanks and surrender the certificates, and have the shares transferred and new certificates issued to him by the corporation; and that he purchased the shares a without any knowledge or information of any claim by Crump*against Wilson. The answer prayed that the shares be decreed to be the property of Thurber and not of Crump, and that the corporation be ordered to cancel the certificates issued to Wilson, and to issue to Thurber new certificates in their place. There was a replication to this answer. Thurber also filed a crossbill in the circuit court, making as a defendant only the corporation, but not Crump, setting forth himself as a citizen of New York, and the corporation as a citizen of Kentucky; and averring the facts as to his purchase of the

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