Congress certainly did not overlook, much less intend to ignore, the stipulations of the treaty, or question their scope or effect; for the fourth section, referring to Chinese laborers who were here on the seventeenth day of November, 1880, expressly recognizes the fact that the treaty of that date gave them "the right to go from and come to the United States."

Now, the argument in behalf of the government is that, since congress made provision for certificates to be furnished to those who were entitled to demand them, it did not intend to recognize the right to return of any Chinese laborer who, being in the United States at the date of the treaty, was not here when the act of 1882 was passed. Assuming, always, that there was a purpose, in good faith, to abide by the stipulations of the treaty, this arguinent necessarily implies that, in the judgment of congress, the treaty did not secure to any Chinese laborer the right of going and coming of his own free will, except to those in this country at the date of the treaty, who renained here continuously until the original act was passed, or who had returned by the latter date; in other words, that a Chinese laborer who was here on the seventeenth of November, 1880, lost the right to return, so far as that right was secured by treaty, if he left at any time-no matter for what purpose or for how brief a period prior to, and had not returned before, the passage of the act of 1882.

But the treaty is not subject to any such interpretation. To give it that interpretation would be, in effect, to interpolate in its second article, after the words "Chinese laborers who are now in the United States," the words "and who shall continue to reside therein." The plaintiff in error left this country after the ratification of the treaty, having the right, secured by s articles, to return, of his own free will, without being subjected to burdens or regulations that materially interfere with its enjoyment. The legislative enactments in question should receive such a construction, if possible, as will save that right, while giving full effect to the intention of congress. That result can be attained consistently with recognized rules of interpretation. Lex non intendit aliquid impossibile is a familiar maxim of the law. The supposition should not be indulged that congress, while professing to faithfully execute treaty stipulations, and recognizing the fact that they secured to a certain class the "right to go from and come to the United States," intended to make its protection depend upon the performance of conditions which it was physically impossible to perform. "Besides," said this court in U. S. v. Kirby, 7 Wall. 486, "general terms should be so limited in their application as not to lead to injustice, oppression, or an absurd consequence. It will always, therefore, be presumed that the legislature intended exceptions to its language which would avoid results of this character. The reason of the law in such cases should prevail over its letter." See, also, Carlisle v. U. 8. 16 Wall. 153. So, in Perry v. Skinner, 2 Mees. & W. 471, it was said: "The rule by which we are to be guided is to look at the precise words, and to construe them in their ordinary sense, unless it would lead to absurdity or manifest injustice; and if it should, so to vary them as to avoid that which certainly could not have been the intention of the legislature. We must put a reasonable construction upon their words." Lake Shore Ry. Co. v. Roach, 80 N. Y. 339; Com. v. Kimball, 24 Pick. 370; Campbell's Case, 2 Bland, 209; Sedg. St. & Const. Law, 191. What injustice could be more marked than, by legislative enactment, to recognize the existence of a right by treaty to come within the limits of the United States, and, at the same time, to prescribe, as the only evidence permissible to establish it, the possession of a collector's certificate that could not possibly have been obtained by the person to whom the right belongs? Or, to prevent the re-entry of a person into the United States upon the ground that he did not, upon his arrival from a foreign port, produce a certain certificate, under the hand and seal of a collector, and upon forms prescribed by the secretary of the treasury, which neither

that nor any other officer was authorized or permitted to give prior to the departure of such person from this country? Or what incongruity is more evident than to impose upon a collector the duty of going on board of a vessel about to sail from his district for a foreign port, and making and recording a list of its passengers of a particular race, showing their individual,, family, and tribal names in full, their age, occupation, last place of residence, physical marks and peculiarities, when such vessel had sailed long before the law passed which imposed that duty on the collector? These questions suggest the consequences that must result if it is held that congress intended to abrogate the treaty with China, by imposing conditions upon the enjoyment of rights secured by it which are impossible of performance.

