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adding a provision that any other investment of trust funds must be made under a judicial order, or else be at the risk of the trustee,) those who lent the fund at interest, on what was at the time considered by prudent men to be good security, were not held liable for a loss without their fault. Cobb, Dig. 333; Code 1861, § 2308; Brown v. Wright, 39 Ga. 96; Moses v. Moses, 50 Ga. 9, 33.

In Alabama the supreme court in Bryant v. Craig, 12 Ala. 354, 359, hav. ing intimated that a guardian could not safely invest upon either real or personal security without an order of court, the legislature, from 1852, authorized guardians and trustees to invest on bond and mortgage, or on good personal security, with no other limit than fidelity and prudence might require. Code 1852, 8 2024; Code 1867, § 2426; Foscue v. Lyon, 55 Ala. 440, 452.

The rules of investment varying so much in the different states, it becomes necessary to consider by what law the management and investment of the ward's property should be governed. As a general rule (with some exceptions not material to the consideration of this case) the law of the domicile governs the*status of a person, and the disposition and management of his movable property. The domicile of an infant is universally held to be the fittest place for the appointment of a guardian of his person and estate; al. though, for the protection of either, a guardian may be appointed in any state where the person or any property of an infant may be found. On the con. tinent of Europe, the guardian appointed in the state of the domicile of the ward is generally recognized as entitled to the control and dominion of the ward and his movable property everywhere, and guardians specially appointed in other states are responsible to the principal guardian. By the law of England and of this country, a guardian appointed by the courts of one state has no authority over the ward's person or property in another state, except so far as allowed by the comity of that state, as expressed through its legisla. ture or its courts; but the tendency of modern statutes and decisions is to lefer to the law of the domicile, and to support the authority of the guardian appointed there. Hoyt v. Sprague, 103 U. S. 613, 631, and authorities cited; Morrell v. Dickey, 1 Johns. Ch. 153; Woodworth v. Spring, 4 Allen, 321; Milliken v. Pratt, 125 Mass. 374, 377, 378; Leonard v. Putnam, 51 N. H. 247; Com. v. Rhoads, 37 Pa. St. 60; Sims v. Renwick, 25 Ga. 58; Dicey, Dom. 172-176; Westl. Int. Law, (20 Ed.) 48-50; Whart. Confl. Laws, (2d Ed.) SS 259–268. An infant cannot change his own domicile. As infants have the domicile of their father, he may change their domicile by changing his own; and after his death the mother, while she remains a widow, may likewise, by changing her domicile, change the domicile of the infants; the domicile of the children, in either case, following the independent domicile of their parent. Kennedy v. Ryall, 67 N. Y. 379; Potinger v. Wightman, 3 Mer. 67; Dedham v. Natick, 16 Mass. 135; Dicey, Dom. 97–99. But when the widow, py marrying again, acquires the domicile of a second husband, she does not, by taking her children by the first husband to live with her there, make the domicile which she derives from th econd husbar their domicile; and they retain the domicile which they had, before her second marriage, acquired from her or from their father. * Cumner v. Milton, 3 Salk. 259; S. C. Holt, 578: Freetoun v. Taunton, 16 Mass. 52; School Directors v. James, 2 Watts & S. 568; Johnson v. Copeland, 35 Ala. 521; Brown v. Lynch, 2 Bradf. 214; Mears V. Sinclair, 1 West Va. 185; Pot. Introduction Generale aux Coutumes, No. 19; 1 Burge, Col. Law, 39; 4 Phillim. Int. Law, (20 Ed.) 8 97.

