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formity of that section with the requirements of the constitution of the state, Our jurisdiction is confined to a consideration of the federal question involved, which arises upon an alleged conflict of the fourth section in ques. tion with the first section of the fourteenth amendment of the constitution of the United States. No other part of the amendment has any possible application. That fourth section, so far as it is involved in the case before the police judge, was simply a prohibition to carry on the washing and ironing of clothes in public laundries and wash-houses, within certain prescribed limits of the city and county, from 10 o'clock at night until 6 o'clock in the morning of the following day. The prohibition against labor on Sunday is not involved. The provision is purely a police regulation within the competency of any municipality possessed of the ordinary powers belonging to such bodies. And it would be an extraordinary usurpation of the authority of a municipality, if a federal tribunal should undertake to supervise such regu. lations. It may be a necessary measure of precaution in a city composed largely of wooden buildings like San Francisco, that occupations, in which fires are constantly required, should cease after certain hours at night until the following morning; and of the necessity of such regulations the munici. pal bodies are the exclusive judges; at least, any correction of their action in such matters can coine only from state legislation or state tribunals. The same municipal authority which directs the cessation of labor must necessa: rily prescribe the limits within which it shall be enforced, as it does the limits in a city within which wooden buildings cannot be constructed. There is no invidious discrimination against any one within the prescribed limits by such regulations. There is none in the regulation under consideration. The specie fication of the limits within which the business cannot be carried on without the certificates of the health officer and board of fire-wardens is merely a designation of the portion of the city in which the precautionary measures against fire and to secure proper drainage must be taken for the public health and safety. It is not legislation*discriminating against any one. All persons engaged in the same business within it are treated alike; are subject to the same restrictions, and are entitled to the same privileges under similar con. ditions.
The fourteenth amendment, in declaring that no state “shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,” undoubtedly intended not only that there should be no arbitrary deprivation of life or liberty, or arbitrary spoliation of property, but that equal protection and security should be given to all under like circumstances in the enjoyment of their personal and civil rights; that all persons should be equally entitled to pursue their happiness, and acquire and enjoy property; that they should have like access to the courts of the country for the protection of their persons and property, the prevention and redress of wrongs, and the enforcement of contracts; that no impediment should be interposed to the pursuits of any one, except as applied to the same pursuits by others under like cir. cumstances; that no greater burdens should be laid upon one than are laid upon others in the same calling and condition; and that in the administration of criminal justice no different or higher punishment should be imposed upon one than such as is prescribed to all for like offenses.
But neither the amendment-broad and comprehensive as it is—nor any other amendment, was designed to interfere with the power of the state, sometimes termed its police power, to prescribe regulations to promote the health, peace, morals, education, and good order of the people, and to legislate so as to increase the industries of the state, develop its resources, and add to its wealth and prosperity. From the very necessities of society, legislation of a special character, having these objects in view, must often be had in cer. tain districts, such as for draining marshes and irrigating arid plains. Spo
cial burdens are often necessary for general benefits,- for supplying water, preventing fires, lighting districts, cleaning streets, opening parks, and many other objects. Regulations for these purposes may press with more or less weight upon one than upon another, but they are designed, not to impose unequal or unnecessary restrictions upon any one, but to promote, with as little individual inconvenience as possible, the general good. Though, in many respects, necessarily special in their character, they do not furnish just ground of complaint if they operate alike upon all persons and property under the same circumstances and conditions. Class legislation, discriminating against some and favoring others, is prohibited; but legislation which, in carrying out a public purpose, is limited in its application, if within the sphere of its operation it affects alike all persons similarly situated, is not within the amendment. In the execution of admitted powers unnecessary proceedings are often required which are cumbersome, dilatory, and expensive; yet, if no discrimination against any one be made, and no substantial right be impaired by them, they are not obnoxious to any constitutional objection. The inconveniences arising in the administration of the laws from this cause are matters entirely for the consideration of the state; they can be remedied only by the state. In the case before us the provisions requiring certificates from the health officer and the board of fire-wardens may, in some instances, be un7ecessary, and the changes to be made to meet the conditions prescribed may ve burdensome; but, as we have said, this is a matter for the determination of the municipality in the execution of its police powers, and not a violation of any substantial right of the individual. Judgment afirmed.
(112 U. 8. 711)
(December 15, 1884.) REMOVAL OF CAUSE HEARING UPON DEMURRER.
A case cannot be removed from a state court under the act of March 3, 1875, e. 137, (18 St. 470,) after a hearing on a demurrer to a complaint, because it did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. Alley v. Nott, 111 U. 8. 472; 8. C. 4 SUP. Cr. REP. 495. In Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Missouri.