But there is another view which tends to show the unsoundness of the construction upon which the government insists. It is this: If Chinese laborers who were here at the date of the treaty, or who came within 90 days next after the passage of the act of 1882, being out of the country when the act of 1884 was passed, can re-enter only upon producing the certificate required by the latter act, then congress must have intended to exclude even those who were in this country at the time the act of 1882 was passed, and who, upon going away, received the certificate mentioned in it; for the certificate prescribed by the act of 1882 is not the certificate prescribed by that of 1884; they differ in several particulars; and yet, if the act of 1884 is to be taken literally, all Chinese laborers are excluded who do not produce the very certificate mentioned in it. The original act expressly provides that the certificate prescribed therein "shall entitle the Chinese laborer to whom the same is issued to return to and re-enter the United States, upon producing and delivering the same" to the collector of the district at which he seeks to re-enter. Congress did not intend, by indirection, to withdraw from those who received and relied upon the certificate mentioned in that act the privilege of returning, simply because they did not (and could not) produce the certificate required by the amendatory act, passed during their rightful absence. Those who left the country with certificates under the original act were entitled to return upon the production of those certificates. If, then, the act of 1884 did not defeat the rights given by that of 1882, it follows that there are Chinese laborers who, having been in the United States prior to July 5, 1884, may re-enter without producing the certificate required by the act of the latter date; and so the argument that congress intended to exclude from the *country Chinese laborers of every class who did not produce the certificate prescribed by the act of 1884, fails in respects essential to sustain the judgment below. A construction of the original and amendatory acts which saves the rights of the plaintiff in error rests upon precisely the same grounds as does a construction of the amendatory act which saves the rights of those obtaining certificates under the original act, who did not seek to re-enter the country until after the act of 1884 was passed.

There are other sections of the act of congress upon which, it was suggested in argument, the judgment below could be sustained. Some stress is laid upon the fifth section, which provides that "any Chinese laborer mentioned in section four of this act, being in the United States and desiring to depart from the United States by land, shall have the right to demand and receive, free of charge or cost, a certificate of identification similar to that provided for in section four of this act to be issued to such Chinese laborers as may desire to leave the United States by water; and it is hereby made the duty of the collector of customs of the district next adjoining the foreign country to which said Chinese laborer desires to go, to issue such certificate, free of charge or cost, upon application by such Chinese laborer, and to enter the same upon registry books to be kept by him for the purpose, as provided for in section four of this act." The argument, based upon this section, is that the phrase "being in the United States" indicates a purpose to exclude

all Chinese laborers not in the United States at the date of the original act In our judgment, that phrase throws light upon the true meaning of the fourth section, in this: that, as the fifth section prescriben a certificate for those "being in the United States" who desired to depart by land, so the fourth section prescribed a certificate for those being in the United States who desired to depart by water. In each case the provision is for those who are rightfully here, and therefore have an opportunity to demand and receive the required certificate, and not for those who are protected by the treaty, but who, being absent from the country, when the law was enacted making provision for a collector's certificate, could not demand and receive it. Neither section purports to defeat previously-existing rights by imposing conditions upon their enjoyment which cannot be satisfied.

It is also said, in support of the judgment, that the sixth section is significant, in that it prescribes the mode for the coming to this country of Chinese persons, "other than a laborer who may be entitled by said treaty and this act to come within the United States," but fails to provide the means for the return and identification of Chinese laborers who were entitled by the treaty to return, but who were out of the country when the act of congress was passed. But this argument, like the one just alluded to, only proves that congress, while making provision for the coming of persons who were entitled to come, other than laborers, omitted to make special provision in reference to the latter, and, consequently, left them to stand upon their rights as secured by the treaty, and, if their right to enter the United States was questioned, to prove in some way, consistent with the general principles of law, that they belonged to the class entitled to go and come. Some reliance was also placed upon the implication arising from that clause of the twelfth section which declares that "no Chinese person shall be permitted to enter the United States by land, without producing to the proper officer of customs the certificate in this act required of Chinese persons seeking to land from a vessel." We do not perceive that any argument based upon these words meets the view that the act of congress, in respect of Chinese laborers entitled to gc and come, is inapplicable to those who were here at the date of the treaty, but, by reason of absence when the act of congress took effect, could not obtain the required certificate. If, however, the twelfth section should be held to forbid the entrance of Chinese persons of every class into this country, by land, except upon the certificate required by the fourth section, it would not follow that a Chinese laborer entitled by the treaty to go and come at pleasure, and who was out of the country when the act of congress was passed, could not re-enter by vessel, upon satisfactory evidence of his being here at the date of the treaty.