The preference due to the law of the ward's domicile, and the importance of a uniform administration of his whole estate, require that, as a general rule, the management and investment of his property should be governed by the law of the state of his doinicile, especially when he actually resides there, rather than by the law of any state in which a guardian may have been appointed

or may have received some property of the ward. If the duties of the guardian were to be exclusively regulated by the law of the state of his appointment, it would follow that in any case in which the temporary residence of the ward was changed from state to state, from considerations of health, education, pleasure, or convenience, and guardians were appointed in each state, the guardians appointed in the different states, even if the same persons, might be held to diverse rules of accounting for different parts of the ward's property. The form of accounting, so far as concerns the remedy only, must, indeed, be according to the law of the court in which relief is sought; but the general rule by which the guardian is to be held responsible for the investment of the ward's property is the law of the place of the domicile of the ward. Bar, Int. Law, $ 106, (Gillespie's translation,) p. 438; Whart. Confl. Laws, § 259. It may be suggested that this would enable the guardian, by changing the domicile of his ward, to choose for himself the law by which he should account. Not so. The father, and after his death the widowed mother, being the natural guardian, and the person from whom the ward derives his domicile, may change that domicile. But the ward does not derive a domicile from any other than a natural guardian. A testamentary guardian nominated by the father may have the same control of the ward's domicile that the father had. Wood v. Wood,*5 Paige, 596, 605. And any guardian, appointed in the state of the domicile of the ward, has been generally held to have the power of changing the ward's domicile from one county to another within the same state and under the same law. Cutts v. Haskins, 9 Mass. 543; Holyoke v. Haskins, 5 Pick. 20; Kirkland v. Whately, 4 Allen, 462; Anderson v. Anderson, 42 Vt. 350; Ex parte Bartlett, 4 Bradf. 221; The Queen v. Whitby, L. R. 5 Q. B. 325, 331. But it is very doubtful, to say the least, whether even a guardian appointed in the state of the domicile of the ward (not being the natural guardian or a testamentary guardian) can remove the ward's domicile beyond the limits of the state in which the guardian is appointed, and to which his legal authority is confined. Douglas v. Douglas, L. R. 12 Eq. 617, 625; Daniel v. Hill, 52 Ala. 430; Story, Cont. Laws, $ 506, note: Dicey, Dom. 100, 132. And it is quite clear that a guardian appointed in a state in which the ward is temporarily residing, can not change the ward's permanent domicile from one state to another. The case of such a guardian differs from that of an executor of, or a trustee under, a will. In the one case, the title in the property is in the executor or the trustee; in the other, the title in the property is in the ward, and the guardian has only the custody and management of it, with power to change its investment. The executor or trustee is appointed at the domicile of the testator; the guardian is most fitly appointed at the domicile of the ward, and may be appointed in any state in which the person or any property of the ward is found. The general rule which governs the administration of the property in the one case may be the law of the domicile of the testator; in the other case, it is the law of the domicile of the ward.

As the law of the domicile of the ward has no extraterritorial effect, except by the comity of the state where the property is situated, or where the guardian is appointed, it cannot, of course, prevail against a statute of the state in which the question is presented for adjudication, expressly applicable to the estate of a ward domiciled elsewhere. Hoyt v. Sprague, 103 U. S. 613. Cases may also arise with facts so peculiar or so complicated as to modify the degree of influence that the court in which the guardian is called to account may allow to the law of the domicile of the ward, consistently with doing justice to the parties before it. And a guardian, who had in good faith conformed to the law of the state in which he was appointed, might, perhaps, be excused for not having complied with stricter rules prevailing at the domicile of the ward. But in a case in which the domicile of the ward has always been in a state whose law leaves much to the discretion of the guardian in

the matter of investments, and he has faithfully and prudently exercised that discretion with a view to the pecuniary interests of the ward, it would be in. consistent with the principles of equity to charge him with the amount of the moneys invested, merely because he was not complied with the more rigid rules adopted by the courts of the state in which he was appointed. The domicile of William W. Sims, during his life and at the time of his death in 1850, was in Georgia. This domicile continued to be the domicile of his widow and of their infant children until they acquired new ones. In 1853 the widow, by marrying the Rev. Mr. Ambercrombie, acquired his domicile. But she did not, by taking the infants to the home, at first in New York and afterwards in Connecticut, of her new husband, who was of no kin to the children, was under no legal obligation to support them, and was, in fact, paid for their hoard out of their property, make his domicile, or the domicile derived by her from him, the domicile of the children of the first husband. Immediately upon her asath in Connecticut, in 1859, these children, both under 10 years of age, were taken back to Georgia to the house of their father's mother and unmarried sister, their own nearest surviving relatives; and they continued to live with their grandmother and aunt in Georgia until the marriage of the aunt in January, 1860, to Mr. Micou, a citizen of Alabama, after which the grandmother and the children resided with Mr. and Mrs. Micou at their domicile in that state.