J. W. Noble and J. C. Orrick, for plaintiffs in error. J. P. Ellis and Jeff. Chandler, for defendants in error.
WAITE, C. J. The order remanding this cause to the state court from which it was removed is affirmed on the authority of Alley v. Nott, 111 U.S. 472, S. C. 4 SUP. Cr. REP. 495, where it was decided that a case could not be removed from a state court under the act of March 3, 1875, c. 137, (18 St. 470,) after a hearing on a demurrer to a complaint because it did not stato facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. To that decision we adhere. The Code of Civil Procedure of New York, from which state that cause came, provided that the court might, in its discretion, allow the party in fault to plead over or amend after the decision against him on a demurrer. In Missouri, from which state this case comes, section 3518 of the Revised Statutes cf 1879 provides that a plaintiff may amend, of course, with or without costs, as the court may order. But in Missouri, as in New York, a general de murrer to a petition or complaint raises an issue of law, which, when tried, will finally dispose of the case unless the plaintiff amends or the defendant answers, as may be required. "If final judgment is entered on the demurrer, it will be a final determination of the rights of the parties, which can be pleaded in bar of another suit for the same cause of action.” An issue of law involving the merits of the action is as much tried on the hearing of a demurrer in Missouri as it is in New York. The fact that in Missouri an
amendment may be made or a plea filed as a matter of course does not affect the principle on which the right of removal depends. The demurrer in the present case is not set out in full in the record, but it is conceded in the brief of counsel for the plaintiffs in error that it was “on the ground that the facts stated did not constitute a cause of action," and that would have been a fair inference from the entry, "demurrer filed," if the admission had not been made. Alfirmed.
(112 U. S. 710)
THE COLONEL MCLEOD.
(December 15, 1884.)
As upon a motion to vacate a supersedeas, it rests upon the party moving to show that the bond was not accepted in time; upon the failure of such party in this re
spect the motion will be denied. 2. SAME-PRINTING or RECORD-REQUIREMENTS BY COURT.
A motion to vacate, made before the record is printed, must be accompanied by a statement of the facts on which they rest, agreed to by the parties, or supported by printed copies of so much of the record as will enable the court to act under. standingly with reference to the transcript on file. Motion to Vacate Supersedeas. James H. Davidson, for motion. E. G. Rogers, in opposition.
WAITE, C. J. Neither the record in this case nor the part thereof on which this motion depends has been printed, and the appellees have neglected to state in their motion papers the facts as presented by the transcript on which they rely. An affidavit has been filed to the effect that the appellees were not served with a citation, nor with a notice of an application for the allowauce of an appeal, until after the expiration of 60 days, Sundays exclusive, from the time of the rendition of the decree appealed from. In the same atfidavit it is stated, however, that the proctor of the appellees was informed that an appeal-bond had been presented to the circuit court for approval within the 60 days. It is also stated that on the tenth of January, 1884, an order allowing an appeal was entered nunc pro tunc as of the date of the presentation of the bond. An affidavit filed by the appellants shows that on the day the bond was presented to the circuit court, it was approved, allowed, and filed in the cause. As upon this motion it rests on the appellees to show that the bond was not accepted in time, and that has not been done, the motion to vacate the supersedeas is denied. In this connection we take occasion to say that motions of this kind, made before the record is printed, must be accompanied by a statement of the facts on which they rest, agreed to by the parties, or supported by printed copies of so much of the record as will enable us to act understandingly, without reference to the transcript on file. Motion denied.
(112 U. 8. 737)
PEUGN 0. PORTER and others,
(January 6, 1885.) 1. CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT.
Review of the facts upon which a decree was rendered by the snpreme court of
the District of Columbia. Upon such review decree reversed. 2. SAME-JOINT INTERESTS-RELEASE BY ONE PARTY-EFFECT AS TO OTHER.
A release of rights by one of two parties bolding joint interests is not, in equity, a release necessarily by both. Appeal from the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia.
8. Shellabarger and J. M. Wilson, for appellant. 8. V. White, for appellees.
MATTHEWS, J. Several awards were made by the Mexican claims commis. sion under the treaty between the United States and Mexico of July 4, 1868, in favor of claimants, representatives respectively of three American citizens, Parsons, Conrow, and Standish, which amounted in the aggregate to $143,812.32. Of this one-half was paid to the claimants and the other half remained with their consent under the control of the secretary of state, to be paid to the agents and counsel of the claimants according to their respective rights and interests. Several bills in equity to determine these interests were filed in the supreme court of the District of Columbia, to one of which Peugh, the appellant, was made a deïendant, and appearing therein also filed a cross-bill on his own behalf. On final hearing all the bills and cross-bills were dismissed, Peugh alone appealing. The adverse interest in the litigation is represented by White, who claims as a purchaser of the whole fund. The object of the bill of Peugh was to obtain a declaration of the fact and extent of his interest in the fund, and to enjoin the defendant White from demanding and receiving more than what should remain after satisfaction of the appellant's claim. The secretary of state was made a party defendant, but did not appear, and no relief is asked against him. The jurisdiction of the court is in. voked for the single purpose of determining the relative equities of the parties in the fund, and giving effect to them by an appropriate decree.