The entire argument in support of the jugdment below proceeds upon the erroneous assumption that congress intended to exclude all Chinese laborers of every class who were not in the United States at the time of the passage of the act of 1882, including those who, like the plaintiff in error, were here when the last treaty was concluded, but were absent at the date of the passage of that act. We have stated the main reasons which, in our opinion, forbid that interpretation of the act of congress. To these may be added the further one, that the courts uniformly refuse to give to statutes a retrospective operation, whereby rights previously vested are injuriously affected, unless compelled to do so by language so clear and positive as to leave no room to doubt that such was the intention of the legislature. In U. S. v. Heth, 3 Cranch, 413, this court said that "words in a statute ought not to have a retrospective operation unless they are so clear, strong, and imperative that no other meaning can be annexed to them, or unless the intention of the legislature cannot be otherwise satisfied;" and such is the settled doctrine of this court. Murray v. Gibson, 15 How. 423; McEwen v. Den, 24 How. 244; Harvey v. Tyler, 2 Wall. 347; Sohn v. Waterson, 17 Wall 599; Twenty per cent

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Cases, 20 Wall. 187. So far from the court being compelled, by the language of the act of congress, to give it a retrospective operation, the plain, natural, and obvious meaning of the words-interpreted with reference to the general scope and the declared purpose of the statute-utterly forbids the conclusion that there was any intention to impair or destroy rights previously granted. The Chinese laborer who, under the act of 1882, was entitled to return and re-enter the United States upon producing the certificate therein prescribed, and the Chinese laborer who, after the act of 1884 was passed, could re-enter the country only upon producing the certificate required by the latter act, is described as one "to whom the same is issued."

It would be a perversion of the language used to hold that such regulations apply to Chinese laborers who had left the country with the privilege, secured by treaty, of returning, but who, by reason of their absence when those legislative enactments took effect, could not obtain the required certificates. Statutory provisions which declare that a certificate shall be evidence, or the only evidence, of the right of the person "to whom it is issued" to re-enter the United States, cannot, upon any sound rule of interpretation, be held to apply to one to whom it could not have been issued. A Chinese laborer, to whom a certificate was issued under the original act, is entitled to re-enter only upon producing that certificate; one, to whom a certificate was issued under the act of 1884, is entitled to re-enter only upon producing such certificate; while the plaintiff in error, having left before any certificate was permitted to be issued, cannot be required to produce one before re-entering, because, having resided here on the seventeenth day of November, 1880, he was clearly entitled, under the express words of the treaty, to go from and return to the United States of his own free will,-a privilege that would be destroyed if its enjoyment depended upon a condition impossible to be performed. The recognition of that privilege is entirely consistent with existing legislation; for, by construing the original and amendatory acts, so far as they require the production of a collector's certificate by Chinese laborers who were in the United States on the seventeenth of November, 1880, as applicable only to those of that class who were here at the dates when those acts, respectively, took effect, no previously acquired rights are violated, and full effect is given to the expressed intention of congress to faithfully meet our treaty obligations. Thus, the legislation of congress and the stipulations of the treaty may stand together.