Upon these facts, the domicile of the children was always in Georgia from their birth until January, 1860, and thenceforth*was either in Georgia or in Alabama. As the rules of investment prevailing before 1863 in Georgia and in Alabama did not subsiantially differ, the question in which of those two states their domicile was is immaterial to the decision of this case; and it is therefore unnecessary to consider whether their grandmother was their natural guardian, and as such had the power to change their domicile from one state to another. See Hargrave's note 66 to Co. Litt. 886; Reeve, Dom. Rel. 315; 2 Kent, Comm. 219; Code Ga. 1861, $S 1754, 2452; Darden v. Wyatt, 15 Ga. 414. Whether the domicile or Lamar in December, 1855, when he was appointed in New York guardian of the infants, was in New York or in Georgia, does not distinctly appear, and is not material; because, for the reasons already stated, wherever his domicile wis, his duties as guardian in the management and investment of the property of his wards were to be regulated by the law of their domicile.

It remains to apply the test of that law to Lamai 's acts or omissions with regard to the various kinds of securities in which the property of the wards was invested.

1. The sum which Lamar received in New York in money from Mrs. Abercrombie he invested in 1856 and 1857 in stock of the Bank of the Republic at New York, and of the Bank of Commerce at Savannah, both of which were then, and continued till the breaking out of the war, in sound condition, pay ing good dividends. There is nothing to raise a suspicion that Lamar, in making these investments, did not use the highest degree of prudence; and they were such as by the law of Georgia or of Alabama he might properly make. Noi is there any evidence that he was guilty of neglect in not withdrawing the investment in the stock of the Bank of Commerce at Savannah before it became worthless. He should not, therefore, be charged with the loss of that stock. The investment in the stock of the Bank of the Republic of New York being a proper investment by the law of the domicile of the wards, and there being no evidence that the sale of that stock by Lamar's vr. der in New York, in 1862, was not judicious, or was for less than its fair market price, he was not*responsible for the decrease in its value between the times of its purchase and of its sais. He had the authority, as guardian, without any order of court, to sell personal property of his ward in his own possession, and to reinvest the proceeds. Gield Schieffelin, ?Johns. Ch.

150;

*476

Ellis v. Essex Merrimack Bridge, 2 Pick. 243. That his motive in sell ing it was to avoid its being confiscated by the United States, does not af pear to us to have any bearing on the rights of these parties. And no stalute under which it could have been confiscated has been brought to our notice. The act of July 17, 1862, c. 195, § 6, cited by the appellant, is limited to property of persons engaged in or abetting armed rebellion, which could hardly be predicated of two girls under 13 years of age. 12 St. 591. Whatever liability, criminal or civil, Lamar may have incurred or avoided as towards the United States, there was nothing in his selling this stock, and turning it into money, of which his wards had any right to complain.