The history of the case, so far as material to the determination of the controversy, we gather from a volume of testimony, not without conflict, and find to be as follows:
The three claimants severally employed Richard H. Musser, of St. Louis, to prosecute their claims, and, agreeing that he should pay all expenses and receive half the net proceeds of the claims after deducting the expenses of their prosecution, executed and delivered to him full powers of attorney, with power of substitution. Knowledge of the existence of these claims had been first*communicated to Musser by Richard H. Porter, and the agreement between them was that each should have an equal interest in the prosecution and proceeds of the claims in case of recovery. Accordingly, Porter entered into an agreement with the appellant, Peugh, and C. E. Rittenhouse, a copy of which is as follows:
“Memorandum of agreement, made by and between Richard H. Porter, of St. Louis, Mo., and Charles E. Rittenhouse and Samuel A. Peugh, of this city of Washington, District of Columbia.
"Whereas, said Richard H. Porter, acting as attorney for Richard H. Musser by authority of substitution from said Musser, who, acting in behalf as attorney in fact for Mildred Standish, widow of Austin M. Standish; Mrs.
Conrow, widow of Aaron H. Conrow, and Parsons, father of Monroe M. Parsons, and guardian of the son, Monroe M. Parsons, above named, all of the state of Missouri; and whereas, said Porter is desirous of the aid of said Rittenhouse and Peugh in a certain advance of money to the said Porter, to enable him to procure the testimony to sustain the claims these Ither certain-named parties have against the government of Mexico for rob bery and destruction of the lives of those whom they represent under the reaty made between the United States and the republic of Mexico on the fourth day of July, 1868, and also the prosecution of said claim before a commission appointed by and between the two said republics, and now in sessiov in the city of Washington, D. C.; and whereas, said Porter being, in his agreement with the said parties claiming against Mexico as aforesaid, enti tled to one-half of any amount to which he may establish claim before said commission, he hereby agrees to, and does hereby, transfer and assign, in consideration of the premises, unto the said Rittenhouse and Peugh one-half of the amount he is entitled to receive under and by virtue of his authority in the premises; the said last-named parties to be at the expense of prosecut.
ing the said claims before the commission herein named, but the testimony to be produced to them by the said parties.
• "In testimony whereof, we, and each of us, have hereunto set our hands and seals this sixteenth day of February, 1870. [Signed]
“R. H. PORTER. [Seal.] “S. A. PEUGH.
Seal. “C. E. RITTENHOUSE. [Seal.]”
At the date of the execution of this paper Porter had not in fact been substituted by Musser, under his powers, in writing, but subsequently, on July 4, 1870, Musser did so, by writing indorsed on the letters of attorney given by the claimants; and Porter himself subsequently, in 1874, obtained direct powers from at least two of them. Peugh and Rittenhouse entered upon the performance of their engagements with Porter in pursuance of the agree ment of February 16, 1870, but Rittenhouse subsequently released his interest therein to Porter, by the following instrument:
“WASHINGTON, September 2, 1872. "In consideration of said Porter's having paid certain expenses on the claim of Mrs. Hamilton for $35,000, now pending before the southern claims commission, one-half of which he demands of me on account of my interest cherein, I hereby relinquish to him, said Porter, all my right, title, and interest in and to the several claims referred to in the foregoing agreement, and release him from his obligation to repay me the sum advanced by me for my aforesaid interest in these Mexican claiins. (Signed]
“C. E. RITTENHOUSE."
In the mean time Peugh and Rittenhouse had employed Charles H. Winder as counsel, for a fixed compensation, payable out of their proportion of the awards, to present the case to the commission in argument; and, after the relinquishment by Rittenhouse of his interest in the matter, Peugh and Winder continued to co-operate in the prosecution of the claims. Their services in that behalf were well known to Porter and to Musser, as well as the particular arrangements under which they were rendered. Indeed, the latter, by a letter to Rittenhouse, dated February 18, 1871, expressly ratified the contract made by Porter with Peugh and Rittenhouse. Mr. Winder, the record abundantly shows, under his employment by Peugh, and a distinct agreement directly with Porter, made afterwards, rendered constant and evidently very valuable and efficient services in the prosecution of the claims until the awards were finally made. And, in respect to the services rendered by Peugh, which were also continuous during the entire proceeding, Mr. Winder, whose statements seem to be entitled to full credit, testifies as follows: “With regard to the statements contained in the eighth paragraph of Mr. Peugh's amended cross-bill, in cause of McManus v. White et al., No. 6,382, I would say that I have no knowledge of the amount of money Mr. Peugh may have spent in the matter; but, as attorney in fact and agent, he was industrious and persistent in his efforts to procure testimony and to forward the proceedings before the commission. I think he was especially diligent in getting the parties in Missouri to furnish the necessary pleadings in the case, -I mean memorials,—and also the testimony upon which the cases were adjudicated. My belief at the time was that it was in a great measure due to his efforts that the testimony was received in time to meet the requirements of the commission in relation to the closing of the cases on the first of April, 1872. I don't know of any duties strictly as counsel that were performed by him."
On the whole, we think it is satisfactorily shown that Peugh's services were as valuable and meritorious in the successful prosecution of these claims