In accordance with these views, it is adjudged that the plaintiff in error is entitled to enter and remain in the United States. The first of the certified questions is, therefore, answered in the negative, and the second and third in the affirmative. The judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

FIELD, J., dissenting. I am unable to agree with my associates in their construction of the act of May 6, 1882, as amended by the act of July 5, 1884, restricting the immigration into this country of Chinese laborers. That construction appears to me to be in conflict with the language of the act, and to require the elimination of entire clauses and the interpolation of new ones. It renders nugatory whole provisions which were inserted with sedulous care. The change thus produced in the operation of the act is justified on the theory that to give it any other construction would bring it into conflict with the treaty; and that we are not at liberty to suppose that congress intended by its legislation to disregard any treaty stipulations. The circuit judge, in his opinion, assumes that the treaty of 1880 allows Chinese laborers, then in the United States, freedom to depart and return without reference to their subse quent residence in the country; and that this freedom is assured to them whether they afterwards abandon or continue their residence. Proceeding on this assumption, as though it were impregnable, the assertion is made, with

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great positiveness and frequent repetition, that the act of congress, construed according to the natural meaning of its terms, violates that treaty and our plighted faith; and the enormity of such legislation is dwelt upon with much warmth of expression. The majority of this court, adopting a similar construction of the treaty, narrow the meaning of the act so as measurably to frustrate its intended operation. Whereas, if the treaty as to such laborers be construed, as I think it should be, to apply to those then here who afterwards continue their residence in the country, and who may, during such residence, desire to be temporarily absent, there is no conflict between it and the act of congress. Both are then in perfect harmony, the imputation of bad faith is without a plausible pretext, and the citations in the opinion of the circuit judge, and of this court, as to the necessity of so construing acts as not to lead to injustice, oppression, or absurd consequences, have no application.

The petitioner, a native of China, and a laborer, though here when the treaty of 1880 was concluded, left the country in June, 1881, and was in the Hawaiian islands over three years before he desired to return. Chinese laborers do not travel for pleasure, and during that time he had acquired a residence in those islands as fully as he ever had in the United States. But, according to the opinion of the court, this fact is of no significance. He could reside there 20 years and then return, notwithstanding the act of congress. I cannot construe the treaty as conferring any such unrestricted right, or as applying to any other laborers than those who afterwards continued their residence here. If, however, the act of congress be in conflict with the treaty upon the immigration of Chinese laborers, it must control as being the last expression of the sovereign will of the country. And while I agree with all that is said in the opinion of the court as to the sanctity of the public faith, I must be permitted to suggest that if the legislative department sees fit, for any reason, to refuse, upon a subject within its control, compliance with the stipulations of a treaty, or to abrogate them entirely, it is not for this court or any other court to call in question the validity or wisdom of its action, and impute unworthy motives to it. It should be presumed that good and sufficient reasons controlled and justified its conduct. If the nation with which the treaty is made objects to the legislation it may complain to the executive head of our government, and take such measures as it may deem advisable for its interests. But whether it has just cause of complaint, or whether, in view of its action, adverse legislation on our part be or be not justified, is not a matter for judicial cognizance or consideration. A treaty is, in its nature, a contract between two or more nations, and is so considered by writers on public law; and by the constitution it is placed on the same footing and made of like obligation as a law of the United States. Both are declared in that instrument to be the supreme law of the land, and no paramount authority is given to either over the other.

Some treaties operate in whole or in part by their own force, and some require legislation to carry their stipulations into effect. If that legislation impose duties to be discharged in the future, it may be repealed or modified at the pleasure of congress. If the treaty relates to a subject within the powers of congress, and operates by its own force, it can only be regarded by the courts as equivalent to a legislative act. Congress may, as with an ordinary statute, modify its provisions, or supersede them altogether. The immigration of foreigners to this country, and the conditions upon which they shall be permitted to come or remain, are proper subjects both of legislation and of treaty stipulation. The power of congress, however, over the subject can neither be taken away nor impaired by any treaty.

As said by Mr. Justice CURTIS, in Taylor v. Morton: "To refuse to execute a treaty, for reasons which approve themselves to the conscientious judgment of the nation, is a matter of the utmost gravity and delicacy; but the