As to the sum received from the sale of the stock in the Bank of the Republic, we find nothing in the facts agreed by the parties, upon which the case was heard, to support the argument that Lamar, under color of protecting his wards' interests, allowed the funds to be lent to cities and other corporations which were aiding in the rebellion. On the contrary, it is agreed that that sum was applied to the purchase in New York of guarantied bonds of the cities of New Orleans, Memphis, and Mobile, and of the East Tennessea & Georgia Railroad Company; and the description of those bonds, in the receipt afterwards given by Micou to Lamar, shows that the bonds of that railroad company, and of the cities of New Orleans and Memphis, at least, were issued some years before the breaking out of the rebellion, and that the bonds of the city of Memphis and of the railroad company were, at the time of their issue, indorsed by the state of Tennessee. The company had its charter from that state, and its road was partly in Tennessee and partly in Georgia. Tenn. St. 1848, c. 169. Under the discretion allowed to a guardian or trustee by the law of Georgia and of Alabama, he was not precluded from investing the funds in his hands in bonds of a railroad corporation, indorsed by the state by which it was chartered, or in bonds of a city. As Lamar, in making these investments, appears to have used due care and prudence, inaying regard to the best pecuniary interests of his wards, the sum so invested should be credited to him in this case, unless, as suggested at the argument, the requisite allowance has already been inade in the final decree of the circuit court in the suit brought by the representative of the other ward, an appeal from which was dismissed by this court for want of jurisdiction in 104 U. S. 465.

2. Other moneys of the wards in Lamar's hands, arising either from dividends which he had received on their behalf, or from interest with which he charged himself upon sums not invested, were used in the purchase of bonds of the Confederate states, and of the state of Alabama. The investment in bonds of the Confederate states was clearly unlawful, and no legislative act or judicial decree or decision of any state could justify it. The so-called Confederate government was in no sense a lawful government, but was a mere government of force, having its origin and foundation in rebellion against the United States. The notes and bonds issued in its name and for its support had no legal value as money or property, except by agreement or acceptance of parties capable of contracting with each other, and can never be regarded by a court sitting under the authority of the United States as securities in which trust funds might be lawfully invested. Thorington v. Smith, 8 Wall. 1; Head v. Starke, Chase, 312; Horn v. Lockhart, 17 Wall. 570; Confederate Note Case, 19 Wall. 548; Sprott v. United States, 20 Wall. 459; Fretz v. Slover, 22 Wall. 198; Alexander v. Bryan, 110 U. S. 414; S. C. 4 SUP. Cr. REP. 107. An infant has no capacity, by contract with his guardian, or by assent to his unlawful acts, to affect his own rights. The case is governed in this particular by the decision in Horn v. Lockhart, in which it was held that an executor was not discharged from his liability to legatees by having invested funds, pursuant to a statute of the state, and with the approval of the probate court by which he had been appointed, in honds of the Confederate states, which

becama worthless in his hands. • Neither the date nor the purpose of the issue of the bonds of the state of Alabama is shown, and it is unnecessary to consider the lawfulness of the investment in those bonds, because Lamar appears to have sold them for as much as he had paid for them, and to have invested the proceeds in additional Confederate states bonds, and for the amount thereby lost to the estate he was accountable.

3. The stock in the Mechanics' Bank of Georgia, which had belonged to William W. Sims in his life-time, and stood on the books of the bank in the name of his administratrix, and of which one-third belonged to her, as his widow, and one third to each of the infants, never came into Lamar's possession; and upon a request made by him, the very next inonth after his appointment, the bank refused to transfer to him any part of it. He did receive and account for the dividends; and he could not, under the law of Georgia concerning foreign guardians, have obtained possession of property of his wards within that state without the consent of the ordinary. Code 1861, SS 18341839. The attempt to charge hiin for the value of the principal of the stock must fail for two reasons: First. This very stock had not only belonged to the father of the wards in his life-time, but it was such stock as a guardian or trustee might properly invest in by the law of Georgia. Second. No reason is shown why this stock, being in Georgia, the domicile of the wards, should have been transferred to a guardian who had been appointed in New York during their temporary residence there. The same reasons are conclusive against charging him with the value of the bank stock in Georgia, which was owned by Mrs. Abercrombie in her own right, and to which Mr. Abercrombie became entitled upon her death. It is therefore unnecessary to consider whether there is sufficient evidence of an immediate surrender by him of her interest to her children.

The result is that both the decrees of the circuit court in this case must be reversed, and the case remanded for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion.

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